Indian Holocaust My Father`s Life and Time, Chapter:Nine Hundred Thirty Two
Palash Biswas
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Another Himalayan blunder imminent!We'll send force to protect our interests in South China Sea, says Navy chief!Is India replicating United States of America? Only superpower US is known to send its armies beyond neighbourhood to protect its interests! Would America or Israel support India`s virgin venture?In a major assertion of maritime power, Navy chief Admiral DK Joshi said that the Indian Navy was prepared to defend Indian assets in the South China Sea .Against the backdrop of China's renewed assertiveness in the South China Sea, Indian Navy chief Admiral D.K. Joshi on Monday robustly defended freedom of navigation and underlined that the force was ready to protect this country's assets . Viewing the rapid modernisation of Chinese Navy as a "major concern", Navy Chief Admiral D K Joshi today made it clear that India will protect its interests in the disputed South China Sea, even if it means sending forces there.Navy Chief Admiral DK Joshi said while India was not a claimant in the dispute over territorial rights in the South China Sea, it was prepared to act, if necessary, to protect its maritime and economic interests in the region.Mind you,from the South China Sea to Somalia to Mali to Nigeria to Venezuela the usual culprits are at play: nationalism, ethnic hatred, religious zeal, overpopulation, climate change, pandemic disease, hunger, water, greed, and lust for power. China is "literally testing the waters" to see how far it can go in provoking America's tolerance with the plan to board foreign ships as an act of asserting its claim over virtually the entire South China Sea.Are we tempted to play in accordance with US global strategic game plan?Thus,the Indian navy is prepared to deploy vessels to the South China Sea to protect India's oil interests there, the navy chief said on Monday amid growing international fears over the potential for naval clashes in the disputed region.
Meanwhile,Army chief General Bikram Singh reviewed the operational preparedness of troops deployed along the border with China and the security situation in the north-eastern states, The Times of India reported.India is upgrading its defence preparedness along the eastern boundary by deploying more troops, using new formations and deploying more lethal equipment such as the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile.
This came as India's National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon arrived in Beijing for wide-ranging talks on bilateral ties, including discussion on the disputed border. It was the first high-level Sino-India contact since China's leadership change last month.
India has sparred diplomatically with China in the past over its gas and oil exploration block off the coast of Vietnam. China claims virtually the entire mineral-rich South China Sea and has stepped up its military presence there. Other nations such as Vietnam, Philippines and Malaysia have competing claims.
State-run explorer Oil and Natural Gas Corp. (ONGC) has a stake in a gas field in the Nam Con Son basin, off Vietnam's south coast.
Any display of naval assertiveness by India in the South China Sea would likely fuel concern that the navies of the two rapidly growing Asian giants could be on a collision course as they seek to protect trade routes and lock in the supply of coal, minerals and other raw material from foreign sources.
"It is one of the most important international waterways and freedom of navigation there is an issue of utmost concern to India because a large portion of India's trade is through the South China Sea," said Brahma Chellaney, analyst at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi.
Chellaney, however, played down Joshi's comments, saying the Indian navy's focus would remain on the Indian Ocean, which the Asian nation views as its strategic backyard.
Lest we should afford to forget that the origins of the 1962 conflict lie in New Delhi's decision to encroach militarily in the Tibet-Aksai-Ladakh (western) sector of their disputed boundary.
Although the territory in question was subject to overlapping claims, it was deemed strategically salient by the Chinese and, crucially, was within their administrative control.
Yet when the war erupted in October that year, a major determinant was India's attempt to militarily impose its preferred alignment of the boundary line (the McMahon Line) in the Assam Himalayas sector to the east. The Chinese inflicted embarrassingly swift reprisals across the McMahon Line.
Cartographic unilateralism and the extension of administrative prerogatives by themselves did not cause the Sino-Indian border war of 1962.
Each country had established administrative control of specific territories according to claim lines deemed to be strategically vital to their interests – in the east by India (the Assam Himalayas sector) and in much of the west by China (the Tibet-Aksai-Ladakh sector).
It was New Delhi's unwillingness to negotiate the disposition of territory that was subject to overlapping claims that ultimately precipitated the war. It was not until a bilateral agreement was signed in 1993 that the lesson of non-infringement of territory under the administrative control of the other party was formally institutionalised.
NEW RULES
In September 2011, an Indian warship sailing in the South China Sea to the Vietnamese port of Haiphong was challenged when a caller identifying himself as an official of the Chinese navy warned the ship on an open radio channel that it was entering Chinese waters.
Nothing happened, the ship sailed on, and both India and China have since played down the incident, with New Delhi saying the vessel was well within international waters in the South China Sea and that there was no confrontation.
China's neighbours are fretting about a recent Chinese media report on new rules that will allow police in the southern Chinese province of Hainan to board and seize control of foreign ships which "illegally enter" its waters from 1 January.
The Philippines on Saturday condemned the Chinese plan as illegal and Singapore, home to the world's second-busiest container port, said on Monday it was concerned.
Asked about the report of China's plan to board ships, Joshi said India had the right to self-defence.
Estimates for proven and undiscovered oil reserves in the South China Sea range as high as 213 billion barrels of oil, the US Energy Information Administration said in a 2008 report. That would surpass every country's proven oil reserves except Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, according to the BP Statistical Review.
Mind you,China has expressed serious concern and firm opposition to a U.S. bill that regards China's territory as under the authority of a U.S.-Japan security pact.
At a regular press briefing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei told reporters, "The Chinese side expresses serious concern and firm opposition to the U.S. Senate's amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act which involves the Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islets."
In the bill, which the U.S. Senate passed last week, the United States reaffirmed that it "takes no position" on the ultimate sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands. However, the bill notes that Japan has the rights of administration over the territory and that "unilateral actions of a third party" would not affect its position.
Hong said the Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islets have always been the inherent territory of China since ancient times, and China has undisputed sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands.
According to the U.S. bill, any armed attack "in the territories under the administration of Japan" would be met under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.
Hong called the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan as a "product of the Cold War era", saying it should not go beyond bilateral scopes, nor undermine the interests of a third party.
Hong said the U.S. side has repeatedly stated that it will not take sides on territory disputes between China and Japan.
He said the U.S. side "should not send out signals that conflict with each other." He expressed the hope that the U.S. side would "proceed from the general situation of peace and stability of the region", "keep its words" and "do more things that are conducive to peace and stability in the region."
On the other hand,China on Monday sought to allay the concerns of India and some Southeast Asian countries over disputed maps in its new e-passport, saying it is not a "big issue" and should not be overplayed.India also downplayed the ongoing row with China over boundary lines in passports, saying nothing had changed. Talking to journalists in New delhi before leaving for Beijing, national security adviser (NSA) Shivshankar Menon said, "I think you need to see these things in some perspective. We do have differences on where the boundary lies. We are discussing them. We have made progress in dealing with that."Admiral`s aggressive comment seems to spoil his diplomatic ploy.However,China is "ready to press ahead" with negotiations on the boundary question, the Chinese government has said ahead of Monday's visit of National Security Adviser (NSA) Shivshankar Menon.
Making a strong pitch for deepening ties with India after the leadership changes here, China on Monday said that Sino-Indian ties should not be affected by "noise" by "some parties" intended to undermine bilateral ties which had improved despite the lingering border dispute.
Peace at the borders has not come easy and it took strong efforts on the part of the two countries to establish, maintain peaceful borders even while continuing to resolve the boundary issue, Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo told National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon.
As National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon is in Beijing for talks on the boundary question, Navy Chief Admiral D.K. Joshi has termed the situation in the South China Sea "complex," as China is rapidly modernising its Navy, and said India will protect its economic interests in the disputed waters by sending forces, if need be. "Yes, you are right. The modernisation of the Chinese Navy is truly impressive. It is actually a major, major cause for concern…, which we continuously evaluate, and [we will] work out our options and strategies," he said in reply to questions at the customary Navy Day press conference in New Delhi on Monday.
National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon arrived in Beijing on Sunday for talks with the Chinese leadership on the boundary question and strategic issues of common interest. His two-day visit will mark India's first major engagement with the newly-selected fifth generation of the Communist Party of China's (CPC) leadership.
National security advisor and negotiator in border talks with China, Shiv Shankar Menon, arrived here on Sunday, the first visit by a top ranking Indian official after changes announced in the Communist Party of China. Menon is expected to meet China's next premier Li Keqiang.
Chinese State Councillor Dai Bingguo told National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon in Beijing on Monday that China was looking to forge stronger ties with its neighbours following the leadership transition.The Hindu reports.
Mr. Dai, who is also Mr. Menon's counterpart as the Special Representative (SR) on the boundary talks, said Monday's visit had assumed "special and important" significance as it was one of the first visits by a foreign leader to China following November's Party Congress, which formalised a once-in-a-decade leadership transition.
"You're one of the first few foreign leaders we are receiving after the party congress," Mr. Dai told Mr. Menon at their first session of talks. "I'm sure through your visit the Indian side will have a better sense of China after the eighteenth Party Congress and China's foreign policy, and how best to join forces to further promote the development of China-India relations".
The first session of Monday's talks was devoted to briefing Mr. Menon on China's transition. Two other sessions later on Monday will focus on Sino-Indian relations and are expected to cover a range of topics from the boundary question to wider strategic issues.
Mr. Menon is expected to meet Wu Bangguo, the head of the National People's Congress or Parliament and the second-ranked member of the outgoing Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) which stepped down last month, at the Great Hall of the People on Tuesday morning. Officials said earlier he was also expected to meet with one of the seven members of the newly-selected PBSC.
Mr. Dai began Monday's meeting by describing India as "a big and friendly neighbour of China". "I would like to emphasise here," he told Mr. Menon, "that it was made very clear at the eighteenth party congress that China would continue to be committed to path of peaceful development and work for the noble cause of peace and development for all mankind."
"It was also solemnly declared at the party congress that China will continue to make friends with and forge partnerships with our neighbours," he said. "We will consolidate our good relations with our neighbours and expand mutually beneficial cooperation. We will do our best to make sure that China's development will bring more benefits to our surrounding countries and will always be a friend to other members of the developing world."
Mr. Menon said Monday's meeting came "at a time of significant developments, in China, with the party congress, and in the world as well". "It also a time when India China relations are proceeding smoothly and developing well," he said, describing the relationship as "one of our most important relationships".
"The development of this relationship is important not just to us in India and China, but to also the region and the rest of the world and it is of growing significance," he added.
Mr. Menon said Mr. Dai "had made major contributions to India China relations" for many years. The Chinese State Councillor – a rank below Vice Premier in the State Council, or Cabinet – will step down as the Special Representative when he retires at the Parliament Session in March. He was accompanied at Monday's talks by Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying. A member of the newly selected Central Committee, she has been seen as one of the candidates to take over his role as the SR in the boundary talks.
Both sides will review the progress after 15 rounds of talks, although the perception in both New Delhi and Beijing is that little progress has been made since the signing of an agreement on political parameters and guiding principles in 2005. Talks are currently in the second of three stages, which involves the complicated task of arriving at a framework to settle the boundary question in all sectors. The final stage will see the delineating of the border in maps and on the ground.
The Chinese would seek a diplomatic signal from Menon suggesting India does not want to join forces with Vietnam and Philippines in the passport row triggered by China, informed sources said. The three countries have protested against Beijing's embossing the map of China on areas controlled and claimed by them on their passports.
India and China are trying to work out a positive signal to overcome criticism that the two countries have gone through 15 rounds of border negotiations without any improvement in the situation. At the same time, China's passport move has somewhat vitiated the atmosphere.
Menon's visit will see a battle of wits between the two sets of negotiators at a time when China is getting ready for a change of guard with both the president and premier to be replaced in March.
Though India was not a direct claimant in the South China Sea, its primary concern was the "freedom of navigation in international waters," Admiral Joshi said.
"It is not that we expect to be in those waters very frequently," but whenever the situation required, with the country's interests at stake — for example "ONGC Videsh has three oil exploration blocks there" — "we will be required to go there and we are prepared for that," Admiral Joshi said.
Dai said the bilateral ties should not be affected by "noise," and advocated further cooperation for common development.
"The two countries should have a clear idea about some parties' intentions of undermining bilateral ties. They should also remember that there is more consensus than differences, and more cooperation than competition, between China and India," he told Menon.
While it was not clear who exactly Dai was referring to as "some parties", the Chinese strategic analysts often point to US and Japan's efforts to improve ties with India as part of larger strategy to contain Beijing.
The trip will take place almost 50 years to the day that the People's Liberation Army began a unilateral withdrawal from territories captured in the Assam Himalayas after inflicting a punishing defeat on Indian positions.
Mr Menon and his departing Chinese counterpart, Dai Bingguo, are expected to lay out a joint record of the progress achieved in the 15 rounds of special representative-level talks conducted since 2003.
Arriving at a negotiated settlement over the more difficult question of overlapping territorial claims has been much harder.
Two historical factors have conspired against such an accord.
First, as a general rule, in pre-modern times along the Sino-Indian frontier sovereignty and boundaries were not coterminous; they were sanctioned locally.
Mountains, except at their highest reaches, were not a deterrent to movement: Tibetans and ethnically-related groups frequently moved across them.
China's modern boundary claims generally shadow these historical practices and the British-Indian imposition of a linear boundary based on the crest-line of the Himalayas was bound to become a point of discord.
Second, the British were neither willing to countenance any frontier power with equal rights in the SinoIndian border zone, nor acknowledge that the allegiance of their dependants in this area was shared with another great (Russian) or significant (Chinese) power.
Administrative responsibilities were kept to a minimum in Tibet, where Britain's imperial arm barely reached. While Beijing's input or acquiescence to its alignment – while preferable – was not deemed essential, the attempt to unilaterally present it as a fait accompli to the Chinese at a 1914 Shimla convention turned into an exercise of coercion and fraud. Britain's diplomatic recognition of the newly-constituted Chinese Republic was made contingent on China's participation at Shimla.
The alignment of the boundary was secretly settled between the British and Tibetan representatives at the conference, even though the former was legally bound by Anglo-Chinese treaties of 1886, 1890 and 1906 to have no direct dealings with the Tibetans.
Within days of China's preliminary signature on a draft map, the Chinese foreign office vehemently repudiated the alignment of the boundary; Whitehall followed shortly thereafter by disavowing the convention's entire purpose.
Shimla failed to produce anything resembling a conclusive agreement and can hardly serve as the lawful basis for a consensual and durable boundary arrangement. Yet the political and legal justness of the McMahon Line continues to persist as an article of faith within political, strategic and media circles in New Delhi.
It was not until a bilateral agreement was signed in 2005 to frame principles-based parameters to guide settlement that a negotiated path to boundary dispute resolution was formally institutionalised.
Earlier, a Chinese official had expressed strong reservations about reports in the Indian media pointing that border talks have not made any headway.
Qin Gang, Director-General of Foreign Minister's media wing who took the lead in briefing the Indian media about Dai-Menon talks, refuted the Indian media reports that border talks failed to make any progress ahead of Menon's visit here.
"This meeting is not like any occasion where both sides expressed their differences on boundary issues. This is not the time and occasion for both sides to express differences on boundary issues," he said.
"This is the time and occasion to express good wishes and good views," he said referring to reports in Indian media that this meeting can not hope for any agreement on boundary issue because both sides are far from each other's position.
"That is not true. Menon's visit is not about boundary issue but the whole relationship," Qin said.
State-run Xinhua news agency reported that Dai spoke highly of the two countries' "creative" practices in coping with disparities and contradictions, saying China and India do not allow problems to influence bilateral ties.
The experience of handling and controlling disparities between China and India has made an important contribution to enriching the theories and practices of international relations, Dai said.
In the process of developing the ties, China and India are committed to pushing forward a solution to existing problems, he said. Dai noted that 15 rounds of talks had been held between Special Representatives on China-India border issues, and the two sides had accumulated consensus in the framework for solving the issues.
China and India experienced a border conflict in 1962.
The two countries launched the mechanism of meetings between Special Representatives on border issues in 2003.
China and India, Dai added, are committed to protecting peace and stability in border areas and promoting military mutual trust.
"China and India's independence and peaceful development, as well as making their two-fifths of the world's population live in abundance, will be huge contributions to world peace and development," Dai said.
Menon and Dai, the two officials, designated as Special Representatives to resolve the boundary differences, held three rounds of talks today.
Earlier, welcoming Menon Dai told him that he is among the first foreign dignitaries to visit Beijing after Communist Party leadership change last month, which signifies the importance China attaches to its relationship with India.
"You're one of the first few foreign leaders we are receiving after the Party Congress," Dai told Menon welcoming him for the talks at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse.
"There is a very special and important background to your visit this time, that is the Communist Party of China has just successfully concluded its 18th party congress," he said.
"I'm sure through your visit the Indian side will have a better sense of China" after the CPC Congress about its future foreign policy and "how best to join force to further promote the development of China-India relations."
On his part, Menon said his visit is taking place in the midst of significant developments.
"We are meeting at a time of significant developments, in China, the Party Congress, in the world as well. It is also a time when India-China relations are proceeding smoothly and developing well," he said.
"So I am looking forward very much to discussing these issues, continuing our talks. You yourself have made major contributions to India-China relations.
"I am confident that our talks will help us further develop this relationship which for us in India is one of our most important relationships," he said.
The development of India-China relations are important not just to them but to also the region and the rest of the world and it is of growing significance, he said.
Menon's visit was ostensibly to take part in informal talks with Dai. The main purpose of his visit is also aimed at establishing formal contacts with the new Chinese leadership headed by Xi Jinping who succeeded Hu Jintao as General Secretary at the Party Congress last month.
He is expected to meet Li Keqiang, the number two leader in the seven-member all powerful Standing Committee headed by Xi. Li is slated to succeed Premier Wen Jiabao when the latter retires in March next year.
Chinese officials maintain that Menon would be meeting one of the top leaders. Though both Xi, who was the Vice President under Hu, and Vice Premier Li have not visited India in recent times, the two were stated to be part of policy of friendship pursued by previous leadership.
They have been interacting with Indian officials at various levels, officials said. Apprising Menon of Party's resolve to improve relations with neighbours, Dai stated that China want to deepen relations with India under the new leadership.
This will be Dai's last meeting of the boundary talks, which was categorised as "informal" in nature as he is set to retire after a decade long stint as State Councillor, a top political post higher than the Foreign Minister.
Asked about problems relating to disputed maps in the e-passports, Director-General of Chinese Foreign Ministry Qin Gang who briefed the Indian media about the talks between National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon and Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo, said it is not an issue to be overplayed.
Qin, who briefed the media at the end of second round of talks, said the issue did not figure in the deliberations.
It is not clear whether it figured in the third round of talks which took place later in the evening.
India countered China's move by stamping the visas with India's official map nullifying any perception that granting visas on Chinese passport with disputed maps amounted to endorsement of Beijing's position.
Vietnam, which along the Philippines objected to Chinese stand, started issuing stapled visas, similar to what China has issued to residents of Jammu and Kashmir in 2009 which was subsequently rolled back after India's objections.
Asked whether China accepted India stamping the visas with India's map, Qin said "that is the way for Indian side to express. Our passport is not targeted at any particular country."
"Both sides know each other's positions well.
We have fully explained to other parties, including India, both sides need to work for a smooth travelling of citizens to countries," he said.
To a question why the map was printed on the passport he said "there is no particular purpose. We issue the passports in accordance to relevant regulation of International Civil Aviation Organisation."
Southeast Asia's top diplomat has warned that the South China Sea disputes risk becoming "Asia's Palestine", deteriorating into a violent conflict that draws sharp dividing lines between nations and destabilises the whole region.Surin Pitsuwan, the outgoing secretary-general of the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations, told the Financial Times that Asia was entering its "most contentious" period in recent years as a rising China stakes out its claim to almost the entire South China Sea, clashing with the Philippines, Vietnam and others.
"We have to be mindful of the fact that the South China Sea could evolve into another Palestine," if countries do not try harder to defuse rather than inflame tensions, he said.
