Indian Holocaust My Father`s Life and Time - SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT
Palash Biswas
http://indianholocaustmyfatherslifeandtime.blogspot.com/
http://basantipurtimes.blogspot.com/
Hillarry Clinton Pushes on Nuclear Liability and Defence Deal!
US pushes India on nuclear liability!
<iframe width="425" height="349" src="http://www.youtube.com/embed/NLJf6vJ_Hj0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe>
http://youtu.be/NLJf6vJ_Hj0
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has urged India to use its economic power to boost commerce across Central Asia, including Afghanistan and India's long-time adversary Pakistan.
In a speech in Chennai, India, Wednesday, Clinton said India, which has been working to broaden economic and political ties in East Asia, also has the potential to positively shape the future of the Asia-Pacific region.
She added that the United States and India have common interests in Asia, including protecting sea lanes and promoting democracy and human rights.
The secretary of state on Wednesday wrapped up a two-day visit to India as part of the ongoing U.S.-India strategic dialogue.
During her speech in Chennai, Clinton again addressed the issue of stability in Afghanistan, saying the United States and NATO do not intend to allow security in the war-torn country to lapse as they withdraw troops.
Clinton said that achieving and maintaining political reconciliation and stability in Afghanistan will require the support of both India and Pakistan.
The secretary of state called for greater economic cooperation among South Asian nations. She urged them to reduce barriers and increase trade in order to open up new sources of raw material, energy, and agricultural products.
Clinton will continue her multi-nation diplomatic tour with stops this week in Indonesia and Hong Kong.
On Tuesday, Clinton and her Indian counterpart, S.M. Krishna, urged Pakistan to do more to eliminate "terrorist sanctuaries" on its territory, both for the sake of its own interests and those of the region.
http://blogs.voanews.com/breaking-news/2011/07/20/clinton-urges-india-to-boost-economic-activity/
Hillary unhappy with India's N-liability law
Sachin Parashar, TNN | Jul 20, 2011, 12.54am ISTNEW DELHI: Visiting US secretary of state Hillary Clinton on Tuesday reiterated support for the India-US civil nuclear deal but in doing so she also gave vent to the US displeasure over India's nuclear liability law which makes it possible to seek compensation from suppliers.
Clinton made it clear that it was absolutely important for India to ratify "this year" the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which decides on a nuclear operator's financial liabilities, and ensure that its liability law conforms to international requirements under the convention.
According to Clinton, the US worked hard for the nuclear deal and would stand by it in the face of recent NSG guidelines restricting transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies but it also expected the pact to be "enforceable and actionable" in all regards. As Indian officials later admitted, Clinton's reference to CSC may have been "unnecessary" because India has not just signed CSC but also announced that it will ratify it by November.
"Nothing about the new enrichment and reprocessing transfer restrictions agreed to by the Nuclear Suppliers Group members should be construed as detracting from the unique impact and importance of the US-India civil nuclear agreement or our commitment to full civil nuclear cooperation," Clinton said while addressing reporters after the India-US strategic dialogue with foreign minister S M Krishna.
"But I have to add that we are looking forward to India ratifying the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage during this year, before the end of this year, and we would encourage engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that the liability regime that India adopts by law fully conforms with the international requirements under the convention," she added.
According to Clinton, these issues needed to be resolved to allow both the countries to "reap the rewards of the extraordinary work that both of our governments have done". According to the joint statement issued later, the two sides noted that "India is committed to ensuring a level playing field for US companies seeking to enter the Indian nuclear energy sector, consistent with India's national and international legal obligations".
Clinton said the recent NSG guidelines on transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies was not going to impact the civil nuclear pact between the two countries, which does not allow ENR transfer without an amendment, but she did not reply to a query on whether or not the US would itself at any point think of giving similar technology to India.
Indian officials only last week had said that even though the India-US nuclear deal doesn't call for ENR supply, it does mention that such a transfer can take place through an amendment in the agreement. "The US doesn't rule it out," an official had said.
Clinton, however, again made it clear that the US strongly supported India's full membership in the four nuclear export control regimes -- NSG, Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) -- including the Nuclear Suppliers Group in a phased manner.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Hillary-unhappy-with-Indias-N-liability-law/articleshow/9290282.cms
Nuclear-boost: Uranium mine in Andhra could be among largest in world
Abantika Ghosh, TNN | Jul 19, 2011, 02.20am ISTRAWATBHATA (Rajasthan): India`s nuclear power aspirations just got a boost thanks to a lucky find. The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) has discovered that the upcoming uranium mine in Andhra Pradesh's Tumalapalli has close to 49,000 tonnes of uranium — three times the original estimate of the area`s deposits. In fact, there are indications that the total quantity could go up to 1.5 lakh tonnes, which would make it among the largest uranium mines in the world.
The quantity is sufficient for supporting a nuclear power plant of 8,000 MW capacity for 40 years. Production will start in six months. Srikumar Banerjee, secretray of DAE and chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, announced the discovery during the foundation stone-laying ceremony of the seventh and eighth units of the Rawatbhata atomic power project.
"It`s confirmed that the mine has 49,000 tonnes of ore, and there are indications that the total quantity could be three times of that amount. If that be the case, it will become the largest uranium mine in the world. The plant is ready, and will begin production by the end of this year," Banerjee said.
Now, India has two functioning uranium mines — both in Jharkhand. The total reserves are estimated to be in the range of 1,70,000 tonnes. The discovery of the Tumalapalli deposit has at one stroke boosted the availability of uranium, lowering the country`s dependence on foreign supplies.
India has been procuring uranium on various terms from countries like France and Kazakhstan but does not yet have a long-term supply contract.
India continues to fancy nuclear energy as a possible solution for its energy needs. Unlike some other countries which have been forced to temper their enthusiasm for nuclear energy post-Fukushima, the UPA government is persisting with its push for what is considered to be the cleanest source of energy.
The fact that Tumalapalli may have uranium reserves has been known for a while, but it took four years for the estimate to come to the present level from 15,000 tonnes in 2007. A 220-MW plant requires 45 tonnes of uranium per year, a 540-MW plant needs 80 tonnes and a 700-MW plant requires 100 tonnes per year.
Banerjee said that the fact that the usual acidic method of leaching would not have worked in Tumalapalli took some time for a full exploration of the reserves. "We developed the method of acidic leaching in the Jadugoda mines in Jharkhand. Subsequent exploration showed that reserves are spread across a 35-km radius," he said.
India has been procuring uranium on various terms from countries like France and Kazakhstan but does not yet have a long-term supply contract.
The countdown has started for the seventh and eighth units of the Rawatbhata power project, which is all set to have two indigenously built 700 MW capacity plants — the biggest in the country. The plants, being built at a cost of Rs 12,000 crore, are likely to be ready by 2016. As per the revised policy, 50% of the energy output will be for consumption in Rajasthan, and the rest will be given to the Northern Grid.
S K Jain, CMD of the Nuclear Power Corporation India Limited, announced plans of constructing 14 plants of 700 MW capacity each over the next few years.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Nuclear-boost-Uranium-mine-in-Andhra-could-be-among-largest-in-world/articleshow/9277652.cms
|
Indo-US deals
1. Aviation: The US President announced India's decision to buy 10 C-17 Globemaster III military transport planes from the US-based aircraft manufacturer Boeing for $4.1-billion.
Deal detail: It will create 22,000 jobs in the US. India may well order another six C-17 s after the first 10.
2. Energy cooperation: Signed by Planning Commission Deputy Chairman Montek Singh Ahluwalia and US Commerce Secretary Gary Locke.
Deal detail: Lays stress on funding studies and projects on clean and efficient energy practices such as grid-connected and off-grid power from renewable energy, smart grids, transportation efficiency, as well as unconventional gas resources and advanced biofuels.
3. Energy Research: Signed by Biotech Secretary MK Bhan with US Ambassador Timothy Roemer.
Deal detail: Both countries will provide $5 million (Rs 22.15 crore) each year for five years to the 10-year project for setting up a joint energy research and development (R&D) centre. Priority will be accorded to R&D of solar energy and second-generation biofuels. The agreement envisages private funding to match both Indian and US government funding.
4. Nuclear Partnership: Signed by US Ambassador to India Timothy Roemer with Atomic Energy Secretary Srikumar Banerjee.
Deal detail: Brainchild of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April. India and the United States aim to promote cooperation on initiatives aimed at strengthening global nuclear security and addressing threats of nuclear terrorism.
5. Defence agreement: Announced US's decision to remove Indian organisations from the so-called "entities list."
Deal detail: US companies will be able to collaborate with the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and public sector units like Bharat Dynamics Ltd.
6. Nuclear non-proliferation: Announced the setting up of a Global Center for Nuclear Energy Partnership, a centre of excellence, for nuclear energy and security in India in the next four years.
Deal detail: It aims to secure vulnerable nuclear materials. The agreement, with a validity of ten years, also calls for cooperation on programs for capacity building in technology, human resource development, education and training, besides giving impetus to research and development in nuclear science and technology in these areas.
7. Infrastructure: Both countries seek a chance of creating a $10 billion joint debt fund to finance infrastructure projects.
Other private agreements between US and Indian companies
1. SpiceJet agreed to buy 30 B737-800 planes from Boeing, in a $2.7 billion transaction that will support 12,970 jobs.
2. Indian Railways announced the prequalification of two bidders- GE Transportation and Electro-Motive Diesel- to manufacture and supply 1,000 diesel locomotives over 10 years.
3. General Electric to supply six advanced class 9FA gas turbines and three steam turbines for 2,500 MW Samalkot power plant to be constructed by Reliance Power. The contract is valued at $ 750 million.
4. Reliance Power MoU with US Exim Bank to get up to $5 billion as financial support.
5. Oil: India has signed an accord with the US for cooperation in shale gas technology that will help exploit its vast unconventional resource. The MoU envisages exploration of shale gas resources in India, technical studies to commence on exploration and training of Indian personnel.
Posted on November 09, 2010
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main50.asp?filename=Ws200711Nothing.asp
The Communist Party of India (Marxist) on Wednesday asked the government to reject the U.S. proposal to "dilute" the Civil Nuclear Liability Act that provides for suppliers' liability in the event of a nuclear accident.
"The U.S. continues to exercise pressure on the Indian government to dilute the Civil Nuclear Liability law which was adopted by Parliament," the party Polit Bureau said in New Delhi.
In a statement, it said this demand had become "evident" from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's statement asking India to engage with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to "ensure that the nuclear liability law 'fully conforms' with the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC)".
Maintaining that CSC "does not provide for suppliers' liability" in case of a nuclear accident, the party demanded that the UPA government should reject this suggestion.
Observing that the IAEA was "only a depository for the Convention and cannot judge a law passed by Parliament", it accused the government of "vacillating and seeking to accommodate the U.S. concerns which are primarily the interests of its nuclear industry.
National Law
It said the Civil Nuclear Liability Act was passed in Parliament "after compelling the government to accept section 17(b) which provides for foreign suppliers liability. This national law should prevail over any international convention".
The CPI(M) also said despite being passed since it was adopted in Parliament, the Act has not yet been notified and come into force, "nor have the rules under the Act been placed before Parliament".
It demanded that the UPA government should explain why this has not been done.
The government should "firmly adhere to the law as established with regard to nuclear liability of foreign suppliers. This is all the more necessary after the Fukushima disaster", the CPI(M) said.
Instead of the private company which operates the reactors or the foreign suppliers, billions of dollars are being spent by the Japanese government after the nuclear accident to clean-up and rehabilitate those affected, it pointed out.
Betting on India's future, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Wednesday said the country should play a "more assertive" role across Asia-Pacific, noting that this is a "time to lead" by seizing emerging opportunities.
Ms. Clinton said India's leadership has the potential to positively shape the future of the Asia-Pacific and that the U.S. encourages the country to not just to look east, but continue to engage and "act east" as well.
Defining partnership of 21st century
Ms. Clinton, who is the first American top diplomat to visit Chennai during a India trip, also asserted that the bondage outweighed differences in Indo-U.S. ties and that the bilateral relationship would be a defining partnership of the 21st century.
"We have a common commitment to combating terrorism and achieving economic prosperity," she told students and opinion makers at the Anna Centenary Library hall in Chennai.
"It is true we are different countries with different backgrounds. We will from time to time disagree. But we believe our differences are far outweighed by the bondage," Ms. Clinton said, addressing students and opinion makers.
Ms. Clinton began her address saying "Vanakkam," a vernacular greeting, triggering a round of applause.
Noting that the role she was asking India to play is ambitious, Ms. Clinton said, "Yes, it is an ambitious agenda, but we can afford to be ambitious."
"Assertive role across Asia-Pacific"
"It's time(for India) to lead. It has to do more to integrate economically with neighbors Afghanistan and Pakistan and take a more assertive role across the Asia-Pacific," Ms. Clinton said a day after attending the second Indo-U.S. joint strategic dialogue in New Delhi.
"This is not a time when any of us can afford to look inward at the expense of looking outward. This is a time to seize the emerging opportunities of the 21st century. This is a time to lead." she said
"We are betting on India's future...that the opening of India's markets to world will produce a more prosperous India and South Asia. We are betting that India's vibrant pluralistic society will inspire others to follow a similar path of tolerance. We are making this bet not out of blind faith but because we have watched your progress with great admiration," she added.
In Ms. Clinton's view, the U.S. was not making this bet not out of some blind faith but because it has watched the progress of India with "great admiration".
Ms. Clinton said the future of Asia would be shaped by decisions of the Indian government and 1.3 billion people of the country.
She said the opening of India's market to the world would not only produce a more prosperous India and a more prosperous South Asia, but it would also spill over to Central Asia and beyond into the Asia-Pacific region.
On Indo-U.S. relations
The top diplomat singled out civil nuclear energy as an area where India and the U.S. "can and must do more".
Ms. Clinton said she was "encouraged" by India and Pakistan's decision to restart their peace talks.
The visiting U.S. leader also referred to questions raised about the directions of Indo-U.S. relationship, but said the differences between the two countries were "far outweighed" by their deep and abiding policies, including democracy and pluralism.
"We share common interest like stopping terrorism and spurring balanced and broad-based economic growth that deeply influence our societies," Ms. Clinton said.
Speaking about India's growing leadership role, she said "... India is today taking its rightful place in meeting rooms and conference halls where the world's consequential questions are debated and decided."
President Barack Obama had recognised this when he said the U.S. would look "forward to a reformed UNSC that includes India as a permanent member."
Noting that U.S.-India cooperation was producing "real results", she said both countries would work together on strengthening the joint fight against terrorism, boosting economic ties, completing civilian nuclear partnership and deepening defence cooperation.
"We think this works very much in the interest of our country and the people." she said.
Ms. Clinton also had a word of praise for India's Election Commission which is widely viewed as the "global gold standard" for holding polls.
Against the backdrop of New Delhi's stance on human rights abuses in Asia, Ms. Clinton said "As India takes on a larger role throughout the Asia-Pacific, it is also taking on new responsibilities including the duty to speak out against violations of universal human rights."
Ms. Clinton stressed that cordial relations between India, China and the U.S. were important.
"This will not always be easy," she said. But she added that "if we want to address, manage or solve some of the most pressing issues of the 21st century, India, China and the United States will have to coordinate our efforts."
marxistindia
news from the cpi(m)
July 20, 2011
Press Statement
The Polit Bureau of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) has issued the following statement:
Reject US Demand on Civil Nuclear Liability
The United States continues to exercise pressure on the Indian government to dilute the Civil Nuclear Liability law which was adopted by parliament. This has become evident from the statement made by US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, in Delhi asking India to engage with the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that the nuclear liability law "fully conforms" with the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC). The CSC does not provide for suppliers' liability in the event of a nuclear accident.
The Indian government should reject this suggestion. The IAEA is only a depository for the Convention and cannot judge a law passed by parliament.
The UPA government has been vacillating and seeking to accommodate the US concerns which are primarily the interests of its nuclear industry. The Civil Nuclear Liability Act was passed in parliament after compelling the government to accept section 17(b) which provides for foreign suppliers liability. This national law should prevail over any international convention.
The Civil Nuclear Liability Act has not yet been notified and come into force, even though nearly a year has passed since its adoption by parliament. Nor the rules under the Act have been placed before parliament. The UPA government should explain why this has not been done.
The Polit Bureau of the CPI(M) demands that the UPA government firmly adhere to the law as established with regard to nuclear liability of foreign suppliers. This is all the more necessary after the Fukushima disaster. Instead of the private company which operates the reactors or the foreign suppliers, billions of dollars are being spent by the Japanese government after the nuclear accident to clean-up and rehabilitate those affected.
_______________________________________________
Marxistindia mailing list
Marxistindia@cpim.org
http://cpim.org/mailman/listinfo/marxistindia_cpim.org
http://www.cpim.org
Indo-US talks: Hillary Clinton eyes Indian defence market
| |
| * |
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Tuesday played the role of a good salesperson pitching defense deals. Seeking the bigger pie of India's defence kitty, her meeting with the Indian team went on for more than three hours stretching over lunch.
The pitch was for a contract of 22 apache helicopters and an upgrade of jaguar engines a contract worth 1.8 billion.
While counter-terror cooperation and the recent Mumbai attacks were discussed, she did have words of sympathy and advice about being engaged. She repeated the old line about Pakistan being a victim of terrorism. Clearly the US is not willing to dehyphenate the Indo-Pak relationship and its needs in Afghanistan will determine its strategic choice of Pakistan as an important ally in the war against terror.
"Counter-terrorism cooperation is on top of our mind after last week's bombings in Mumbai," she said, adding, "We cannot tolerate safe haven to terrorists anywhere. It is in the interest of Pakistan itself to act against terrorism."
The message was clear that India will have to fight its own battle on terrorism.
On the other big issue of entry of India into the Nuclear Suppliers Group while the support was forthcoming, India made it a point that the US shouldn't use it like a strategic issue to bargain with India. The US also insisted that India should tweak its liability legislation and sign the supplementary convention on liability.
There were differences on issues such as Libya and on market access to the US agricultural products in India.
While trade was on the menu, they did agree to resume the negotiations on the bilateral investment treaty.
India also flagged the Tri-Valley students issue and problems for Indian IT professionals.
"We discussed a broad range of regional developments. We reviewed progress of our relationship. Our cooperation on counter-terrorism has deepened," Minister for External Affairs S.M. Krishna said. On the Tri-Valley issue, she has assured us on an early solution, Krishna said of Hillary.
The scope of the strategic dialogue also was limited given that it was low keyed compared to its original idea where top cabinet ministers from both sides were supposed to be present.
While the visit was not about big ticket substantive outcomes, it did lead to the two sides managing to keep the relationship on an even keel.
The takeaways from the visit
Both sides have reaffirmed their commitment to take the relationship forward. The relationship was running out of steam and they have managed to put it on an even keel.
While NASA and ISRO will collaborate on the International Space Station, on the Commercial Space Launch Agreement, India is not comfortable with the text.
Annual Higher Education Dialogue between the US Secretary of State and Human Resource Development Minister of India has been discussed.
While India agreed on maritime cooperation, it is still weary about operational engagement with the US.
India is keen to take a lead on fighting Somalian pirates and has offered to host the meeting of the contact group on Somalia.
India raised its concerns on visa and countered the US argument that over 50 per cent of the H1-B visas have been given to Indians. New Delhi wants the US to provide visas for Indians sponsored by Indian IT firms.
India also raised the issue of a totalization agreement and argued that 300,000 Indians were losing out on their savings because of a lack of a totalization agreement, which leads to their social security contribution not being returned to them on their return.
The US wants closer cooperation between the TSA and Indian security agencies, but the Home Ministry is not too keen. New Delhi was also cold to the US demand to post a transport security administration.
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/story/indo-us-talks-hillary-clinton-eyes-indian-defence-market/1/145505.html
Krishna talks terror, N-deal; Clinton wants biz
Last Updated: Tuesday, July 19, 2011, 16:52Tags: SM Krishna, Hillary Clinton, India-US strategic dialogueZeenews Bureau
New Delhi: External Affairs Minister SM Krishna and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Tuesday, reiterated the commitment to make India and US relationship one of the most global strategic partnerships of the 21st century. Importantly, Clinton also announced that the US remains committed to the civil nuclear agreement with India, while also pressing for the sale of defence technology.
Addressing a joint press conference along with Clinton, after they held discussions on a wide range of issues including terrorism, Krishna said, "It is a great pleasure to welcome you back in India on the second anniversary of your first visit as Secretary of State. You have been a steadfast friend of India, unwavering in your commitment to India-US strategic relationship."
"Two years almost to this very day, we announced the strategic dialogue. The strategic dialogue is the bedrock upon which we are building our global strategic relationship… we expressed satisfaction in the momentum in our relationship. We welcome the maturity and mutual confidence in our relationship," he added.
He also said that both sides had "good discussions" on terrorism in the region, adding that both countries have resolved to intensify their cooperation to fight terrorism. "Terror sanctuaries in Pakistan needed to be eliminated for regional peace and stability," he added.
Krishna also said that the US has reiterated its commitment to cooperation in civil nuclear energy with India, besides cooperation in areas like food security and cyber security.
Clinton, on her part, termed the talks she held with Krishna as very constructive and that the US wholeheartedly supports the rise of India as a regional and global leader.