As it has grown economically and militarily more powerful, Beijing has become more assertive about its territorial claims in the South China Sea, which encompasses vast oil and gas reserves, large fish stocks and key global trade routes.
After naval clashes with Vietnam and the Philippines -- which claim parts of the South China Sea alongside Brunei, Malaysia and Taiwan -- China has further angered its neighbours by printing a map of its extensive maritime claim, known as the "nine-dotted line" in new passports.
Vietnam has hit back by marking the passports of visiting Chinese as "invalid" and issuing separate visa forms rather than appearing to recognise the Chinese claim by stamping passports.
"Yes you are right. The modernisation (of Chinese Navy) is truly impressive... It is a actually a major major cause of concern for us, which we continuously evaluate and work out our options and our strategies," Admiral D.K. Joshi told a press conference.
Admiral D.K. Joshi said, "Where our country's interests are involved, we will protect them and we will intervene."
The Navy Chief was replying to a question on contingencies in South China sea to protect Indian interests there and impression about the Chinese Navy's modernisation.
Answering a volley of questions about South China Sea over which India had a tiff with China last year, he said although India's presence in that maritime region was not on "very very frequent" basis, it had interests like free navigation and exploitation of natural resources there.
"Not that we expect to be in those waters very very frequently, but when the requirement is there for situations where country's interests are involved, for example ONGCBSE -0.89 % Videsh, we will be required to go there and we are prepared for that. Are we holding exercises for that nature, the short answer is yes," Joshi said.
Talking about Indian interests in the South China Sea, he said the first of it included freedom of navigation.
"Not only us, but everyone is of the view that they have to be resolved by the parties concerned, aligned with the international regime, which is outlined in UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), that is our first requirement," he said.
ONGC Videsh has three offshore deepwater blocks, on the southern Vietnamese coast, and invested $600 million in oil and gas exploration in these blocks in the past few years. The footprint of ONGC Videsh is spread over 15 countries, where it is engaged in exploration work on 31 projects.
Asked whether the Indian Navy had undertaken exercises for such a mission, he said: "The short answer is yes."
He said: "Not only us but everyone is of the view that they [the disputes] have to be resolved by the parties concerned, aligned with the international regime, which is outlined in UNCLOS [the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea]; that is our first requirement."
Asked whether the Navy would provide protection to ONGC Videsh's assets in the South China Sea, Admiral Joshi said it would require government approval.
New rules announced recently by Hainan province (which administers the South China Sea for China) to allow for interception of ships have raised concerns in the region, with fears of simmering disputes with Southeast Asian nations escalating.
Defence analysts say Hainan's move is another step in China's bid to solidify its control over much of the sea, which includes crucial international shipping lanes over which more than a third of global trade passes.
Protecting the country's economic assets was the Navy's mandate, Admiral Joshi said, maintaining that it was neither a new policy nor a shift in emphasis. "We have to protect our country's economic assets wherever they are, otherwise what the Navy is for?"
Asked about the balance of naval presence on the eastern and western seaboards, he said some of the recent inductions were deployed only in the eastern side, in the Bay of Bengal. "Three recent inductions — the Shivalik-class frigates Sahyadri, Satpura and Shivalik — were commissioned there… INS Jalashwa, the biggest vessel we have after the aircraft carrier, is also deployed there. The nuclear-powered submarine INS Chakra is operating from there, and INS Arihant is also going to be there."
Asked about the Dongfeng series of missiles that China developed to target aircraft carriers, he said: "That is a very significant capability, and we are evaluating it in our context and taking whatever action as may be appropriate — either to acquire a similar capability or to think of a counter…"
Referring to China's aircraft carrier programme, Admiral Joshi said it was "very ambitious," but the integration of the warship and the aircraft had not taken place.
Despite persistent delays, India's first indigenous aircraft carrier, being built at the Cochin Shipyard, should be ready for delivery by 2016-17, he said.
On the other hand, the shortage of uniformed and civilian personnel is of primary concern for the Indian Navy, said its chief Admiral D K Joshi in the backdrop of stepped up maritime activities by China.
The Navy Chief expressed his concern on Monday during his interaction with reporters on the occasion of his annual press conference.
Admiral Joshi said: "The biggest strength of our Navy is our well trained Human Resource that derives its strength and motivation from the finest traditions inherited from our predecessors. The Navy is facing a shortfall in both uniformed and civilian personnel.
"Civilian personnel form the backbone of our maintenance force and have longstanding expertise, which we can ill afford to lose. We are making all efforts in conducting special recruitment drives to make good the shortfalls. Shortages of service personnel are also being progressively reduced through additional recruitments."
The Indian Navy is focussing on strengthening its preparedness to deal with any situation and safeguard India's maritime interests.
He said: "The Navy is prepared to meet any form of traditional threat, it is constantly acquiring capabilities and realigning its operational ethos to meet emerging security challenges.
"Accordingly, the Navy has maintained its momentum towards enhancing maritime security and safeguarding our economic and strategic interests. Today, we stand committed to providing stability, not just to the Indian Ocean Region, but also for safeguarding our interests across the oceans."
The Indian Navy is evolving continuously to meet emerging challenges to suit India's maritime interests. Modernisation and enhancement of the Navy's capabilities is going on to meet emerging maritime challenges/threats.
Admiral Joshi said: "Over the next five years we expect to induct ships/submarines at an average rate of 5-6 ships per year. Amongst the major projects, under construction in Indian shipyards, are ships of Kolkata Class (P-15A), P- 15B ships which are an advanced version of the Kolkata Class and the P-75 submarines, all at Mazagaon Dock Limited, Mumbai.
Anti Surface Warfare Corvettes are being series built at Garden Reach Ship-builders, Kolkata. In addition, Naval Offshore Patrol vessels are under construction both at public and private sector shipyards. The construction of the Indigenous Aircraft Carrier though delayed is now picking up pace at Kochi Shipyard. In 2013, we expect to induct one Kolkata class destroyer, one P-28 ASW Corvette, one Catamaran Hull Survey Vessel, one Offshore Patrol Vessel and sixteen Fast Interceptor Craft."
Amongst the overseas projects, the delivery of Vikramaditya is expected to take place in the last quarter of 2013. The scheduled induction of P8I Long Range Maritime Reconnaissance aircraft commencing 2013 would augment the aerial surveillance capability.
The much-awaited aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, currently undergoing trials in Russia, is likely to be commissioned in Indian Navy by the end of next year, Navy chief Admiral DK Joshi said on Monday.
Addressing the annual Navy Day press conference here, he also said that a "good news for the nation" regarding indigenously developed nuclear-powered submarine INS Arihant will be made "very soon".
"There has been a delay in the delivery of INS Vikramaditya (Admiral Gorshkov), which has sailed for more than 100 days in the recent past and completed a majority of her equipment and aviation trials. The revised schedule envisages the delivery of the ship in the last quarter of 2013," he said.
On the present status of INS Arihant, he said, "We expect to have good news for the nation very soon." The vessel was expected to be launched for sea trials soon as part of efforts towards completing India's nuclear triad and achieving a credible and invulnerable retaliatory strike capability.
Accepting that the development of Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC) too has been delayed, Joshi said that the project is finally "picking up pace" at the Kochi shipyard. "The construction of the IAC though delayed is now picking up pace at Kochi Shipyard," he said.
On future inductions in the force in the next one year, he said, "In 2013, we expect to induct one Kolkata-class destroyer, one P-28 Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Corvette, one Catamaran Hull Survey Vessel, one Offshore Patrol Vessel and sixteen Fast Interceptor Craft (FIC)."
Meanwhile, Provinces and special administrative regions in south China have agreed to hasten the development of the South China Sea, as the country is now targeting a stronger marine economy.
Members of the Pan-Pearl River Delta (PPRD) region, which has led China's export-oriented economy for nearly three decades, signed a cooperative agreement to develop the South China Sea at the eighth PPRD Forum held in Hainan Province from November 28 to December 2.
Fishery will be prioritized in the development process, including the establishment of joint fishing fleets and fishery supply bases in the city of Sansha, according to the agreement.
The region will act as a bridgehead for the country to build itself into a maritime power, said Wang Hong, deputy director of the State Oceanic Administration.
Wang said the PPRD has opened an important window for China to participate in globalization and will continue to serve as a base for China to protect and exploit the South China Sea and safeguard its maritime rights and interests.
The forum attracted government leaders and thousands of businessmen from Hong Kong, Macao and other nine provincial-level regions.
Chinese leader Hu Jintao said at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) held last month that China should enhance its capacity for exploiting marine resources, resolutely safeguard the country's maritime rights and interests and build itself into a maritime power.
Liu Cigui, director of the SOA, said "maritime power" usually refers to a country with comprehensive strength in maritime exploitation, marine economic development, marine environmental protection and marine control.
Liu said the maritime economy is becoming a new engine for China's economic restructuring.
The government's determination to develop the marine economy has resulted in a series of efforts, including the establishment of Sansha City in July and the State Council's approval of maritime zoning plans submitted by Guangdong and Hainan provinces for the 2011-2020 period, as well as its approval of a five-year plan for maritime economic development from 2011 to 2015.
However, China's exploitation of its maritime territory is still at a relatively low level, said Luo Liang, a marine economics researcher at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies.
Data from the Hainan Provincial Fishery Research Institute indicated that the potential fish catch in waters administered by Sansha adds up to 5 million tonnes, with fishermen able to sustainably catch 2 million tonnes of fish annually.
However, the actual catch stands at just 80,000 tonnes every year. Gigantic oil and gas deposits lying under the ocean are also waiting to be explored.
The South China Sea's oil reserves are estimated to be around 23 to 30 billion tonnes, with gas reserves believed to total about 16 trillion cubic meters, according to the Ministry of Land and Resources.
In late August, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), the country's largest offshore oil and gas producer, opened 26 new offshore blocks for development in cooperation with foreign companies, with 22 blocks located in the South China Sea.
Emerging maritime industries, such as offshore wind power and tidal power projects, will create new growth in the marine economy, according to Liu Rongzi, an expert from the China Institute for Marine Affairs (CIMA).
Emerging maritime industries saw a 25-percent annual growth rate during the 2006-2010 period, exceeding the marine economy's overall growth rate of 13.5 percent. By the end of 2015, emerging maritime industries will account for 20 percent of the entire sector, according to Liu.
The central government has also stressed the significance of environmental protection amid increased maritime exploitation.
According to the maritime economy development plans approved by the State Council, land reclaimed from the sea will be strictly conserved and the establishment of marine natural reserves will be encouraged.
The total length of China's coast measures around 32,000 km, according to the Ministry of Land and Resources. The country also has more than 6,500 islands and islets and administers nearly 3 million square km of maritime territory.
As ties between China and Japan plunge to their lowest in decades over territorial dispute, an amendment passed by the US Senate to make the Diaoyu Islands covered by a US-Japan security pact will boomerang.The US Senate approved the amendment on Thursday to acknowledge application of a US-Japan security treaty to the Diaoyu Islands. The measure was interpreted by Japan's Kyodo News as "intended to keep China's moves to assert its claim in check."
Although the measure, attached to the national defense authorization bill for 2013, has yet to be approved by the US House and signed by President Barack Obama, it could embolden the Japanese rightists to continue defying the international order established after World War II.
The amendment is sending a disturbing message to the world that the US Senate does not want the row over the Diaoyu Islands to subside. Instead, it is seeking an escalation of the territorial dispute in the coming year, and heralding a downward spiral of the China-Japanese relations.
However, the lopsided move will impair the much-hyped US pivot to Asia strategy, depriving Washington of the chance to gain advantages achieved by a peaceful and prosperous Asia.
Prosperity only comes from peace and stability. There will be no regional prosperity if both China and Japan's commitment to development is disturbed by deteriorating relations, let along regional peace and stability if Japan is allowed to challenge the world order and resort to militarism.
The United States benefits from the Chinese and Japanese economies, which are highly interdependent. Surely the Sino-Japanese economic and trade ties will bear the brunt of a prolonged dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, thus thwarting the anemic US economic recovery.
For Washington, to stir up territorial disputes between Asian countries may, in short term, facilitate its pivot to Asia strategy. However, the act, which encourages confrontation rather than cooperation, will not serve the long-term US interests in Asia.
Asia and the Pacific are big enough for both China and the United States. The Asia-Pacific, one of the most dynamic regions, welcomes any country willing to promote and share its peace and prosperity. However, the participant must respect the sovereignty of countries in the region and honor its taking-no-position promise.
Neither the US Senate nor the Japanese rightists can change the fact that the Diaoyu Islands are Chinese inherent territory since ancient times.
Also, the China's determination to defend its territorial sovereignty should never be underestimated. The attempt by the US Senate to muddy the waters over the Diaoyu Island dispute will backfire against itself.
What China's transition means for India
Ananth Krishnan
The new leadership in Beijing is likely to look for stability in relations with New Delhi as it addresses more urgent issues with its neighbours in the Asia Pacific and the U.S.
"Continuity" is a word that National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon is likely to hear often from his Chinese interlocutors during his visit to Beijing, which begins today. Mr. Menon, who is also the Special Representative on the boundary question, will meet State Councillor Dai Bingguo, his counterpart on the border talks, for what officials have described as "informal talks" on the border and strategic issues of common concern. He is expected to hold talks with one of the seven members of the newly-selected Politburo Standing Committee — likely to be second-ranked Li Keqiang, the anointed Premier, subject to his availability — marking India's first real engagement with the fifth generation of the Chinese leadership following the November 15 transition.
The once-in-ten-year leadership change in China is likely to usher in a new chapter on how the country conducts its foreign policy, officials and strategic scholars in Beijing say. Over the next four months, both the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the government that it leads will complete a sweeping change across all levels of its leadership. At the recently concluded Party Congress, the CPC selected a new 25-member Politburo and 371-member Central Committee, which will guide policy-making in all spheres for the next five years. The Parliament session of the National People's Congress in March will be of more relevance to China's diplomacy. The expected retirement of Dai Bingguo — one of five State Councillors who function under the four Vice Premiers of the Cabinet, or the State Council — in March has received much attention in India, as he has served as the Special Representative (SR) on the boundary talks since the current format was initiated a decade ago.
Border talks
Chinese officials and strategic scholars who focus on China-India relations say Mr. Dai's retirement will not have much impact on the boundary talks. Mr. Dai himself, as the SR, was only tasked with the mandate of following strictly the guidelines put in place by the Politburo and Central Committee for the talks. That role will be continued by his successor as the SR — the current Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and Vice Foreign Ministers Fu Ying and Zhang Zhijun, who were all selected as members of the new Central Committee, have been mentioned as likely candidates. Among Chinese strategic scholars, there is little expectation that the boundary talks, of which 15 rounds have been held, will yield any major concrete outcomes in the near future. Since 2005, when the two countries completed the first of three stages of negotiations by signing an agreement on political parameters and guiding principles, perceptions in Beijing are that the crucial second stage of framework negotiations has been deadlocked.
"After 2005, there is nearly no significant progress on the boundary talks," said Hu Shisheng, a South Asia scholar at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). "If there [will] be any progress in the future," he said, "it could be [because of] accepting and respecting each other's LAC [Line of Actual Control] claim." Based upon this, he said, both sides could "put aside the sovereignty issue" and leave the boundary question for next generations to solve. Mr. Hu's sentiment was echoed in a rare commentary on the boundary talks published last month in the Liberation Daily, a newspaper with ties to the CPC in Shanghai, which suggested that both sides put aside the dispute. The commentary said even the status quo — that is, accepting the Line of Actual Control — would not be acceptable to both countries, rendering a solution unlikely in the near future.
Lack of progress on the border notwithstanding, relations with India "will be much more stable" under the new leadership because of China's current domestic and external priorities, according to Mr. Hu. As the Work Report of the Party Congress — the policy blueprint for the next five years — stressed, the internal focus will be on development. As for the external focus, "addressing China's relations with West Pacific neighbours and China's relations with the U.S." would be the likely priority, Mr. Hu said. He agreed that India fared far below issues such as relations with the United States, current territorial disputes with Japan and the situation in the South China Sea in terms of China's pressing priorities. "In urgency, it is true that China-India relations are secondary to those more urgent issues," he said. "[But] in China's present foreign policy, India is regarded as one country that China has confidence in. India-China relations are not a disturbance. The Chinese government has to keep this kind of momentum. But as for issues such as … the regional order in the Asia-Pacific region in particular, climate change and trade regime talks, China's strong partner is still India." "So, in whatever way," he concluded, "China needs more stable Indo-China relations."
'Pivot concerns'
China's concerns on the United States "pivot" or "rebalancing", which has emerged as Beijing's primary foreign policy focus in recent months, is likely to cast a shadow on ties with India. "Obama's "pivot" offers a lens through which many Chinese analysts see India's strategic intention toward China," said Han Hua, a leading South Asia scholar at Peking University. "The two have to talk to each other on "core interests" and how to avoid challenging those interests," she said. "Small frictions will be still there, but in general, stable relations are the main theme in China's India policy."
Ms Han was of the view that China under new General Secretary Xi Jinping "will attach more importance on its relations with its neighbours than before." Chinese officials and scholars say the new leadership is acutely aware that the past year has been a difficult one for China's diplomacy. There is renewed concern in the region — particularly among China's neighbours — about increasing Chinese assertiveness, in the wake of recent territorial disputes with Japan over the East China Sea islands and in the South China Sea. There is also a perception in Beijing that its diplomacy has lacked creativity and nimbleness. To elevate the level of diplomatic decision-making, the CPC is considering appointing one of its 25 Politburo members as a new foreign policy "czar" who would also hold the title of Vice Premier — a rank higher than the position held by the current top Chinese diplomat, Mr. Dai. Wang Huning, who joined the Politburo in November, has been mentioned as a candidate for the post. As an official working in the Secretariat of the Politburo, Mr. Wang regularly accompanied President Hu Jintao on almost all of his international trips, including to India for the BRICS Summit earlier this year. He speaks French fluently, and earlier worked as the Dean of the International Politics Department at Shanghai's Fudan University.
Two other areas where a new approach by the Chinese leadership is likely to be of relevance to India are with regard to Tibet and trade. The CPC has appointed a new head of the United Front Work Department, the leading organisation in charge of Tibet policy and talks with the Dalai Lama, which have been stalled after the Tibetan spiritual leader's representatives resigned citing a hardening Chinese position. The around 90 self-immolation protests by Tibetans have brought fresh accusations aimed at Dharamsala of a "separatist plot". The Tibet policy will be under the charge of Ling Jihua, a protégé of Hu Jintao. Under Mr. Hu, China followed an approach to Tibet that emphasised stability and security, and stepped up pressure on the Dalai Lama internationally.
On the trade front, the past year has seen a more than 13 per cent decline in trade with India, as of October. Bilateral trade has been driven by Indian exports of iron ore and imports of Chinese power and telecom equipment. Iron ore exports are unlikely to recover as a result of a prolonged slowdown in China's steel sector in the short-term and the government's long-term target of rebalancing the economy. China has suggested boosting mutual investments as a way to bridge the imbalance, but its officials have voiced concern — most recently at the November 26 Strategic Economic Dialogue in New Delhi — at the investment climate in India after duties on the import of power equipment and restrictions in the telecom sector were imposed. The CPC's Work Report highlighted health care reform and Information Technology as strategic priorities for the next five years, which may open up new possibilities for Indian pharmaceutical and IT companies. In both sectors, India is pushing for greater market access. But Chinese officials say Indian companies will, for their part, have to invest far more in the domestic market — in terms of boosting both their expertise and commitment — if they want to expand their presence in China as the country's new leadership takes charge.
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/what-chinas-transition-means-for-india/article4156961.ece
Managing India-China trade ties
A wide trade deficit is only one of the many challenges in economic relations between the two neighbours
Biswajit Dhar Mail Me
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First Published: Mon, Dec 03 2012. 06 12 PM IST
The second India-China strategic economic dialogue held last week came at a time when the two countries need to address a range of bilateral economic issues. Revisiting bilateral economic relations is important for changing the global rules of economic engagement. For years, India and China have been involved in re-shaping the global economic architecture to make the functioning of the multilateral institutions in the areas of trade and finance democratic. India and China are also coordinating their positions in critical negotiations on climate change that are taking place in Doha.
Bilateral economic relations between India and China have gone through interesting phases in the past decade. Towards the middle of the previous decade, the two governments were in active consultations for commencing negotiations for a free trade agreement (FTA). These preparations went astray as the Indian government faced opposition from major industry associations. These associations were apprehensive about their ability to stand up to competition from the relatively cheap Chinese products and, were therefore, unwilling to allow lowering of tariffs through an FTA. Another reflection of the unease of Indian businesses with imports from China is the large number of anti-dumping complaints that have registered against Chinese firms.
Policymakers may have failed to bring the two economies together in a closer relationship through a FTA, but the market had worked out its own plan. Rapid expansion of trade since the beginning of the previous decade indicates this clearly. In 2001-02, India-China trade was just less than $3 billion. This increased to $75.6 billion in the last fiscal, registering a 25-fold increase. More significantly, China has emerged as India's largest trade partner since 2009. Currently, India-China trade accounts for nearly 12% of India's total trade.
The spurt in trade volumes took place on the back of India's rapidly increasing imports from China. From a tad above $2 billion in 2001-02, India's imports from China increased to over $57.5 billion by 2011-12—a 28-fold increase. In contrast, India has not been able to penetrate Chinese markets very well; its exports have lagged its imports from China by a considerable margin, thus giving rise to the spectre of unbalanced trade. The high trade deficit that India faces indicates this clearly. In 2011-12, the deficit exceeded $39 billion and was more than twice the level of India's exports to China. It is not just the absolute trade deficit that should worry India, but the rate at which it has increased. In the last fiscal, the level of trade deficit was twice as high as that recorded two years back.
Besides the trade imbalance, the commodity composition is also skewed against India. In 2011-12, raw materials and intermediate products made up for more than 90% of India's exports to China. In other words, India was feeding the factory of the world that China is. But one noticeable change that has occurred in the past three years is that while in 2008, raw materials were nearly 80% of India's exports to China, in the previous year, the share of raw materials had declined while those of intermediate products has increased to nearly 34%. This probably indicated that component manufacturers from India are getting involved in the production networks spawned by Chinese enterprises.
In contrast, raw materials and intermediates were less than 40% of India's total imports from China. The share of these products was as high as 70% in the beginning of the previous decade, but has declined rapidly as China implemented a policy to restrict exports of raw materials.
India has thus got into a division of labour with its neighbour wherein it exports low value-added products and imports high value-added and technologically sophisticated products. Perhaps the only cause of comfort for India could be that China has developed this trade pattern with most of its major trading partners, including Brazil and South Africa.
Where, then, are Sino-Indian economic relations headed and what contribution can the strategic economic dialogue make in this process? Trade relations, the most visible sign of economic engagement between the two nations, need a close look, particularly the yawning trade deficit that India faces. While it is no one's case that the trade should be balanced, the magnitude of imbalance could introduce undesirable strains in bilateral relations. Importantly, this is also the view of several commentators in China.
Even a casual look at the developments in the Chinese economy shows there are opportunities for India. After 2008, policymakers in China have realized that their growth model, based substantially on exports, cannot be sustained. Rapid growth has also pushed up wages. These will, undoubtedly, erode China's export competitiveness. This could result in a relocation of production bases away from China. India with a diversified production base is best placed to take advantage of this development. It must prepare to make the most of this coming change.
Biswajit Dhar is director general at Research and Information System for Developing Countries, New Delhi.
http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/zE0DVjpG7WaaTjE1Qa88VP/Managing-IndiaChina-trade-ties.html
Himalayan Blunder
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| * | This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (June 2012) |
Himalayan Blunder | |
| * | |
| Author(s) | John Dalvi |
| Country | India |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | Thacker; Natraj |
| Publication date | 1968; others |
| Pages | 506 |
Himalayan Blunder was an extremely controversial war memoir penned by Brigadier John Dalvi. It dealt with the causes, consequences and aftermath of the Sino-Indian War of 1962, that ended in Chinese People's Liberation Army inflicting a defeat on India. Incidentally, after the book was published, the term Himalayan Blunder, began to be referred as a synonym for colossal failure in the context of Indian politics.
The title seems to allude to the "Himalayan miscalculation" that Gandhi discusses in his autobiographical article for April 14, 1919,[1] and which retained this title as Chapter 33 in Gandhi's autobiography.[2]:469
Brigadier Dalvi served in the Indian Army and gives a first-person account of the war. The book was banned by the Indian Government after its publication.[citation needed].
Contents |
The Content
The book begins with the narration of Brig. Dalvi's days in the DSSC, Welllington. He narrates an incident where a guest faculty, a retired British official, after hearing that Nehru had signed Panchsheel agreement with China and had decided to give up the post in Tibet that the British had maintained in Tibet to check Chinese advance, interrupted his class and warned that India and China would soon be at war and people in this class would be fighting it. Brig. Dalvi remembers that he was very angry with the gentleman questioning the authority of the gentleman to criticise the leader of his country.Brig. Dalvi also examines the position of Tibet vis-a-vis India and China. The British, he says, had insight into China's imperial ambitions. They had therefore cultivated Tibet as a buffer state. Expectedly, the Chinese attacked Tibet in 1950 and captured it. India did not protest the attack[citation needed] owing to Nehru's China-friendly policy[citation needed]. The Chinese began constructing roads from Tibet leading to Aksai Chin near Ladakh. The Chinese had two major claims with respect to Indian territories -
1) Aksai Chin in the northeastern section of Ladakh District in Jammu and Kashmir.
2) British-designated North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA), which is the present-day state of Arunachal Pradesh.
The War
When the war broke out on September 8, 1962, Nehru was away from India. The Chinese attacked simultaneously on the Ladakh area and NEFA. They managed to capture 11,000 km² of area in Aksai Chin and substantial area in NEFA. The commander of IV Corps, General B.M. Kaul was not on the front lines and was in Military Hospital, Delhi, recovering from an illness. Dalvi further alleges that B.M. Kaul was promoted to the position of General supplanting more capable, and senior officers because he was personally close to Nehru.According to Dalvi, the Indian Army lacked leadership, equipment for mountain warfare, weaponry, and basic essentials like warm clothing, snow boots, and glasses. Brg Dalvi lavishes praise on his brigade's courage, bravery, and grit in face of superior opposition. Despite gaining territory, the Chinese army declared a unilateral ceasefire, while still maintaining the status quo. Brig. Dalvi was taken as prisoner of war along with the soldiers of his brigade. He was subsequently imprisoned for six months. Dalvi also records how China had meticulously planned the attack while officially it maintained a different posture.
Dalvi also examines the aftermath of the war. The detractors of Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru held Defence Minister Krishna Menon and General Brij Mohan Kaul responsible for the debacle and both of them resigned.
Mr. Ravi Belagere, a Kannada journalist, has translated Himalayan Blunder into Kannada. The translated Kannada version has allowed Indian readers to read more about causes for the defeat of the Indian army against China.
Editions
Editions that have been published include:- Dalvi, John P. (1968). Himalayan blunder; the curtain-raiser to the Sino-Indian war of 1962 (1st ed.). Bombay, India: Thacker. (506 pages)
- Dalvi, John P. (1969). Himalayan blunder; the curtain-raiser to the Sino-Indian war of 1962 (2nd ed.). Bombay, India: Thacker. (506 pages)
- Dalvi, John P.; Frank Moraes (Foreword) (2003). Himalayan blunder; The Angry Truth About India's Most Crushing Military Disaster. Dehra Dun, India: Natraj. ISBN 978-8185019666. (506 pages)
References
- ^ "Articles By Gandhi: A Himalayan Miscalculation - April 14, 1919" (accessed 10 June 2012)
- ^ Gandhi, Mohandas K.; Mahadev H. Desai (1993). An autobiography: The story of my experiments with truth. Boston, MA, USA: Beacon Press. ISBN 0807059099.
Sino-Indian War
 | The neutrality of this article is disputed. (June 2012) |
| Sino-Indian War | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Cold War | |||||||||
 The Sino-Indian War was fought between India and China. | |||||||||
| |||||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||||
 India |  China | ||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
| Brij Mohan Kaul Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan Jawaharlal Nehru V. K. Krishna Menon Pran Nath Thapar | Zhang Guohua[2] Mao Zedong Liu Bocheng Lin Biao Zhou Enlai | ||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
| 10,000–12,000 | 80,000[3][4] | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
| 1,383 Killed[5] 1,047 Wounded [5] 1,696 Missing[5] 3,968 Captured[5] | 722 Killed.[5] 1,697 Wounded[5][6] | ||||||||
The Sino-Indian War (Hindi: भारत-चीन युद्ध Bhārat-Chīn Yuddh), also known as the Sino-Indian Border Conflict (simplified Chinese: 中印边境战争; traditional Chinese: 中印邊境戰爭; pinyin: Zhōng-Yìn Biānjìng Zhànzhēng), was a war between China and India that occurred in 1962. A disputed Himalayan border was the main pretext for war, but other issues played a role. There had been a series of violent border incidents after the 1959 Tibetan uprising, when India had granted asylum to the Dalai Lama. India initiated a Forward Policy in which it placed outposts along the border, including several north of the McMahon Line, the eastern portion of a Line of Actual Control proclaimed by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1959.
Unable to reach political accommodation on disputed territory along the 3,225-kilometer-long Himalayan border,[7] the Chinese launched simultaneous offensives in Ladakh and across the McMahon Line on 20 October 1962, coinciding with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Chinese troops advanced over Indian forces in both theatres, capturing Rezang la in Chushul in the western theatre, as well as Tawang in the eastern theatre. The war ended when the Chinese declared a ceasefire on 20 November 1962, and simultaneously announced its withdrawal from the disputed area.
The Sino-Indian War is notable for the harsh conditions under which much of the fighting took place, entailling large-scale combat at altitudes of over 4,250 metres (14,000 feet).[8] The Sino-Indian War was also noted for the non-deployment of the navy or air force by either the Chinese or Indian side.
Location
China and India shared a long border, sectioned into three stretches by Nepal, Sikkim (then an independent kingdom), and Bhutan, which follows the Himalayas between Burma and what was then West Pakistan. A number of disputed regions lie along this border. At its western end is the Aksai Chin region, an area the size of Switzerland, that sits between the Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang and Tibet (which China declared as an autonomous region in 1965). The eastern border, between Burma and Bhutan, comprises the present Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh (formerly the North East Frontier Agency). Both of these regions were overrun by China in the 1962 conflict.
Most combat took place at high altitudes. The Aksai Chin region is a desert of salt flats around 5,000 metres above sea level, and Arunachal Pradesh is mountainous with a number of peaks exceeding 7000 metres. According to military doctrine, to be successful an attacker generally requires a 3:1 ratio of numerical superiority over the defender for foot soldiers[citation needed]; in mountain warfare this ratio should be considerably higher as the terrain favours defence.[citation needed] The Chinese Army had possession of one of the highest ridges in the regions. The high altitude and freezing conditions also cause logistical and welfare difficulties; in past similar conflicts (such as the Italian Campaign of World War I) more casualties have been caused by the harsh conditions than enemy action. The Sino-Indian War was no different, with many troops on both sides dying in the freezing cold.[9]
Background
The cause of the war was a dispute over the sovereignty of the widely separated Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh border regions. Aksai Chin, claimed by India to belong to Kashmir and by China to be part of Xinjiang, contains an important road link that connects the Chinese regions of Tibet and Xinjiang.China's construction of this road was one of the triggers of the conflict.
The Johnson Line
The western portion of the Sino-Indian boundary originated in 1834, with the Sikh Confederation's conquest of Ladakh. In 1842, the Sikh Confederacy, which at the time ruled over much of Northern India (including the frontier regions of Jammu and Kashmir), signed a treaty which guaranteed the integrity of its existing borders with its neighbours.[10] The British defeat of the Sikhs in 1846 resulted in transfer of sovereignty over Ladakh, part of the Jammu and Kashmir region, to the British, and British commissioners contacted Chinese officials to negotiate the border. The boundaries at its two extremities, Pangong Lake and Karakoram Pass, were well defined, but the Aksai Chin area in between lay undefined.[11]
W. H. Johnson, a civil servant with the Survey of India proposed the "Johnson Line" in 1865, which put Aksai Chin in Kashmir.[12] Johnson presented this line to the Maharaja of Kashmir, who then claimed the 18,000 square kilometres contained within.[12] Johnson's work was severely criticized for gross inaccuracies, with description of his boundary as "patently absurd" who even extended his claim 80 miles further into China when India and China went into conflict over the border.[8] Johnson was reprimanded by the British Government for crossing into Khotan without permission and resigned from the Survey.[8][12][13] According to Francis Younghusband, who explored the region in the late 1880s, there was only an abandoned fort and not one inhabited house at Shahidulla when he was there - it was just a convenient staging post and a convenient headquarters for the nomadic Kirghiz.[14] The abandoned fort had apparently been built a few years earlier by the Kashmiris.[15] In 1878 the Chinese had reconquered Xinjiang, and by 1890 they already had Shahidulla before the issue was decided.[12] By 1892, China had erected boundary markers at Karakoram Pass.[8]
Throughout most of the 19th century the expanding British and Russian empires were jockeying for influence in Central Asia, and Britain decided to hand over Aksai Chin to the Chinese administration as a buffer against a Russian invasion. The newly created border was known as the MacCartney-MacDonald Line, and both British-controlled India and China now began to show Aksai Chin as Chinese.[12] In 1911 the Xinhai Revolution resulted in power shifts in China, and by 1918 (in the wake of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution) the British no longer saw merit in China's continuing possession of the region. On British maps, the border was redrawn as the original Johnson Line,[8] but despite this reversion, the new border was left unmanned and undemarcated.[8][12] According to Neville Maxwell, the British had used as many as 11 different boundary lines in the region, as their claims shifted with the political situation.[16] By the time of Indian independence in 1947, the Johnson Line had become India's official western boundary.[8] On 1 July 1954, India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru definitively stated the Indian position.[13] claimed that Aksai Chin had been part of the Indian Ladakh region for centuries, and that the border (as defined by the Johnson Line) was non-negotiable.[17] According to George N. Patterson, when the Indian government finally produced a report detailing the alleged proof of India's claims to the disputed area, "the quality of the Indian evidence was very poor, including some very dubious sources indeed".[18][19]
In 1956–57, China constructed a road through Aksai Chin, connecting Xinjiang and Tibet, which ran south of the Johnson Line in many places.[8][12][17] Aksai Chin was easily accessible to the Chinese, but access from India, which meant negotiating the Karakoram mountains, was more problematic.[17] The road came on Chinese maps published in 1958.[2]
The McMahon Line
In 1826, British India gained a common border with China after the British wrested control of Manipur and Assam from the Burmese, following the First Anglo-Burmese War of 1824–1826. In 1847, Major J. Jenkins, agent for the North East Frontier, reported that the Tawang was part of Tibet. In 1872, four monastic officials from Tibet arrived in Tawang and supervised a boundary settlement with Major R. Graham, NEFA official, which included the Tawang Tract as part of Tibet. Thus, in the last half of the 19th century, it was clear that the British treated the Tawang Tract as part of Tibet. This boundary was confirmed in a 1 June 1912 note from the British General Staff in India, stating that the "present boundary (demarcated) is south of Tawang, running westwards along the foothills from near Ugalguri to the southern Bhutanese border."[8] A 1908 map of The Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam prepared for the Foreign Department of the Government of India, showed the international boundary from Bhutan continuing to the Baroi River, following the Himalayas foothill alignment.[8] In 1913, representatives of Great Britain, China and Tibet attended a conference in Simla regarding the borders between Tibet, China and British India. Whilst all three representatives initialed the agreement, Beijing later objected to the proposed boundary between the regions of Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet, and did not ratify it. The details of the Indo-Tibetan boundary was not revealed to China at the time.[8] The foreign secretary of the British Indian government, Henry McMahon, who had drawn up the proposal, decided to bypass the Chinese (although instructed not to by his superiors) and settle the border bilaterally by negotiating directly with Tibet.[17] According to later Indian claims, this border was intended to run through the highest ridges of the Himalayas, as the areas south of the Himalayas were traditionally Indian.[20] However, the McMahon Line lay south of the boundary India claims.[17] India's government held the view that the Himalayas were the ancient boundaries of the Indian subcontinent, and thus should be the modern boundaries of India,[20] while it is the position of the Chinese government that the disputed area in the Himalayas have been geographically and culturally part of Tibet since ancient times.[21]
Months after the Simla agreement, China set up boundary markers south of the McMahon Line. T. O'Callaghan, an official in the Eastern Sector of the North East Frontier, relocated all these markers to a location slightly south of the McMahon Line, and then visited Rima to confirm with Tibetan officials that there was no Chinese influence in the area.[8] The British-run Government of India initially rejected the Simla Agreement as incompatible with the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which stipulated that neither party was to negotiate with Tibet "except through the intermediary of the Chinese government".[22] The British and Russians cancelled the 1907 agreement by joint consent in 1921.[23] It was not until the late 1930s that the British started to use the McMahon Line on official maps of the region.
China took the position that the Tibetan government should not have been allowed to make a such a treaty, rejecting Tibet's claims of independent rule.[17] For its part, Tibet did not object to any section of the McMahon Line excepting the demarcation of the trading town of Tawang, which the Line placed under British-Indian jurisdiction.[17] However, up until World War II, Tibetan officials were allowed to administer Tawang with complete authority. Due to the increased threat of Japanese and Chinese expansion during this period, British Indian troops secured the town as part of the defence of India's eastern border.[8]
In the 1950s, India began actively patrolling the region. It found that, at multiple locations, the highest ridges actually fell north of the McMahon Line.[17] Given India's historic position that the original intent of the line was to separate the two nations by the highest mountains in the world, in these locations India extended its forward posts northward to the ridges, regarding this move as compliant with the original border proposal, although the Simla Convention did not explicitly state this intention.[17]
Events leading up to war
Tibet and the border dispute
The 1940s saw huge change in South Asia with the Partition of India in 1947 (resulting in the establishment of the two new states of India and Pakistan), and the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. One of the most basic policies for the new Indian government was that of maintaining cordial relations with China, reviving its ancient friendly ties. India was among the first nations to grant diplomatic recognition to the newly created PRC.[24]
At the time, Chinese officials issued no condemnation of Nehru's claims or made any opposition to Nehru's open declarations of control over Aksai Chin. In 1956, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai stated that he had no claims over Indian controlled territory.[24] He later argued that Aksai Chin was already under Chinese jurisdiction, implying that there was therefore no contradiction with his earlier statement, since China did not regard the region as "Indian controlled", and that since the British hand-over, China had regarded the McCartney MacDonald Line as the relevant border.[17] Zhou later argued that as the boundary was undemarcated and had never been defined by treaty between any Chinese or Indian government, the Indian government could not unilaterally define Aksai Chin's borders.[16]
In 1950, the Chinese People's Liberation Army annexed Tibet and later the Chinese extended their influence by building a road in 1956–67 [8] and placing border posts in Aksai Chin.[12] India found out after the road was completed, protested against these moves and decided to look for a diplomatic solution to ensure a stable Sino-Indian border.[12][24] To resolve any doubts about the Indian position, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru declared in parliament that India regarded the McMahon Line as its official border (what year was this? cannot see link to the reference).[24] The Chinese expressed no concern at this statement,[12][24] and in 1951 and 1952, the government of China asserted that there were no frontier issues to be taken up with India.[24]
In 1954, Prime Minister Nehru wrote a memo calling for India's borders to be clearly defined and demarcated;[13] in line with previous Indian philosophy, Indian maps showed a border that, in some places, lay north of the McMahon Line.[25] Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, in November 1956, again repeated Chinese assurances that the People's Republic had no claims on Indian territory, although official Chinese maps showed 120,000 square kilometres (46,000 sq mi) of territory claimed by India as Chinese.[24] CIA documents created at the time revealed that Nehru had ignored Burmese premier Ba Swe when he warned Nehru to be cautious when dealing with Zhou.[26] They also allege that Zhou purposefully told Nehru that there were no border issues with India.[26]
In 1954, China and India negotiated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, by which the two nations agreed to abide in settling their disputes. India presented a frontier map which was accepted by China, and the Indian government under Prime Minister Nehru promoted the slogan Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers). According to Georgia Tech political analyst John W Garver, Nehru's policy on Tibet was to create a strong Sino-Indian partnership which would be catalysed through agreement and compromise on Tibet. Garver believes that Nehru's previous actions had given him confidence that China would be ready to form an "Asian Axis" with India.[2]
This apparent progress in relations suffered a major setback when, in 1959, Nehru accommodated the Tibetan religious leader at the time, the 14th Dalai Lama, who fled Lhasa after a failed Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule. The Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, was enraged and asked the Xinhua News Agency to produce reports on Indian expansionists operating in Tibet.[citation needed]
Border incidents continued through this period. In August 1959, the People's Liberation Army took an Indian prisoner at Longju, which had an ambiguous position in the McMahon Line,[8][12][25][27] and two months later in Aksai Chin, a clash led to the death of nine Indian frontier policemen.[12]
On 2 October, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev defended Nehru in a meeting with Mao. This action reinforced China's impression that the Soviet Union, the United States and India all had expansionist designs on China. The People's Liberation Army went so far as to prepare a self-defence counterattack plan.[2] Negotiations were restarted between the nations, but no progress was made.[13][28]
As a consequence of their non-recognition of the McMahon Line, China's maps showed both the North East Frontier Area (NEFA) and Aksai Chin to be Chinese territory.[20] In 1960, Zhou Enlai unofficially suggested that India drop its claims to Aksai Chin in return for a Chinese withdrawal of claims over NEFA. Adhering to his stated position, Nehru believed that China did not have a legitimate claim over either of these territories, and thus was not ready to concede them. This adamant stance was perceived in China as Indian opposition to Chinese rule in Tibet.[2] Nehru declined to conduct any negotiations on the boundary until Chinese troops withdrew from Aksai Chin, a position supported by the international community.[17] India produced numerous reports on the negotiations, and translated Chinese reports into English to help inform the international debate.[citation needed] China believed that India was simply securing its claim lines in order to continue its "grand plans in Tibet".[2] India's stance that China withdraw from Aksai Chin caused continual deterioration of the diplomatic situation to the point that internal forces were pressuring Nehru to take a military stance against China.