She said there were three areas where the two countries could deepen what Washington considers "a defining partnership of the 21st century", namely trade and investment, security cooperation and civil nuclear technology.
On the important issue of the civil nuclear deal, Clinton said that US remains fully committed to civil nuclear cooperation with India.
With regard to the new energy guidelines, Clinton said there is "nothing" about reprocessing guidelines that should be construed as going against the civil nuclear deal between the two countries.
However, she was categorical about what the US expects from India in lieu of US' "commitment" to the nuke deal. She said, "The US looks forward to India ratifying the Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC) before this year end."
Importantly, Clinton also pushed for defence deals. She said, "We believe in increasing military-to-military cooperation between the two countries, including the sale of defence technology."
On the issue of terrorism, especially in view of the recent blasts in Mumbai, Clinton said the US shares the pain of Mumbai victims. "We are with you in your fight, which is also our fight," she said, adding, "Counter-terrorism cooperation is on top of our mind after last week's bombings in Mumbai."
On the issue of Pakistan, Clinton said, "We cannot tolerate safe haven to terrorists anywhere; it is in the interest of Pakistan itself to act against terrorism."
Clinton, who is accompanied by 25-member delegation including top security officials in the US administration, will travel to Chennai tomorrow.
First Published: Tuesday, July 19, 2011, 15:01
http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/india-us-building-a-global-strategic-partnership_720699.html
Hillary Clinton outraged by Mumbai serial blasts, backs India's fight against terror
ITGD Bureau | New Delhi, July 19, 2011 | Updated 14:37 ISTThe United States has assured India that it would fully implement the civil nuclear cooperation agreement, External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna said on Tuesday after the second round of Indo-US strategic dialogue with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
India and the US have "decided to start negotiations on bilateral trade and investment agreement," Krishna told media after the talks.
"You (United States) have been a steadfast friend of India," Krishna said. "We welcome the maturity and mutual confidence in our relationship."
He emphasised on the need for "elimination of terror sanctuaries in Pakistan" for "peace and stability" in the region.
The foreign minister termed the strategic dialogue, which lasted about two-and-a-half hours, as "the bedrock on which we are building our partnership". "We discussed a broad range of regional developments. We reviewed progress of our relationship. Our cooperation on counter-terrorism has deepened," he said.
Addressing India's concern on the terror front, Clinton said, "We pledge full support to India in fight against terror. It is also our fight against terrorism and extremism."
"Counter-terrorism cooperation is on top of our mind after last week's bombings in Mumbai," she said, adding, "We cannot tolerate safe haven to terrorists anywhere. It is in the interest of Pakistan itself to act against terrorism."
Welcoming the ongoing bilateral talks between the two neighbouring countries, Clinton said, "We are encouraged by India and Pakistan dialogue. It will build more confidence between them. From the US perspective, Pakistan is a key ally in fight against terror."
"Terrorists have killed more Pakistanis by attacking mosques, government buildings etc than American. Pakistan must act on its own. We cannot tolerate safe havens anywhere. And, if we discover any such safe haven we cannot let them threaten people across the world," she said.
The two leaders discussed various other issues, including India's effort to secure a permanent seat in the United Nations' Security Council (UNSC), concerns over IT professionals' difficulties in the US in the wake of visa restrictions and the Tri-Valley University issue involving Indian students.
-- With inputs from Headlines Today
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/story/hillary-clinton-sm-krishna-press-conference/1/145448.html
July 19, 2011
India's Minister of External Affairs Shri S.M. Krishna and the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton met in New Delhi on July 19, 2011, for the second annual meeting of the India-U.S. Strategic Dialogue. The leaders recognized the achievements made since the inaugural Strategic Dialogue in June 2010 and President Obama's historic visit to India in November 2010 in advancing our two countries' shared interests. They committed to continuing to broaden and deepen the India-U.S. global strategic partnership.
As a testament to the relationship's extraordinary breadth and depth, Secretary Clinton was accompanied by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, the President's Advisor for Science and Technology Dr. John P. Holdren, Department of Energy Deputy Secretary Daniel Poneman, Department of Homeland Security Deputy Secretary Jane Holl Lute, and other senior U.S. government officials.
Minister Krishna was joined by Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission Montek Singh Ahluwalia, Prime Minister's Public Information Infrastructure and Innovation Advisor Sam Pitroda, Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao, and other senior officials.
Minister Krishna was also joined at the working lunch by Home Minister P. Chidambaram and Minister for Human Resource Development and Information Technology Kapil Sibal.
As part of Secretary Clinton's visit to India, she met with Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh, Chairperson of the United Progressive Alliance Sonia Gandhi, Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee, Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha Sushma Swaraj, and National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon.
Secretary Clinton offered her prayers and sympathies to the victims of the despicable attacks in Mumbai on July 13. The American people stand with the Indian people in times of trial, and offer support to India's efforts to bring the perpetrators of these terrible crimes to justice. Minister Krishna welcomed the expressions of support from the Secretary, the President, and the U.S. Congress. The two leaders resolved to strengthen cooperation between their governments to fight against terrorism.
Since the inaugural Strategic Dialogue in 2010, the India-U.S. partnership has resulted in advances in nearly every area of human endeavor. The two sides have expanded their strategic consultations to cover all major issues and regions of the world. They have increased counterterrorism cooperation, intelligence sharing, and law enforcement exchanges. They have continued to expand their defence cooperation. They have expanded their growing partnership on export controls and non-proliferation. They have witnessed an expansion of the already robust people-to-people ties; scientific, space, and technology collaboration; clean energy cooperation; and connections among entrepreneurs and social innovators.
The two leaders emphasized our countries' shared values – pluralism, tolerance, openness, and respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights. They reiterated Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh's and President Barack Obama's pledge to harness these shared strengths and to expand the India-U.S. global partnership for the benefit of their countries; and, for peace, stability, and prosperity in Asia and the world.
Today, the two leaders reviewed progress in bilateral relations and set new goals to further strengthen the India-U.S. Global Strategic Partnership.
Global Stability and Prosperity
• Marking the expansion of strategic consultations, the two sides launched a Central Asia Dialogue in June 2011 in New Delhi and a West Asia Dialogue in July 2011 in Washington DC. The two sides intend to expand strategic consultations to other regions, including Latin America and Caribbean, and plan to hold the fourth round of the East Asia Dialogue in September 2011.
• India, the United States, and Japan plan to commence a trilateral dialogue at senior official level.
• They welcomed the launch of bilateral dialogue on United Nations matters in New Delhi in March 2011. The two sides intend to continue this dialogue and meet next in Washington in early 2012, while continuing regular consultations between capitals and in UN cities as appropriate.
• Following on the successful meeting of the Joint Working Group (JWG) on UN Peacekeeping Operations in March 2011 in New Delhi, the two countries hope to conduct their 10th meeting of the JWG in early 2012.
• The two sides reaffirmed their commitment for consultation, coordination, and cooperation on Afghanistan, and to work jointly in Afghanistan in capacity building, agriculture, and women's empowerment, expanding on work already underway. Both sides agreed to Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, and inclusive reconciliation.
• The two sides acknowledged that increased trade, transit, and commercial linkages across South and Central Asia will benefit Afghanistan and contribute to the region's long-term peace, stability, and prosperity.
• The two sides intend to promote food security in Africa through a triangular cooperation program with Liberia, Malawi, and Kenya. A promising area of potential collaboration includes the participation of Africans at Indian universities and research and technical institutes in mutually agreed capacity building programs. The two sides agree to explore additional areas based on requests from the three African countries.
• As part of the India-U.S. Dialogue on Open Government launched in November 2010, the two countries have committed to jointly create an open source "Data.gov" platform by the first quarter of 2012 to be taken to interested countries globally. Leveraging the high-technology strengths and institutional expertise of both India and the United States, the "open source" platform is intended to provide citizens access to Government information via a user-friendly website and a package of e-Governance applications to enhance public service delivery.
• The two sides reiterated their commitment to work together to strengthen election management capacity in interested countries. They welcomed the technical collaboration between the Indian International Institute of Democracy and Election Management and the Washington DC-based International Federation of Electoral Systems.
• Secretary Clinton recalled President Obama's statement that, in the years ahead, the United States looks forward to a reformed UN Security Council that includes India as a permanent member.
Enhancing the U.S. – India Bilateral Relationship
Defence, security and counter-terrorism
• The two sides launched the Homeland Security Dialogue in May 2011 in New Delhi, and have decided upon on a program of cooperation in global supply chain management, megacity policing, combating counterfeit currency and illicit financing, cyber security, critical infrastructure protection, and capacity building and technology upgrading.
• They reiterated their commitment to further strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation, including through intelligence sharing, information exchange, operational cooperation, and access to advanced counter-terrorism technology and equipment. The two sides had their ninth meeting of the Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism in March 2011 in New Delhi.
• The two leaders reiterated that success in Afghanistan and regional and global security requires elimination of safe havens and infrastructure for terrorism and violent extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Condemning terrorism in all its forms, the two sides confirmed that all terrorist networks must be defeated and called for Pakistan to move expeditiously in prosecuting those involved in the November 2008 Mumbai terror attack.
• The two sides reiterated their commitment on comprehensive sharing of information on the investigations and trials relating to the November 2008 Mumbai terror attack.
• The two countries held cyber consultations on July 18, led by their two National Security Councils, at which they exchanged views on a broad range of cyberspace issues and coordinated bilateral cooperation on cyber issues. The United States and India signed on 19 July 2011 a Memorandum of Understanding between our Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERT-IN and US-CERT) to exchange information on cyber attacks and mutual response to cybersecurity incidents, to cooperate on cybersecurity technology, and to exchange information on cybersecurity policy and best practices and capacity building and exchange of experts.
• India and the United States welcomed progress in bilateral defence cooperation. The Defence Policy Group met in March 2011 and plans to meet again in early 2012.
• The two sides noted India's defence orders from U.S. companies have reached a cumulative value of over USD 8.0 billion in the last decade. The two sides noted that these sales reflect strengthened cooperation. Both sides also affirmed their desire to strengthen cooperation through technology transfer, and joint research, development and production of defence items.
• They noted progress in defence bilateral exchanges, exercises, capacity building, information sharing, including in the areas of counternarcotics, counter piracy, maritime safety and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief. They affirmed the importance of maritime security, unimpeded commerce, and freedom of navigation, in accordance with international law, and the peaceful settlement of disputes.
• The United States and India agreed to continue consultations on maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region in existing forums such as Defense Policy Group and its appropriate sub-groups. They also agreed to exchange views on promoting regional security architecture that enhances maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region.
• The United States welcomed India's decision to chair a plenary of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia in 2012.
Civil Nuclear Cooperation
• The two leaders welcomed the continued commitment of the two governments for full implementation of the India-U.S. civil nuclear energy cooperation agreement. They reiterated their commitment to build strong India - U.S. civil nuclear energy cooperation through the participation of U.S. nuclear energy firms in India on the basis of mutually acceptable technical and commercial terms and conditions that enable a viable tariff regime for electricity generated. They noted that the United States has ratified the Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC) and India intends to ratify the CSC within this year. They further noted that India is committed to ensuring a level playing field for U.S. companies seeking to enter the Indian nuclear energy sector, consistent with India's national and international legal obligations.
• The United States looks forward to hosting a senior-level Indian delegation at the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Energy Working Group (CNEWG) next week at Oak Ridge Laboratory.
Membership of Export Control Regimes
• Both sides expressed satisfaction with the progress we have achieved together towards India's full membership of the four multilateral export control regimes – Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group and the Wassennaar Arrangement – in a phased manner consistent with the core principles of these regimes, as the Government of India takes steps towards the full adoption of the regimes' export control requirements.
Export Control Cooperation
• India welcomed steps taken by the United States to remove Indian entities from the U.S. Department of Commerce's 'Entity List' and realignment of India in U.S. export control regulations. Both sides agreed to continue efforts to fulfill objectives of strengthening export control cooperation envisaged in the Joint Statement of November 2010 as well as on the basis of discussions in the High Technology Cooperation Group held earlier this month.
Nuclear Security
• The two sides looked forward to holding later this year the first meeting of the U.S.-India Joint Working Group to implement the MOU on Cooperation with India's Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnerships.
Strategic Security Dialogue
• Both sides view the Strategic Security Dialogue, the last round of which was held in Vienna on 14 June 2011, as a vital element in their dialogue architecture which has strengthened the common ground in promoting global non-proliferation objectives. Both sides also discussed key issues on the multilateral agenda, and looked forward to the commencement of negotiations of the Fissile Missile Cutoff Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.
Prosperity
• The two sides welcomed increases of 30 percent in bilateral trade in 2010 over the previous year and the balanced and positive growth in services trade. They also welcomed the increase in foreign direct investment flows in both directions.
• The two governments plan to resume technical-level negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) in August in Washington D.C. A BIT would enhance transparency and predictability for investors, and support economic growth and job creation in both countries.
• The two sides reiterated their commitment to take steps to expand trade ties. The India-U.S. Trade Policy Forum plans to meet in October 2011, and on-going public-private discussions are to continue under the Commercial Dialogue.
• The two governments intend to participate in the first Consular Dialogue on July 25 in Washington DC for a full discussion of visa and other consular matters.
• The two governments signed a Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement (BASA) on July 18.
• The U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the U.S. Export-Import Bank, the U.S. Trade Development Agency (USTDA), and U.S. Agency for International Development, in coordination with multiple U.S. government agencies, are participating in the development of clean and renewable energy projects, energy-efficient buildings and Smart Grids in India. The two leaders welcomed the progress in the USTDA supported bilateral Energy Cooperation Programme, announced in November 2010, which works with Indian and U.S. businesses on deployment of clean energy technology in India. The bilateral Joint Clean Energy Research and Development Center is accepting applications for its $100 million, five-year program that is stimulating new collaboration between the United States' and India's public and private sectors in solar energy, energy-efficient buildings, and advanced biofuels.
• The India-U.S. agriculture dialogue was launched in September 2010 to intensify collaboration with India on food security, including joint work with third countries. USTDA hosted a trade mission to the United States for business and government representatives from India in the cold storage field.
• The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Ministry of Earth Sciences have set up a "monsoon desk" to share the latest monsoon prediction models, which are now providing forecasts for the 2011 Indian monsoon season.
Women's Empowerment
• The Women's Empowerment Dialogue is planned for September 2011 in New Delhi.
Education, Innovation, Science and Technology
• The United States and India plan to host a Higher Education Summit in Washington D.C. on October 13 to highlight and emphasize the many avenues through which the higher education communities in the United States and India collaborate.
• The United States and India plan to expand its higher education dialogue, to be co-chaired by the U.S. Secretary of State and Indian Minister of Human Resource Development to convene annually, incorporating the private/non-governmental sectors and higher education communities to inform government-to-government discussions.
• As part of the Obama-Singh 21st Century Knowledge Initiative (OSI), the two governments announced the publication of their requests for proposals from post-secondary educational institutions that support OSI's goals of strengthening teaching, research, and administration of both U.S. and Indian institutions through university linkages and junior faculty development.
• The United States created the Passport to India initiative to encourage an increase in the number of American students studying and interning in India. The leaders recognized the great bridge of mutual understanding resulting from the more than 100,000 Indian students studying and interning in the United States.
• The United States' Department of Energy and India's Department of Atomic Energy signed an Implementing Agreement on Discovery Science that provide provides the framework for cooperation in accelerator and particle detector research and development at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility, and Brookhaven National Laboratory.
• The India-U.S. S&T Endowment Board, established by Secretary Clinton and Minister Krishna in 2009, plans to award nearly $3 million annually to entrepreneurial projects that commercialize technologies to improve health and empower citizens. The two sides are strongly encouraged by the response to this initiative, which attracted over 380 joint India-U.S. proposals. The Endowment plans to announce the first set of grantees by September 2011.
• The India-U.S. S&T Forum, now in its tenth year, has convened activities that have led to the interaction of nearly 10,000 Indian and U.S. scientists and technologists.
• As a follow up to the successful India-U.S. Innovation Roundtable held in September 2010 in New Delhi, the two sides agreed to hold another Innovation Roundtable in early 2012.
• India and the United States plan to host their third annual Women in Science workshop in September 2011.
Space
• The U.S. – India Joint Space Working Group on Civil Space Cooperation met in July 2011 in Bangalore. Building on the successful Chandrayan-1 lunar mission, NASA and ISRO reviewed potential areas for future cooperation in earth observation, space exploration, space sciences and satellite navigation. Both sides agreed for early finalization three new implementing arrangements for sharing satellite data on oceans and global weather patterns. Recognising the research opportunities available on the International Space Station, both sides agreed to explore the possibilities of joint experiments. NASA reiterated its willingness to discuss potential cooperation with ISRO on human spaceflight activities. The two sides also agreed to expand upon previous work in the area of global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) with the goal of promoting compatibility and interoperability between the U.S. Global Positioning System, India's Navigation systems, and those of other countries.
Secretary Clinton thanked the Minister, the Government, and the people of India for their gracious hospitality, their warm welcome, and their hard work in making this year's Strategic Dialogue a success. Secretary Clinton thanked Minister Krishna for his strong support for the India-U.S. relationship.
Minister Krishna thanked the Secretary for her participation and engagement in this year's Strategic Dialogue and for the commitment and dedication she has given to the U.S. – India global partnership.
The next meeting of the Strategic Dialogue is planned for Washington D.C. in 2012.
New Delhi
July 19, 2011
(The above document was taken from the official website of Ministry of External Affairs, India)
http://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/article2259865.ece
-
Govt clears biggest-ever defence deal with US - Times Of India
7 Jun 2011 – NEW DELHI: Sulking ever since its jets got ejected from the race to supply 126 fighters to IAF, the US now has reason to cheer. India has ...
-
Biggest Indo-US defence deal; CCS clears buy of 10 C-17s - PTI -
6 Jun 2011 – Marking the biggest defence deal between Indiaand the US, government on Monday gave a green signal to procurement of 10 C-17 heavy-lift ...
-
Decks cleared for biggest ever Indo-US defence deal
www.defence.pk/.../india-defence/108157-decks-cleared-biggest-ev... - Cached15 posts - 11 authors - Last post: 13 MayNEW DELHI: India may have ejected American fighters out of the $10.4 billion race to supply 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) ...
-
India Today - 22 hours agoUS Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Tuesday played the role of a good salesperson pitchingdefense deals. Seeking the bigger pie ofIndia's defence ...1388 related articles
-
Decks clear for biggest Indo-US defence deal - The Tribune ...
www.tribuneindia.com/2011/20110607/main4.htm - Cached6 Jun 2011 – Decks clear for biggest Indo-US defence deal. India to buy 10 US C-17 aircraft for $4.1 bn. Ajay Banerjee Tribune News Service ...
-
After Indo-US defence deals, Pak on shopping spree in Chinese arms ...
www.indianexpress.com/news/after-indous-defence-deals.../712981/- Cached18 Nov 2010 – After Indo-US defence deals, Pak on shopping spree in Chinese arms store - Pakistan has stepped up its defence cooperation with China with ...
-
India to Freeze Defence Deals wih US, Russia and France
www.indian-military.org/.../indian.../982-india-to-freeze-defence-de... - Cached13 Sep 2010 – Indian Military : India to Freeze Defence Dealswih US, Russia and France.
-
Indian Defense News and Networking | India Defence
www.india-defence.com/ - Cached2011-04-01 The biggest-ever Indo-US defence deal expected to be worth USD 4.1 billion for procuring 10 C-17 heavylift transport aircraft has been delayed ...
-
India wary of Indo-US defence deal : Obama Visit: India Today
indiatoday.intoday.in/site/.../india-wary...indous-defence-deal/.../119100...4 min - 6 Nov 2010
India is not keen on the Indo-US defence deal. India also does not want to delete the DRDO list from the US export blacklist.
-
Indo-US defence deals unlikely during Obama's visit ...
www.livemint.com/2010/10/.../IndoUS-defence-deals-unlikely.html - Cached27 Oct 2010 – Indo-US defence deals unlikely during Obama?s visit, India and the US are in talks to finalise a deal for 10 C-17 transport aircraft for the ...
-
Pakistan Alarmed by Indo-US Defense Deal - by M.B. Naqvi
12 Jul 2005 – The new "Framework for the U.S.-India DefenseRelationship" envisages the outsourcing of military functions toIndia, including joint ...
-
-
US bags million-dollar Defence Deals just after N-Liability Bill ...
indianholocaustmyfatherslifeandtime.blogspot.com/.../us-bags-million-dolla...3 Sep 2010 – The stage is being set for the largest-everIndo-US defence deal with the Centre ... Govt set to ink record $2.2bn arms deal with US . ...
You shared this
-
Clinton fights cooking deaths in developing worldBoston Globe - 1 hour agoUS Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, left and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, during a meeting at the Prime Minister's Office in New Delhi, Tuesday, July 19, 2011. US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said Tuesday that the United ... As China looms, Clinton tells India "it's time to lead"Reuters Africa - Andrew Quinn - 1 hour agoCHENNAI, India (Reuters) - US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told India on Wednesday "it's time to lead", urging New Delhi to take a stronger role across Asia where China is flexing its muscles, and to bolster support for struggling ... Hillary Clint on enjoys dance performance in ChennaiNDTV.com - 1 hour agoChennai: When Michelle Obama visited Mumbai, her dance with school children provided a dream photo-op. Hillary Clinton didn't join dancers in Chennai today, but she was very much the star of the show. The US Secretary of State watched students perform ...