The Forward Policy
At the beginning of 1961, Nehru appointed General B. M. Kaul as army Chief of General Staff,[29] but he refused to increase military spending and prepare for a possible war.[29] According to James Barnard Calvin of the U.S. Navy, in 1959, India started sending Indian troops and border patrols into disputed areas. This program created both skirmishes and deteriorating relations between India and China.[8] The aim of this policy was to create outposts behind advancing Chinese troops to interdict their supplies, forcing them north of the disputed line.[8][24][27][30] There were eventually 60 such outposts, including 43 north of the McMahon Line, to which India claimed sovereignty.[8][13] China viewed this as further confirmation of Indian expansionist plans directed towards Tibet. According to the Indian official history, implementation of the Forward Policy was intended to provide evidence of Indian occupation in the previously unoccupied region through which Chinese troops had been patrolling. Kaul was confident, through contact with Indian Intelligence and CIA information, that China would not react with force.[17] Indeed, at first the PLA simply withdrew, but eventually Chinese forces began to counter-encircle the Indian positions which clearly encroached into the north of McMahon Line. This led to a tit-for-tat Indian reaction, with each force attempting to outmanoeuver the other. However, despite the escalating nature of the dispute, the two forces withheld from engaging each other directly.[2]
Chinese attention was diverted for a time by the military activity of the Nationalists on Taiwan, but on 23 June the U.S. assured China that a Nationalist invasion would not be permitted.[31] China's heavy artillery facing Taiwan could then be moved to Tibet.[32] It took China six to eight months to gather the resources needed for the war, according to Anil Athale, author of the official Indian history.[32] The Chinese sent a large quantity of non-military supplies to Tibet through the Indian port of Calcutta.[32]
Early incidents
Various border conflicts and "military incidents" between India and China flared up throughout the summer and autumn of 1962. In May, the Indian Air Force was told not to plan for close air support, although it was assessed as being a feasible way to counter the unfavourable ratio of Chinese to Indian troops.[33] In June, a skirmish caused the deaths of dozens of Chinese troops. The Indian Intelligence Bureau received information about a Chinese buildup along the border which could be a precursor to war.[33]
During June–July 1962, Indian military planners began advocating "probing actions" against the Chinese, and accordingly, moved mountain troops forward to cut off Chinese supply lines. According to Patterson, the Indian motives were threefold:
- Test Chinese resolve and intentions regarding India.
- Test whether India would enjoy Soviet backing in the event of a Sino-Indian war.
- Create sympathy for India within the U.S., with whom relations had deteriorated after the Indian annexation of Goa.[18][34]
On 10 July 1962, 350 Chinese troops surrounded an Indian occupied post in Chushul (north of the McMahon Line) but withdrew after a heated argument via loudspeaker.[9] On 22 July, the Forward Policy was extended to allow Indian troops to push back Chinese troops already established in disputed territory.[24] Whereas Indian troops were previously ordered to fire only in self-defence, all post commanders were now given discretion to open fire upon Chinese forces if threatened.[24] In August, the Chinese military improved its combat readiness along the McMahon Line and began stockpiling ammunition, weapons and gasoline.[8]
The Chinese had advance knowledge about the coming Cuban Missile Crisis, and Mao Zedong could pursue Nikita Khrushchev to reverse Russians policy backing India temporarily. Indians were stunned when Pravda in mid-October editorially advised to maintain peace "Chinese brothers" and "Indian friends". This situation lasted however only till the end of the Cuban confrontation and Mao publicly reprimanded him for "perfidy in the Himalayas"(against Indians) and "cowardice in the Caribbean"(against Americans).[35]
Confrontation at Thag La
In June 1962, Indian forces established an outpost at Dhola, on the southern slopes of the Thag La Ridge.[8] Dhola lay north of the McMahon Line but south of the ridges along which India interpreted the McMahon Line to run.[17][25][36] In August, China issued diplomatic protests and began occupying positions at the top of Thag La.[8][2] On 8 September, a 60-strong PLA unit descended to the south side of the ridge and occupied positions that dominated one of the Indian posts at Dhola. Fire was not exchanged, but Nehru said to the media that the Indian Army had instructions to "free our territory" and the troops had been given discretion to use force.[2] On 11 September, it was decided that "all forward posts and patrols were given permission to fire on any armed Chinese who entered Indian territory".[24]
However, the operation to occupy Thag La was flawed in that Nehru's directives were unclear and it got underway very slowly because of this.[8][17] In addition to this, each man had to carry 35 kilograms (77 lb) over the long trek and this severely slowed down the reaction.[37] By the time the Indian battalion reached the point of conflict, Chinese units controlled both banks of the Namka Chu River.[8] On 20 September, Chinese troops threw grenades at Indian troops and a firefight developed, triggering a long series of skirmishes for the rest of September.[8][37]
Some Indian troops, including Brigadier Dalvi who commanded the forces at Thag La, were also concerned that the territory they were fighting for was not strictly territory that "we should have been convinced was ours".[27] According to Neville Maxwell, even members of the Indian defence ministry were categorically concerned with the validity of the fighting in Thag La.[17]
On 3 October, a week before the start of the war, Zhou Enlai visited Nehru in New Delhi promising there would be no war.[citation needed] On 4 October, Kaul assigned some troops to secure regions south of the Thag La Ridge.[8] Kaul decided to first secure Yumtso La, a strategically important position, before re-entering the lost Dhola post.[24] Kaul had then realised that the attack would be desperate and the Indian government tried to stop an escalation into all-out war. Indian troops marching to Thag La had suffered in the previously unexperienced conditions; two Gurkha soldiers died of pulmonary edema.[37]
On 10 October, an Indian Punjabi patrol of 50 troops to Yumtso La were met by an emplaced Chinese position of some 1,000 soldiers.[8] Indian troops were in no position for battle, as Yumtso La was 16,000 feet (4,900 m) above sea level and Kaul did not plan on having artillery support for the troops.[37] The Chinese troops opened fire on the Indians under their belief that they were north of the McMahon Line. The Indians were surrounded by Chinese positions which used mortar fire. However, they managed to hold off the first Chinese assault, inflicting heavy casualties.[8]
At this point, the Indian troops were in a position to push the Chinese back with mortar and machine gun fire. However, Brigadier Dalvi opted not to fire, as it would mean decimating the Rajput who were still in the area of the Chinese regrouping. They helplessly watched the Chinese ready themselves for a second assault.[37] In the second Chinese assault, the Indians began their retreat, realising the situation was hopeless. The Indian patrol suffered 25 casualties, and the Chinese 33. The Chinese troops held their fire as the Indians retreated, and then buried the Indian dead with military honours, as witnessed by the retreating soldiers. This was the first occurrence of heavy fighting in the war.[8]
This attack had grave implications for India and Nehru tried to solve the issue, but by 18 October, it was clear that the Chinese were preparing for an attack on India, with massive troop buildups on the border.[8] A long line of mules and porters had also been observed supporting the buildup and reinforcement of positions south of the Thag La Ridge.[37]
Chinese and Indian preparations
Motives
Two of the major factors leading up to China's eventual conflicts with Indian troops were India's stance on the disputed borders and perceived Indian subversion in Tibet. There was "a perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian efforts to undermine Chinese control of Tibet, Indian efforts which were perceived as having the objective of restoring the pre-1949 status quo ante of Tibet". The other was "a perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian aggression against Chinese territory along the border". John W. Garver argues that the first perception was incorrect based on the state of the Indian military and polity in the 1960s. It was, nevertheless a major reason for China's going to war. However, he argues the Chinese perception of Indian aggression to be "substantially accurate".[2]
The CIA's recently declassified POLO documents reveal contemporary American analysis of Chinese motives during the war. According to this document, "Chinese apparently were motivated to attack by one primary consideration — their determination to retain the ground on which PLA forces stood in 1962 and to punish the Indians for trying to take that ground". In general terms, they tried to show the Indians once and for all that China would not acquiesce in a military "reoccupation" policy. The secondary reasons for the attack, which had made it desirable but not necessary, included a desire :
- to damage Nehru's prestige by exposing Indian weakness.[26]
- to expose as traitorous Khrushchev's policy of supporting Nehru against a Communist country.[26]
Another factor which might have affected China's decision for war with India was a perceived need to stop a Soviet-U.S.-India encirclement and isolation of China.[2] India's relations with the Soviet Union and United States were both strong at this time, but the Soviets (and Americans) were preoccupied by the Cuban Missile Crisis and would not interfere with the Sino-Indian War.[8] Regarding why China waited till October of the year to launch the attack, P. B. Sinha suggests that China timed the war exactly in parallel with American actions so as to avoid any chance of American or Soviet involvement. Although American buildup of forces around Cuba occurred on the same day as the first major clash at Dhola, and China's buildup between 10 and 20 October appeared to coincide exactly with the United States establishment of a blockade against Cuba which began 20 October, the Chinese probably prepared for this before they could anticipate what would happen in Cuba.[24] Another explanation is that the confrontation in the Taiwan Strait has eased by then.
Garver argues that the Chinese correctly assessed Indian border policies, particularly the Forward Policy, as attempts for incremental seizure of Chinese-controlled territory. On Tibet, Garver argues that one of the major factors leading to China's decision for war with India was a common tendency of humans "to attribute others behavior to interior motivations, while attributing their own behavior to situational factors". Studies from China published in the 1990s confirmed that the root cause for China going to war with India was the perceived Indian aggression in Tibet, with the forward policy simply catalysing the Chinese reaction.[2]
Neville Maxwell and Allen Whiting argue that the Chinese leadership believed they were defending territory they believed to be legitimately Chinese, and which was already under de facto Chinese occupation prior to Indian advances, and regarded the Forward Policy as an Indian attempt at creeping annexation.[2] Mao Zedong himself compared the Forward Policy to a strategic advance in Chinese chess:
Their [India's] continually pushing forward is like crossing the Chu Han boundary. What should we do? We can also set out a few pawns, on our side of the river. If they don't then cross over, that's great. If they do cross, we'll eat them up [chess metaphor meaning to take the opponent's pieces]. Of course, we cannot blindly eat them. Lack of forbearance in small matters upsets great plans. We must pay attention to the situation.[2]
India claims that the motive for the Forward Policy was to cut off the supply routes for Chinese troops posted in NEFA and Aksai Chin.[8] According to the official Indian history, the forward policy was continued because of its initial success, as it claimed that Chinese troops withdrew when they encountered areas already occupied by Indian troops. It also claimed that the Forward Policy was having success in cutting out supply lines of Chinese troops who had advanced South of the McMahon Line, though there was no evidence of such advance before the 1962 war. However, the Forward Policy rested on the assumption that Chinese forces "were not likely to use force against any of our posts, even if they were in a position to do so". No serious re-appraisal of this policy took place even when Chinese forces ceased withdrawing.[24] Nehru's confidence was probably justified given the difficulty for China to supply the area over the high altitude terrain over 5000 km from the more populated areas of China.
The Chinese leadership initially held a sympathetic view towards India as the latter had been ruled by British colonial masters for centuries. However, Nehru's forward policy convinced PRC leadership that the independent Indian leadership was a reincarnation of British imperialism. Mao Zedong stated: "Rather than being constantly accused of aggression, it's better to show the world what really happens when China indeed moves its muscles."
Chinese policy toward India, therefore, operated on two contradictory assumptions in the first half of 1961. On the one hand, the Chinese leaders continued to entertain a hope, although a shrinking one, that some opening for talks.would appear. On, the other hand, they read Indian statements and actions as clear signs that Nehru wanted to talk only about a Chinese withdrawal. Regarding the hope, they were willing to negotiate and tried to prod Nebru into a similar attitude. Regarding Indian intentions, they began to act politically and to build a rationale based on the assumption that Nehru already had become a lackey of imperialism; for this reason he opposed border talks.[26]
Krishna Menon is reported to have said that when he arrived in Geneva on 6 June 1961 for an international conference in Laos, Chinese officials in Chen Yi's delegation indicated that Chen might be interested in discussing the border dispute with him. At several private meetings with Menon, Chen avoided any discussion of the dispute and Menon surmised that the Chinese wanted him to broach the matter first. He did not, as he was under instructions from Nehru to avoid taking the initiative, leaving the Chinese with the impression that Nehru was unwilling to show any flexibility.[26]
In September, the Chinese took a step toward slandering Nehru openly in their commentary. After citing Indonesian and Burmese press criticism of Nehru by name, the Chinese attacked him by implication for his moderate remarks on colonialism (People's Daily Editorial, 9 September) - Somebody at the Non-Aligned Nations Conference advanced t h e argument t h a t the era of classical colonialism is gone and dead...contrary to facts." This was a distortion of Nehru's remarks but appeared close enough to be credible. On the same day, Chen Yi referred to Nehru by implication at the Bulgarian embassy reception: 'Those who attempted to' deny history, ignore reality, and distort the truth and who attempted to divert the Conference from its important object have failed to gain support and were isolated." On 10 September, they dropped all circumlocutions and criticized him by name in a China Youth article and NCNA report—the first time in almost two years that they had commented extensively on the Prime Minister.[26]
By early 1962, the Chinese leadership began to fear that India's intentions were to launch a massive attack against Chinese troops, and that the Indian leadership wanted a war.[8][2] In 1961, the Indian army had been sent into Goa, a small region without any other international borders apart from the Indian one, after Portugal refused to surrender the exclave colony to the Indian Union. Although this action met little to no international protest or opposition, China saw it as an example of India's expansionist nature, especially in light of heated rhetoric from Indian politicians. India's Home Minister declared, "If the Chinese will not vacate the areas occupied by it, India will have to repeat what she did in Goa. India will certainly drive out the Chinese forces",[8] while another member of the Indian Congress Party pronounced, "India will take steps to end [Chinese] aggression on Indian soil just as she ended Portuguese aggression in Goa".[18] By mid-1962, it was apparent to the Chinese leadership that negotiations had failed to make any progress, and the Forward Policy was increasingly perceived as a grave threat as Delhi increasingly sent probes deeper into border areas and cut off Chinese supply lines.[18] Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi commented at one high-level meeting, "Nehru's forward policy is a knife. He wants to put it in our heart. We cannot close our eyes and await death."[2] The Chinese leadership believed that their restraint on the issue was being perceived by India as weakness, leading to continued provocations, and that a major counterblow was needed to stop perceived Indian aggression.[2]
Xu Yan, prominent Chinese military historian and professor at the PLA's National Defense University, gives an account of the Chinese leadership's decision to go to war. By late September 1962, the Chinese leadership had begun to reconsider their policy of "armed coexistence", which had failed to address their concerns with the forward policy and Tibet, and consider a large, decisive strike.[2] On 22 September 1962, the People's Daily published an article which claimed that "the Chinese people were burning with 'great indignation' over the Indian actions on the border and that New Delhi could not 'now say that warning was not served in advance'."[38][39]
Military planning
The Indian side was confident war would not be triggered and made little preparations. India had only two divisions of troops in the region of the conflict.[40] In August 1962, Brigadier D. K. Palit claimed that a war with China in the near future could be ruled out.[40] Even in September 1962, when Indian troops were ordered to "expel the Chinese" from Thag La, Maj. General J. S. Dhillon expressed the opinion that "experience in Ladakh had shown that a few rounds fired at the Chinese would cause them to run away."[2][24] Because of this, the Indian army was completely unprepared when the attack at Yumtso La occurred.[8][40]
Recently declassified CIA documents which were compiled at the time reveal that India's estimates of Chinese capabilities made them neglect their military in favour of economic growth.[41] It is claimed that if a more military-minded man had been in place instead of Nehru, India would have been more likely to have been ready for the threat of a counter-attack from China.[41]
On 6 October 1962, the Chinese leadership convened. Lin Biao reported that PLA intelligence units had determined that Indian units might assault Chinese positions at Thag La on 10 October (Operation Leghorn). The Chinese leadership and the Central Military Council decided upon war to launch a large-scale attack to punish perceived military aggression from India.[2] In Beijing, a larger meeting of Chinese military was convened in order to plan for the coming conflict.[2]
Mao and the Chinese leadership issued a directive laying out the objectives for the war. A main assault would be launched in the eastern sector, which would be coordinated with a smaller assault in the western sector. All Indian troops within China's claimed territories in the eastern sector would be expelled, and the war would be ended with a unilateral Chinese ceasefire and withdrawal to prewar positions, followed by a return to the negotiating table.[2] India led the Non-Aligned Movement, Nehru enjoyed international prestige, and China, with a larger military, would be portrayed as an aggressor. However, he said that a well-fought war "will guarantee at least thirty years of peace" with India, and determined the benefits to offset the costs.[2]
China also reportedly bought significant amount of Indian Rupee currency notes from Hong Kong, supposedly to distribute amongst its soldiers in preparation for the war. [42]
On 8 October, additional veteran and elite divisions were ordered to prepare to move into Tibet from the Chengdu and Lanzhou military regions.[2]
On 12 October, Nehru declared that he had ordered the Indian army to "clear Indian territory in the NEFA of Chinese invaders" and personally met with Kaul, issuing instructions to him.
On 14 October, an editorial on People's Daily issued China's final warning to India: "So it seems that Mr. Nehru has made up his mind to attack the Chinese frontier guards on an even bigger scale....It is high time to shout to Mr. Nehru that the heroic Chinese troops, with the glorious tradition of resisting foreign aggression, can never be cleared by anyone from their own territory... If there are still some maniacs who are reckless enough to ignore our well-intentioned advice and insist on having another try, well, let them do so. History will pronounce its inexorable verdict... At this critical moment...we still want to appeal once more to Mr. Nehru: better rein in at the edge of the precipice and do not use the lives of Indian troops as stakes in your gamble." [39]
Marshal Liu Bocheng headed a group to determine the strategy for the war. He concluded that the opposing Indian troops were among India's best, and to achieve victory would require deploying crack troops and relying on force concentration to achieve decisive victory. On 16 October, this war plan was approved, and on the 18th, the final approval was given by the Politburo for a "self-defensive counter-attack", scheduled for 20 October.[2]
Chinese offensive
On 20 October 1962, the Chinese People's Liberation Army launched two attacks, 1000 kilometres apart. In the western theatre, the PLA sought to expel Indian forces from the Chip Chap valley in Aksai Chin while in the eastern theatre, the PLA sought to capture both banks of the Namka Chu river. Some skirmishes also took place at the Nathula Pass, which is in the Indian state of Sikkim (an Indian protectorate at that time). Gurkha rifles travelling north were targeted by Chinese artillery fire. After four days of fierce fighting, the three regiments of Chinese troops succeeded in securing a substantial portion of the disputed territory.[8]
Eastern theatre
Chinese troops launched an attack on the southern banks of the Namka Chu River on 20 October.[37] The Indian forces were undermanned, with only an understrength battalion to support them, while the Chinese troops had three regiments positioned on the north side of the river.[37] The Indians expected Chinese forces to cross via one of five bridges over the river and defended those crossings.[8] However, the PLA bypassed the defenders by crossing the shallow October river instead. They formed up into battalions on the Indian-held south side of the river under cover of darkness, with each battalion assigned against a separate group of Rajputs.[37]
At 5:14 am, Chinese mortar fire began attacking the Indian positions. Simultaneously, the Chinese cut the Indian telephone lines, preventing the defenders from making contact with their headquarters. At about 6:30 am, the Chinese infantry launched a surprise attack from the rear and forced the Indians to leave their trenches.[37]
The Chinese troops overwhelmed the Indians in a series of flanking manoeuvres south of the McMahon Line and prompted their withdrawal from Namka Chu.[37] Fearful of continued losses, Indian troops escaped into Bhutan. Chinese forces respected the border and did not pursue.[8] Chinese forces now held all of the territory that was under dispute at the time of the Thag La confrontation, but they continued to advance into the rest of NEFA.[37]
On 22 October, at 12:15 am, PLA mortars fired on Walong, on the McMahon line.[43] Flares launched by Indian troops the next day revealed numerous Chinese milling around the valley.[43] The Indians tried to use their mortars against the Chinese but the PLA responded by lighting a bushfire, causing confusion amongst the Indians. Some 400 Chinese troops attacked the Indian position. The initial Chinese assault was halted by accurate Indian mortar fire. The Chinese were then reinforced and launched a second assault. The Indians managed to hold them back for four hours, but the Chinese used sheer weight of numbers to break through. Most Indian forces to withdraw to established positions in Walong, while a company supported by mortars and medium machine guns remained to cover the retreat.[43]
On the morning 23 October, the Indians discovered a Chinese force gathered in a cramped pass and opened fire with mortars and machine guns, leading to heavy fighting. About 200 Chinese soldiers were killed and wounded in this action. Nine Indian soldiers were also killed. The fighting continued well into the afternoon, until the company was ordered to withdraw. Meanwhile, the 4th Sikhs made contact with the Chinese and subjected them to withering mortar and machine gun fire as the Chinese set off a brushfire and attempted to sneak forward. Sepoy Piara Singh tried to douse the fire while fighting the enemy, but died after he was wounded and refused to be evacuated.
Elsewhere, Chinese troops were launched a three-pronged attack on Tawang, which the Indians evacuated without any resistance.[8]
Over the following days, there were clashes between Indian and Chinese patrols at Walong as the Chinese rushed in reinforcements. On 25 October, the Chinese made a probe, which was met with resistance from the 4th Sikhs. As some Chinese soldiers began to close in, Sepoy Kewal Singh charged them with his bayonet and killed a few of them in hand-to-hand combat, but he himself was killed. The following day, a patrol from the 4th Sikhs was encircled, and after being unable to break the encirclement, an Indian unit sneaked in and attacked the Chinese flank, allowing the Sikhs to break free.[43]
Western theatre
On the Aksai Chin front, China already controlled most of the disputed territory. Chinese forces quickly swept the region of any remaining Indian troops.[44] Late on 19 October, Chinese troops launched a number of attacks throughout the western theatre.[9] By 22 October, all posts north of Chushul had been cleared.[9]
On 20 October, the Chinese easily took the Chip Chap Valley, Galwan Valley, and Pangong Lake.[45] Many outposts and garrisons along the Western front were unable to defend against the surrounding Chinese troops. Most Indian troops positioned in these posts offered resistance but were either killed or taken prisoner. Indian support for these outposts was not forthcoming, as evidenced by the Galwan post, which had been surrounded by enemy forces in August, but no attempt made to relieve the besieged garrison. Following the 20 October attack, nothing was heard from Galwan.[8]
On 24 October, Indian forces fought hard hold the Rezang La Ridge, in order to prevent a nearby airstrip from falling to the Chinese .[46]
After realising the magnitude of the attack, the Indian Western Command withdrew many of the isolated outposts to the south-east. Daulet Beg Oldi was also evacuated, but it was south of the Chinese claim line and was not approached by Chinese forces. Indian troops were withdrawn in order to consolidate and regroup in the event that China probed south of their claim line.[8]
Lull in the fighting
By 24 October, the PLA had entered territory previously administered by India to give the PRC a diplomatically strong position over India. The majority of Chinese forces had advanced sixteen kilometres south of the control line prior to the conflict. Four days of fighting were followed by a three-week lull. Zhou ordered the troops to stop advancing as he attempted to negotiate with Nehru. The Indian forces had retreated into more heavily fortified positions around Se La and Bombdi La which would be difficult to assault.[8] Zhou sent Nehru a letter, proposing
- A negotiated settlement of the boundary
- That both sides disengage and withdraw twenty kilometres from present lines of actual control
- A Chinese withdrawal north in NEFA
- That China and India not cross lines of present control in Aksai Chin.[8]
Nehru's 27 October reply expressed interest in the restoration of peace and friendly relations and suggested a return to the "boundary prior to 8 September 1962". He was categorically concerned about a mutual twenty kilometre withdrawal after "40 or 60 kilometres of blatant military aggression". He wanted the creation of a larger immediate buffer zone and thus resist the possibility of a repeat offensive. Zhou's 4 November reply repeated his 1959 offer to return to the McMahon Line in NEFA and the Chinese traditionally claimed MacDonald Line in Aksai Chin. Facing Chinese forces maintaining themselves on Indian soil and trying to avoid political pressure, the Indian parliament announced a national emergency and passed a resolution which stated their intent to "drive out the aggressors from the sacred soil of India". The United States and the United Kingdom supported India's response, however the Soviet Union was preoccupied with the Cuban Missile Crisis and did not offer the support it had provided in previous years. With the backing of other great powers, a 14 November letter by Nehru to Zhou once again rejected his proposal.[8]
Neither side declared war, used their air force, or fully broke off diplomatic relations; however, the conflict is commonly referred to as a war. This war coincided with the Cuban Missile Crisis and was viewed by the western nations at the time as another act of aggression by the Communist bloc.[8][47] According to Calvin, the Chinese side evidently wanted a diplomatic resolution and discontinuation of the conflict.[8]
Continuation of war
After Zhou received Nehru's letter (rejecting Zhou's proposal), the fighting resumed on the eastern theatre on 14 November (Nehru's birthday), with an Indian attack on Walong, claimed by China, launched from the defensive position of Se La and inflicting heavy casualties on the Chinese. The Chinese resumed military activity on Aksai Chin and NEFA hours after the Walong battle.[8]
Eastern theatre
On the eastern theatre, the PLA attacked Indian forces near Se La and Bomdi La on 17 November. These positions were defended by the Indian 4th Infantry Division. Instead of attacking by road as expected, PLA forces approached via a mountain trail, and their attack cut off a main road and isolated 10,000 Indian troops.
Se La occupied high ground, and rather than assault this commanding position, the Chinese captured Thembang, which was a supply route to Se La.[8]
Western theatre
On the western theatre, PLA forces launched a heavy infantry attack on 18 November near Chushul. Their attack started at 4:35 am, despite a mist surrounding most of the areas in the region. At 5:45 the Chinese troops advanced to attack 2 platoons of Indian troops at Gurung Hill.
The Indians did not know what was happening, as communications were dead. As a patrol was sent, China attacked with greater numbers. Indian artillery could not hold off against superior Chinese forces. By 9:00 am, Chinese forces attacked Gurung Hill directly and Indian commanders withdrew from the area.[9]
The Chinese had been simultaneously attacking Rezang La which was held by 123 Indian troops. At 5:05 am, Chinese troops launched their attack audaciously. Chinese medium machine gun fire pierced through the Indian tactical defences.[9]
At 6:55 am the sun rose and the Chinese attack on the 8th platoon began in waves. Fighting continued for the next hour, until the Chinese signaled that they had destroyed the 7th platoon. Indians tried to use light machine guns on the medium machine guns from the Chinese but after 10 minutes the battle was over.[9] Logistical inadequacy once again hurt the Indian troops.[48] The Chinese gave the Indian troops a respectful military funeral.[48] The battles also saw the death of Major Shaitan Singh of the Kumaon Regiment, who had been instrumental in the first battle of Rezang La.[48] Over 1,000 Chinese soldiers were killed or wounded. Out of the 123 Indian defenders, 109 were killed and 9 of the survivors were severely injured.[49] The Indian troops were forced to withdraw to high mountain positions. Indian sources believed that their troops were just coming to grips with the mountain combat and finally called for more troops. However, the Chinese declared a ceasefire, ending the bloodshed.[9]
Indians suffered heavy casualties, with dead Indian troops' bodies being found in the ice, frozen with weapons in hand. Chinese forces also suffered heavy casualties, especially at Rezang La. This signalled the end of the war in Aksai Chin as China had reached their claim line – many Indian troops were ordered to withdraw from the area. China claimed that the Indian troops wanted to fight on until the bitter end. However, the war ended with their withdrawal, so as to limit the amount of casualties.[8]
The PLA penetrated close to the outskirts of Tezpur, Assam, a major frontier town nearly fifty kilometres from the Assam-North-East Frontier Agency border.[17] The local government ordered the evacuation of the civilians in Tezpur to the south of the Brahmaputra River, all prisons were thrown open, and government officials who stayed behind destroyed Tezpur's currency reserves in anticipation of a Chinese advance.[24]
Ceasefire
China had reached its claim lines so the PLA did not advance farther, and on 19 November it declared a unilateral cease-fire. Zhou Enlai declared a unilateral ceasefire to start on midnight, 21 November. Zhou's ceasefire declaration stated,
Beginning from 21 November 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will cease fire along the entire Sino-Indian border. Beginning from 1 December 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw to positions 20 kilometres behind the line of actual control which existed between China and India on 7 November 1959. In the eastern sector, although the Chinese frontier guards have so far been fighting on Chinese territory north of the traditional customary line, they are prepared to withdraw from their present positions to the north of the illegal McMahon Line, and to withdraw twenty kilometres back from that line. In the middle and western sectors, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw twenty kilometres from the line of actual control.
Zhou had first given the ceasefire announcement to Indian chargé d'affaires on 19 November, (before India's request for United States air support) but New Delhi did not receive it until 24 hours later. The aircraft carrier was ordered back after the ceasefire and thus American intervention on India's side in the war was avoided. Retreating Indian troops, who hadn't come into contact with anyone knowing of the ceasefire, and Chinese troops in NEFA and Aksai Chin, were involved in some minor battles[8] but for the most part the ceasefire signalled an end to the fighting. The United States Air Force flew in supplies to India in November 1962, but neither side wished to continue hostilities.
Toward the end of the war India increased her support for Tibetan refugees and revolutionaries, some of them having settled in India, as they were fighting the same common enemy in the region. The Nehru administration ordered the raising of an elite Indian-trained "Tibetan Armed Force" composed of Tibetan refugees.[50] The CIA had already begun operations in bringing about change in Tibet.[citation needed]
World opinion
The Chinese military action has been viewed by the United States as part of the PRC's policy of making use of aggressive wars to settle its border disputes and to distract from its internal issues.[51] According to James Calvin from the United States Marine Corps, western nations at the time viewed China as an aggressor during the China-India border war, and the war was part of a monolithic communist objective for a world dictatorship of the proletariat. This was further triggered by Mao Zedong's views that: "The way to world conquest lies through Havana, Accra, and Calcutta". Calvin believes that Chinese actions show a "pattern of conservative aims and limited objectives, rather than expansionism" and blames this particular conflict on India's provocations towards China. However, Calvin also expresses that China, in the past, has been adamant to gain control over regions to which it has a "traditional claim", which triggered the dispute over NEFA and Aksai Chin and indeed Tibet. Calvin's assumption, based on the history of the Cold War and the Domino Effect, assumed that China might ultimately try to regain control of everything that it considers as "traditionally Chinese" which in its view includes the entirety of South East Asia.[8]
The Kennedy administration was disturbed by what they considered "blatant Chinese communist aggression against India". In a May 1963 National Security Council meeting, contingency planning on the part of the United States in the event of another Chinese attack on India was discussed. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor advised the president to use nuclear weapons should the Americans intervene in such a situation. McNamara stated "Before any substantial commitment to defend India against China is given, we should recognize that in order to carry out that commitment against any substantial Chinese attack, we would have to use nuclear weapons. Any large Chinese Communist attack on any part of that area would require the use of nuclear weapons by the U.S., and this is to be preferred over the introduction of large numbers of U.S. soldiers."[52] After hearing this and listening to two other advisers, Kennedy stated "We should defend India, and therefore we will defend India."[52][53] It remains unclear if his aides were trying to dissuade the President of considering any measure with regard to India by immediately raising the stakes to an unacceptable level, nor is it clear if Kennedy was thinking of conventional or nuclear means when he gave his reply.[52] By 1964 China had developed its own nuclear weapon which would have likely caused any American nuclear policy in defense of India to be reviewed.[52] The Johnson Administration considered and then rejected giving nuclear weapons technology to the Indians.
The non-aligned nations remained mostly uninvolved, and only the United Arab Republic openly supported India.[54] Of the non-aligned nations, six, Egypt, Burma, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Ghana and Indonesia, met in Colombo on 10 December 1962.[55] The proposals stipulated a Chinese withdrawal of 20 km from the customary lines without any reciprocal withdrawal on India's behalf.[55] The failure of these six nations to unequivocally condemn China deeply disappointed India.[54]
In 1972, Chinese Premier Zhou explained the Chinese point of view to President Nixon of the US. As for the causes of the war, Zhou asserted that China did not try to expel Indian troops from south of the McMahon line and that three open warning telegrams were sent to Nehru before the war. However, Indian patrols south of the McMahon line were expelled and suffered casualties in the Chinese attack.[56] Zhou also told Nixon that Chairman Mao ordered the troops to return to show good faith.[57] The Indian government maintains that the Chinese military could not advance further south due to logistical problems and the cut-off of resource supplies.
While Western nations did not view Chinese actions favourably because of fear of the Chinese and competitiveness,[8] Pakistan, which had had a turbulent relationship with India ever since the Indian partition, improved its relations with China after the war.[58] Prior to the war, Pakistan also shared a disputed boundary with China, and had proposed to India that the two countries adopt a common defence against "northern" enemies (i.e. China), which was rejected by India.[24] However, China and Pakistan took steps to peacefully negotiate their shared boundaries, beginning on 13 October 1962, and concluding in December of that year.[17] Pakistan also expressed fear that the huge amounts of western military aid directed to India would allow it to threaten Pakistan's security in future conflicts. Mohammed Ali, External Affairs Minister of Pakistan, declared that massive Western aid to India in the Sino-Indian dispute would be considered an unfriendly act towards Pakistan. As a result Pakistan made efforts to improve its relations with China. The following year, China and Pakistan peacefully settled disputes on their shared border, and negotiated the China-Pakistan Border Treaty in 1963, as well as trade, commercial, and barter treaties.[58] On 2 March 1963, Pakistan conceded its northern claim line in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir to China in favor of a more southerly boundary along the Karakoram Range.[17][55][58] The border treaty largely set the border along the MacCartney-Macdonald Line.[13] India's military failure against China would embolden Pakistan to initiate the Second Kashmir War with India. However, it effectively ended in a stalemate as Calvin states that the Sino-Indian War had caused the previously passive government to take a stand on actively modernising India's military.[8] China offered diplomatic support to Pakistan in this war but did not offer military support.[55] In January 1966, China condemned the Tashkent Agreement between India and Pakistan as a Soviet-US plot in the region.[55] In the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, Pakistan expected China to provide military support, but it was left alone as India successfully helped the rebels in East Pakistan to found the new nation-state of Bangladesh.[59]
Involvement of other nations
During the conflict, Nehru wrote two desperate letters to U.S. President John F. Kennedy, requesting 12 squadrons of fighter jets and a modern radar system. These jets were seen as necessary to beef up Indian air strength so that air to air combat could be initiated safely from the Indian perspective (bombing troops was seen as unwise for fear of Chinese retaliatory action). Nehru also asked that these aircraft be manned by American pilots until Indian airmen were trained to replace them. These requests were rejected by the Kennedy Administration (which was involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis during most of the Sino-Indian War). According to former Indian diplomat G Parthasarathy, "only after we got nothing from the US did arms supplies from the Soviet Union to India commence." [60] In 1962, President of Pakistan Ayub Khan made clear to India that Indian troops could safely be transferred from the Pakistan frontier to the Himalayas.[61]
Aftermath
China
According to the China's official military history, the war achieved China's policy objectives of securing borders in its western sector, as China retained de facto control of the Aksai Chin. After the war, India abandoned the Forward Policy, and the de facto borders stabilised along the Line of Actual Control.
According to James Calvin of Marine Corps Command and Staff College, even though China won a military victory it lost in terms of its international image.[8] China's first nuclear weapon test in October 1964 and her support of Pakistan in the 1965 India Pakistan War tended to confirm the American view of communist world objectives, including Chinese influence over Pakistan.[8]
Lora Saalman opined in a study of Chinese military publications, that while the war led to much blame, debates and ultimately acted as causation of military modernization of India but the war is now treated as basic reportage of facts with relatively diminished interest by Chinese analysts.[62]
India
The aftermath of the war saw sweeping changes in the Indian military to prepare it for similar conflicts in the future, and placed pressure on Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who was seen as responsible for failing to anticipate the Chinese attack on India. Indians reacted with a surge in patriotism and memorials were erected for many of the Indian troops who died in the war. Arguably, the main lesson India learned from the war was the need to strengthen its own defences and a shift from Nehru's foreign policy with China based on his stated concept of "brotherhood". Because of India's inability to anticipate Chinese aggression, Prime Minister Nehru faced harsh criticism from government officials, for having promoted pacifist relations with China.[17] Indian President Radhakrishnan said that Nehru's government was crude and negligent about preparations. Nehru admitted that Indians had been living in a world of own understanding. The Indian politicians spent considerable efforts on removing Defence Minister Krishna Menon for losing complete focus on pushing back the invaders. The Indian army was divided because of Krishna Menon's playing favorites, and overall 1962 war was seen as a combination of a military debacle and as bad a political disaster by Indians. Under American advice (by American envoy John Kenneth Galbraith who made and ran American policy on the war as all other top policy makers in USA were absorbed in coincident Cuban Missile Crisis[63]) Indians refrained, not according to the best choices available, from using the Indian air force to beat back the Chinese advances. The CIA later revealed that at that time the Chinese had neither the fuel nor runways long enough for using their air force effectively in Tibet.[35] Indians in general became highly sceptical of China and its military. Many Indians view the war as a betrayal of India's attempts at establishing a long-standing peace with China and started to question Nehru's usage of the term "Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai" (meaning "Indians and Chinese are brothers"). The war also put an end to Nehru's earlier hopes that India and China would form a strong Asian Axis to counteract the increasing influence of the Cold War bloc superpowers.[2]
The unpreparedness of the army was blamed on Defence Minister Menon, who resigned his government post to allow for someone who might modernise India's military further. India's policy of weaponisation via indigenous sources and self-sufficiency was thus cemented. Sensing a weakened army, Pakistan, a close ally of China, began a policy of provocation against India by infiltrating Jammu and Kashmir and ultimately triggering the Second Kashmir War with India in 1965 and Indo-Pakistani war of 1971. The Attack of 1965 was successfully stopped and ceasefire was negotiated under international pressure.[64] In the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 India won a clear victory, resulting in liberation of Bangladesh (formerly East-Pakistan).[65][66]
In 1967, there was a short border skirmish known as the Chola Incident between Chinese and Indian soldiers. In this incident 8 Chinese soldiers and 4 Indian soldiers were killed.[67]
British journalist Neville Maxwell, who was known for his pessimistic views on India [68][69][70] wrote that the "hopelessly ill-prepared Indian Army that provoked China on orders emanating from Delhi … paid the price for its misadventure in men, money and national humiliation".[71] As a result of the war, the Indian government commissioned an investigation, resulting in the classified Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat Report on the causes of the war and the reasons for failure. India's performance in high-altitude combat in 1962 led to an overhaul of the Indian Army in terms of doctrine, training, organisation and equipment. Maxwell also claimed that the Indian role in international affairs after the border war was also greatly reduced after the war and India's standing in the non-aligned movement suffered.[17]
According to James Calvin, an analyst from the U.S. Navy, India gained many benefits from the 1962 conflict. This war united the country as never before. India got 32,000 square miles (8.3 million hectares, 83,000sq.km.) of disputed territory even if she felt that NEFA was hers all along. The new Indian republic had avoided international alignments; by asking for help during the war, India demonstrated her willingness to accept military aid from several sectors. And, finally, India recognised the serious weaknesses in her army. She would more than double her military manpower in the next two years and she would work hard to resolve the military's training and logistic problems to later become the third-largest army in the world. India's efforts to improve her military posture significantly enhanced her army's capabilities and preparedness.[8] This played a role in subsequent wars against Pakistan.