Clinton Urges India to Boost Economic ActivityVoice of America (blog) - 1 hour agoUS Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has urged India to use its economic power to boost commerce across Central Asia, including Afghanistan and India's long-time adversary Pakistan. In a speech in Chennai, India, Wednesday, Clinton said India, ... Hillary expresses concern over Sri Lankan Tamils' issueThe Hindu - 2 hours agoUS Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Wednesday voiced concern over the plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Sri Lanka and said her country was looking at some innovative and creative ideas to break the impasse over the Sri Lankan Tamils issue. ... US pushes India on nuclear liabilityNDTV.com - 2 hours agoDifferences on civilian nuclear deal persist after talks between Foreign Affairs Minister SM Krishna and US Secretary of state Hillary Clinton. Clinton Tells India It's 'Time to Lead' in Asia-PacificBloomberg - Nicole Gaouette - 2 hours agoUS Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called on India today to expand its presence in East Asia, positioning it as a partner in countering China's growing power. "This is a time to seize the emerging ... Look East, and act East, too: US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to IndiaEconomic Times - 3 hours agoCHENNAI: Visiting US secretary of state Hillary Clinton on Wednesday advocated a more active policy initiative from India with reference to its stature and policies in Asia and the East. Clinton, who said she believed "21st century will be written in ... Opening up markets will result in prosperous Asia: US Secretary of State ...Economic Times - 3 hours agoCHENNAI: US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Wednesday said her country is betting on India opening its trade for the prosperity of its own people and that of other nations in Asia. Flying in here from New Delhi Wednesday afternoon Clinton ... All 1,254 related articles » | RelatedHillary ClintonIndia Terrorism Chennai Foreign Policy S. M. Krishna Timeline of articlesNumber of sources covering this story
ImagesBoston Globe Reuters Africa NDTV.com Atlanta Journal... The Hindu AFP DAWN.com The Associated ... BBC News All related images »VideosUS pushes India on nuclear liability NDTV.com - 2 hours ago *Mint - 21 hours ago *Clinton to push security, trade ties in India AFP - 22 hours ago *Hillary's double standards on terror NewsX - Jul 19, 2011 *Second round of Indo-US strategic talks Times Now - Jul 18, 2011 All related videos » |
U.S. wants IAEA to vet Indian liability law
SANDEEP DIKSHIT
Adding a new element to the ongoing Indo-U.S. nuclear saga, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Tuesday "encouraged" New Delhi to "engage" with the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that the Indian nuclear liability law "fully conforms" with the international Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC) for Nuclear Damage.
Indian officials told The Hindu that any suggestion that Indian law would have to be adjusted on the basis of the IAEA's opinions was not acceptable. The Agency was only the depository of the CSC — essentially a clearing house for countries filing their ratification of the treaty — and can have no role in vetting a sovereign law.
New Delhi considers the liability law to be in conformity with the CSC and is committed to ratifying the Convention before the year is out.
The U.S., on the other hand, thinks Section 17(b) of the Indian law, which expands the scope of the operator's right to compensation from nuclear suppliers in case of an accident due to faulty equipment, violates the CSC. U.S. companies have also opposed Section 46 of the Indian law, which implicitly allows accident victims to file tort claims.
Indian officials maintain the CSC cannot proscribe the operation of ordinary tort law in India and that the only forum which can pronounce the Indian law incompatible with the CSC is the Indian Supreme Court and not the IAEA.
Despite this tough public message, Ms. Clinton acknowledged the fact that the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan had reduced India's room for manoeuvre on the liability front, senior Indian officials who were familiar with the delegation-level talks told The Hindu.
However, with U.S. firms wary of entering India because of the tough liability law, Ms. Clinton said she expected the nuclear deal to be "enforceable and actionable in all regards."
Speaking to newspersons at the end of the second strategic dialogue, External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna and Ms. Clinton also expressed divergent views on the manner in which India should join the four export control regimes — the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement.
Mr. Krishna twice made the point of India gaining membership to these bodies in "tandem," while Ms. Clinton felt the process should be "phased." Curiously, the Joint Statement, which usually reflects a consensus on phraseology, uses the word "phased."
This wordplay is significant as India's priority is membership of the NSG and the MTCR, while the U.S. would prefer India acceding first to the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement.
Asked about the tightening of NSG guidelines, Ms. Clinton stuck to an earlier State Department formulation that these did not "detract" from the clean waiver India had secured from the cartel in 2008.
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2259880.ece
Nothing 'strategic' about Clinton's India picnic
Experts question team's pursual of market interests and , absence of defence ministry officials in the strategic talks
Iftikhar Gilani
New Delhi
Experts have questioned the government for allowing US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton-led team pursue private interests in the garb of the second strategic dialogue held here on Tuesday.
Absence of defence ministry officials in the strategic talks also raised eyebrows and made to believe that Americans were more interested in market access rather than seriously discuss anything "strategic".
"Many of the economic issues on the agenda relate to market access for US companies whose only "strategic" interest is profits and shareholder value. What is specifically strategic in the bilateral demand made on us to introduce more banking, insurance, retail trade and labour reforms," asked former foreign secretary Kanwal Sibal.
The United States pressed India to open up banking, insurance and retail trade for investments by the American businesses. Sibal thinks it only shows the government is under the US pressure to allow FDI in multi-brand retail and open up the money-churning banking and insurance business, unmindful of its impact on Indians.
He even questioned Clinton's intention for not using the leverage at her disposal to compel Pakistan to eliminate terrorist safe-havens on its territory and would not expect India to ratchet up pressure either.
Sibal said her warning to Islamabad is meaningless as "Pakistan has heard the American calls for bringing the perpetrators of the Mumbai carnage to justice often enough to ignore them" and Hillary herself acknowledged in the joint press conference that there are limitations on what the US and India can do to make Pakistan perform.
Pointing out that India has endorsed an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned inclusive reconciliation process on Afghanistan, he stressed that this process seems "a bit of a sham" as it is hardly likely that Pakistan or the Taliban groups it backs will be kept out.
On the nuclear liability law frowned by the American nuclear reactor and supplier firms, Clinton's advice to work with the International Atomic Energy Agency to make the Indian law compatible with international practice implies "a legal watering down of our own domestic law" which seems not a viable prospect, Sibal affirmed.
He pointed out that she has also skirted the issue of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group refraining transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to India by listing Non-Proliferation Treaty membership as one of the criteria for eligibility by just stating that nothing in the new restriction will detract from the impact and importance of the India-US nuclear deal as the US stands to its commitment.
Sibal said India wanted clear answers but Clinton left the riddle unsolved as to how the US position against such transfers to India, conveyed to the Congress at the time of negotiating the nuclear deal, the subsequent G-8 stand and now the NSG decision to both of which the US is a party, can be reconciled with India's expectations.
Iftikhar Gilani is a Special Correspondent with Tehelka.com
iftikhar@tehelka.com
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main50.asp?filename=Ws200711Nothing.asp
N-issue still a thorn in Indo-US relations
Support to civil n-cooperation but need to resolve issues: Hillary
Iftikhar Gilani
New Delhi
DIFFERENCES OVER key issues of nuclear liability and American attempts to engage Taliban in Afghanistan continued to plague Indo-US relations. However, visiting secretary of state Hillary Clinton declared full support to New Delhi's efforts to curb terrorism.
At the end of second India- US strategic dialogue, both sides decided to increase levels of intelligence sharing. Sources said India and the US have agreed to set up a "credible" mechanism between Intelligence Bureau (IB) of India and National Intelligence of the United States to share real time intelligence on terrorism, drug trafficking and other crimes.
On the critical nuclear issue, both sides, failed to make any headway. America has been facing stiff opposition within the 46-member Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) for forwarding India's case, without forcing its entry into the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
The group has set new guidelines which make off-limits technology for enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) to countries like India.
Clinton reaffirmed commitment for full civil nuclear cooperation. But she also stressed that "we need to resolve the issues that still remain."
The main problem for US operators is a clause in India's Nuclear Liability Bill that makes the suppliers of reactors liable for 80 years for any accident at a plant.
She also asked India to ratify within a year an International Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage that addresses liability, and then ensure that domestic laws comply with these guidelines.
A joint statement issued at the end of talks said India was committed to ensuring a level playing field for US atomic companies.
The United States will host a senior-level Indian delegation at the US-India Civil Nuclear Energy Working Group (CNEWG) next week at Oak Ridge Laboratory to sort out glitches.
On the issue of granting India membership of expert control regimes Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group and the Wassennaar Arrangement, the statement mentioned the US was working towards the goal as per the nuclear agreement.
But, the Clinton noted that it would be done in a phased manner. It has to be consistent with the core principles of these regimes, as India takes steps towards the full adoption of the regimes' export control requirements.
Both the countries will hold the first ever meeting of the joint working group to implement the MoU on cooperation with India's Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnerships later this year.
India raised concerns at the integration of Taliban into any power sharing mechanism in Kabul, without adhering to redlines.
Clinton did try to diffuse India's fears, but indicated that for the sake of a stable future in Afghanistan, inclusive and broad-based talks were imperative.
Clinton appealed Pakistan to cooperate to end the menace of terrorism and reminded that it has special obligation to do so transparently, full and urgently.
"It is US policy, we believe the perpetrators need to be brought to justice and have urged Pakistan to do so. Obviously, there is a limit to what both the US and India can do but we intend to continue to press as hard as possible," she said.
Maintaining that the US was encouraged by the discussions between India and Pakistan, Clinton said, "We think this is the most promising approach to encourage both sides to build more confidence between them and work to implement the kinds of steps that will demonstrate the improved atmosphere that is so necessary for us to deal with the nderlying problem of terrorism."
Both Krishna and Clinton underscored the importance of the elimination of terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan for regional stability and security and for Pakistan's future, according to a joint statement released after the meeting.
Pakistan was a key ally in the fight against terrorism and the US has made the point repeatedly to its Pakistani colleagues that terrorists threaten both of them, she said.
"We recognise that Pakistan must act on its own behalf first and foremost to protect its own territory and sovereignty and to protect the lives of its people," Clinton said.
Iftikhar Gilani is a Special Correspondent with Tehelka.com
iftikhar@tehelka.com
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main50.asp?filename=Ws200711N_issue.asp
Clinton Calls on India to Amend Atomic Trade Law
Tuesday, July 19, 2011U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Tuesday called on India to modify a domestic nuclear liability law that has dampened U.S. enthusiasm for engaging in atomic commerce with the developing South Asian nation, Reuters reported (see GSN, Dec. 16, 2010).
The controversial Indian law caps nuclear reactor operator liability following an atomic incident to approximately $320 million and permits lawsuits against suppliers of atomic materials, technology and services -- a measure that conflicts with international norms.
Washington hopes that New Delhi will "tighten up" a bill to safeguard foreign parts manufacturers from lawsuits, arguing the measure it is considerably more strict than similar laws elsewhere in the world.
"We need to resolve those issues that still remain so that we can reap the rewards of the extraordinary work that both of our governments have done," Clinton said during a visit to India this week (Mukherjee/Quinn,Reuters, July 18).
New Delhi and Washington in 2008 inked a landmark agreement that permitted U.S. nuclear firms to conduct civilian atomic commerce with nuclear-armed India. In exchange, New Delhi agreed to open its nonmilitary nuclear installations to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. In order to conclude the agreement, India received an exemption allowing it to purchase atomic technology from all members of the 46-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group.
The Obama administration is now backing India's quest for membership in the coalition of nuclear exporters (see GSN, July 18).
U.S. Deputy Energy Secretary Daniel Poneman on Monday said there was no discrepancy between hoped-for atomic trade with India and recently instituted NSG guidelines that prohibit the export of nuclear fuel enrichment and reprocessing systems to countries outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Asian News International reported (see GSN, July 14). India is not a treaty state.
The technology is question could be used to produce nuclear-weapon material, a capability already possessed by New Delhi.
"There is nothing indeed inconsistent between what has been happening in the Nuclear Suppliers [Group] guidelines and bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and India," the deputy secretary said in remarks to students in New Delhi. "That cooperation was enabled by the 123 agreement signed between the two sides."
"The reprocessing consent agreement between our two nations concludes six month ahead of time and has only ever been two concluded twice before between the United States and any other party -- Japan and the European Union," Poneman said. "So I do not think there is any other basis for a charge of betrayal," he added, possibly referring to recent comments from India's former atomic energy chief (Pooja Shali, Asian News International/Economic Times, July 18).
Clinton on Tuesday said Washington was "encouraged" by the resumption of a peace process between Pakistan and India that was frozen for more than two years following the November 2008 militant assault on the Indian city of Mumbai, the Associated Press reported.
New Delhi pulled out of the composite dialogue, which seeks to simultaneously address such divisive issues as Kashmir, nuclear weapons and terrorism, as it did not feel Islamabad had done enough to suppress the Pakistani-based extremists that masterminded the siege that killed more than 160 people.
The foreign ministers from the two longtime antagonists are scheduled to meet next week.
"We are encouraged by the dialogue between India and Pakistan," Clinton said, characterizing the dialogue as "the most promising approach" to building mutual trust between the two nuclear-armed nations (Ravi Nessman, Associated Press/Atlanta Journal-Constitution, July 19).
RSS
Twitter
Email Sign UpBiological Weapons
- Legal Statements on Anthrax Mailings Withdrawn new
- Anthrax Mailing Suspect's Lab Lacked Spore-Drying Gear
- Malaysia Prepares Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Legislation
Chemical Weapons
- Old Iraqi Chemical Weapon Unearthed in Iran
- Umatilla Depot Nears Finishing Final CW Disposal Campaign
- Enzyme Might Hold Key to Countering Nerve Agents
Missile Defense
- Germany Opposes U.S. Shutdown of MEADS Program
- Pentagon Pressed to Improve Antimissile Training
- Russian Plan Off The Table in Missile Defense Talks
Missile Proliferation
- China Violating Missile Proliferation Controls, Cables State
- U.S. to Refer Iranian Satellite Launch to U.N. Panel
- Iran Launches Missiles at Indian Ocean Targets
Nuclear Weapons
- Experts: NATO Should Limit Role of Nukes, Remove U.S. Warheads new
- Iran Reports Downing U.S. Drone Near Atomic Facility new
- IAEA Should Review Indian Atomic Law, Clinton Says new
- Activist Loses Legal Challenge to U.S. Nukes in Germany new
- U.S. Completes Two More Nonexplosive Atomic Tests new
- South Korea to Push Security Forum For Rebuke of North new
Terrorism
- Bin Laden Targets Included Obama, Top General
- Bin Laden Planned Sept. 11 Anniversary Attack
- Pakistan-India Peace Talks Still on After Bombings
Weapons of Mass Destruction
- U.N. Nonproliferation Panel to Visit Washington new
- International Nonproliferation Center to Remain Open Until 2015
- British Spy Agency Cleared Iraqi WMD Intel Under Pressure: Officials
Other Topics
- Japan to Begin Pulling Spent Fuel From Nuclear Plant by 2015 new
- Japan Details Nuclear Plant Stabilization Schedule
- Japan Finishes Initial Nuclear Plant Stabilization
- http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20110719_9256.php
-
-
Structural limitations to blunt India-US strategic dialogue
Economic Times - 2 days ago
... the first having been held in Washington DC in June 2010. ...and that the Indian nuclear liability bill makes civilian nuclear cooperation less viable ... -
In praise of… Abdul Jabbar
The Guardian (blog) - 2 days ago
Civil Nuclear Liability Bill 2010 limits MNEs (Nuclear specific) liability and, bearing in mind the high risk in nuclear industry, the victims of any ... -
India's NSG question
Express Buzz - 30 Jun 2011
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) comprising of 46 states is meeting in Hague ... 123 Agreement and on the Nuclear Liability Bill (2010) on August 25, 2010. ... -
Unfazed by Nuclear Suppliers' New Rules
Inter Press Service - Ranjit Devraj - 6 Jul 2011
Also, he said, Indian parliament had passed a stiff nuclear liability bill in August 2010 that discouraged international nuclear equipment suppliers ... -
US Reaffirms Backing of Indian Nuclear Pact
Global Security Newswire - 11 Jul 2011
Meanwhile, New Delhi has settled on terms for placing in effect the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill, the Press Trust of India reported (see GSN, ... -
N-power in India. How safe are our plants?
Rediff - 7 Jul 2011
Under the recently passed Civil Liability for Nuclear DamageAct, 2010 the AERB is also the authority responsible for notifying when a nuclear incident ... -
State Department Live: US-India Strategic Dialogue
US Department of State (press release) - Robert O. Blake, Jr - 8 Jul 2011
In 2010 two-way trade rose 30 percent from the year before. ...stand after the passage of the Nuclear Liability Bill appeared to stall in US investments? ... -
Accused of Illegal Turnover of Radioactive Materials
Hetq Online - 9 Jul 2011
The part of the criminal case initiated by the RA National Security Service relating to G. Dadayan was separated and on December 9, 2010 thebill of ...
-
Senator Murkowski unveils bill to create interimnuclear storage sites
Platts - 1 Jul 2011
Murkowski said the Nuclear Fuel Storage Improvement Act (S. 1320) would reduce the federal government's liability under theNuclear Waste Policy Act. Under ...
-
Hillary seeks greater investment, Krishna wants better environment for IT sector
SANDEEP DIKSHIT
With the U.S. facing financial crises, the second India-U.S. strategic dialogue here on Tuesday saw the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pushing for greater investment and trading opportunities, while External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna sought a better operating environment for the Indian I.T. sector.
In over two hours of discussions that continued over lunch, both Ministers broke new ground by discussing the situation in Central and West Asia which were preceded by official level talks over the past one month.
Ms. Clinton condoled the deaths in the recent Mumbai bomb blasts and said the U.S. had made it clear to Pakistan that "we cannot tolerate a safe haven for terrorists anywhere" because if left unchecked, the consequences could be very difficult to control. She described Pakistan as a key U.S. ally which must act against terrorists to save its own people and lauded the ongoing India-Pakistan dialogue as the "most promising approach."
The U.S. wanted Pakistan to bring to book perpetrators of the 2008 attacks in Mumbai because it had a "special obligation to do so." "But there is a limit to what the U.S. and India can do," she conceded.
Ms. Clinton identified three focal points in U.S.' relationship with India — lower tariff barriers and further opening the markets to continue with the "good story" of burgeoning bilateral trade; U.S. interest in involving India in maritime security and selling equipment for the purpose especially to the navy; and, ensuring that the civil nuclear agreement takes off with conditions that enable the U.S. companies to begin talks on setting up civil nuclear power plants.
Mr. Krishna's wish list highlighted the narrowing of opportunities for the I.T. sector by a restrictive visa regime and inward looking contractual norms for I.T. companies. He also raised the absence of a Totalisation Agreement with India which avoids double taxation of income for social security taxes and the distress suffered by Indian students by the closure of the Tri Valley University in the U.S.
In a meeting with Union Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee, Ms. Clinton was informed that India was about to finalise the guidelines of an Infrastructure Debt Fund to accelerate investment by U.S. companies.
Troop withdrawal
On Afghanistan, the Joint Statement did not touch upon the withdrawal of foreign troops. Responding to a question, Mr. Krishna indicated India's discomfiture with a hasty withdrawal. The U.S. has been informed of India's request to factor in the comfort level of the Afghan government and the ground realities so that Kabul would be in a position to defend itself against Taliban "sponsored" terrorists, he said.
The two Ministers noted the breadth of the relationship which now covers "all major issues and regions of the world" – counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing, defence cooperation, export controls and non-proliferation, besides expanding to the existing people-to-people ties, scientific, space, and technology collaboration and clean energy cooperation.
Megacity policing
In counter-terrorism, India and the U.S. were cooperating in the areas of megacity policing, cracking down on counterfeit currency and illicit financing, ensuring cyber security and capacity building and technology upgrading.
The joint statement made a reference to several sub-groups that have come up to discuss specialised subjects such as U.N. matters and Peacekeeping Operations since U.S. President Barack Obama's visit to the country last year.
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2255679.ece
The Indo-US military alliance
Dr Jassim Taqui
2Share
Islamabad—Living to its reputation, the US House of Representatives decided to block aid to Pakistan. The previously approved aid would not be released until Pakistan accepts the US dictates. Also, the US Secretary of State should certify to the Congress that Islamabad is " fully assisting the United States with investigating the existence of an official or unofficial network in Pakistan for Obama bin Laden, including by providing the United States with direct access to Osama bin Laden's relatives in Pakistan and to Osama bin Laden's former compound in Abbotabad."
The decision is timed with the visit of the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to India to hold the so-called "Strategic dialogue," that is largely viewed as a vehicle to surround and isolate Pakistan and to create US-Indo axis to contain People's Republic of China.
Following the failure of arms twisting US tactics against Islamabad, the Indian card is being used to increase the pressure on the civilian dispensation. Earlier, the Obama administration suspended $800 million military aid. Now, the civilian government is not spared. It has dared to show of solidarity with the armed forces of Pakistan.