Later skirmishes
India also reported a series of skirmishes after the 1962 war, which were never confirmed by China. One report provided by India shows that in late 1967, there were two skirmishes between Indian and Chinese forces in Sikkim. The first one was dubbed the "Nathu La incident", and the other the "Chola incident". Prior to these incidents had been the Naxalbari uprising in India by the Communist Naxalites and Maoists.[72]
Diplomatic process
In 1993 and 1996, the two sides signed the Sino-Indian Bilateral Peace and Tranquility Accords, agreements to maintain peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LoAC). Ten meetings of a Sino-Indian Joint Working Group (SIJWG) and five of an expert group have taken place to determine where the LoAC lies, but little progress has occurred.
On 20 November 2006 Indian politicians from Arunachal Pradesh expressed their concern over Chinese military modernization and appealed to parliament to take a harder stance on the PRC following a military buildup on the border similar to that in 1962.[73] Additionally, China's military aid to Pakistan as well is a matter of concern to the Indian public,[40] as the two sides have engaged in various wars.
On 6 July 2006, the historic Silk Road passing through this territory via the Nathu La pass was reopened. Both sides have agreed to resolve the issues by peaceful means.
In Oct 2011, it was stated that India and China will formulate a border mechanism to handle different perceptions as to the LAC and resume the bilateral army exercises between Indian and Chinese army from early 2012.[74][75]
In popular culture
- Australian author Jon Cleary wrote a novel set at the time of the conflict, The Pulse of Danger (1966).
- A Hindi movie Haqeeqat (1964) and a Tamil movie Ratha Thilagam (1963) were based on events of the Sino-Indian war.
- On June 27, 1963, against the backdrop of the Sino-Indian War, Lata Mangeshkar sang the patriotic song Ae Mere Watan Ke Logon (literally, "Oh, the People of My Country") in the presence of Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India. The song, composed by C. Ramchandra and written by Pradeep, is said to have brought the Prime Minister to tears.[76][77]
See also
Further reading
- Calvin, James Barnard (April 1984). "The China-India Border War". GlobalSecurity.org. Retrieved 2006-06-14.
- Lamb, Alastair (1964). The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries. L. Oxford University Press.
- Neville Maxwell's India's China War, Pantheon Books, USA, 1971
- Gunnar Myrdal. Asian Drama; An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. New York: Random House, 1968
- History of the Conflict with China, 1962. P.B. Sinha, A.A. Athale, with S.N. Prasad, chief editor, History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1992. — Official Indian history of the Sino-Indian War.
- Allen S. Whiting. The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina.
- The Sino-Indian Boundary Question [Enlarged Edition], Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1962
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External links
- Sino-Indian Border Dispute (Top Secret CIA report, 1964, Declassified 2007)
- Sino-Indian War (1962)
- Remembering a War: The 1962 India-China Conflict — Rediff.com.
- Neville Maxwell: Henderson Brooks Report
- 1962 Sino-Indian War, Hindustan Times
- Why India lost the 1962 border war? – Tejas Patel
- War in the Himalayas: 1962 Indo-Sino Conflict (includes official war history) from History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India
- Critical Asian Studies Article: Sino Indian War 1962
- India, China to speed up border dispute talks: 2005 Xinhuanet
- The Rediff Special/Claude Arpi
- 1962 War and Its Implications For Sino-India Relations
- History of Sino-India Border War (Chinese)
- Historical maps of the Sino-Indian border (Chinese)
- Conflict in Kashmir: Selected Internet Resources by the Library, University of California, Berkeley, USA; University of California, Berkeley Library Bibliographies and Web-Bibliographies list
- Frontier India India-China Section
- Why China is playing hardball in Arunachal by Venkatesan Vembu, Daily News & Analysis, 13 May 2007
- China, India, and the fruits of Nehru's folly by Venkatesan Vembu, Daily News & Analysis, 6 June 2007
South China Sea
| South China Sea | |||
|---|---|---|---|
 | |||
| A map of the South China Sea | |||
| Chinese name | |||
| Traditional Chinese | 南海 | ||
| Simplified Chinese | 南海 | ||
| Hanyu Pinyin | Nán Hǎi | ||
| Literal meaning | South Sea | ||
| |||
| Alternative Chinese name | |||
| Traditional Chinese | 南中國海 | ||
| Simplified Chinese | 南中国海 | ||
| Literal meaning | South China Sea | ||
| |||
| Vietnamese name | |||
| Vietnamese | Biển Đông (East Sea) | ||
| Chữ nôm | 匾東 | ||
| Thai name | |||
| Thai | ทะเลจีนใต้ [tʰáʔlēː tɕīːnáʔ tɑ̂i] (South China Sea) | ||
| Japanese name | |||
| Kanji | 南支那海 or 南シナ海 (literally "South Shina Sea") | ||
| Hiragana | みなみシナかい | ||
| |||
| Malay name | |||
| Malay | Laut Cina Selatan (South China Sea) | ||
| Indonesian name | |||
| Indonesian | Laut Cina Selatan / Laut Tiongkok Selatan (South China Sea) | ||
| Filipino name | |||
| Tagalog | Dagat Timog Tsina (South China Sea) Dagat Luzon (Luzon Sea) Dagat Kanlurang Pilipinas (West Philippine Sea)[1] | ||
| Portuguese name | |||
| Portuguese | Mar da China Meridional (South China Sea) | ||
The South China Sea is a marginal sea that is part of the Pacific Ocean, encompassing an area from the Singapore and Malacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan of around 3,500,000 square kilometres (1,400,000 sq mi). The area's importance largely results from one-third of the world's shipping transiting through its waters, and that it is believed to hold huge oil and gas reserves beneath its seabed.[2]
It is located
- south of mainland China and the island of Taiwan,
- west of the Philippines,
- north west of Sabah (Malaysia), Sarawak (Malaysia) and Brunei,
- north of Indonesia,
- north east of the Malay peninsula (Malaysia) and Singapore, and
- east of Vietnam.
The minute South China Sea Islands, collectively an archipelago, number in the hundreds. The sea and its mostly uninhabited islands are subject to competing claims of sovereignty by several countries. These claims are also reflected in the variety of names used for the islands and the sea.
Contents |
Names
South China Sea is the dominant term used in English for the sea, and the name in most European languages is equivalent, but it is sometimes called by different names in neighboring countries, often reflecting historical claims to hegemony over the sea.
The English name is a result of early European interest in the sea as a route from Europe and South Asia to the trading opportunities of China. In the sixteenth century Portuguese sailors called it the China Sea (Mar da China); later needs to differentiate it from nearby bodies of water led to calling it the South China Sea.[3] The International Hydrographic Organization refers to the sea as "South China Sea (Nan Hai)".[4]
The Yizhoushu, which was a chronicle of the Western Zhou dynasty (1046–771 BCE) gives the first Chinese name for the South China Sea as Nanfang Hai (Chinese: 南方海; pinyin: Nánfāng Hǎi; literally "Southern Sea"), claiming that barbarians from that sea gave tributes of hawksbill sea turtles to the Zhou rulers.[5] The Classic of Poetry, Zuo Zhuan, and Guoyu classics of the Spring and Autumn period (771-476 BCE) also referred to the sea, but by the name Nan Hai (Chinese: 南海; pinyin: Nán Hǎi; literally "South Sea") in reference to the State of Chu's expeditions there.[5] During the Eastern Han dynasty (23-220 CE), China's rulers called the Sea Zhang Hai (Chinese: 漲海; pinyin: Zhǎng Hǎi; literally "distended sea").[5] Fei Hai (Chinese: 沸海; pinyin: Fèi Hǎi; literally "boil sea") became popular during the Southern and Northern Dynasties period. Usage of the current Chinese name, Nan Hai (South Sea), became gradually widespread during the Qing Dynasty.[6]
In Southeast Asia it was once called the Champa Sea AKA Sea of Cham, after the maritime kingdom of Champa that flourished there before the sixteenth century. The majority of the sea came under Japanese naval control during World War II following the military acquisition of many surrounding South East Asian territories in 1941. Japan calls the sea Minami Shina Kai "South China Sea". This was written 南支那海 until 2004, when the Japanese Foreign Ministry and other departments switched the spelling 南シナ海, which has become the standard usage in Japan.
In China, it is called the "South Sea", 南海 Nánhǎi, and in Vietnam the "East Sea", Biển Đông.[7][8][9] In Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, it was long called the "South China Sea" (Dagat Timog Tsina in Tagalog, Laut China Selatan in Malay), with the part within Philippine territorial waters often called the "Luzon Sea", Dagat Luzon, by the Philippines.[10] However, following an escalation of the Spratly Islands dispute in 2011, various Philippine government agencies started using the name "West Philippine Sea". A PAGASA spokesperson said that the sea to the east of the Philippines will continue to be called the Philippine Sea.[11]
In September 2012, Philippine President Benigno Aquino III signed Administrative Order No. 29, mandating that all government agencies use the name "West Philippine Sea" to refer to the parts of the South China Sea within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone, and tasked the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) to use the name in official maps to bolster the Philippines' claims to the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal.[12]
Geography
States and territories with borders on the sea (clockwise from north) include: the People's Republic of China (including Macau and Hong Kong), the Republic of China (Taiwan), the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam.
Major rivers that flow into the South China Sea include the Pearl, Min, Jiulong, Red, Mekong, Rajang, Pahang, Pampanga, and Pasig Rivers.
Extent
The International Hydrographic Organization defines the limits of the South China Sea as follows:[4]
On the South. The Eastern and Southern limits of Singapore and Malacca Straits [A line joining Tanjong Datok, the Southeast point of Johore (1°22′N 104°17′E) through Horsburgh Reef to Pulo Koko, the Northeastern extreme of Bintan Island (1°13.5′N 104°35′E). The Northeastern coast of Sumatra] as far West as Tanjong Kedabu (1°06′N 102°58′E) down the East coast of Sumatra to Lucipara Point (3°14′S 106°05′E) thence to Tanjong Nanka, the Southwest extremity of Banka Island, through this island to Tanjong Berikat the Eastern point (2°34′S 106°51′E), on to Tanjong Djemang (2°36′S 107°37′E) in Billiton, along the North coast of this island to Tanjong Boeroeng Mandi (2°46′S 108°16′E) and thence a line to Tanjong Sambar (3°00′S 110°19′E) the Southwest extreme of Borneo.
On the East. From Tanjong Sambar through the West coast of Borneo to Tanjong Sampanmangio, the North point, thence a line to West points of Balabac and Secam Reefs, on to the West point of Bancalan Island and to Cape Buliluyan, the Southwest point of Palawan, through this island to Cabuli Point, the Northern point thereof, thence to the Northwest point of Busuanga and to Cape Calavite in the island of Mindoro, to the Northwest point of Lubang Island and to Point Fuego (14°08'N) in Luzon Island, through this island to Cape Engano, the Northeast point of Luzon, along a line joining this cape with the East point of Balintang Island (20°N) and to the East point of Y'Ami Island (21°05'N) thence to Garan Bi, the Southern point of Taiwan (Formosa), through this island to Santyo (25°N) its North Eastern Point.
On the North. From Fuki Kaku the North point of Formosa to Kiushan Tao (Turnabout Island) on to the South point of Haitan Tao (25°25'N) and thence Westward on the parallel of 25°24' North to the coast of Fukien.
On the West. The Mainland, the Southern limit of the Gulf of Thailand and the East coast of the Malay Peninsula.
Geology
 | This section does not cite any references or sources. (September 2012) |
The sea lies above a drowned continental shelf; during recent ice ages global sea level was hundreds of metres lower, and Borneo was part of the Asian mainland.
The South China Sea opened after around 45 million years ago when the Dangerous Grounds (Reed Tablemount) were rifted away from southern China. Extension culminated in seafloor spreading around 30 million years ago, a process that propagated to the SW resulting in the V-shaped basin we see today. Extension ceased around 17 million years ago. Arguments have continued about the role of tectonic extrusion in forming the basin. Paul Tapponnier and colleagues have argued that as India collides with Asia it pushes Indochina to the SE. The relative shear between Indochina and China caused the South China Sea to open. This view is disputed by geologists who do not consider Indochina to have moved far relative to mainland Asia. Recent marine geophysical studies by Peter Clift has shown that the Red River Fault was active and causing basin formation at least by 37 million years ago in the NW South China Sea, consistent with extrusion playing a part in the formation of the sea. Since opening the South China Sea has been the repository of large sediment volumes delivered by the Mekong River, Red River and Pearl River. Several of these deltas are rich in oil and gas deposits.
Islands and seamounts
The South China Sea contains over 250 small islands, atolls, cays, shoals, reefs, and sandbars, most of which have no indigenous people, many of which are naturally under water at high tide, and some of which are permanently submerged. The features are grouped into three archipelagos (listed by area size), Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal:
- The Spratly Islands
- The Paracel Islands
- The Pratas Islands
- The Macclesfield Bank
- The Scarborough Shoal
The Spratly Islands spread over an 810 by 900 km area covering some 175 identified insular features, the largest being Taiping Island (Itu Aba) at just over 1.3 km long and with its highest elevation at 3.8 metres.
The largest singular feature in the area of the Spratly Islands is a 100 km wide seamount called Reed Tablemount, also known as Reed Bank, in the northeast of the group, separated from Palawan Island of the Philippines by the Palawan Trench. Now completely submerged, with a depth of 20 m, it was an island until it sank about 7,000 years ago due to the increasing sea level after the last ice age. With an area of 8,866 km², it is one of the largest submerged atoll structures of the world.
Resources
It is an extremely significant body of water in a geopolitical sense. It is the second most used sea lane in the world, while in terms of world annual merchant fleet tonnage, over 50% passes through the Strait of Malacca, the Sunda Strait, and the Lombok Strait. Over 1.6 million m³ (10 million barrels) of crude oil a day are shipped through the Strait of Malacca, where there are regular reports of piracy, but much less frequently than before the mid-20th century.
The region has proven oil reserves of around 1.2 km³ (7.7 billion barrels), with an estimate of 4.5 km³ (28 billion barrels) in total. Natural gas reserves are estimated to total around 7,500 km³ (266 trillion cubic feet).
According to studies made by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Philippines, this body of water holds one third of the entire world's marine biodiversity, thereby making it a very important area for the ecosystem. However the fish stocks in the area are depleted, and countries are using fishing bans as a means of asserting their sovereignty claims.[13]
Territorial claims
Several countries have made competing territorial claims over the South China Sea. Such disputes have been regarded as Asia's most potentially dangerous point of conflict. Both People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) claim almost the entire body as their own, demarcating their claims within what is known as the nine-dotted line, which claims overlap with virtually every other country in the region. Competing claims include:
- Indonesia, China, and Taiwan over waters NE of the Natuna Islands
- The Philippines, China, and Taiwan over Scarborough Shoal.
- Vietnam, China, and Taiwan over waters west of the Spratly Islands. Some or all of the islands themselves are also disputed between Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines.
- The Paracel Islands are disputed between the PRC/ROC and Vietnam.
- Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam over areas in the Gulf of Thailand.
- Singapore and Malaysia along the Strait of Johore and the Strait of Singapore.
China and Vietnam have both been vigorous in prosecuting their claims. The People's Republic of China and South Vietnam each controlled part of the Paracel Islands before 1974. A brief conflict in 1974 resulted in 18 soldiers being killed, and China has controlled the whole of Paracel since then.[citation needed] The Spratly Islands have been the site of a naval clash, in which over seventy Vietnamese sailors were killed just south of Chigua Reef in March 1988. Disputing claimants regularly report clashes between naval vessels.[citation needed]
ASEAN in general, and Malaysia in particular, has been keen to ensure that the territorial disputes within the South China Sea do not escalate into armed conflict. As such, Joint Development Authorities have been set up in areas of overlapping claims to jointly develop the area and dividing the profits equally without settling the issue of sovereignty over the area. This is true, particularly in the Gulf of Thailand. Generally, China has preferred to resolve competing claims bi-laterally,[14] while some ASEAN countries prefer multi-lateral talks,[15] believing that they are disadvantaged in bi-lateral negotiations with the much larger China and that because many countries claim the same territory only multilateral talks could effectively resolve the competing claims.[16]
The overlapping claims over Pedra Branca or Pulau Batu Putih including neighboring Middle Rocks by both Singapore and Malaysia were settled in 2008 by the International Court of Justice, awarding Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh to Singapore and Middle Rocks to Malaysia.
In July 2010, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for the Peoples Republic of China to resolve the territorial dispute. China responded by demanding the US keep out of the issue. This came at a time when both countries have been engaging in naval exercises in a show of force to the opposing side, which increased tensions in the region.[17] The US Department of Defense released a statement on August 18 where it opposed the use of force to resolve the dispute, and accused China of assertive behaviour.[18]
In May 2011, Chinese naval ships attacked and cut the cable of Vietnamese oil exploration ship. This incidence sparked several protests against China in Vietnam.[19]
On July 22, 2011, one of India's amphibious assault vessels, the INS Airavat which was on a friendly visit to Vietnam, was reportedly contacted at a distance of 45 nautical miles from the Vietnamese coast in the disputed South China Sea on an open radio channel by a vessel identifying itself as the Chinese Navy and stating that the ship was entering Chinese waters.[20][21] The spokesperson for the Indian Navy clarified that as no ship or aircraft was visible from INS Airavat it proceeded on her onward journey as scheduled. The Indian Navy further clarified that "[t]here was no confrontation involving the INS Airavat. India supports freedom of navigation in international waters, including in the South China Sea, and the right of passage in accordance with accepted principles of international law. These principles should be respected by all." [20]
In September 2011, shortly after China and Vietnam had signed an agreement seeking to contain a dispute over the South China Sea, India's state-run explorer, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) said that its overseas investment arm ONGC Videsh Limited had signed a three-year deal with PetroVietnam for developing long-term cooperation in the oil sector and that it had accepted Vietnam's offer of exploration in certain specified blocks in the South China Sea.[22] In response, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu issued a protest.[23][24] The spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India responded by saying that "The Chinese had concerns but we are going by what the Vietnamese authorities have told us and have conveyed this to the Chinese."[23] The Indo-Vietnamese deal was also denounced by the Chinese state-run newspaper Global Times.[22][24]
See also
References
- ^ Pacpaco, Ryan Ponce (2012 [last update]). "Rename South China Sea -- solon | National". journal.com.ph. Retrieved 29 September 2012.
- ^ A look at the top issues at Asian security meeting Associated Press, ROBIN McDOWELL, July 21, 2011. Retrieved September 27, 2012 (archived from the original on 2011-07-23)
- ^ Tønnesson, Stein (2005). Locating the South China Sea. In Kratoska, Paul et al., eds. Locating Southeast Asia: geographies of knowledge and politics of space. Singapore: Singapore University Press. p. 203-233.
- ^ a b "Limits of Oceans and Seas, 3rd edition". International Hydrographic Organization. 1953. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
- ^ a b c Shen, Jianming (2002). "China's Sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands: A Historical Perspective". Chinese Journal of International Law 1 (1): 94-157.
- ^ 华林甫 (Hua Linfu), 2006. 插图本中国地名史话 (An illustrated history of Chinese place names). 齊鲁書社 (Qilu Publishing), page 197. ISBN 7533315464
- ^ "VN and China pledge to maintain peace and stability in East Sea". Socialist Republic of Vietnam Government Web Portal.
- ^ "FM Spokesperson on FIR control over East Sea". Embassy of Vietnam in USA. March 11, 2001.
- ^ "The Map of Vietnam". Socialist Republic of Vietnam Government Web Portal. Archived from the original on 2006-10-06.
- ^ John Zumerchik; Steven Laurence Danver (2010). Seas and Waterways of the World: An Encyclopedia of History, Uses, and Issues. ABC-CLIO. p. 259. ISBN 978-1-85109-711-1.
- ^ Quismundo, Tarra (2011-06-13). "South China Sea renamed in the Philippines". Philippine Daily Inquirer. Retrieved 2011-06-14.
- ^ West Philippine Sea Limited To Exclusive Economic Zone | The Manila Bulletin Newspaper Online
- ^ Schearf, Daniel. "S. China Sea Dispute Blamed Partly on Depleted Fish Stocks." VOA, May 16, 2012.
- ^ Direct bilateral dialogue 'best way to solve disputes' - China.org.cn
- ^ Resolving S.China Sea disputes pivotal to stability: Clinton archived from the original on 2010-07-27)
- ^ Wong, Edward (February 5, 2010). "Vietnam Enlists Allies to Stave Off China's Reach". The New York Times.
- ^ [1][dead link]
- ^ [2][dead link]
- ^ Chinese patrol boats confront Vietnamese oil exploration ship in South China Sea
- ^ a b DNA: India-China face-off in South China Sea
- ^ South Asia Analysis Group
- ^ a b Reuters: China paper warns India off Vietnam oil deal
- ^ a b South Asia Analysis Group[ [3]
- ^ a b The Hindu: China warns India on South China Sea exploration projects
Further reading
- Clive Schofield et al., From Disputed Waters to Seas of Opportunity: Overcoming Barriers to Maritime Cooperation in East and Southeast Asia (July 2011)
- C.Michael Hogan (2011) South China Sea Topic ed. P.Saundry. Ed.-in-chief C.J.Cleveland. Encyclopedia of Earth. National Council for Science and the Environment. Washington DC
- UNEP (2007). Review of the Legal Aspects of Environmental Management in the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand. UNEP/GEF/SCS Technical Publication No. 9.
- Keyan Zou (2005). Law of the sea in East Asia: issues and prospects. London/New York: Rutledge Curzon. ISBN 0-415-35074-3
- Wang, Gungwu (2003). The Nanhai Trade: Early Chinese Trade in the South China Sea. Marshall Cavendish International. ISBN 9789812102416.
External links
 | Wikimedia Commons has media related to: South China Sea |
- ASEAN and the South China Sea: Deepening Divisions Q&A with Ian J. Storey (July 2012)
- Rising Tensions in the South China Sea, June 2011 Q&A with Ian J. Storey
- News collections on The South China Sea on China Digital Times
- The South China Sea on Google Earth - featured on Google Earth's Official Blog
- South China Sea Virtual Library - online resource for students, scholars and policy-makers interested in South China Sea regional development, environment, and security issues.
- Energy Information Administration - The South China Sea
- Tropical Research and Conservation Centre - The South China Sea
- Weekly Piracy Report[dead link]
- Reversing Environmental Degradation Trends in the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand
- UNEP/GEF South China Sea Knowledge Documents
China–India relations
 | This article needs additional citations for verification. (January 2010) |
| China-India relations | |
 | |
 India |  China |
Sino-Indian relations, also called Indo-China relations, refers to the bilateral relationship between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of India. Relations began in 1950 when India was among the first countries to break relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan and recognize the PRC. China and India are the world's most populous countries and also fastest growing major economies. The resultant growth in China and India's global diplomatic and economic influence has also increased the significance of their bilateral relationship.
China and India are two of the world's oldest civilizations and have coexisted in peace for millennia.[1] Cultural and economic relations between China and India date back to ancient times. The Silk Road not only served as a major trade route between India and China, but is also credited for facilitating the spread of Buddhism from India to East Asia.[2] During the 19th century, China's growing opium trade with the British Raj triggered the Opium Wars.[2] During World War II, India and China played a crucial role in halting the progress of Imperial Japan.[3]
Relations between contemporary China and India have been characterized by border disputes, resulting in three major military conflicts — the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the Chola incident in 1967, and the 1987 Sino-Indian skirmish.[1] However, since late 1980s, both countries have successfully attempted to reignite diplomatic and economic ties. In 2008, China emerged as the largest trading partner of India and the two countries have also attempted to extend their strategic and military relations.[4][5][6]
Despite growing economic and strategic ties, several issues continue to strain Sino-Indian relations. Though bilateral trade has continuously grown, India faces massive trade imbalance heavily in favor of China.[6] The two countries have failed to resolve their long-standing border dispute and Indian media outlets repeatedly report Chinese military incursions into Indian territory.[7] Both nations have steadily built-up military infrastructure along border areas.[7][8] Additionally, India harbors suspicions about China's strong strategic relations with its arch-rival Pakistan[9] while China has expressed concerns about Indian military and economic activities in disputed South China Sea.[10]
Recently, China has said that "Sino-Indian ties" would be the most "important bilateral partnership of the century".[11] On June 21, 2012, Wen Jiabao, the Premier of China and Manmohan Singh, the Prime Minister of India set a goal to increase bilateral trade between the two countries to 100 billion dollars by 2015 [12]
Contents |
Geographical overview
(The border between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India over Arunachal Pradesh/South Tibet reflects actual control, without dotted line showing claims.)
China and India are separated by the formidable geographical obstacles of the Himalayan mountain chain. China and India today share a border along the Himalayas and Nepal and Bhutan, two states lying along the Himalaya range, and acting as buffer states. In addition, the disputed Kashmir province of India (claimed by Pakistan) borders both the PRC and India. As Pakistan has tense relations with India, Kashmir's state of unrest serves as a natural ally to the PRC.[citation needed]
Two territories are currently disputed between the People's Republic of China and India: Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. Arunachal Pradesh is located near the far east of India, while Aksai Chin is located near the northwest corner of India, at the junction of India, Pakistan, and the PRC. However, all sides in the dispute have agreed to respect the Line of Actual Control and this border dispute is not widely seen as a major flashpoint.
Country comparison
 India |  China | |
|---|---|---|
| Population | 1,210,193,422[13] | 1,339,724,852 (2010 Census) |
| Area | 3,287,240 km² (1,269,210 sq mi) | 9,640,821 km² (3,704,427 sq mi) |
| Population density | 382/km² (922/sq mi) | 139.6/km² (363.3/sq mi) |
| Capital | New Delhi | Beijing |
| Largest city | Mumbai | Shanghai |
| Government | Federal republic (Formerly Socialist until 1991), Parliamentary democracy | Socialist, Single-party state |
| Official languages | Hindi, English, Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Kannada, Kashmiri, Konkani, Malayalam, Marathi, Manipuri, Nepali, Oriya, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Tamil, Telugu and Urdu (See Languages with official status in India) | Standard Chinese, Mongolian, Tibetan, Uyghur, Zhuang (See Languages of China) |
| Main religions | 80.5% Hinduism, 13.4% Islam, 2.3% Christianity, 1.9% Sikhism, 0.8% Buddhism, 0.4% Jainism[14] | N/A |
| GDP (nominal) | US$1.848 trillion | US$7.298 trillion |
| GDP (nominal) per capita | US$1,389 | US$5,413 |
| GDP (PPP) | US$4.548 trillion | US$11.3 trillion |
| GDP (PPP) per capita | US$3,694 | US$10,382 |
| Human Development Index | 0.547 (medium) | 0.663 (medium) |
| Foreign exchange reserves | 289,737 (millions of USD) | 3,285,090 (millions of USD) |
| Military expenditures | US$46.8 billion (1.83% of GDP) | US$140 billion (2012) (1.3% of GDP) |
| Manpower | Active Troops: 1,325,000 (1,155,100 Reserve personnel) | Active Troops: approximately 2,285,000 (800,000 Reserve Personnel) |
Early history
Antiquity
India and China had relatively little modern political contact before the 1950s. However, both countries have had extensive and close historical cultural contact since the 1st century, especially with the transmission of Buddhism from India to China. Trade relations via the Silk Road acted as economic contact between the two regions.
China and India have also had some contact before the transmission of Buddhism. References to a people called the Chinas, now believed to be the Chinese, are found in ancient Indian literature. The Indian epic Mahabharata (c. 5th century BC) contains references to "China", which may have been referring to the Qin state which later became the Qin Dynasty. Chanakya (c. 350-283 BC), the prime minister of the Maurya Empire and a professor at Takshashila University, refers to Chinese silk as "cinamsuka" (Chinese silk dress) and "cinapatta" (Chinese silk bundle) in his Arthashastra.
In the Records of the Grand Historian, Zhang Qian (d. 113 BC) and Sima Qian (145-90 BC) make references to "Shendu", which may have been referring to the Indus Valley (the Sindh province in modern Pakistan), originally known as "Sindhu" in Sanskrit. When Yunnan was annexed by the Han Dynasty in the 1st century, Chinese authorities reported an Indian "Shendu" community living there.[16]
Middle Ages
After the transmission of Buddhism from India to China from the 1st century onwards, many Indian scholars and monks travelled to China, such as Batuo (fl. 464-495 AD)—founder of the Shaolin Monastery—and Bodhidharma—founder of Chan/Zen Buddhism—while many Chinese scholars and monks also travelled to India, such as Xuanzang (b. 604) and I Ching (635-713), both of whom were students at Nalanda University in Bihar. Xuanzang wrote the Great Tang Records on the Western Regions, an account of his journey to India, which later inspired Wu Cheng'en's Ming Dynasty novel Journey to the West, one of the Four Great Classical Novels of Chinese literature.
Tang and Harsha dynasties
During the 7th century, Tang Dynasty China gained control over large portions of the Silk Road and Central Asia. Wang Xuance had sent a diplomatic mission to northern India, which was embroiled by civil war just following the death of Emperor Harsha (590–647). After the murder of 30 members of this mission by usurper claiments to the throne, Wang fled, and returned with allied Nepali and Tibetan troops to back the opposing claimant. With his forces, Wang besieged and captured the capital, while his deputy Jiang Shiren (蒋师仁) captured the usurper and sent him back to Emperor Tang Taizong (599-649) in Chang'an as a prisoner.
During the 8th century, the astronomical table of sines by the Indian astronomer and mathematician, Aryabhata (476-550), were translated into the Chinese astronomical and mathematical book of the Treatise on Astrology of the Kaiyuan Era (Kaiyuan Zhanjing), compiled in 718 AD during the Tang Dynasty.[17] The Kaiyuan Zhanjing was compiled by Gautama Siddha, an astronomer and astrologer born in Chang'an, and whose family was originally from India. He was also notable for his translation of the Navagraha calendar into Chinese.
Ming dynasty
Between 1405 and 1433, the Ming Dynasty China sponsored a series of seven naval expeditions. Emperor Yongle designed them to establish a Chinese presence, impose imperial control over trade, and impress foreign people in the Indian Ocean basin. He also might have wanted to extend the tributary system, by which Chinese dynasties traditionally recognized foreign peoples.
Admiral Zheng He was dispatched to lead a series of huge naval expeditions to explore these regions. The largest of his voyages included over 317 ships and 28,000 men, and the largest of his treasure ships were over 126.73 m in length. During his voyages, he visited numerous Indian kingdoms and ports. On the first three voyages, Zheng He visited southeast Asia, India, and Ceylon. The fourth expedition went to the Persian Gulf and Arabia, and later expeditions ventured down the east African coast, as far as Malindi in what is now Kenya. Throughout his travels, Zheng He liberally dispensed Chinese gifts of silk, porcelain, and other goods. In return, he received rich and unusual presents from his hosts, including African zebras and giraffes that ended their days in the Ming imperial zoo. Zheng He and his company paid respects to local deities and customs, and in Ceylon they erected a monument (Galle Trilingual Inscription) honouring Buddha, Allah, and Vishnu.
Sino-Sikh War
In the 18th to 19th centuries, the Sikh Confederacy of the Punjab region in India was expanding into neighbouring lands. It had annexed Ladakh into the state of Jammu in 1834. In 1841, they invaded Tibet with an army and overran parts of western Tibet. Chinese forces defeated the Sikh army in December 1841, forcing the Sikh army to withdraw from Tibet, and in turn entered Ladakh and besieged Leh, where they were in turn defeated by the Sikh Army. At this point, neither side wished to continue the conflict, as the Sikhs were embroiled in tensions with the British that would lead up to the First Anglo-Sikh War, while the Chinese was in the midst of the First Opium War with the British East India Company. The Chinese and the Sikhs signed a treaty in September 1842, which stipulated no transgressions or interference in the other country's frontiers.[18]
After independence
Jawaharlal Nehru based his vision of "resurgent Asia" on friendship between the two largest states of Asia; his vision of an internationalist foreign policy governed by the ethics of the Panchsheel, which he initially believed was shared by China, came to grief when it became clear that the two countries had a conflict of interest in Tibet, which had traditionally served as a geographical and political buffer zone, and where India believed it had inherited special privileges from the British Raj.
However, the initial focus of the leaders of both the nations was not the foreign policy, but the internal development of their respective states. When they did concentrate on the foreign policies, their concern wasn't one another, but rather the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the alliance systems which were dominated by the two superpowers.
1950s
On October 1, 1949 the People's Liberation Army defeated the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) of China in a civil war and established the People's Republic of China. On August 15, 1947, India became an independent dominion under British Commonwealth and became a federal, democratic republic after its constitution came into effect on January 26, 1950. Mao Zedong, the Commander of the Liberation Army and the Chairman of the Communist Party of China viewed Tibet as an integral part of the Chinese State. Mao was determined to bring Tibet under direct administrative and military control of People's Republic of China and saw Indian concern over Tibet as a manifestation of the Indian Government's interference in the internal affairs of the People's Republic of China. The PRC sought to reassert control over Tibet and to end Lamaism (Tibetan Buddhism) and feudalism, which it did by force of arms in 1950. To avoid antagonizing the People's Republic of China, Nehru informed Chinese leaders that India had neither political nor territorial ambitions, nor did it seek special privileges in Tibet, but that traditional trading rights must continue. With Indian support, Tibetan delegates signed an agreement in May 1951 recognizing PRC sovereignty but guaranteeing that the existing political and social system of Tibet would continue. Direct negotiations between India and the PRC commenced in an atmosphere improved by India's mediation efforts in ending the Korean War (1950–1953).
Meanwhile, India was the 16th state to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, and did so on April 1, 1950.
In April 1954, India and the PRC signed an eight-year agreement on Tibet that set forth the basis of their relationship in the form of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (or Panch Shila). Although critics called the Panch Shila naive, Nehru calculated that in the absence of either the wherewithal or a policy for defense of the Himalayan region, India's best guarantee of security was to establish a psychological buffer zone in place of the lost physical buffer of Tibet. It is the popular perception that the catch phrase of India's diplomacy with China in the 1950s was Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai, which means, in Hindi, "Indians and Chinese are brothers" but there is evidence to suggest that Nehru did not trust the Chinese at all.[19] Therefore, in unison with diplomacy, Nehru sought to initiate a more direct dialogues between the peoples of China and India in various ways, including culture and literature. Around that time, the famous Indian artist (painter) Beohar Rammanohar Sinha from Visva-BharatiSantiniketan, who had earlier decorated the pages of the original Constitution of India, was sent to China in 1957 on a Government of India fellowship to establish a direct cross-cultural and inter-civilization bridge. Noted Indian scholar Rahul Sankrityayan and diplomat Natwar Singh were also there, and Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan paid a visit to PRC. Between 1957 and 1959, Beohar Rammanohar Sinha not only disseminated Indian art in PRC but also became skilled in Chinese painting and lacquer-work. He also spent time with great masters Qi Baishi, Li Keran, Li Kuchan as well as some moments with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Consequently, up until 1959, despite border skirmishes and discrepancies between Indian and Chinese maps, Chinese leaders amicably had assured India that there was no territorial controversy on the border though there is some evidence that India avoided bringing up the border issue in high level meetings.[20]
In 1954, India published new maps that included the Aksai Chin region within the boundaries of India (maps published at the time of India's independence did not clearly indicate whether the region was in India or Tibet).[21] When an Indian reconnaissance party discovered a completed Chinese road running through the Aksai Chin region of the Ladakh District of Jammu and Kashmir, border clashes and Indian protests became more frequent and serious. In January 1959, PRC premier Zhou Enlai wrote to Nehru, rejecting Nehru's contention that the border was based on treaty and custom and pointing out that no government in China had accepted as legal the McMahon Line, which in the 1914 Simla Convention defined the eastern section of the border between India and Tibet. The Dalai Lama, spiritual and temporal head of the Tibetan people, sought sanctuary in Dharmsala, Himachal Pradesh, in March 1959, and thousands of Tibetan refugees settled in northwestern India, particularly in Himachal Pradesh. The People's Republic of China accused India of expansionism and imperialism in Tibet and throughout the Himalayan region. China claimed 104,000 km² of territory over which India's maps showed clear sovereignty, and demanded "rectification" of the entire border.
Zhou proposed that China relinquish its claim to most of India's northeast in exchange for India's abandonment of its claim to Aksai Chin. The Indian government, constrained by domestic public opinion, rejected the idea of a settlement based on uncompensated loss of territory as being humiliating and unequal.
1960s
Sino-Indian War
Border disputes resulted in a short border war between the People's Republic of China and India in 20 October 1962. The PRC pushed the unprepared and inadequately led Indian forces to within forty-eight kilometres of the Assam plains in the northeast and occupied strategic points in Ladakh, until the PRC declared a unilateral cease-fire on 21 November and withdrew twenty kilometers behind its contended line of control.
At the time of Sino-Indian border conflict, a severe political split was taking place in the Communist Party of India. One section was accused by the Indian government as being pro-PRC, and a large number of political leaders were jailed. Subsequently, CPI split with the leftist section forming the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in 1964. CPI(M) held some contacts with the Communist Party of China in the initial period after the split, but did not fully embrace the political line of Mao Zedong.
Relations between the PRC and India deteriorated during the rest of the 1960s and the early 1970s as Sino-Pakistani relations improved and Sino-Soviet relations worsened. The PRC backed Pakistan in its 1965 war with India. Between 1967 and 1971, an all-weather road was built across territory claimed by India, linking PRC's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region with Pakistan; India could do no more than protest, however 1971 war with Pakistan India won a landslide victory. The PRC continued an active propaganda campaign against India and supplied ideological, financial, and other assistance to dissident groups, especially to tribes in northeastern India. The PRC accused India of assisting the Khampa rebels in Tibet. Diplomatic contact between the two governments was minimal although not formally severed. The flow of cultural and other exchanges that had marked the 1950s ceased entirely. The flourishing wool, fur and spice trade between Lhasa and India through the Nathula Pass, an offshoot of the ancient Silk Road in the then Indian protectorate of Sikkim was also severed. However, the biweekly postal network through this pass was kept alive, which exists till today.