Presently, Pakistan is facing many fronts: the hostile Afghan front, the internal front and the Indian front. Pakistan, which is described the " most sanctioned US ally" is now gaining the reputation," the most punished US ally."
The Obama administration continues to rely on military force to achieve its foreign policy objectives. India is used as a military ally. Ms Hilary Clinton speaks on trade and development but conceals the military aspect of the relationship. The framework of the US-India defence relations includes massive arms deals. It envisages outsourcing of several function to India, including joint-military operations in third countries, patrolling of sea lanes, rescue operations, cooperation in nuclear and ballistic missile technology and research, and joint operation in combating WMD( Weapons of Mass Destruction).
The Americans should be congratulated for the feat they achieved in handling and taming New Delhi. India has never signed such a comprehensively one-sided agreement with any other country. Every country envies American for such feat especially its traditional ally, the Russian Federation.
Under the new "strategic partnership," the US would use India as a puppet state to extend Washington dominance on South Asia in the face of rising China. Evidently, this framework of cooperation is one-sided since it seeks to achieve US objectives in the region by undermine regional peace and security.
Following the failure of US " military diplomacy" in Afghanistan, the Obama administration fails to concede defeat. The US militarism is coming to the region through another course and in different form.
Yet, Washington is trying to fool the international community by claiming the so-called strategic "partnership" with India. This is mere rhetoric because there cannot be any sort of partnership between two states with huge military and technological asymmetry.
http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=104141
The China Challenge: A strategic vision for U.S.-India relations
JUL 20, 2011 03:08 IST(The views expressed in this column are the authors' own and do not represent those of Reuters)
By Lisa Curtis and Dean Cheng
India is keeping a wary eye on China's rapid global ascent. Unresolved border issues that resulted in the Sino-Indian War of 1962 have been heating up again in recent years.
Indian policymakers are scrambling to develop effective policies to cope with a rising China by simultaneously pursuing both a robust diplomatic strategy aimed at encouraging peaceful resolution of border disputes and forging strong trade and economic ties and an ambitious military modernisation campaign that will build Indian air, naval, and missile capabilities.
By bolstering its naval assets, India will solidify its position in the Indian Ocean and enhance its ability to project power into the Asia Pacific. New Delhi also will continue to boost its medium-range missile programs to deter Beijing and to strengthen its air capabilities to deal with potential flare-ups along their disputed borders.
Meanwhile, China has also been paying increasing attention to India. China's interests on its southern flank have led the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to strengthen its forces in the Lanzhou and Chengdu Military Regions bordering India.
China's increased assertiveness in the East and South China Seas over the past year has been accompanied by a hardening position on its border disputes with India. Last summer, India took the unprecedented step of suspending military ties with China in response to Beijing's refusal to grant a visa to an Indian Army general serving in Jammu and Kashmir.
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to New Delhi last December helped tamp down the disagreement, and military contacts have since resumed. Still, the incident shows the fragility of the Sino-Indian rapprochement and the potential for deepening tensions over the unresolved border issues to escalate.
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's visit to India this week for Strategic Dialogue talks provides an opportunity to take India's pulse on China and to discuss new diplomatic and security initiatives that will contribute to maintaining a stable balance of power in Asia. The U.S. should demonstrate support for Indian military modernisation and enhanced U.S.-Indian defence ties.
Despite U.S. disappointment over India's decision to de-select two American companies from its Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition, the U.S. is bound to conclude other major defence deals with India as it pursues an ambitious defence modernisation campaign, which includes spending plans of around $35 billion over the next five years.
Indeed, this year, the two sides finalised a deal worth nearly $4 billion for the U.S. to provide India with enough C-17 aircraft to give India the second-largest C-17 fleet in the world. Enhancing Indo-U.S. cooperation in maritime security in the Indian Ocean region is also an area of mutual interest that is ripe for new initiatives.
India's rejection of the MMRCA has added a dose of realism to Indo-U.S. relations and reminded U.S. officials that the burgeoning partnership will not always reach the full expectations of either side. Still, the growing strategic challenge presented by a rising China will inevitably drive the U.S. and India to increase cooperation in defence and other key sectors, such as space, maritime security, and nuclear non-proliferation.
WHAT DRIVES SINO-INDIAN COMPETITION?
For its part, India, long suspicious of China's close relations and military support for Pakistan, views an increased Chinese presence in northern Pakistan and expanded civil nuclear cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad as particularly worrisome. Indian military strategists believe they must plan for the possibility of a two-front war with Pakistan and China even as they actively seek dialogues with both to diminish the chances of such a dire scenario.
At the same time, Chinese assessments of Indian military planning suggest a view in Beijing that New Delhi sees China as a major threat. One Chinese assessment concludes that the Indian military sees Pakistan as the main operational opponent and China as a potential operational opponent. It also describes the Indians as seeing China and Pakistan as closely aligned in threatening India.
The rivalry is also driven by the rapidly expanding resource requirements of each country, whose economies continue to grow steadily despite the global economic downturn. Competition over energy and water resources will increasingly shape the contours of their competition, as will each country's efforts to expand trade and economic relations with countries that are in the other's traditional sphere of influence.
SIMMERING BORDER TENSIONS
Long-standing border disputes between China and India continue to cause friction between the two countries despite ongoing border talks that started in the 1980s. India claims that China occupies more than 14,000 square miles of Indian territory in the Aksai Chin along its northern border in Kashmir (commonly referred to as the western sector), while China lays claim to more than 34,000 square miles of India's northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh (commonly referred to as the eastern sector). The two sides fought a brief border war in 1962 after China invaded the eastern and western sectors of their shared borders and ended up annexing the area of Aksai Chin, a barren plateau that had been part of the pre-partition princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. India also is a long-term host to the Dalai Lama and about 100,000 Tibetan refugees that fled after China annexed Tibet in 1950.
Meanwhile, according to Beijing, India is occupying territory unfairly claimed during the era of "unequal treaties." The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has never accepted the validity of the McMahon Line as the demarcation of the Sino-Indian border in Tibet, viewing it as forced upon weak imperial and republican governments by the British Raj.
In 2003, each side appointed "special representatives" – national security adviser for India and vice foreign minister for China—to upgrade and regularise their border discussions. Since then, the two sides have clarified the mapping of the middle sector of their disputed frontiers (the border that demarcates the Indian state of Sikkim). However, there has been no exchange of maps of the eastern and western sectors under dispute.
China's interest in consolidating its hold on Tibet and its perceptions of India's expanding global influence and closer ties to the U.S. have led Beijing to harden its position on its border disputes with New Delhi over the past five years. China has increasingly questioned Indian sovereignty over the states of Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir and has stepped up probing operations along different parts of their shared frontier. The Chinese are also building up military infrastructure and expanding a network of road, rail, and air links in the border areas.
The hardening Chinese position can be traced back to comments made by the Chinese ambassador to India, referring to the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh as part of China, in the run-up to President Hu Jintao's November 2006 visit.
Moreover, in recent years, Chinese commentators have begun to refer to Arunachal Pradesh commonly as "Southern Tibet." Prior to 2005, there were no Chinese references to "Southern Tibet" in China's official media. In 2009, China opposed an Asian Development Bank loan, part of which was earmarked for a watershed project in Arunachal Pradesh — another demonstration that China is questioning Indian sovereignty over the state more openly.
These moves have signalled to New Delhi that the Chinese may be backing away from a 2005 border agreement, referred to as the "Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for Settlement of the Boundary Question." More specifically, since the 2005 accord stipulated that "settled populations will not be disturbed," India argues that China has violated the 2005 agreement by laying claim to Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh. Chinese interlocutors claim Tawang is part of Tibet because one of the Dalai Lamas was born there. The Chinese have objected to recent visits to Tawang by the Indian Prime Minister and the Dalai Lama.
In addition to raising questions about the status of Arunachal Pradesh, China has called into question Indian sovereignty over the state of Jammu and Kashmir. In 2009, Beijing began stapling visas to Indian passport holders from Jammu and Kashmir. Furthermore, in July of last year, China denied a visa to Indian Lieutenant General B. S. Jaswal, chief of Northern Command, which includes parts of Kashmir. General Jaswal had intended to travel to Beijing to participate in a high-level China-India defence exchange. In response to China's refusal to grant General Jaswal a visa, India suspended further bilateral defence exchanges.
The visa issue appears to have been resolved, as India resumed defence contacts with China last month by sending an eight-member Indian military delegation to China. The visit followed media reports that China had begun issuing regular visas to Indian residents of Jammu and Kashmir.
Since the 1999 Kargil border conflict between India and Pakistan, Beijing's position on Kashmir seemed to be evolving toward a more neutral position. During that conflict, Beijing helped convince Pakistan to withdraw forces from the Indian side of the Line of Control following its incursion into the heights of Kargil in Kashmir. Beijing made clear its position that the two sides should resolve the Kashmir conflict through bilateral negotiations, not military force, but the stapled visas issue and Beijing's refusal to grant a visa to the Indian army official from Kashmir have raised concern in New Delhi that China is reverting to a policy of favouring Pakistan's position on Kashmir.
Indian commentators have noted that China's backtracking from its neutral position on Kashmir would likely be met with subtle moves by India that increasingly question Chinese sovereignty over Tibet.
INCREASING MILITARY ACTIVITIES
Meanwhile, Chinese military activities in the region have expanded. In July 2010, the official newspaper of the PLA, People's Liberation Army Daily, reported that units of the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) were engaging in armed combat air patrols. These are believed to have been advanced Su-27 or J-11 (domestically produced versions of the Su-27) fighter aircraft.
The combat air patrols were followed by an August 2010 logistics exercise involving the newly constructed Qinghai-Tibet railway. This exercise marked the first PLAAF use of the railway for military purposes, with the Military Transportation Department of the PLAAF Logistics Department overseeing the movement of "combat readiness materials" to Tibet. This would seem to reflect a growing PLAAF role in maintaining security along the Sino-Indian border in the Tibetan area.
In October 2010, there were reports that the PLA had conducted joint (inter-services) live-fire exercises in Tibet for the first time. These reportedly involved armour, artillery, air, and electronic warfare units and a variety of new equipment. Given the emphasis placed on joint operations in PLA doctrine, such exercises are not surprising, but instead reflect the extent to which they are being applied across the military, not just opposite Taiwan.
Indian expert observers do not interpret China's new-found assertiveness as preparation for imminent conflict, and they continue to calculate that the overall probability of another Sino-Indian war is low. However, they believe China may be trying to enhance its bargaining position in the ongoing border negotiations. The Indian observers note that incursions across the disputed borders are likely aimed at gaining tactical advantage to bolster Chinese territorial claims.
India has somewhat belatedly sought to match the Chinese moves and to reinforce its own claims in the disputed border areas by augmenting forces and constructing roads along the shared frontiers. These measures include the deployment of two squadrons of Su-30 MKI fighter jets in Assam and the raising of two mountain divisions for deployment in Arunachal Pradesh. India also has redeployed elements of its 27th Mountain Division from Jammu and Kashmir to the patch of land that intersects India, Tibet, and Bhutan and links India with the rest of its northeastern states.
India is reviving air fields along the border with China, including one in the Ladakh region.
India must increasingly factor the potential threat of conflict over its disputed borders with China into its security planning and projections. While Indian strategists assess that Pakistan poses the most immediate threat to India, they increasingly view China as the more important long-term strategic threat.
In order to deter Chinese aggression along India's border, Indian strategists believe they must develop the capability to inflict severe damage on Chinese forces in Tibet. China has an edge over India with regard to overall air power. Given infrastructure constraints in Tibet, however, China's ability to deploy significant air power on the border with India remains in question.
CHINA'S EXPANDING INFLUENCE IN SOUTH ASIA
China is consciously strengthening ties to its traditional ally Pakistan and slowly gaining more influence with other South Asian states. In addition to developing a port facility in Sittwe, Burma, China has invested in the development of ports in Hambantota, Sri Lanka, and Gwadar, Pakistan, and has offered assistance to Bangladesh in developing its deep-sea port in Chittagong. Because China imports about 70 percent of its energy requirements, its interest in developing these ports is primarily to help ensure uninterrupted access to crucial energy supplies.
China has already invested about $200 million in the Gwadar Port facility in the southwest part of Baluchistan Province in Pakistan off the coast of the Arabian Sea.
Pakistan's defence minister recently claimed that Pakistan had invited China to start building a naval base at Gwadar; Chinese officials publicly dismissed the notion. It is unclear whether Islamabad made the statement without coordinating with Beijing or whether the episode was carefully choreographed to send a signal (mainly to the U.S. and India) about the potential impact of an even cosier Sino–Pakistani military alliance.
China maintains a robust defence relationship with Pakistan and views a strong partnership with Pakistan as a useful way to contain Indian power in the region and divert Indian military force and strategic attention away from China. The Chinese JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft is currently under serial production at the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, and an initial batch of 250 to 300 planes is scheduled. China also plans to provide Pakistan with J-10 medium-role combat aircraft with an initial delivery of 30 to 35 planes. Other recent sales of conventional weapons include F-22P frigates with helicopters, K-8 jet trainers, T-85 tanks, F-7 aircraft, small arms, and ammunition.
The China-Pakistan partnership serves both Chinese and Pakistani interests by presenting India with a potential two-front theatre in the event of war with either country. Toward the end of the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, China reportedly demanded that India dismantle certain posts on the India-China contested borders, but the war ended with Pakistan's acceptance of a U.N.-brokered ceasefire before China had an opportunity to act on its demands. During the 1971 Indo–Pakistani War, China took a less threatening posture toward India, possibly because of Soviet warnings to the Chinese.
China transferred equipment and technology and provided scientific expertise to Pakistan's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs throughout the 1980s and 1990s, enhancing Pakistan's strength in the South Asian strategic balance. The most significant development in China–Pakistan military cooperation occurred in 1992, when China supplied Pakistan with 34 short-range ballistic M-11 missiles. Beijing also built a turnkey ballistic missile manufacturing facility near Rawalpindi and helped Pakistan develop the 750 km–range solid-fuelled Shaheen-1 ballistic missile.
China helped Pakistan build two civilian nuclear reactors at the Chasma site in the Punjab Province under agreements made before it joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2004. More recently, China is moving forward with plans for two additional new nuclear reactors for Pakistan (Chasma III and Chasma IV), but the U.S. has indicated that Beijing must first seek an exemption from the NSG for any nuclear technology transfers. The NSG members discussed the proposed Chinese reactor sale to Pakistan at their plenary meeting in late June 2011 in the Netherlands. China argued that the proposed sale should be viewed as part of the earlier agreement struck with Pakistan before Beijing joined the NSG.
An Obama Administration decision to allow the China–Pakistan nuclear deal to advance unhindered would contradict earlier statements by U.S. officials that the construction of the two new nuclear plants would be inconsistent with China's NSG commitments. It could also jeopardise nuclear safety and security on the subcontinent, given that Pakistan's increased access to civilian nuclear technology without sufficient legal context and safeguards poses a potential proliferation threat.
U.S. media reports claiming that 7,000 to 10,000 PLA troops were deployed to Gilgit-Baltistan in Northern Pakistan last summer to help rebuild areas devastated by the massive Pakistani floods raised alarm in New Delhi. Indian analysts also noted the presence of PLA logistics and engineering corps in the region to provide flood relief and to build infrastructure projects such as roads, railways, and dams. The troops are most likely construction battalions helping to build transportation links between Pakistan and China, possibly from Gwadar Port. Nonetheless, New Delhi would view with consternation the possibility of Chinese troops stationed on both the eastern and northwestern borders of Indian Kashmir.
China also uses military and other assistance to court the smaller South Asian nations and to help them enhance their autonomy vis à vis India. Beijing has sold modern missile boats to Bangladesh and provided extensive military aid to Sri Lanka to help it win the war against the Tamil Tigers in 2009.
China's main interest in Nepal stems from its concerns over the large Tibetan refugee population there. Close to 20,000 Tibetans reside in Nepal, making it home to the world's second-largest Tibetan refugee community. Beijing increased its involvement with Nepal after the March 2008 ethnic Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule on the eve of the 2008 summer Olympics in Beijing.
Beijing has been pressing Nepal to tighten its borders with Tibet, which has led to a major decrease in the number of Tibetans able to flee to Nepal in recent years. China is also bolstering trade with Nepal and pursuing road-building and hydropower projects.
INDIA "GLANCING" EAST
For its part, India is slowly building political and economic ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the individual states of Southeast Asia, which generally welcome India's involvement as a balance to growing Chinese influence. India became a member of the East Asia Summit in December 2005 and signed a free trade deal with the ASEAN countries in2009. India has also enhanced its naval profile in Southeast Asia, holding periodic joint exercises with Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia.
Also with an eye on China, India has prioritised strengthening relations with Japan through increasing military contacts, maritime cooperation, and trade and investment ties. Tokyo has pledged $4.5 billion in soft loans for the Delhi-Mumbai railway freight corridor, and the two sides inked a joint security declaration in 2008, calling their partnership "an essential pillar for the future architecture of the region." In 2007 and 2009, Japan participated in the Malabar naval exercises in the Indian Ocean.
In a significant turnaround from its past tough stance toward India's nuclear program, Tokyo is currently negotiating a civil nuclear deal with New Delhi.
Contesting the Seas… Indo–Chinese strategic competition increasingly revolves around naval issues. India views with concern the Chinese military presence in and around the Indian Ocean and is carefully considering what it means for energy and sea-lane security. New Delhi is especially worried about Beijing's potential naval expansion, including the development of its first aircraft carrier.
India is steadily increasing its defence budgets and focusing particular attention on building up its naval capabilities. In February, New Delhi unveiled its 2011 budget with an 11 percent increase for defence. India's rising defence budgets and growing navy have begun to concern Beijing, as China's energy lifeline that passes through the Indian Ocean side of the Malacca Straits will increasingly be vulnerable to India's naval presence.
India has the world's fifth-largest navy. It already has one aircraft carrier and is striving to put into place three carriers by 2020 as part of its naval expansion and desire to project power throughout the Indian Ocean. Difficulties in defence procurement and deficiencies in its own shipbuilding sector, however, could stall India's progress in developing its naval capabilities. India has also carefully cultivated ties with the countries of the Indian Ocean rim, including Mauritius, Maldives, Seychelles, and Madagascar, providing these countries with naval support, such as offshore naval patrol vessels and staff and training. In February 2008, India convened the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, inviting participants from the littoral states to discuss maritime security. The United Arab Emirates hosted the second conference in May 2010.
India is pursuing better ties with Vietnam to try to check Chinese naval influence and access to the Indian Ocean. New Delhi initiated a new security partnership with Hanoi in 2000 that emphasized defence training, supply of advanced weaponry, and the potential for India to gain access to the South China Sea through the Cam Ranh Bay naval and air base. Indian officials have long understood the importance of Vietnam in the South China Sea and its potential to balance the Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. The Vietnamese have demurred on granting India access to Cam Ranh Bay, and the Vietnamese–Indian security partnership remains limited. Vietnam has supported India in its quest for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and has helped to block Pakistan's bid for membership in the ASEAN Regional Forum.
China, meanwhile, increasingly sees India as a maritime as well as a land threat. An assessment of the Indian military published by the PLA's National Defense University Press observes that, since the 1970s, India has increasingly shifted its strategic attention toward the Indian Ocean. In the Chinese view, this shift began in the wake of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, with increased construction of naval bases and forces and a concomitant expansion of Indian strategic guiding thoughts (zhanlue zhidao sixiang) to the Indian Ocean, and accelerated in the 1980s with the dispatch of Indian troops to Sri Lanka and the Maldives. While some of this naval effort is seen as being aimed at other states in the Indian Ocean region, especially Pakistan, the Chinese assessment also sees the Indian naval buildup as aimed at extra-regional military powers.
China's growing dependence on maritime commerce to sustain its economy inevitably heightens its concern over Indian naval capabilities. The Chinese assessment is that the Indian military has expanded its area of operations westward to the Persian Gulf and eastward to the Straits of Malacca, encompassing the key sea lanes of communications (SLOCs) that Chinese oil imports must transit.
As China modernizes its navy, there is some potential for the PLA to establish a greater presence in the Indian Ocean. India fears—a fear associated with China's port construction activities in Burma, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and potentially Bangladesh—that these commercial ports might become naval ports of call. With China's acquisition of several new nuclear-powered attack submarines and additional diesel-electric submarines, and also the introduction of an aircraft carrier (the Shi Lang), the PLA navy may choose to establish a longer-term, sustained presence in the Indian Ocean, in part to help safeguard its SLOCs.
…and Space. India has given indications that it is developing a military space program to match China's expanding space capabilities. New Delhi has an advanced civilian space program and launches satellites for other countries, including Israel. Officials from the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) have announced their aim to use satellite-based communication and navigation systems for "security needs." In 2010, the Indian Ministry of Defence unveiled plans for dedicated military satellites for all three of its defence services. Still, India's space budget is one-third of China's, which is publicly stated as about $2.2 billion.
There are also reports that India has shown growing interest in an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability. Media reports from March 2011 about India's ballistic missile defense (BMD) program provide indications that such a system might also have ASAT missions.
Demographic trends feed strategic rivalry
India's population will surpass China's in about 15 years. While not a decisive factor in determining the overall power balance between the two Asian giants, this demographic trend will play a role in regional security dynamics.
The most striking difference in the Indian and Chinese demographic pictures over the coming decades is the onset of India's youth bulge at the same time that China finds its population graying. U.S. Census Bureau analysts estimate that new entrants into China's labour force may be near its upper limits of 124 million as the population of Chinese aged 20 to 24 peaks this year. India's population of 20- to 24-year-olds, on the other hand, is not expected to peak until 2024 when it hits 116 million. While India's workforce will increase by 110 million over the next decade, China's will increase by less than 20 million, according to a Goldman Sachs study.
This demographic dividend could fuel India's economy in ways that make it a peer competitor to China—in particular, pushing Indian growth rates ahead of China's. At present, the Chinese economy is vastly larger than India's. At more than $4.7 trillion, China's GDP is four times India's; its GDP per capita, at about $3,565, is three times India's; and China produces about 12 percent of the world's GDP while India produces about 5 percent. The Chinese also hold socioeconomic advantages over India that could play in Beijing's favour: Adult literacy in China stands at about 91 percent, compared to roughly 61 percent in India.
Trade could mitigate other competitive interests
Trade and business ties between China and India have increased dramatically in the past decade. Bilateral trade has increased from around $5 billion in 2002 to more than $60 billion in 2010. During Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India last December, the two sides highlighted their growing economic relationship by pledging to boost trade over the next five years to $100 billion annually.
The rapidly expanding trade relationship between the two countries could help encourage a mutual interest in regional stability. While Beijing will almost certainly maintain close strategic ties to Pakistan, its growing economic stakes in India could motivate China to pay more attention to balancing its ties between India and Pakistan. On the other hand, some Indian analysts believe that China is pursuing a two-pronged strategy of lulling India into complacency with greater economic interaction while taking steps to encircle India and undermine its security.
What the U.S. should do
India must include the potential threat of conflict erupting over its disputed borders with China in its security planning and projections. While Pakistan presents the most immediate threat to India, Indian strategists increasingly view China as the most important long-term security challenge. Long-standing China-Pakistan security ties are a continuing source of angst in New Delhi and reminder of a potential two-front war. While India seeks to avoid conflict with China, Indian military planners also assess that they need to develop sufficient capabilities to deter an increasingly powerful and assertive China.
The U.S. should pursue robust strategic and military engagement with India in order to encourage a stable balance of power in Asia that prevents China from dominating the region and surrounding seas. New Delhi — not unlike many other capitals in Asia — balks at the idea of being part of an American-led China "containment" strategy. Some Indian strategists even favour a go-slow approach to the U.S.-Indian partnership in order to avoid raising Chinese ire. But China's recent posturing on its border disputes with India leaves New Delhi few options other than to play all the strategic cards at its disposal, including deepening and expanding ties with the U.S.
One must also calculate that Chinese alarms over "containment" may in part be a tactic to prevent closer Indian cooperation with nations in the Pacific, including the U.S.
The partnership between the U.S. and India will almost certainly never develop into an "alliance," given India's core foreign policy goal of maintaining its "strategic autonomy." But an elevated partnership that gives a nod to India's growing political, economic, and military strength would signal a solidarity that could help deter Chinese military aggression and temper China's ambitions to revise borders in its favour.
The U.S. and India share a broad strategic interest in setting limits on China's geopolitical horizons. They can work together to support mutually reinforcing goals without ever becoming "allies" in the traditional sense. To this end, the U.S. should:
– Support India's military modernisation campaign, including its quest for increasingly sophisticated technologies related to its strategic weapons programs. The U.S. advanced this goal earlier this year when it removed export controls on several Indian space and defence-related organizations. In January, the U.S. removed several subsidiaries of India's Defense Research and Development Organization and the Indian Space Research Organization from the Department of Commerce's "Entities List," which bars the export of certain dual-use technologies.
During the 1990s, the U.S. had pressured India to modify its nuclear and missile posture and opposed the deployment of India's short-range Prithvi missile and the development of its medium-range Agni missile. The U.S. must recognise India's need to improve its strategic capabilities in order to address potential challenges from a rising China.
Develop new initiatives for keeping the Indian Ocean safe and secure. India and the U.S. have participated together in informal low-level efforts to address piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. However, India has not joined the U.S.-led Coalition Maritime Force with combined task force (CTF-151), which the U.S. established as a major multilateral counterpiracy effort. India has been more interested in coordinating with other countries on a bilateral basis to address piracy rather than joining multinational anti-piracy organisations. In 2008, India initiated the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium to discuss maritime security with the other littoral states but did not include the U.S. in the discussions.
The U.S. should continue to work with India on maritime security while also seeking to convince New Delhi of the merits of adding the U.S., the United Kingdom, and Australia to a forum like the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. One of the main goals of the forum should be to agree to a code of conduct for naval vessels operating in the region and to develop an action plan for dealing with violations of the agreed code.
Additionally, the U.S. should consider engaging the Indian navy in such areas as anti-submarine warfare training and ocean surveillance capabilities. Improvements in these areas would help to reassure India, especially in the event of a growing PLA naval presence.
Remain engaged with the smaller South Asian states and fully exercise its observer role in the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The U.S. needs to remain focused on its relations with Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh so that these nations do not perceive China as the main economic and political game in town. India is clearly the dominant power in South Asia, but China is making new inroads with these countries that could come at the expense of stability and democratic trends in the region. The U.S. should participate fully in SAARC gatherings and ensure that its presence and influence are felt throughout the region.
Increase cooperation with India to address cyber security threats. In December 2009, more than 200 computers belonging to top-ranking Indian government officials, including three service chiefs and former National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan, were compromised in a hacking operation that originated in China. The U.S. and India have been slow to seize opportunities for cooperating on cyber security issues. The two sides should explore joint efforts to monitor foreign investments in critical Internet technologies and telecommunications in order to establish a means of sharing pertinent cyber threat and vulnerability information to enhance the mutual security of their networks.
Keep strategic messaging in the region consistent. The Administration faltered in 2009 when it promoted U.S.–China "cooperation" in South Asia as part of the U.S.–China Joint Statement. South Asia constitutes India's immediate neighbourhood, and America's interests in the region are far more aligned with India than they are with China. Stabilising Afghanistan and ensuring that it never again becomes a safe haven for international terrorists is one example of the convergence of U.S.-Indian strategic interests in the region. If the U.S. is to forge a lasting partnership with India, it must start by recognising India's predominant interests in South Asia, even as it promotes peace, stability, and economic progress throughout the Subcontinent.
Conclusion
Sino-Indian tension, particularly over unresolved border issues and naval competition in the Indian Ocean, will persist in the years ahead and could even precipitate armed conflict, although this remains a relatively remote possibility. The U.S. must seek to build closer strategic and defence ties with India, both to help maintain a peaceful equilibrium in the region and to help deter any potential aggressive action by China.
India's decision to forego American planes to fulfil its fighter aircraft needs has added a dose of realism to Indo–U.S. relations. Nevertheless, the complex challenge presented by a rising China will inevitably drive the U.S. and India to elevate ties and increase cooperation across a broad range of sectors in years to come. There is a great deal the U.S. can do, carefully and deliberately, to facilitate this natural confluence of strategic interests.
http://blogs.reuters.com/india-expertzone/2011/07/19/the-china-challenge-a-strategic-vision-for-u-s-india-relations/
| Timeline of articles Number of sources covering this story
ImagesVideos   |
Hillary Clinton
Featured video
Featured photo
Clinton urges India to expand influence
The Associated Press - 8 hours ago CHENNAI, India (AP) - US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton on Wednesday challenged India to expand its traditional sphere of interes... Images
Hillary Clinton
Featured videoFeatured photoClinton urges India to expand influenceThe Associated Press - 8 hours ago CHENNAI, India (AP) - US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton on Wednesday challenged India to expand its traditional sphere of interes... Images |
Foreign Policy
Featured video
Featured photo
Key US lawmakers assail Obama on detainees
AFP - 18 hours ago WASHINGTON - Top Republican US lawmakers on Tuesday assailed President Barack Obama's policy for detaining suspected terrorists and his ... Images
Foreign Policy
Featured videoFeatured photoKey US lawmakers assail Obama on detaineesAFP - 18 hours ago WASHINGTON - Top Republican US lawmakers on Tuesday assailed President Barack Obama's policy for detaining suspected terrorists and his ... Images |
Opinions
Why aren't we working with Japan and India?
By Michael Green and Daniel Twining,
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is in India for a strategic dialogue that will focus on how China's ascendance is transforming Asia. At her next stop, Indonesia, she is to hold trilateral consultations — U.S.-Japan-Korea and U.S.-Japan-Australia — on the margins of a broader regional forum. The Obama administration understands that Japan and India are critical bookends of a regional strategy aimed at peaceful cooperation with a rising China. Both Japan and India are moving closer to the United States precisely because of their concerns about China's direction. Yet something is adrift.The alliance with Japan, a pillar of America's forward presence in the Pacific for nearly six decades, has been buffeted by electoral change and natural disasters. The Obama administration weathered the victory of the populist Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2009 — a transition after nearly a half-century of one-party rule — then won kudos across the Japanese political spectrum for its massive humanitarian response to the March earthquake and tsunami. Yet Japan's deadlocked political system has produced only disappointment on Tokyo's earlier pledges to realign U.S. bases on Okinawa and to join trade liberalization talks through the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Senior Obama administration officials pepper talks about Japan with eye-rolling and expressions of exasperation.
India has also disappointed. The Bush administration handed off a strategic relationship with New Delhi transformed by agreements on peaceful nuclear cooperation and intensified security and economic collaboration. Yet in the first two years of the Obama administration, the Indians have opposed the United States on climate and trade initiatives, failed to enact liability legislation needed for American companies to develop India's nuclear industry, resisted meaningful economic reforms, cozied up to Burma's junta with gas and arms deals, and rejected U.S. combat aircraft in India's biggest defense deal to date. The refrain in Washington is that the Bush administration oversold the potential for strategic partnership with New Delhi.
The Obama administration needs to consider what has shifted in these pivotal relationships and where it bears responsibility for the listlessness in our two biggest strategic partnerships in Asia.
Domestic political weakness is at play in both countries. Japan has lurched from one unstable coalition to the next, with more likely to follow if Prime Minister Naoto Kan steps down in August as expected. While the DPJ seems to have abandoned its earlier flirtation with greater "independence" from Washington — thanks in part to Chinese assertiveness this past year — the Obama administration remains strikingly un-ambitious in setting the agenda for security cooperation with Tokyo. The allies should be having a focused dialogue about recapitalizing our militaries and strengthening interoperability to prepare for a more confident, better-armed China and a nuclear North Korea; instead, that effort has been relegated to an anemic mid-level working group. The administration dropped the sub-Cabinet-level coordination body with Japan on economic issues while elevating the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue to a body that includes half the president's Cabinet.
Meanwhile, India's ruling Congress Party is beset by scandal, internal bickering and declining popularity. But any future Indian government will face similar challenges from coalition politics. Indians rightly complain that Washington's preoccupation with China and "Af-Pak" has displaced India as a focus of U.S. foreign policy, and New Delhi has lost confidence in the administration's commitment to Afghanistan, where a precipitous U.S. withdrawal threatens to undermine core Indian interests with regard to Pakistan, China and terrorism. And as India strikes trade agreements with a range of other partners, a U.S.-India investment treaty is mired in U.S. bureaucracy.
For all of these negatives, there are upsides. An emerging generation of Japanese politicians and business leaders is keen to break old patterns and establish more dynamic economic and security strategies. After decades of distrust, India's leaders have identified partnership with the United States as essential to facilitating India's geopolitical rise and economic development.
Tokyo and New Delhi want to reinforce, not undermine, American leadership in Asia and the world. But mixed U.S. messaging about "strategic restraint" and "strategic reassurance" toward our competitors encourages India and Japan to pursue self-help strategies premised on a belief that Washington's determination to defend common interests is wanting. The tone of our relationships is set in Washington as well as in Tokyo and New Delhi. The Japanese and Indians may well be all the things American critics allege. But they are the only Japanese and Indians we have, and a bolder vision for these critical partnerships is essential.
Michael Green, senior director for Asia at the National Security Council from 2004 to 2005, is Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and an associate professor at Georgetown University. Daniel Twining, a member of the State Department's policy planning staff from 2007 to 2009, is senior fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-arent-we-working-with-japan-and-india/2011/07/18/gIQAIs6gMI_story.html
U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
The 123 Agreement signed between the United States of America and the Republic of India is known as the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation or Indo-US nuclear deal.[1] The framework for this agreement was a July 18, 2005 joint statement byIndian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and then U.S. President George W. Bush, under which India agreed to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities and to place all its civil nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and, in exchange, the United States agreed to work toward full civil nuclear cooperation with India.[2] This U.S.-India deal took more than three years to come to fruition as it had to go through several complex stages, including amendment of U.S. domestic law, specially the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,[3] a civil-military nuclear Separation Plan in India, an India-IAEA safeguards (inspections) agreement and the grant of an exemption for India by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an export-control cartel that had been formed mainly in response to India's first nuclear test in 1974. In its final shape, the deal places under permanent safeguards those nuclear facilities that India has identified as "civil" and permits broad civil nuclear cooperation, while excluding the transfer of "sensitive" equipment and technologies, including civil enrichment and reprocessing items even under IAEA safeguards. On August 18, 2008 the IAEA Board of Governors approved,[4] and on February 2, 2009, India signed an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA.[5] Once India brings this agreement into force, inspections began in a phased manner on the 35 civilian nuclear installations India has identified in its Separation Plan.[6]
The deal is seen as a watershed in U.S.-India relations and introduces a new aspect to international nonproliferation efforts.[7] On August 1, 2008, the IAEA approved the safeguards agreement with India,[8] after which the United States approached the Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG) to grant a waiver to India to commence civilian nuclear trade.[9] The 45-nation NSG granted the waiver to India on September 6, 2008 allowing it to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel from other countries.[10] The implementation of this waiver made India the only known country with nuclear weapons which is not a party to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but is still allowed to carry out nuclear commerce with the rest of the world.[11]
The US House of Representatives passed the bill on 28 September 2008.[12] Two days later, India and France inked a similar nuclear pact making France the first country to have such an agreement with India.[13] On October 1, 2008 the US Senate also approved the civilian nuclear agreement allowing India to purchase nuclear fuel and technology from the United States.[14][15] U.S. President, George W. Bush, signed the legislation on the Indo-US nuclear deal, approved by the U.S. Congress, into law, now called the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act, on October 8, 2008.[16] The agreement was signed by then Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and his counterpart then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, on 10 October.[17][18]
[edit]Overview
The Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006, also known as the Hyde Act, is the U.S. domestic law that modifies the requirements of Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act to permit nuclear cooperation with India[19] and in particular to negotiate a 123 Agreement to operationalize the 2005 Joint Statement. As a domestic U.S. law, the Hyde Act is binding on the United States. The Hyde Act cannot be binding on India's sovereign decisions although it can be construed as prescriptive for future U.S. reactions. As per the Vienna convention, an international treaty such as the 123 agreement cannot be superseded by an internal law such as the Hyde Act.[20][21][22]
The 123 agreement defines the terms and conditions for bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation, and requires separate approvals by the U.S. Congress and by Indian cabinet ministers. According to the Nuclear Power Corporation of India, the agreement will help India meet its goal of adding 25,000 MW of nuclear power capacity through imports of nuclear reactors and fuel by 2020.[23]
After the terms of the 123 agreement were concluded on July 27, 2007,[24] it ran into trouble because of stiff opposition in India from thecommunist allies of the ruling United Progressive Alliance.[25] The government survived a confidence vote in the parliament on July 22, 2008 by 275–256 votes in the backdrop of defections by some parties .[26] The deal also had faced opposition from non-proliferation activists, anti-nuclear organisations, and some states within the Nuclear Suppliers Group.[27][28] . In February 2008 then U.S. Secretary of StateCondoleezza Rice said that any agreement would be "consistent with the obligations of the Hyde Act".[29] The bill was signed on October 8, 2008.
[edit]Background
Parties to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have a recognized right of access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and an obligation to cooperate on civilian nuclear technology. Separately, the Nuclear Suppliers Group has agreed on guidelines for nuclear exports, including reactors and fuel. Those guidelines condition such exports on comprehensive safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which are designed to verify that nuclear energy is not diverted from peaceful use to weapons programs. Though neither India, Israel, nor Pakistanhave signed the NPT, India argues that instead of addressing the central objective of universal and comprehensive non-proliferation, the treaty creates a club of "nuclear haves" and a larger group of "nuclear have-nots" by restricting the legal possession of nuclear weapons to those states that tested them before 1967, who alone are free to possess and multiply their nuclear stockpiles.[30] India insists on a comprehensive action plan for a nuclear-free world within a specific time-frame and has also adopted a voluntary "no first use policy".
Led by the U.S., other states have set up an informal group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), to control exports of nuclear materials, equipment and technology.[31] Consequently, India was left outside the international nuclear order, which forced India to develop its own resources for each stage of the nuclear fuel cycle and power generation, including next generation reactors such as fast breeder reactors and a thorium breeder reactor[32][33] known as the Advanced Heavy Water Reactor. In addition to impelling India to achieve success in developing these new reactor technologies, the sanctions also provided India with the impetus to continue developing its own nuclear weapons technology with a specific goal of achieving self-sufficiency for all key components for weapons design, testing and production.
Given that India is estimated to possess reserves of about 80,000-112,369 tons of uranium,[34] India has more than enough fissile material to supply its nuclear weapons program, even if it restricted Plutonium production to only 8 of the country's 17 current reactors, and then further restricted Plutonium production to only 1/4 of the fuel core of these reactors.[35] According to the calculations of one of the key advisers to the US Nuclear deal negotiating team, Ashley Tellis:[35]
Operating India's eight unsafeguarded PHWRs in such a [conservative] regime would bequeath New Delhi with some 12,135–13,370 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, which is sufficient to produce between 2,023–2,228 nuclear weapons over and above those already existing in the Indian arsenal. Although no Indian analyst, let alone a policy maker, has ever advocated any nuclear inventory that even remotely approximates such numbers, this heuristic exercise confirms that New Delhi has the capability to produce a gigantic nuclear arsenal while subsisting well within the lowest estimates of its known uranium reserves.
However, because the amount of nuclear fuel required for the electricity generation sector is far greater than that required to maintain a nuclear weapons program, and since India's estimated reserve of uranium represents only 1% of the world's known uranium reserves, the NSG's uranium export restrictions mainly affected Indian nuclear power generation capacity. Specifically, the NSG sanctions challenge India's long term plans to expand and fuel its civilian nuclear power generation capacity from its current output of about 4GWe (GigaWatt electricity) to a power output of 20GWe by 2020; assuming the planned expansion used conventional Uranium/Plutonium fueled heavy waterand light water nuclear power plants.
Consequently, India's nuclear isolation constrained expansion of its civil nuclear program, but left India relatively immune to foreign reactions to a prospective nuclear test. Partly for this reason, but mainly due to continued unchecked covert nuclear and missile proliferation activities between Pakistan, China [36][37] and North Korea,[38][39] India conducted five more nuclear tests in May, 1998 at Pokhran.
India was subject to international sanctions after its May 1998 nuclear tests. However, due to the size of the Indian economy and its relatively large domestic sector, these sanctions had little impact on India, with Indian GDP growth increasing from 4.8% in 1997–1998 (prior to sanctions) to 6.6% (during sanctions) in 1998–1999.[40] Consequently, at the end of 2001, the Bush Administration decided to drop all sanctions on India.[41] Although India achieved its strategic objectives from the Pokhran nuclear tests in 1998,[42] it continued to find its civil nuclear program isolated internationally.
[edit]Rationale behind the agreement
[edit]Nuclear non-proliferation
The proposed civil nuclear agreement implicitly recognizes India's "de facto" status even without signing the NPT. The Bush administrationjustifies a nuclear pact with India because it is important in helping to advance the non-proliferation framework [43] by formally recognizing India's strong non-proliferation record even though it has not signed the NPT. The former Under Secretary of State of Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns, one of the architects of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal said "India's trust, its credibility, the fact that it has promised to create a state-of-the-art facility, monitored by the IAEA, to begin a new export control regime in place, because it has not proliferated the nuclear technology, we can't say that about Pakistan." when asked whether the U.S. would offer a nuclear deal with Pakistan on the lines of the Indo-U.S. deal.[44][45][46] Mohammed ElBaradei, former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which would be in charge of inspecting India's civilian reactors has praised the deal as "it would also bring India closer as an important partner in the nonproliferation regime".[47] The reaction in the Western academic community was mixed. While some authors praised the agreement as bringing India closer to the NPT regime, others argued that it gave India too much leeway in determining which facilities were to be safeguarded and that it effectively rewarded India for continuously defying the Non-Proliferation Treaty by not acceding to it.[48]
[edit]Economic considerations
Financially, the U.S. also expects that such a deal could spur India's economic growth and bring in $150 billion in the next decade for nuclear power plants, of which the U.S. wants a share.[49] It is India's stated objective to increase the production of nuclear power generation from its present capacity of 4,000 MWe to 20,000 MWe in the next decade. However, the developmental economic advising firm Dalberg, which advises the IMF and the World Bank, moreover, has done its own analysis of the economic value of investing in nuclear power development in India. Their conclusion is that for the next 20 years such investments are likely to be far less valuable economically or environmentally than a variety of other measures to increase electricity production in India.[citation needed] They have noted that U.S. nuclear vendors cannot sell any reactors to India unless and until India caps third party liabilities or establishes a credible liability pool to protect U.S. firms from being sued in the case of an accident or a terrorist act of sabotage against nuclear plants. Although India's parliament passed The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages bill on August 25, 2010,[50][51] the legislation does not meet international standards for nuclear liability as set forth in theConvention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, because it allows the operator to sue the supplier in case of an accident due to technical defects in the plant.[52] After the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan, issues relating to the safety of operating nuclear power plants, compensation in the event of a radiation-leak accident, disaster clean-up costs, operator responsibility and supplier liability has once again come into the spot-light.