Later skirmishes
In late 1967, there were two skirmishes between Indian and Chinese forces in Sikkim. The first one was dubbed the "Nathu La incident", and the other the "Chola incident". Prior to these incidents had been the Naxalbari uprising in India by the Communist Naxalites and Maoists.[22]
In 1967, a peasant uprising broke out in Naxalbari, led by pro-Maoist elements. A pronunciation by Mao titled "Spring Thunder over India" gave full moral support for the uprising. The support for the revolt marked the end for the relations between CPC and CPI(M). Naxalbari-inspired communists organized armed revolts in several parts of India, and in 1969 they formed the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist). However, as the naxalite movement disintegrated in various splits, the PRC withdrew its political support and turned non-committal towards the various Indian groups.
On 11 September 1967, troops of the Indian Army's 2nd Grenadiers were protecting an Engineering Company that was fencing the North Shoulder of Nathu La, when Chinese troops opened fire on them. This escalated over the next five days to an exchange of heavy artillery and mortar fire between the Indians and the Chinese. 62 Indian soldiers, from the 2nd Grenadiers and the Artillery regiments were killed.[23] Brigadier Rai Singh Yadav, the Commanding Officer, was awarded the MVC and Capt PS Dager was awarded a Vir Chakra (posthumous) for their gallant actions. The extent of Chinese casualties in this incident is not known.
In the second incident, on 1 October 1967, a group of Indian Gurkha Rifles soldiers (from the 7th Battalion of the 11th Regiment) noticed Chinese troops surrounding a sentry post near a boulder at the Chola outpost in Sikkim. After a heated argument over the control of the boulder, a Chinese soldier bayoneted a Gurkha rifleman, triggering the start of a close-quarters knife and fire-fight, which then escalated to a mortar and HMG duel.[24] The Chinese troops had to signal a ceasefire just after three hours of fighting, but later scaled Point 15450 to establish themselves there.[24] The Gurkhas outflanked them the next day to regain Point 15450, and the Chinese retreated across the LAC.[24] 21 Indian soldiers were killed in this action.[23] The Indian government awarded Vir Chakras to Rifleman Limbu (posthumous) and battalion commander Major K.B. Joshi for their gallant actions. The extent of Chinese casualties in this skirmish is also not known.
1970s
In August 1971, India signed its Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation[disambiguation needed] with the Soviet Union, and the United States and the PRC sided with Pakistan in its December 1971 war with India. Although China strongly condemned India, it did not carry out its veiled threat to intervene on Pakistan's behalf. By this time, the PRC had just replaced the Republic of China in the UN where its representatives denounced India as being a "tool of Soviet expansionism."
India and the PRC renewed efforts to improve relations after Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's Congress party lost the 1977 elections to Morarji Desai's Janata Party. The new Desai government sought to improve long-strained relations with India and the PRC. In 1978, the Indian Minister of External Affairs Atal Bihari Vajpayee made a landmark visit to Beijing, and both nations officially re-established diplomatic relations in 1979. The PRC modified its pro-Pakistan stand on Kashmir and appeared willing to remain silent on India's absorption of Sikkim and its special advisory relationship with Bhutan. The PRC's leaders agreed to discuss the boundary issue, India's priority, as the first step to a broadening of relations. The two countries hosted each other's news agencies, and Mount Kailash and Mansarowar Lake in Tibet, the mythological home of the Hindu pantheon, were opened to annual pilgrimages
1980s
In 1981 PRC minister of foreign affairs Huang Hua[disambiguation needed] was invited to India, where he made complimentary remarks about India's role in South Asia. PRC premier Zhao Ziyang concurrently toured Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh.
In 1980, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi approved a plan to upgrade the deployment of forces around the Line of Actual Control to avoid unilateral redefinitions of the line. India also increased funds for infrastructural development in these areas.[25][26]
In 1984, squads of Indian soldiers began actively patrolling the Sumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh (formerly NEFA), which is north of the McMahon Line as drawn on the Simla Treaty map but south of the ridge which Indian claims is meant to delineate the McMahon Line. The Sumdorong Chu valley "seemed to lie to the north of the McMahon line; but is south of the highest ridge in the area, and the McMahon line is meant to follow the highest points" according to the Indian claims, while the Chinese did not recognize the McMahon Line as legitimate and were not prepared to accept an Indian claim line even further north than that.[27][28][29] The Indian team left the area before the winter. In the winter of 1986, the Chinese deployed their troops to the Sumdorong Chu before the Indian team could arrive in the summer and built a Helipad at Wandung.[30] Surprised by the Chinese occupation, India's then Chief of Army Staff, General K.Sundarji, airlifted a brigade to the region.[26][31]
Chinese troops could not move any further into the valley and were forced to move sideways along the Thag La ridge, away from the valley.[32] By 1987, Beijing's reaction was similar to that in 1962 and this prompted many Western diplomats to predict war. However, Indian foreign minister N.D. Tiwari and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi travelled to Beijing over the following months to negotiate a mutual de-escalation.[26]
After the Huang visit, India and the PRC held eight rounds of border negotiations between December 1981 and November 1987. These talks initially raised hopes that progress could be made on the border issue. However, in 1985 the PRC stiffened its position on the border and insisted on mutual concessions without defining the exact terms of its "package proposal" or where the actual line of control lay. In 1986 and 1987, the negotiations achieved nothing, given the charges exchanged between the two countries of military encroachment in the Sumdorung Chu Valley of the Tawang tract on the eastern sector of the border. China's construction of a military post and helicopter pad in the area in 1986 and India's grant of statehood to Arunachal Pradesh (formerly the North-East Frontier Agency) in February 1987 caused both sides to deploy new troops to the area, raising tensions and fears of a new border war. The PRC relayed warnings that it would "teach India a lesson" if it did not cease "nibbling" at Chinese territory. By the summer of 1987, however, both sides had backed away from conflict and denied that military clashes had taken place.
A warming trend in relations was facilitated by Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in December 1988. The two sides issued a joint communiqué that stressed the need to restore friendly relations on the basis of the Panch Shila and noted the importance of the first visit by an Indian prime minister to China since Nehru's 1954 visit. India and the People's Republic of China agreed to broaden bilateral ties in various areas, working to achieve a "fair and reasonable settlement while seeking a mutually acceptable solution" to the border dispute. The communiqué also expressed China's concern about agitation by Tibetan separatists in India and reiterated China's position that Tibet was an integral part of China and that anti-China political activities by expatriate Tibetans was not to be tolerated. Rajiv Gandhi signed bilateral agreements on science and technology cooperation, on civil aviation to establish direct air links, and on cultural exchanges. The two sides also agreed to hold annual diplomatic consultations between foreign ministers, and to set up a joint ministerial committee on economic and scientific cooperation and a joint working group on the boundary issue. The latter group was to be led by the Indian foreign secretary and the Chinese vice minister of foreign affairs.
1990s
As the mid-1990s approached, slow but steady improvement in relations with China was visible. Top-level dialogue continued with the December 1991 visit of PRC premier Li Peng to India and the May 1992 visit to China of Indian president R. Venkataraman. Six rounds of talks of the Indian-Chinese Joint Working Group on the Border Issue were held between December 1988 and June 1993. Progress was also made in reducing tensions on the border via confidence-building measures, including mutual troop reductions, regular meetings of local military commanders, and advance notification of military exercises. Border trade resumed in July 1992 after a hiatus of more than thirty years, consulates reopened in Bombay (Mumbai) and Shanghai in December 1992, and, in June 1993, the two sides agreed to open an additional border trading post. During Sharad Pawar's July 1992 visit to Beijing, the first ever by an Indian minister of defence, the two defense establishments agreed to develop academic, military, scientific, and technological exchanges and to schedule an Indian port call by a Chinese naval vessel.
Substantial movement in relations continued in 1993. The sixth-round joint working group talks were held in June in New Delhi but resulted in only minor developments. However, as the year progressed the long-standing border dispute was eased as a result of bilateral pledges to reduce troop levels and to respect the cease-fire line along the India-China border. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Premier Li Peng signed the border agreement and three other agreements (on cross-border trade, and on increased cooperation on the environment and in radio and television broadcasting) during the former's visit to Beijing in September. A senior-level Chinese military delegation made a six-day goodwill visit to India in December 1993 aimed at "fostering confidence-building measures between the defense forces of the two countries." The visit, however, came at a time when press reports revealed that, as a result of improved relations between the PRC and Burma, China was exporting greater amounts of military matériel to Burma's army, navy, and air force and sending an increasing number of technicians to Burma. Of concern to Indian security officials was the presence of Chinese radar technicians in Burma's Coco Islands, which border India's Union Territory of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Nevertheless, movement continued in 1994 on troop reductions along the Himalayan frontier. Moreover, in January 1994 Beijing announced that it not only favored a negotiated solution on Kashmir, but also opposed any form of independence for the region.
Talks were held in New Delhi in February 1994 aimed at confirming established "confidence-building measures" and discussing clarification of the "line of actual control", reduction of armed forces along the line, and prior information about forthcoming military exercises. China's hope for settlement of the boundary issue was reiterated.
The 1993 Chinese military visit to India was reciprocated by Indian army chief of staff General B. C. Joshi. During talks in Beijing in July 1994, the two sides agreed that border problems should be resolved peacefully through "mutual understanding and concessions." The border issue was raised in September 1994 when PRC minister of national defense Chi Haotian visited New Delhi for extensive talks with high-level Indian trade and defense officials. Further talks in New Delhi in March 1995 by the India-China Expert Group led to an agreement to set up two additional points of contact along the 4,000 km border to facilitate meetings between military personnel. The two sides also were reported as "seriously engaged" in defining the McMahon Line and the line of actual control vis-à-vis military exercises and prevention of air intrusion. Talks in Beijing in July 1995 aimed at better border security and combating cross-border crimes and in New Delhi in August 1995 on additional troop withdrawals from the border made further progress in reducing tensions.
Possibly indicative of the further relaxation of India-China relations, at least there was little notice taken in Beijing, was the April 1995 announcement, after a year of consultation, of the opening of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Center in New Delhi. The center serves as the representative office of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and is the counterpart of the India-Taipei Association in Taiwan; both institutions have the goal of improving relations between the two sides, which have been strained since New Delhi's recognition of Beijing in 1950.
Sino-Indian relations hit a low point in 1998 following India's nuclear tests in May. Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes declared that "China is India's number one threat", hinting that India developed nuclear weapons in defense against China's nuclear arsenal. In 1998, China was one of the strongest international critics of India's nuclear tests and entry into the nuclear club. During the 1999 Kargil War China voiced support for Pakistan, but also counseled Pakistan to withdraw its forces.
2000s
With Indian President K. R. Narayanan's visit to China, 2000 marked a gradual re-engagement of Indian and Chinese diplomacy. In a major embarrassment for China, the 17th Karmapa, Urgyen Trinley Dorje, who was proclaimed by China, made a dramatic escape from Tibet to the Rumtek Monastery in Sikkim. Chinese officials were in a quandary on this issue as any protest to India on the issue would mean an explicit endorsement on India's governance of Sikkim, which the Chinese still hadn't recognised. In 2002, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji reciprocated by visiting India, with a focus on economic issues. 2003 ushered in a marked improvement in Sino-Indian relations following Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's landmark June 2003 visit to China. China officially recognized Indian sovereignty over Sikkim as the two nations moved toward resolving their border disputes.
2004 also witnessed a gradual improvement in the international area when the two countries proposed opening up the Nathula and Jelepla Passes in Sikkim which would be mutually beneficial to both countries. 2004 was a milestone in Sino-Indian bilateral trade, surpassing the $10 billion mark for the first time. In April 2005, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Bangalore to push for increased Sino-Indian cooperation in high-tech industries. In a speech, Wen stated "Cooperation is just like two pagodas (temples), one hardware and one software. Combined, we can take the leadership position in the world." Wen stated that the 21st century will be "the Asian century of the IT industry." The high-level visit was also expected to produce several agreements to deepen political, cultural and economic ties between the two nations. Regarding the issue of India gaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, on his visit, Wen Jiabao initially seemed to support the idea, but had returned to a neutral position on the subject by the time he returned to China. In the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit (2005) China was granted an observer status. While other countries in the region are ready to consider China for permanent membership in the SAARC, India seems reluctant.
A very important dimension of the evolving Sino-Indian relationship is based on the energy requirements of their industrial expansion and their readiness to proactively secure them by investing in the oilfields abroad - in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. On the one hand, these ventures entail competition (which has been evident in oil biddings for various international projects recently). But on the other hand, a degree of cooperation too is visible, as they are increasingly confronting bigger players in the global oil market. This cooperation was sealed in Beijing on January 12, 2006 during the visit of Petroleum and Natural Gas Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar, who signed an agreement which envisages ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) placing joint bids for promising projects elsewhere. This may have important consequences for their international relations.
On July 6, 2006, China and India re-opened Nathula, an ancient trade route which was part of the Silk Road. Nathula is a pass through the Himalayas and it was closed 44 years prior to 2006 when the Sino-Indian War broke out in 1962. The initial agreement for the re-opening of the trade route was reached in 2003, and a final agreement was formalized on June 18, 2006. Officials say that the re-opening of border trade will help ease the economic isolation of the region.[33] In November 2006, China and India had a verbal spat over claim of the north-east Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. India claimed that China was occupying 38,000 square kilometres of its territory in Kashmir, while China claimed the whole of Arunachal Pradesh as its own.[34] In May 2007, China denied the application for visa from an Indian Administrative Service officer in Arunachal Pradesh. According to China, since Arunachal Pradesh is a territory of China, he would not need a visa to visit his own country.[35] Later in December 2007, China appeared to have reversed its policy by granting a visa to Marpe Sora, an Arunachal born professor in computer science.[36][37] In January 2008, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited China and met with President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao and had bilateral discussions related to trade, commerce, defense, military, and various other issues.
Until 2008 the British Government's position remained the same as had been since the Simla Accord of 1913: that China held suzerainty over Tibet but not sovereignty. Britain revised this view on 29 October 2008, when it recognised Chinese sovereignty over Tibet by issuing a statement on its website.[38][39][40] The Economist stated that although the British Foreign Office's website does not use the word sovereignty, officials at the Foreign Office said "it means that, as far as Britain is concerned, 'Tibet is part of China. Full stop.'"[41] This change in Britain's position affects India's claim to its North Eastern territories which rely on the same Simla Accord that Britain's prior position on Tibet's sovereignty was based upon.[42]
In October 2009, Asian Development Bank formally acknowledging Arunachal Pradesh as part of India, approved a loan to India for a development project there. Earlier China had exercised pressure on the bank to cease the loan,[43] however India succeeded in securing the loan with the help of the United States and Japan. China expressed displeasure at ADB[disambiguation needed][44][45] for the same.
2010s
In April 2010, the second BRIC summit was held in Brasília.
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao paid an official visit to India from Dec.15-17,2010 at the invitation of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.[46] He was accompanied by 400 Chinese business leaders, who wished to sign business deals with Indian companies.[47]
| " | India and China are two very populous countries with ancient civilizations, friendship between the two countries has a time-honoured history, which can be dated back 2,000 years, and since the establishment of diplomatic ties between our two countries, in particular the last ten years, friendship and cooperation has made significant progress.[48] | " |
In April 2011, the first BRICS summit was held in Sanya, Hainan, China.[49] During the event, the two countries agreed to restore defence co-operation, and China had hinted that it may reverse its policy of administering stapled visas to residents of Jammu and Kashmir.[50][51] This practice was later stopped,[52] and as a result, defence ties were resumed between the two nations and joint military drills were expected.
It was reported in February 2012 that India will reach US$100 billion dollar trade with China by 2015.[53]
The second BRICS summit was held in New Delhi, India. It was agreed during the summit that China's government would encourage domestic companies to import more products from India in order to balance the trade deficit.[54] Also during the summit, Chinese President Hu Jintao told Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that "it is China's unswerving policy to develop Sino-Indian friendship, deepen strategic cooperation and seek common development" and "China hopes to see a peaceful, prosperous and continually developing India and is committed to building more dynamic China-India relationship".[55] Other topics were discussed, including border dispute problems and a unified BRICS central bank.
In response to India's test of a missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead to Beijing, the PRC called for the two countries to "cherish the hard-earned momentum of co-operation".[56]
See also
Sino-Indian relations
- BRIC – Brazil, Russia, India, and China economic relations
- China in the Mahabharata
- Chindia – China and India together in general, and their economies in particular
- Foreign relations of the People's Republic of China
- Foreign relations of India
- Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Border disputes
- South Tibet – One of the disputed areas between China and India, inhabited by Moinbas, Lhobas (Adi), and Daibameis
- Aksai Chin – Another disputed areas between India and China, inhabited by Pamiris, Uyghurs, Kashmiris and Purik Tibetan
- Line of Actual Control
- List of territorial disputes
- Origins of the Sino-Indian border dispute
- Sino-Indian War
- Tawang District – One of the disputed areas between India and China
References
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- ^ DNA - World - 'China, India and the fruits of Nehru's folly' - Daily News & Analysis
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- ^ Remembering Naxalbari Day
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- ^ David Miliband, Written Ministerial Statement on Tibet (29/10/2008), Foreign Office website, Retrieved 2008-11-25.
- ^ Richard Spencer, UK recognises China's direct rule over Tibet, The Daily Telegraph, 5 November 2008
- ^ Shai Oster, U.K. Policy Angers Tibet Ahead of Beijing Talks, The Wall Street Journal, 1 November 2008
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Further reading
- Hellström, Jerker and Korkmaz, Kaan Managing Mutual Mistrust: Understanding Chinese Perspectives on Sino-Indian Relations, Swedish Defence Research Agency (September 2011)
- China's Response to a Rising India, Q&A with M. Taylor Fravel (October 2011)
- Strategic Asia 2011-12: Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers - China and India, edited by Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner, and Jessica Keough (National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011)
- Forbes, Andrew ; Henley, David (2011). Past, present and future commercial Sino-Indian links via Sikkim, in: China's Ancient Tea Horse Road. Chiang Mai: Cognoscenti Books. ASIN: B005DQV7Q2
- India's Response to a Rising China: Economic and Strategic Challenges and Opportunities, Q&A with Harsh V. Pant (August 2011)
- Frankel, Francine R., and Harry Harding. The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know. Columbia University Press: 2004. ISBN 0-231-13237-9.
- Garver, John W. Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century. University of Washington Press: 2002. ISBN 0-295-98074-5.
- Lu, Chih H.. The Sino-Indian Border Dispute: A Legal Study. Greenwood Press: 1986. ISBN 0-313-25024-3.
- Sen, Tansen. Buddhism, Diplomacy, and Trade: The Realignment of Sino-Indian Relations, 600-1400. University of Hawaii Press: 2003. ISBN 0-8248-2593-4.
- Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh, and Jing Dong Yuan. China and India: Cooperation or Conflict? Lynne Rienner Publishers: 2003. ISBN 1-58826-169-7.
- Varadarajan, S. India, China and the Asian Axis of Oil, January 2006
- The India-China Relationship:What we need to know?, January 2006
- Dalal, JS: The Sino-Indian Border Dispute: India's Current Options. Master's Thesis, June 1993.
- Deepak, BR & Tripathi, D P [2] "India China Relations - Future Perspectives", Vij Books, July 2012
External links
- Inventory of Conflict and Environment (ICE), Arunachal Pradesh Territorial Dispute between India and China
Articles
- Can India Face the Dragon?, The World Reporter, September 5, 2010 By Sanskar Shrivastava
- India-China Relations: Issues, Trends and Emerging Scenarios by B.M. Jain
- The Lotus and the Dragon: The Evolution of the BJP's China Policy by Vijay Vikram
- Uneasy Engagement - China and India Dispute Enclave on Edge of Tibet, NYTimes, September 4, 2009
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