[edit]Strategic
Since the end of the Cold War, The Pentagon, along with certain U.S. ambassadors such as Robert Blackwill, has requested increased strategic ties with India and a de-hyphenization of Pakistan with India, i.e. having separate policies toward India and Pakistan rather than just an "India-Pakistan" policy. The United States also sees India as a viable counter-weight to the growing influence of China,[citation needed] and a potential client and job creator.[53]
While India is self-sufficient in thorium, possessing 25% of the world's known and economically viable thorium,[54] it possesses a meager 1% of the similarly calculated global uranium reserves.[55] Indian support for cooperation with the U.S. centers on the issue of obtaining a steady supply of sufficient energy for the economy to grow. Indian opposition to the pact centers on the concessions that would need to be made, as well as the likely de-prioritization of research into a thorium fuel cycle if uranium becomes highly available given the well understood utilization of uranium in a nuclear fuel cycle.
[edit]Passing of Agreement
On March 2, 2006 in New Delhi, George W. Bush and Manmohan Singh signed a Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, following an initiation during the July 2005 summit in Washington between the two leaders over civilian nuclear cooperation.[56]
Heavily endorsed by the White House, the agreement is thought to be a major victory to George W. Bush's foreign policy initiative and was described by many lawmakers as a cornerstone of the new strategic partnership between the two countries.[57] The agreement is widely considered to help India fulfill its soaring energy demands and boost U.S. and India into a strategic partnership. The Pentagon speculates this will help ease global demand for crude oil and natural gas.
On August 3, 2007, both the countries released the full text of the 123 agreement.[58] Nicholas Burns, the chief negotiator of the India-United States nuclear deal, said the U.S. has the right to terminate the deal if India tests a nuclear weapon and that no part of the agreement recognizes India as a nuclear weapons state.[59]
[edit]Hyde Act Passage in the U.S.
On December 18, 2006 President George W. Bush signed the Hyde Act into law. The Act was passed by an overwhelming 359–68 in theUnited States House of Representatives on July 26 and by 85–12 in the United States Senate on November 16 in a strong show of bipartisan support.[60][61][62]
The House version (H.R. 5682) and Senate version (S. 3709) of the bill differed due to amendments each had added before approving, but the versions were reconciled with a House vote of 330–59 on December 8 and a Senate voice-vote on December 9 before being passed on to President G.W. Bush for final approval.[63][64] The White House had urged Congress to expedite the reconciliation process during the end-2006 lame duck session, and recommended removing certain amendments which would be deemed deal-killers by India.[65] Nonetheless, while softened, several clauses restricting India's strategic nuclear program and conditions on having India align with U.S. views over Iran were incorporated in the Hyde Act.
In response to the language Congress used in the Act to define U.S. policy toward India, President Bush, stated "Given the Constitution's commitment to the authority of the presidency to conduct the nation's foreign affairs, the executive branch shall construe such policy statements as advisory," going on to cite sections 103 and 104 (d) (2) of the bill. To assure Congress that its work would not be totally discarded, Bush continued by saying that the executive would give "the due weight that comity between the legislative and executive branches should require, to the extent consistent with U.S. foreign policy."[66]
[edit]Political opposition in India
The Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement was met with stiff opposition by some political parties and activists in India. Although many mainstream political parties including the Congress(I) supported the deal along with regional parties like Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam andRashtriya Janata Dal its realization ran into difficulties in the face of stiff political opposition in India. Also, in November 2007, former Indian Military chiefs, bureaucrats and scientists drafted a letter to Members of Parliament expressing their support for the deal.[67] However, opposition and criticism continued at political levels. The Samajwadi Party (SP) which was with the Left Front in opposing the deal changed its stand after discussing with ex-president of India and scientist Dr A P J Abdul Kalam. The SP then supported the government and the deal. The Indian Government survived a vote of confidence by 275-256 after the Left Front withdrew their support to the government over this dispute.[68] Incidentally, results showed ten MP's belonging to the opposing BJP party cross-voting in the favor of the government.
As details were revealed about serious inconsistencies between what the Indian parliament was told about the deal, and the actual facts about the agreement that were presented by the Bush administration to the US Congress, opposition grew in India against the deal. In particular, portions of the agreement dealing with guaranteeing India a fuel supply or allowing India to maintain a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel appear to be diametrically opposed to what the Indian parliament was led to expect from the agreement:
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's statement in parliament is totally at variance with the Bush Administration's communication to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which says India will not be allowed to stockpile such nuclear fuel stocks as to undercut American leverage to re-impose sanctions. To drive home this point, it says the 123 Agreement is not inconsistent with the Hyde Act's stipulation—the little-known 'Barack Obama Amendment' -- that the supply of nuclear fuel should be "commensurate with reasonable operating requirements". The 'strategic reserve' that is crucial to India's nuclear program is, therefore, a non-starter.[69] Furthermore, the agreement, as a result of its compliance with the Hyde Act, contained a direct linkage between shutting down US nuclear trade with India and any potential future Indian nuclear weapons test, a point that was factually inconsistent with explicit reassurances made on this subject by Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, during final parliamentary debate on the nuclear deal. As professor Brahma Chellaney, an expert in strategic affairs and one of the authors of the Indian Nuclear Doctrine [70], explained:
While the Hyde Act's bar on Indian testing is explicit, the one in the NSG waiver is implicit, yet unmistakable. The NSG waiver is overtly anchored in NSG Guidelines Paragraph 16, which deals with the consequence of "an explosion of a nuclear device". The waiver's Section 3(e) refers to this key paragraph, which allows a supplier to call for a special NSG meeting, and seek termination of cooperation, in the event of a test or any other "violation of a supplier-recipient understanding". The recently leaked Bush administration letter to Congress has cited how this Paragraph 16 rule will effectively bind India to the Hyde Act's conditions on the pain of a U.S.-sponsored cut-off of all multilateral cooperation. India will not be able to escape from the U.S.-set conditions by turning to other suppliers.[71]
[edit]Indian parliament vote
On July 9, 2008, India formally submitted the safeguards agreement to the IAEA.[72] This development came after the Prime Minister of IndiaManmohan Singh returned from the 34th G8 summit meeting in Hokkaido, Japan, where he met with U.S. President George W. Bush.[73] On June 19, 2008, news media reported that Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh threatened to resign his position if the Left Front, whose support was crucial for the ruling United Progressive Alliance to prove its majority in the Indian parliament, continued to oppose the nuclear deal and he described their stance as irrational and reactionary.[74] According to the Hindu, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee's earlier statement said "I cannot bind the government if we lose our majority," [75] implying that United Progressive Alliance government would not put its signature on any deal with IAEA if it lost the majority in either a 'opposition-initiated no-confidence motion' or if failing to muster a vote of confidence in Indian parliament after being told to prove its majority by the president. On July 8, 2008, Prakash Karat announced that the Left Front is withdrawing its support to the government over the decision by the government to go ahead on the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act. The left front had been a staunch advocate of not proceeding with this deal citing national interests.[76]
On 22 July 2008 the UPA faced its first confidence vote in the Lok Sabha after the Communist Party of India (Marxist) led Left Front withdrew support over India approaching the IAEA for Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. The UPA won the confidence vote with 275 votes to the opposition's 256, (10 members abstained from the vote) to record a 19-vote victory.[77][78][79][80]
[edit]IAEA approval
The IAEA Board of Governors approved the safeguards agreement on August 1, 2008, and the 45-state Nuclear Suppliers Group next had to approve a policy allowing nuclear cooperation with India. U.S. President Bush can then make the necessary certifications and seek final approval by the U.S. Congress.[81] There were objections from Pakistan, Iran, Ireland, Norway, Switzerland and Austria at the IAEA meeting.[82]
[edit]NSG waiver
On September 6, 2008 India was granted the waiver at the NSG meeting held in Vienna, Austria. The consensus was arrived at after overcoming misgivings expressed by Austria, Ireland and New Zealand and is an unprecedented step in giving exemption to a country which has not signed the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)[83][84] The Indian team who worked on the deal includes Manmohan Singh, Pranab Mukherjee, Shiv Shankar Menon, Shyam Saran, MK Narayanan, Anil Kakodkar, Ravi Grover, and DB Venkatesh Varma.[83]
[edit]Versions of U.S. draft exemption
On August 2008 U.S. draft exemption would have granted India a waiver based on the "steps that India has taken voluntarily as a contributing partner in the non-proliferation regime".[85] Based on these steps, and without further conditions, the draft waiver would have allowed for the transfer to India of both trigger list and dual-use items (including technology), waiving the full-scope safeguards requirements of the NSG guidelines.[86]
A September 2008 waiver would have recognized additional "steps that India has voluntarily taken."[87] The waiver called for notifying the NSG of bilateral agreements and for regular consultations; however, it also would have waived the full-scope safeguards requirements of the NSG guidelines without further conditions.[86]
The U.S. draft underwent further changes in an effort to make the language more acceptable to the NSG.[88]
[edit]Initial support and opposition
The deal had initial support from the United States, the United Kingdom,[89] France,[90] Japan,[91] Russia,[92] and Germany.[93][94] After some initial opposition, there were reports of Australia,[95] Switzerland,[96] and Canada[97][98] expressing their support for the deal. Selig S. Harrison, a former South Asia bureau chief of The Washington Post, has said the deal may represent a tacit recognition of India as a nuclear weapon state,[99] while former U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph says the "U.S. State Department made it very clear that we will not recognize India as a nuclear-weapon state".[100]
Norway, Austria, Brazil, and Japan all warned that their support for India at the IAEA did not mean that they would not express reservations at the NSG. New Zealand, which is a member of the NSG but not of the IAEA Board of Governors, cautioned that its support should not be taken for granted.[28] Ireland, which launched the non-proliferation treaty process in 1958 and signed it first in 1968, doubted India's nuclear trade agreement with the U.S.[101] Russia, a potentially large nuclear supplier to India, expressed reservations about transferring enrichment and reprocessing technology to India.[102] China argued the agreement constituted "a major blow to the international non-proliferation regime".[103] New Zealand said it would like to see a few conditions written in to the waiver: the exemption ceasing if India conducts nuclear tests, India signing the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) additional protocol, and placing limits on the scope of the technology that can be given to India and which could relate to nuclear weapons.[104] Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Scandinaviancountries proposed similar amendments.[105] The nuclear deal was opposed by former U.S. president Jimmy Carter, who opined that the U.S. would be making "a dangerous deal with India"[106]
After the first NSG meeting in August 2008, diplomats noted that up to 20 of the 45 NSG states tabled conditions similar to the Hyde Act for India's waiver to do business with the NSG.[107] "There were proposals on practically every paragraph," a European diplomat said.[107] A group of seven NSG members suggested including some of the provisions of the U.S. Hyde Act in the final waiver.[108] Daryll Kimball, executive director of the Washington-based Arms Control Association, said the NSG should at a minimum "make clear that nuclear trade with India shall be terminated if it resumes testing for any reason. If India cannot agree to such terms, it suggests that India is not serious about its nuclear test moratorium pledge."[109]
[edit]Reactions following the waiver
After India was granted the waiver on September 6, the United Kingdom said that the NSG's decision would make a "significant contribution" to global energy and climate security.[110] U.S. National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe said, "this is a historic achievement that strengthens global non-proliferation principles while assisting India to meet its energy requirements in an environmentally friendly manner. The United States thanks the participating governments in the NSG for their outstanding efforts and cooperation to welcome India into the global non-proliferation community. We especially appreciate the role Germany played as chair to move this process forward."[111] New Zealand praised the NSG consensus and said that it got the best possible deal with India.[112] One of India's strongest allies Russia said in a statement, "We are convinced that the exemption made for India reflects Delhi's impeccable record in the non-proliferation sphere and will guarantee the peaceful uses of nuclear exports to India."[113] Australian Foreign Minister Stephen Smith said that the NSG granted waiver because of "India's rise as a global power" and added, "If such a request was made for another country, I don't think it would have been cleared by the NSG members."[114] During his visit to India in September 2008, Smith said that Australia "understood and respected India's decision not to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty".[115] German Foreign Ministry spokesman Jens Ploetner called India a "special case" and added, "Does this agreement send an approving message to Iran? No, it absolutely does not."[116]
Initially, there were reports of People's Republic of China analyzing the extent of the opposition against the waiver at the NSG and then revealing its position over the issue.[117] On September 1, 2008, prominent Chinese newspaper People's Daily expressed its strong disapproval of the civilian agreement with India.[118] India's National Security Advisor remarked that one of the major opponents of the waiver was China and said that he would express Indian government's displeasure over the issue.[119] It was also revealed that China had abstained during the final voting process, indicating its non-approval of the nuclear agreement.[120] In a statement, Chinese delegation to the NSG said the group should address the aspirations of other countries too, an implicit reference to Pakistan.[121] There were also unconfirmed reports of India considering the cancellation of a state visit by Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi.[122] However, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee said the Chinese Foreign Minister will be welcomed "as an honored guest".[123] The Times of India noted that China's stance could have a long-term implication on Sino-Indian relations.[124]
There were some other conflicting reports on China's stance, however. The Hindu reported that though China had expressed its desire to include more stern language in the final draft, they had informed India about their intention to back the agreement.[125] In an interview to theHindustan Times, Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Hu Zhengyue said that "China understands India's needs for civil nuclear energy and related international cooperation."[126] Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi told India's CNN-IBN, "We didn't do anything to block it [the deal]. We played a constructive role. We also adopted a positive and responsible attitude and a safeguards agreement was reached, so facts speak louder ... than some reports".[127] During a press conference in New Delhi, Yang added, "The policy was set much before that. When consensus was reached, China had already made it clear in a certain way that we have no problem with the [NSG] statement."[128]Highlighting the importance of Sino-Indian relations, Yang remarked, "let us [India and China] work together to move beyond doubts to build a stronger relationship between us."[129]
[edit]Indian reactions
Indian PM Manmohan Singh visited Washington D.C. on September 26, 2008 to celebrate the conclusion of the agreement with U.S. President George W. Bush.[130] He also visited France to convey his appreciation for the country's stance.[131] India's External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee expressed his deep appreciation for India's allies in the NSG, especially the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, Germany, South Africa and Brazil for helping India achieve NSG's consensus on the nuclear deal.[132]
Bhartiya Janata Party's Yashwant Sinha, who also formerly held the post of India's External Affairs Minister, criticized the Indian government's decision to seek NSG's consensus and remarked that "India has walked into the non-proliferation trap set by the U.S., we have given up our right to test nuclear weapons forever, it has been surrendered by the government".[133] However, another prominent member of the same party and India's former National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra supported the development at the NSG and said that the waiver granted made "no prohibition" on India to conduct nuclear tests in the future.[134]
A leading advocate of the agreement was India's most eminent strategic affairs analyst K. Subrahmanyam, also known for his long and controversial championing of an Indian nuclear deterrent.[135] He argued that the convergence of strategic interests between the two nations forced such a remarkable gesture from the US, overturning its decades-long stand on non-proliferation, and that it would be unwise on India's part to spurn such an overture.[136] He also argued that not recognizing new geo-political realities would be even more foolhardy on the part of the Indian elite.[137][138]
Former President of India and noted Indian scientist, APJ Abdul Kalam, also supported the agreement and remarked that New Delhi may break its "voluntary moratorium" on further nuclear tests in "supreme national interest".[139] However, analyst M K Bhadrakumar demurred. He said that the consensus at NSG was achieved on the "basis" of Pranab Mukherjee's commitment to India's voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing and by doing so, India has entered into a "multilateral commitment" bringing it within "the ambit of the CTBT and NPT".[140]
The NSG consensus was welcomed by several major Indian companies. Major Indian corporations like Videocon Group, Tata Power andJindal Power saw a $40 billion (U.S.) nuclear energy market in India in the next 10–15 years.[141] On a more optimistic note, some of India's largest and most well-respected corporations like Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, National Thermal Power Corporation and Larsen & Toubrowere eyeing a $100 billion (U.S.) business in this sector over the same time period.[141] According to Hindustan Times, nuclear energy will produce 52,000 MW of electricity in India by 2020.[142]
[edit]Other reactions over the issue
More than 150 non-proliferation activists and anti-nuclear organizations called for tightening the initial NSG agreement to prevent harming the current global non-proliferation regime.[143] Among the steps called for were:[27]
- ceasing cooperation if India conducts nuclear tests or withdraws from safeguards
- supplying only an amount of fuel which is commensurate with ordinary reactor operating requirements
- expressly prohibiting the transfer of enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production items to India
- opposing any special safeguards exemptions for India
- conditioning the waiver on India stopping fissile production and legally binding itself not to conduct nuclear tests
- not allowing India to reprocess nuclear fuel supplied by a member state in a facility that is not under permanent and unconditional IAEA safeguards
- agreeing that all bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements between an NSG member-state and India explicitly prohibit the replication or use of such technology in any unsafeguarded Indian facilities
The call said that the draft Indian nuclear "deal would be a nonproliferation disaster and a serious setback to the prospects of global nuclear disarmament" and also pushed for all world leaders who are serious about ending the arms race to "to stand up and be counted."[27]
Dr. Kaveh L Afrasiabi, who has taught political science at Tehran University, has argued the agreement will set a new precedent for other states, adding that the agreement represents a diplomatic boon for Tehran.[144] Ali Ashgar Soltanieh, the Iranian Deputy Director General for International and Political Affairs,[145] has complained the agreement may undermine the credibility, integrity and universality of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Pakistan argues the safeguards agreement "threatens to increase the chances of a nuclear arms race in the subcontinent."[146] Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi has suggested his country should be considered for such an accord,[147] and Pakistan has also said the same process "should be available as a model for other non-NPT states".[148]. On July 19, 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton countered Pakistan statements by saying that Pakistan's checkered history on nuclear proliferation "raises red flags" regarding nuclear cooperation with Pakistan.[149] Israel is citing the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal as a precedent to alter Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) rules to construct its first nuclear power plant in the Negev desert, and is also pushing for its own trade exemptions.[150]
Brahma Chellaney, a Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research, argued that the wording of the U.S. exemption sought to irrevocably tether New Delhi to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. He argued India would be brought under a wider non-proliferation net, with India being tied to compliance with the entire set of NSG rules. India would acquiesce to its unilateral test moratorium being turned into a multilateral legality. He concluded that instead of the "full" civil nuclear cooperation that the original July 18, 2005, deal promised, India's access to civil nuclear enrichment and reprocessing technologies would be restricted through the initial NSG waiver.[151]
[edit]Consideration by U.S. Congress
The Bush Administration told Congress in January 2008 that the United States may cease all cooperation with India if India detonates a nuclear explosive device. The Administration further said it was not its intention to assist India in the design, construction or operation of sensitive nuclear technologies through the transfer of dual-use items.[152] The statements were considered sensitive in India because debate over the agreement in India could have toppled the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The State Department had requested they remain secret even though they were not classified.[153] Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also previously told the House Foreign Affairs Panel in public testimony that any agreement would "have to be completely consistent with the obligations of the Hyde Act".[29] Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher and the Former Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative AffairsJeffrey Bergner also said the agreement would be in conformity with the Hyde Act.[154]
Howard Berman, chair of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, in a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warned that an NSG waiver "inconsistent" with the 2006 Hyde Act would "jeopardise" the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal in the U.S. Congress.[155] Edward J. Markey, co-chairman of the House Bipartisan Task Force on Non-proliferation, said that there needed to be clear consequences if India broke its commitments or resumed nuclear testing.[156]
[edit]Passage in Congress
On September 28, 2008 the US House of Representatives voted 298-117 to approve the Indo-US nuclear deal.[157] On October 1, 2008 the US Senate voted 86-13 to approve the Indo-US nuclear deal.[158] The Arms Control Association said the agreement fails to make clear that an Indian nuclear test would prompt the U.S. to cease nuclear trade;[158] however, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that any nuclear test by India would result in the "most serious consequences," including automatic cut-off of U.S. cooperation as well as a number of other sanctions.[159]
After Senate approval, US President George W. Bush said the deal would "strengthen our global nuclear nonproliferation efforts, protect the environment, create jobs, and assist India in meeting its growing energy needs in a responsible manner."[160] Then-US presidential candidates Barack Obama and John McCain, as well as then-Vice Presidential candidate Joe Biden, voted in support of the bill.[161]
[edit]Formal signing of the deal
There was speculation the Indo-US deal would be signed on October 4, 2008 when U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was in India. The deal was to be inked by Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The two leaders were to sign the deal at 2 pm at the Hyderabad House in New Delhi.[162] But Mr. Mukherjee announced that India would wait for the US President to sign the 123 agreement legislation first into law and address India's concerns on fuel supply guarantees and the legal standing of the 123 agreement in the accompanying signing statement.[163]
Ms Rice was aware of the Indian decision before she left Washington. But she was very hopeful that the deal would be signed as the US state department had said that the President's signature was not prerequisite for Rice to ink the deal.[164] Rice had earlier said that there were still a number of administrative details to be worked out even as she insisted that the US would abide by the Hyde Act on the testing issue:
"There are a lot of administrative details that have to be worked out. This (the deal) was only passed in our Congress two days ago. The President is looking forward to signing the bill, sometime, I hope, very soon, because we'll want to use it as an opportunity to thank all of the people who have been involved in this," said Rice.[165]
In Washington, a Senate Democratic aide said that such a delay was not that unusual because legislation needed to be carefully reviewed before being sent to the White House.[166]
US President George W Bush signed the legislation on the Indo-US nuclear deal into law on October 8.[16] The new law, called the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act, was signed by President Bush at a brief White House function in the presence of the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman, Vice-President Dick Cheney and the Indian Ambassador to the U.S. Ronen Sen besides a large gathering of other dignitaries.[167] The final administrative aspect of the deal was completed after Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee signed the bilateral instruments of the 123 Agreement in Washington on October 10 paving the way for operationalization of the deal between the two countries.[168] [169]
[edit]Chronology of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal
July 18, 2005: President Bush and Prime Minister Singh first announce their intention to enter into a nuclear agreement in Washington.
March 1, 2006: Bush visits India for the first time.
March 3, 2006: Bush and Singh issue a joint statement on their growing strategic partnership, emphasising their agreement on civil nuclear cooperation.
July 26, 2006: The US House of Representatives passes the 'Henry J Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006,' which stipulates that Washington will cooperate with New Delhi on nuclear issues and exempt it from signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
July 28, 2006: In India, the Left parties demand threadbare discussion on the issue in Parliament.
November 16, 2006: The US Senate passes the 'United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation and US Additional Protocol Implementation Act' to "exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 United States exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology to India."
December 18, 2006: President Bush signs into law congressional legislation on Indian atomic energy.
July 27, 2007: Negotiations on a bilateral agreement between the United States and India conclude.
Aug 3, 2007: The text of the 'Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy' (123 Agreement) is released by both governments.
Aug 13, 2007: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh makes a suo motu statement on the deal in Parliament.
Aug 17, 2007: The CPI(M) General Secretary Prakash Karat says the 'honeymoon (with government) may be over but the marriage can go on'.
Sept 4, 2007: In India, the UPA-Left committee to discuss nuclear deal set up.
Feb 25, 2008: Left parties in India say the ruling party would have to choose between the deal and its government's stability.
March 3–6, 2008: Left parties warn of 'serious consequences' if the nuclear deal is operationalised and set a deadline asking the government to make it clear by March 15 whether it intended to proceed with the nuclear deal or drop it.
March 7–14, 2008: The CPI writes to the Prime Minister Singh, warns of withdrawal of support if government goes ahead with the deal and puts political pressure on the Manmohan Singh government not to go with the deal.
April 23, 2008: The Indian Government says it will seek the sense of the House on the 123 Agreement before it is taken up for ratification by the American Congress.
June 17, 2008: External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee meets Prakash Karat, asks the Left to allow the government to go ahead with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement.
June 30, 2008: The Indian Prime Minister says his government prepared to face Parliament before operationalising the deal.
July 8, 2008: Left parties in India withdraw support to government.
July 9, 2008: The draft India-specific safeguards accord with the IAEA circulated to IAEA's Board of Governors for approval.
July 10, 2008: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh calls for a vote of confidence in Parliament.
July 14, 2008: The IAEA says it will meet on August 1 to consider the India-specific safeguards agreement.
July 18, 2008: Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon briefs the IAEA Board of Governors and some NSG countries in Vienna on the safeguards agreement.
July 22, 2008: Government is willing to look at "possible amendments" to the Atomic Energy Act to ensure that the country's strategic autonomy will never be compromised, says Prime Minister Singh.
July 22, 2008: The UPA government led by Manmohan Singh wins trust vote in the Lok Sabha in India.
July 24, 2008: India dismisses warning by Pakistan that the deal will accelerate an atomic arms race in the sub-continent.
July 24, 2008: India launches full blast lobbying among the 45-nation NSG for an exemption for nuclear commerce.
July 25, 2008: IAEA secretariat briefs member states on India-specific safeguards agreement.
Aug 1, 2008: IAEA Board of Governors adopts India- specific safeguards agreement unanimously.
Aug 21-22, 2008: The NSG meet to consider an India waiver ends inconclusively amid reservations by some countries.
Sep 4-6, 2008: The NSG meets for the second time on the issue after the US comes up with a revised draft and grants waiver to India after marathon parleys.
Sept 11, 2008: President Bush sends the text of the 123 Agreement to the US Congress for final approval.
Sept 12, 2008: US remains silent over the controversy in India triggered by President Bush's assertions that nuclear fuel supply assurances to New Delhi under the deal were only political commitments and not legally binding.
Sept 13, 2008: The State Department issues a fact sheet on the nuclear deal saying the initiative will help meet India's growing energy requirements and strengthen the non- proliferation regime by welcoming New Delhi into globally accepted nonproliferation standards and practices.
Sept 18, 2008: The Senate Foreign Relations Committee kicks off a crucial hearing on the Indo-US nuclear deal.
Sept 19, 2008: America's nuclear fuel supply assurances to India are a "political commitment" and the government cannot "legally compel" US firms to sell a "given product" to New Delhi, top officials tells Congressional panel.
Sept 21, 2008: US financial crisis diverts attention from N-deal as both the Bush Administration and the Congress are bogged down over efforts to rescue bankrupt American banks. financial crisis in the country.
Sept 26, 2008: PM Singh meets President Bush at the White House, but were not able to sign the nuclear deal as the Congress did not approve it.
Sept 27, 2008: House of Representatives approves the Indo-US nuclear deal. 298 members voted for the Bill while 117 voted against.
Oct 1, 2008: Senate approves the Indo-US civil nuclear deal with 86 votes for and 13 against.
Oct 4, 2008: Secretary of State Rice visits Delhi. India and the US unable to ink the nuclear agreement with New Delhi insisting that it would do so only after President Bush signs it into a law, an occasion when it expects certain misgivings to be cleared.
Oct 4, 2008: White House announces that President Bush will sign the legislation on the Indo-US nuclear deal into a law on October 8.
Oct 8, 2008: President Bush signs legislation to enact the landmark US-India civilian nuclear agreement.
Oct 10, 2008: The 123 Agreement between India and US is finally operationalized between the two countries after the deal is signed by External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and his counterpart Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in Washington D C.
[edit]See also
- India – United States relations
- Energy policy of India
- Nuclear Liability Bill
- Energy security
- Foreign relations of India
- Nuclear power in India
[edit]References
- ^ Sultan, Maria; Mian Behzad Adil (September, 2008). "The Henry J. Hyde Act and 123 Agreement: An Assessment" (PDF). South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, London.
- ^ Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
- ^ Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate.; Speaker of the House of Representatives. (Tuesday, 3 January 2006). "''Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006''". The federal government of the United States of America.
- ^ IAEA Board Approves India-Safeguards Agreement
- ^ India Safeguards Agreement Signed
- ^ INFCIRC/731
- ^ Bajoria, Jayshree (November 5, 2010). "The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal". http://www.cfr.org.
- ^ "IAEA approves India nuclear inspection deal - International Herald Tribune". Iht.com. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ "outlookindia.com | wired". Outlookindia.com. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ "Nuclear Suppliers Group Grants India Historic Waiver - MarketWatch". Marketwatch.com. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ 3 hours ago (3 hours ago). "AFP: India energised by nuclear pacts". Afp.google.com. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ "House of Reps clears N-deal, France set to sign agreement-USA-World-The Times of India". Timesofindia.indiatimes.com. 2008-09-29. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ "India, France ink nuclear deal, first after NSG waiver". Indianexpress.com. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ Rajghatta, Chidanand (2008-10-02). "Finally, it's done: India back on the nuclear train-USA-World-The Times of India". Timesofindia.indiatimes.com. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ "Senate approves nuclear deal with India - CNN.com". Edition.cnn.com. 2008-10-01. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ a b "Bush signs bill on N-deal on October 8". United States Office of the Press Secretary. 2008-10-08. Retrieved 2008-10-08.
- ^ Done Deal: India, US seal landmark nuclear pact CNN-IBN
- ^ Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Indian Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee At the Signing of the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
- ^ http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:h5682enr.txt.pdf
- ^ The Indo-U.S. nuclear debate from www.gulfnews.com
- ^ ITGD Bureau. "India Today - India's most widely read magazine". Indiatoday.digitaltoday.in. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ "War of words & world views-India-The Times of India". Timesofindia.indiatimes.com. 2008-07-22. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ "At G-8, Singh, Bush reaffirm commitment to nuclear deal - Economy and Politics - livemint.com". Retrieved 2008-07-11.
- ^ "India and US confirm nuclear pact". BBC News. 2007-07-27. Retrieved 2010-05-05.
- ^ India: Government crisis deepens over U.S. nuclear deal
- ^ "Indian government survives vote". BBC News. 2008-07-22. Retrieved 2008-07-23.
- ^ a b c Arms Control Association: "Decision Time on the Indian Nuclear Deal: Help Avert a Nonproliferation Disaster"
- ^ a b Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation: U.S.-India Nuclear Energy Deal: What's Next?
- ^ a b Economic Times of India: Hyde Act will haunt nuclear deal at NSG too
- ^ "Embassy of India: Nuclear Non-proliferation". Retrieved 2006-06-01.
- ^ "Nuclear Suppliers Group".
- ^ "A Thorium Breeder Reactor".
- ^ "India unveils 'world's safest nuclear reactor'".
- ^ "P.18, paragraph 1, Tellis, Ashley, "Atoms for War? U.S.-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India's Nuclear Arsenal""(PDF).
- ^ a b "P.31-P.36, Tellis, Ashley, "Atoms for War? U.S.-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India's Nuclear Arsenal"" (PDF).
- ^ Vergano, Dan (2008-08-29). "Report says China offered widespread help on nukes". USA Today. Retrieved 2010-05-05.
- ^ "Against nuclear apartheid".
- ^ "Bermudez, Joseph S. Jr. 1998. A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK".
- ^ "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program - 1998: The Year of Testing".
- ^ "Achieving 9% Growth Rate in India: A Growth Paradigm".
- ^ "U.S. Ready to End Sanctions on India to Build an Alliance".
- ^ {http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/118726909/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0}
- ^ "Condoleezza Rice Paks a proliferation punch". The Economic Times. 2008-07-26. Retrieved 2008-08-03.
- ^ [1][dead link]
- ^ "Russia hints at smooth sail for India at IAEA". Ibnlive.com. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ http://209.85.175.104/search?q=cache:nlT8QsQA48QJ:www.ipcs.org/countIssueBrief.jsp%3Fissue%3D31+india+willing+to+sin+npt+as+a+nuclear+weapons+state&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=6&gl=in
- ^ VandeHei, Jim; Linzer, Dafna (2006-03-03). "U.S., India Reach Deal On Nuclear". The Washington Post. Retrieved 2006-03-03.
- ^ Müller, Jörn (2009). "The Signing of the U.S.-India Agreement Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy". Göttingen Journal of International Law. pp. 179–198. Retrieved 2009-04-05.
- ^ Linzer, Dafna (2005-07-20). "Bush Officials Defend India Nuclear Deal". The Washington Post. Retrieved 2005-07-20.
- ^ [|PTI Correspondent] (August 26, 2010). "Nuclear liability bill to bring in more investment: US media". The Times of India.
- ^ [|PTI Correspondent] (August 25, 2010). "Lok Sabha passes Nuclear Liability Bill". The Times of India.
- ^ India's Nuclear Liability Dilemma, by Ashley Tellis, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Interviewed by Jayshree Bajoria, Staff Writer, CFR.org, November 4, 2010.
- ^ PTI Correspondent (February 18, 2010). "US wants Indian businesses to create jobs in America". The Times of India.
- ^ "Information and Issue Briefs – Thorium". World Nuclear Association. Retrieved 2006-06-01.
- ^ "UIC Nuclear Issues Briefing Paper #75 – Supply of Uranium". Uranium Information Center. Archived from the original on April 27, 2006. Retrieved 2006-06-01.
- ^ "Bush, India's Singh Sign Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement". USINFO - International Information Programs. Retrieved 2006-03-02.
- ^ "U.S. House votes for nuclear deal". Chennai, India: The Hindu. 2006-07-28. Retrieved 2006-07-29.
- ^ "U.S. and India Release Text of 123 Agreement". Archived fromthe original on July 9, 2008. Retrieved 2008-07-11.
- ^ U.S. can terminate N-deal if India conducts tests: Nicholas Burns
- ^ "Bush Welcomes Senate Approval of U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement". USINFO - International Information Programs. Retrieved 2006-11-17.
- ^ "H.R. 5682: House Vote 411: Jul 26, 2006 (109th Congress)". GovTrack. Retrieved 2006-07-26.
- ^ "H.R. 5682: Senate Vote 270: Nov 16, 2006 (109th Congress)". GovTrack. Retrieved 2006-11-16.
- ^ "Congress Passes U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Bill". USINFO - International Information Programs. Retrieved 2006-12-09.
- ^ "H.R. 5682: House Vote 541: Dec 8, 2006 (109th Congress)". GovTrack. Retrieved 2006-12-08.
- ^ "Nuclear deal with U.S. made easier for India to digest".Hindustan Times. Retrieved 2006-11-09.
- ^ "Hyde Act not binding, says Bush". CNN-IBN. Retrieved 2006-12-19.
- ^ "IndianExpress.com :: 'The question is can we get a better n-deal? No’". Retrieved 2008-07-11.
- ^ Indian government survives vote
- ^ "The Pioneer > Columnists". Dailypioneer.com. Retrieved 2008-10-02.[dead link]
- ^ "Brahma Chellaney a strategic affairs expert, is a professor at the Centre for Policy Research. He was one of the authors of the nuclear doctrine submitted to the government for finalisation". rediff.com. Retrieved 2008-10-10.
- ^ "Stagecraft and Statecraft: India's retarded nuclear deterrent". Chellaney.spaces.live.com. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ Text of India-IAEA Safeguards Agreement
- ^ "India submits draft safeguards pact to IAEA". PTI(timesofindia.indiatimes.com). 2008-07-09. Retrieved 2008-07-08.
- ^ "PM wants to quit over nuclear deal". Retrieved 2008-07-11.
- ^ Varadarajan, Siddharth (2008-07-09). "India sends safeguards agreement to IAEA Board". Chennai, India: www.thehindu.com. Retrieved 2008-07-08.
- ^ "The Hindu News Update Service". Chennai, India. 2008-07-08. Retrieved 2008-07-11.
- ^ Sengupta, Somini (2007-07-23). "Indian Government Survives Confidence Vote". The New York Times. Retrieved 2010-05-05.
- ^ Indian gov't wins trust vote in parliament_English_Xinhua
- ^ Default
- ^ Post trust vote victory, India Govt. to move forward with reforms, nuclear deal - International Business Times
- ^ "IAEA board gets India's safeguards agreement". www.rediff.com. 2008-07-09. Retrieved 2008-07-08.
- ^ N-deal: Getting NSG nod may not be easy
- ^ a b "NSG CLEARS NUCLEAR WAIVER FOR INDIA". CNN-IBN. September 6, 2008. Retrieved 2008-09-06.
- ^ "INDIA JOINS NUCLEAR CLUB, GETS NSG WAIVER". NDTV.com. September 6, 2008. Retrieved 2008-09-06.
- ^ Carnegie Endowment (August 2008): Text of U.S. NSG Proposal on India
- ^ a b NSG Guidelines
- ^ Arms Control Association (September 2008): Revised Indo-U.S. NSG Draft
- ^ Khabrein: U.S. plans nuclear rewrite to build NSG consensus
- ^ "UK backs India's nuke energy ambitions". The Australian. 2008-01-23.
- ^ "France to back India at IAEA meet-India-The Times of India". Timesofindia.indiatimes.com. 2008-07-15. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ India Times: Japan to recognise India as nuclear state
- ^ "Russia, India Close on Nuclear Deal". Moscowtimes.ru. 13 February 2008. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ German leader: Much scope for India-Germany cooperation on peaceful nuclear energy - International Herald Tribune
- ^ "Germany for end to India's N-isolation". The Hindu (Chennai, India). 2007-10-23.
- ^ RTTNews - Political News and Chatter, World Political News, Forex News, Earnings Revisions
- ^ "Switzerland to support India's case at NSG- Politics/Nation-News-The Economic Times". Economictimes.indiatimes.com. 2008-08-17. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ "Canada, India exploring ways to co-operate in nuclear energy". PTI - The Press Trust of India Ltd. 2007-10-10.
- ^ Times of India: Canada behind U.S., Britain in wooing India, says expert
- ^ Harrison, Selig S. (2006-04-23). "How to Regulate Nuclear Weapons". The Washington Post. Retrieved 2010-05-05.
- ^ Arms Control Today (May 2006): Interview With Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph
- ^ "India's N-deal hurdle: Pak warns of arms race". CNN IBN. 2008-07-24. Retrieved 2008-07-24.
- ^ Times of India: India's NSG battle to focus on nuclear tech
- ^ Times of India: India sees red as China voices n-deal concerns
- ^ The National Business Review: NZ wants conditions written into nuclear agreement
- ^ Gulf Times: NSG 'will seek clear conditions'
- ^ Carter, Jimmy (2006-03-29). "A Dangerous Deal With India".The Washington Post. Retrieved 2010-05-05.
- ^ a b Daily Times: Nuclear suppliers propose terms for U.S.-India deal
- ^ Telegraph: Vienna blow to nuclear deal
- ^ AFP: Nuclear suppliers fail to reach consensus on U.S.-India deal
- ^ Sep 6, 2008 (September 6, 2008). "AFP: Britain hails landmark US-India nuclear deal". Afp.google.com. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ "U.S., India welcome NSG's agreement to lift nuclear trade embargo on India_English_Xinhua". News.xinhuanet.com. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ "New Zealand compromises on India nuclear deal_English_Xinhua". News.xinhuanet.com. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ "The Hindu : International : Russia welcomes NSG waiver for India". Chennai, India: Hindu.com. 2008-09-09. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ "'India got the waiver because of its rise as global power'-India-The Times of India". Timesofindia.indiatimes.com. Retrieved 2008-10-02.[dead link]
- ^ "India understands uranium stance: Smith - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)". Abc.net.au. September 12, 2008. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ DW Staff (jen). "Germany Grudgingly Accepts Landmark Nuclear Deal with India | Europe | Deutsche Welle | 09.09.2008". Dw-world.de. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ "NDTV.com: China, the main spoiler". Ndtv.com. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ "China state paper lashes India-U.S. nuclear deal | Markets | Reuters". In.reuters.com. 2008-09-01. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ "China was India's secret enemy at Vienna | What NSA says". Ibnlive.com. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?id=2beddd13-7339-4bcf-8484-83f7b7e2e8c6&ParentID=725c91cd-5ecf-44c4-8e4f-d5bd5791c1e4&&Headline=China+says+it+backs+India's+N-ambitions
- ^ "NSG should address aspirations of others too: China". Indianexpress.com. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ "India runs into the great wall of China at NSG". Ibnlive.com. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ "Will discuss NSG U-turn with China Foreign Min: NSA". Ibnlive.com. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ "Beijing 'disappoints' Delhi-India-The Times of India". Timesofindia.indiatimes.com. 2008-09-07. Retrieved 2008-10-02.[dead link]
- ^ "The Hindu : Front Page : Waiver enables member states to provide India full civil nuclear cooperation". Chennai, India: Hindu.com. 2008-09-07. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?sectionName=&id=2beddd13-7339-4bcf-8484-83f7b7e2e8c6&&Headline=China+says+it+backs+India's+N-ambitions&strParent=strParentID
- ^ "China denies blocking India's nuclear waiver bid | Markets | Reuters". Uk.reuters.com. 2008-09-08. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ "We decided to back India in NSG before Vienna meeting: China- Hindustan Times". Hindustantimes.com. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ "Let's move beyond doubts to build ties: China to India - Express India". Expressindia.com. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ "Manmohan arrives in Washington, to meet Bush". Thaindian News. Retrieved 2008-10-10.
- ^ "Manmohan leaves for home winding up 9 day US, France visit". Chennai, India: The Hindu. 2008-10-01. Retrieved 2008-10-10.
- ^ "India thanks NSG's Big Four for 'unique' waiver - Sify.com". Sify.com. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ "Gulf Daily News". Gulf-daily-news.com. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ "The Hindu : National : Advantage India, says Brajesh Mishra". Chennai, India: Hindu.com. 2008-09-07. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ Sengupta, Somini (2006-12-10). "Interests Drive U.S. to Back a Nuclear India". The New York Times. Retrieved 2010-05-05.
- ^ http://www.aerospaceindia.org/Journals/Monsoon%202005/Indo-US%20Relations%20in%20a%20Changing%20World.pdf
- ^ http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/oct/13ndeal.htm
- ^http://www.samachaar.in/Politics/Stalling_nuclear_deal_will_be_a_historical_mistake_23244/
- ^ Hindustan Times: N-deal, NSG waiver good for country
- ^ "Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan". Atimes.com. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ a b "India Inc sets eyes on $40 bn nuclear energy market- Indicators-Economy-News-The Economic Times". Economictimes.indiatimes.com. 2008-09-09. Retrieved 2008-10-02.[dead link]
- ^ Laxman, Srinivas (2008-09-11). "N-trade: It's a $40 billion opportunity-India-The Times of India". Timesofindia.indiatimes.com. Retrieved 2008-10-02.
- ^ The Hindu: Tighten draft waiver for India
- ^ Afrasiabi: Iran heartened by India's nuclear vote
- ^ Second Meeting of Experts of The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (July 2004): Statement By His Excellency Dr. Ali-Asghar Soltanieh
- ^ Forbes: India moves a step closer to U.S. nuclear pact
- ^ ISIS (July 2008): "Press Trust of India - India dismisses Pak talk of arms race due to N-deal"
- ^ Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the International Organizations (July 2008): Letter from Pakistan to the IAEA Board of Governors and Nuclear Suppliers Group
- ^ Clinton woos Pakistan on security, aid, Reuters, July 19, 2010.
- ^ Hindustan Times: Now, Israel wants NSG rules changed
- ^ "Serious implications for India in NSG draft". In.rediff.com. Retrieved 2008-10-02.[dead link]
- ^ Indian Express: Was India misled by America on nuclear deal?
- ^ Washington Post: In Secret Letter, Tough U.S. Line on India Nuclear Deal
- ^ Department of State: Answers to questions about Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement
- ^ "N-deal will be consistent with US domestic law". The Hindu(Chennai, India). 2008-08-08.
- ^ Economic Times of India: Congressional approval may not be automatic; dissenters speak out
- ^ Times of India: US House approves Indo-US nuke deal
- ^ a b Bloomberg: Bush Wins Approval in Congress for Priority India Atomic Accord
- ^ The Hindu: Nuclear test will have serious consequences
- ^ "Bush hails Senate passage of Indo-US nuclear deal-USA-World-The Times of India". Timesofindia.indiatimes.com. Retrieved 2008-10-02.[dead link]
- ^ Rice hails approval of India nuclear deal
- ^ "N-deal faces last-minute glitch". Deccan Harald.
- ^ "Condoleezza Rice leaves without inking deal". Economic Times.
- ^ Sunday Times (October 5, 2008), Rice is here but deal still not on table, Times of India
- ^ "Rice arrives, nuclear deal not to be signed today". NDTV.com.
- ^ "Rice in India, may not sign nuclear deal". Reuters.com. 2008-10-04.
- ^ "Bush signs India-U.S. nuclear bill into law". Chennai, India: The Hindu. 2008-10-10. Retrieved 2008-10-13.
- ^ Gollust, David (2008-10-10). "US, India Sign Civilian Nuclear Accord". Voice Of America. Retrieved 2008-12-24.
- ^ Times of India (October 11, 2008), India, US seal 123 Agreement, Times of India
[edit]External links
- U.S. Government links
- U.S. Government Printing Office: The text of the Hyde Act
- U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee: Questions for the Record submitted to Assistant Secretary Bernger by Chairman Tom Lantos
- U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee: Documents from the White House related to the U.S.-India civilian nuclear cooperation agreement
- India Government links
- Indian Ministry of External Affairs (August 2007): Text of the preliminary Indo-U nuclear agreement (meaindia.nic.in)
- Nuclear Suppliers Group links
- Nuclear Suppliers Group (August 2008): NSG Public Statement – Extraordinary Plenary Meeting
- Nuclear Suppliers Group (November 2007): INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1
- Nuclear Suppliers Group (March 2006): INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2
| ||
| |||
Liability for Nuclear Damage
(updated May 2011)
- Operators of nuclear power plants are liable for any damage caused by them, regardless of fault. They therefore normally take out insurance for third-party liability, and in most countries they are required to do so.
- The potential cross boundary consequences of a nuclear accident require an international nuclear liability regime, so national laws are supplemented by a number of international conventions.
- Liability is limited by both international conventions and by national legislation, so that beyond the limit (normally covered by insurance) the state can accept responsibility as insurer of last resort, as in all other aspects of industrial society.
An illustrative exchange on insuring nuclear power plantsIt is commonly asserted that nuclear power stations are not covered by insurance, and that insurance companies don't want to know about them either for first-party insurance of the plant itself or third-party liability for accidents. This is incorrect, and the misconception was addressed as follows in 2006 by a broker who had been responsible for a nuclear insurance pool: "it is wrong [to believe] that insurers will not touch nuclear power stations. In fact, wherever they are available to private sector insurers, Western-designed nuclear installations are sought-after business because of their high engineering and risk management standards. This has been the case for fifty years." He elaborated: "My comment refers very much to the world scene and is not contentious. Apart from Three Mile Island, the claim experience has been very good. Chernobyl was not insured. Significantly, because Chernobyl was of a design that would not have been an acceptable risk at the time, notably the lack of a containment structure, the accident had no impact on premium rates for Western plants. |
The structure of insurance of nuclear installations is different from ordinary industrial risks. Insurance (direct damage and third party liability insurance) is placed with either one of the many national insurance pools which brings together insurance capacity for nuclear risks from the domestic insurers in the local country, or into one of the mutual insurance associations such as Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited (NEIL) in USA or EMANI and ELINI in Europe. These are set up by the nuclear industry itself. Third Party liability involves international conventions, national legislation channeling liability to the operators, and pooling of insurance capacity in more than twenty countries. The national nuclear insurance pool approach was particularly developed in the UK in 1956 as a way of marshalling insurance capacity for the possibility of serious accidents. Other national pools that followed were modeled on the UK pool - now known as Nuclear Risk Insurers Limited, and based in London. The mutualisation of insurance risks began with the forerunner of NEIL in 1973
Ever since the first commercial nuclear power reactors were built, there has been concern about the possible effects of a severe nuclear accident, coupled with the question of who would be liable for third-party consequences. This concern was based on the supposition that even with reactor designs licensable in the West, a cooling failure causing the core to melt would result in major consequences akin to those of the Chernobyl disaster. It was supposed that damage caused could be extensive, creating the need for compulsory third party insurance schemes for nuclear operators, and international conventions to deal with transboundary damage. On the other hand it was realized that nuclear power makes a valuable contribution to meeting the world's energy demands and that in order for it to continue doing so, individual operator liability had to be curtailed and beyond a certain level, risk had to be socialized. Experience over five decades has shown the fear of catastrophe to be exaggerated, though the local impact of a severe accident or terrorist attack was shown at Fukushima in 2011 to be considerable, even with minor direct human casualties. Prior to that, the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 was taken as being indicative.
Nuclear liability principles
Most conventions and laws regarding nuclear third party liability have at their heart the following principles:
- Strict liability of the nuclear operator
- Exclusive liability of the operator of a nuclear installation
- Compensation without discrimination based on nationality, domicile or residence
- Mandatory financial coverage of the operator's liability
- Exclusive jurisdiction (only courts of the State in which the nuclear accident occurs have jurisdiction)
- Limitation of liability in amount and in time
Strict liability means that the victim is relieved from proving fault. In the case of an accident the operator (power plant, enrichment/fuel facility, reprocessing facility) is liable whether or not any fault or negligence can be proven. This simplifies the litigation process, removing any obstacles, especially such as might exist with the burden of proof, given the complexity of nuclear science. In layman's terms: strict liability means a claimant does not need to prove how an accident occurred.
Exclusive liability of the operator means that in the case of an accident, all claims are to be brought against the nuclear operator. This legal channeling is regardless of the accident's cause. By inference suppliers or builders of the plant are protected from public litigation in the case of an accident. Again this simplifies the process because claimants do not have to figure out who is responsible – under law it will be the nuclear operator.
Mandatory financial coverage means that the operator must maintain insurance cover, and it ensures that funds will be made available by the operator or their insurers to pay for damages. The minimum amount of protection required is set by national laws which in turn often depend on international treaty obligations. Over time the amount of this mandatory protection has increased, partially adjusting for inflation and partially allowing for an increased burden of responsibility to be passed on to nuclear operators.
Exclusive jurisdiction means that only the courts of the country in which the accident occurs has jurisdiction over damages claims. This has two effects; firstly it prevents what is known as jurisdiction shopping, whereby claimants try and find courts and national legislation more friendly to their claims, thus offering nuclear operators a degree of certainty and protection. Secondly it locates the competent court close to the source of damage meaning that victims do not have to travel far in order to lodge claims. This combined with exclusive liability ensures that relevant courts are accessible, even when the accident is transport-related and the relevant company based far away.
Limitation of liability protects individual nuclear operators and thus is often controversial. By limiting the amount that operators would have to pay, the risks of an accident are effectively socialized. Beyond a certain level of damage, responsibility is passed from the individual operator either on to the State or a mutual collective of nuclear operators, or indeed both. In essence this limitation recognizes the benefits of nuclear power and the tacit acceptance of the risks a State takes by permitting power plant construction and operation, as with other major infrastructure.
Altogether these principles ensure that in the case of an accident, meaningful levels of compensation are available with a minimal level of litigation and difficulty.
International Framework
Governments have long recognized the risk of a nuclear accident causing transboundary damage. This led to the development of international frameworks to ensure that access to justice was readily available for victims outside of the country in which an accident occurs, so far as the countries are party to the relevant conventions. The number of different international instruments and their arrangements often give rise to confusion. Many of the major instruments, outlined below, have been amended several times and not all countries party to the earlier version have ratified the latter. The result is a patchwork quilt of countries and conventions and work towards harmonization of these regimes is ongoing.
Before 1997, the international liability regime was embodied primarily in two instruments:
- the IAEA's Vienna Convention* on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 1963 (entered into force in 1977), and
- the OECD's Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 1960 which entered into force in 1968 and was bolstered by the Brussels Supplementary Convention in 1963**.
* Parties to Vienna Convention are mainly outside of Western Europe, including: Argentina, Bulgaria, Czech Rep, Egypt, Hungary, Lithuania, Mexico, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine. See also http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/liability_status.pdf
** The Paris convention includes all Western European countries except Ireland, Austria, Luxembourg and Switzerland. Parties to both Paris & Brussels are: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK. Paris only: Greece, Portugal, Turkey. See also: http://www.nea.fr/html/law/paris-convention-ratification.html
http://www.nea.fr/html/law/brussels-convention-ratification.html
These Conventions were linked by the Joint Protocol adopted in 1988 (see below) to bring together the geographical scope of the two*. They are based on the concept of civil law and adhere to the principles outlined above. Specifically they include the following provisions:
- Liability is channeled exclusively to the operators of the nuclear installations (legal channelling means exclusive liability of operator, and protects suppliers);
- Liability of the operator is absolute, i.e. the operator is held liable irrespective of fault, except for "acts of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection";
- Liability of the operator is limited in amount. Under the Vienna Convention the upper ceiling for operator liability is not fixed**; but it may be limited by legislation in each State. The lower limit may not be less than US$ 5 million. Under the 1960 Paris convention, liability is limited to not more than 15 million Special Drawing Rights*** (SDRs - about US$ 23 million) and not less than SDR 5 million.
- Liability is limited in time. Generally, compensation rights are extinguished under both Conventions if an action is not brought within ten years. Additionally, States may not limit the operator's liability to less than two years under the 1960 Paris convention, or three years under 1960 Vienna convention, from the time when the damage is discovered.
- The operator must maintain insurance or other financial security for an amount corresponding to his liability or the limit set by the Installation State, beyond this level the Installation State can provide public funds but can also have recourse to the operator;
- Jurisdiction over actions lies exclusively with the courts of the Contracting Party in whose territory the nuclear incident occurred;
- Non-discrimination of victims on the grounds of nationality, domicile or residence.
- Definition of nuclear damage covers property, health and loss of life but does not make provision for environmental damage, preventative measures and economic loss. This greatly reduces the total number of possible claimants, but increases the level of compensation available to the remainder.
* parties: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/jointprot_status.pdf** The Paris Convention set a maximum liability of 15 million Special Drawing Rights - SDR (about EUR 18 million), but this was increased under the Brussels Supplementary Convention up to a total of 300 million SDRs (about EUR 360 million), including contributions by the installation State up to SDR 175 million (EUR 210M) and other Parties to the Convention collectively on the basis of their installed nuclear capacity for the balance.
***An SDR is the unit of currency of the international monetary fund, it is approximately equal to 1.5 US dollars.
The 1963 Brussels supplementary convention created a system of three tiers to provide for damages. Parties of the Brussels convention must also be party to the Paris convention which provides for the first tier of funds via the nuclear operator's liability. Tier two requires the state to pay the difference between the operator's liability (which is set under national law) and SDR 70 million. Tier three calls upon all parties to the convention to supply up to SDR 50 million. The maximum total amount available for compensation of the 1963 convention is therfore SDR 120 million, though note that this has since been increased - see below..
Following the Chernobyl accident in 1986, the IAEA initiated work on all aspects of nuclear liability with a view to improving the basic Conventions and establishing a comprehensive liability regime. In 1988, as a result of joint efforts by the IAEA and OECD/NEA, the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention was adopted. Parties to the Joint protocol are treated as if they are Parties to both conventions. If an accident takes place in a country bound by the Paris convention which causes damages in a country bound by the Vienna convention, then victims in the latter are subject to compensation as per the Paris convention. The reverse is also true. Generally, no country can be a party to both conventions because the exact details are not consistent, leading to potential conflict in their simultaneous application. The Joint protocol was also intended to obviate any possible conflicts of law in the case of international transport of nuclear material. It entered into force in 1992.
The Vienna convention has been amended once in 1997, while the Paris convention and associated Brussels convention have been amended three times; in 1964, 1982 and 2004, though the latest amendment has not yet been ratified by enough countries to pass into force.
In 1997 governments took a significant step forward in improving the liability regime for nuclear damage when delegates from over 80 States adopted a Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention. The amended IAEA Vienna Convention sets the possible limit of the operator's liability at not less than 300 million SDRs (about EUR 360 million) and entered into force in 2003 but with few members. It also broadens the definition of nuclear damage (to include the concept of environmental damage and preventive measures), extends the geographical scope of the Convention, and extends the period during which claims may be brought for loss of life and personal injury. It also provides for jurisdiction of coastal states over actions incurring nuclear damage during transport.
There was no change in the liability caps provided for under either of the 1964 Paris or Brussels amendments or the 1982 Paris amendment. However, under the 1982 Brussels amendment, the second tier of finance (made available by the country in which the accident occurs) was raised to the difference between the operator's liability and SDR 175 million (i.e. between SDR 160 million and 170 million ), while the third tier called upon all contracting countries to contribute up to SDR125 million so that the total amount currently available is SDR 300 million.
In 2004, contracting parties to the OECD Paris (and Brussels) Conventions signed Amending Protocols which brought the Paris Convention more into line with the IAEA Conventions amended or adopted in 1997. The principal objective of the amendments was to provide more compensation to more people for a wider scope of nuclear damage. They also shifted more of the onus for insurance on to industry. Consequently new limits of liability were set as follows: Operators (insured) €700 million, Installation State (public funds) €500 million, Collective state contribution (Brussels) €300 million => total €1500 M. The definition of "nuclear damage" is broadened to include environmental damage and economic costs, and the scope of application is widened. Moreover the 2004 amendment removed the requirement for a state to restrict the maximum liability of a nuclear operator, allowing for the first time states with a policy preference for unlimited liability to join the convention.
These Paris/ Brussels amendments are expected to be ratified by the contracting parties once they have consulted with industry stakeholders and then drafted the necessary amending legislation. They are not yet in force, and the old limits still apply (c €210 million, €360 million).
Also in 1997 IAEA parties adopted a Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC)*. This defines additional amounts to be provided through contributions by States Parties collectively on the basis of installed nuclear capacity and a UN rate of assessment, basically at 300 SDRs per MW thermal (ie about EUR 360 million total). The CSC - not yet in force - is an instrument to which all States may adhere regardless of whether they are parties to any existing nuclear liability conventions or have nuclear installations on their territories, , though in the case where they are not party to either Paris or Vienna they must still implement national laws consistent with an annex to the CSC. In order to pass into force the CSC must be ratified by five countries with a minimum of 400 GW thermal of installed nuclear capacity. Currently the only ratifying party with significant nuclear generating capacity is the USA (c 300 GWt). Fourteen countries have signed it, now including India, but most have not yet ratified it. The CSC is set to enter into force on the 90th day after date of ratification by at least five States who have a minimum of 400,000 units of installed nuclear capacity (ie MWt). India will bring about 22 GWt operating and under construction.
* www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/supcomp.html
Beyond the provision of the above-mentioend instruments there is at least a tacit acceptance that the installation state will make available funds to cover anything in excess of these provisions, just as is the case with any major disaster - natural or other (the main industiral ones have been chemical plants). This has long been accepted in all developed countries. In the event of government payout to meet immediate claims however, the operator's liability is in no way extinguished, and taxpayers would expect to recover much or all of the sums involved.
However, several states with a significant current or planned nuclear capacity such as Japan, China and India, are not yet party to any international nuclear liability convention, so far relying on their own arrangements.
Beyond the international conventions, most countries with commercial nuclear programs also have their own legislative regimes for nuclear liability. These national regimes implement the conventions' principles, and impose financial security requirements which vary from country to country. There are three categories of countries in this regard: those that are party to one or both of the international conventions and have their own legislation, those that are not parties to an international convention but have their own legislation (notably USA, Canada, Japan, S.Korea), and those that are not party to a convention and are without their own legislation (notably China).
In 2010 both France's CEA and the IAEA called for an overhaul and rationalization of the several international conventions. In particular, the Paris Convention open only to OECD countries was unsatisfactory when reactor vendors and utilities from those countries were building plants in non-OECD countries. Partly due to the US channeling situation described below, the CSC is seen as a possible basis for an all-encompassing international regime
US Framework
The USA takes a somewhat different approach, and having pioneered the concept is not party to any international nuclear liability convention, except for the CSC, which has yet to come into force. The Price Anderson Act - the world's first comprehensive nuclear liability law - has since 1957 been central to addressing the question of liability for nuclear accident. It now provides $12.5 billion in cover without cost to the public or government and without fault needing to be proven. It covers power reactors, research reactors, enrichment plants, waste repositories and all other nuclear facilities.
It was renewed for 20 years in mid 2005, with strong bipartisan support, and requires individual operators to be responsible for two layers of insurance cover. The first layer is where each nuclear site is required to purchase US$ 375 million liability cover (as of 2011) which is provided by a private insurance pool, American Nuclear Insurers (ANI). This is financial liability, not legal liability as in European liability conventions.
The second layer or secondary financial protection (SFP) program is jointly provided by all US reactor operators. It is funded through retrospective payments if required of up to $112 million per reactor per acident* collected in annual instalments of $17.5 million (and adjusted with inflation). Combined, the total provision comes to over $12.2 billion paid for by the utilities. (The Department of Energy also provides $10 billion for its nuclear activities.) Beyond this cover and irrespective of fault, Congress, as insurer of last resort, must decide how compensation is provided in the event of a major accident.
* plus up to 5% if required for legal costs.
More than $150 million has been paid by US insurance pools in claims and costs of litigation since the Price- Anderson Act came into effect, all of it by the insurance pools. Of this amount, some $71 million related to litigation following the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requires all licensees for nuclear power plants to show proof that they have the primary and secondary insurance coverage mandated by the Price-Anderson Act. Licensees obtain their primary insurance for third-party liability through American Nuclear Insurers (ANI), and ANI manages the secondary insurance program also. Licensees also sign an agreement with NRC to keep the insurance in effect. American Nuclear Insurers also has a contractual agreement with each of the licensees to collect the retrospective premiums if these payments become necessary. A certified copy of this agreement, which is called a bond for payment of retrospective premiums, is provided to NRC as proof of secondary insurance. It obligates the licensee to pay the retrospective premiums to ANI if required.
American Nuclear Insurers is a pool comprised of some 60 investor-owned stock insurance companies, including the major ones. About half the pool's total liability capacity comes from foreign sources such as Lloyd's of London. The average annual premium for a single-unit reactor site is $400,000. The premium for a second or third reactor at the same site is discounted to reflect a sharing of limits.
The nuclear operators' mutual arrangement for insuring the actual plants against accidents is Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited (NEIL) which is well funded (a $5 billion surplus) and cooperates closely with the American Nuclear Insurers pool. It was founded in 1980 and insures operators for any costs associated with property damage, decontamination, extended outages and related nuclear risks. For property damage and on-site decontamination, up to $2.75 billion is available to each commercial reactor site. The policies provide coverage for direct physical damage to, or destruction of, the insured property as a result of an accident ["accident" is defined as a sudden and fortuitous event, an event of the moment, which happens by chance, is unexpected and unforeseeable. Accident does not include any condition which develops, progresses or changes over time, or which is inevitable]. The policies prioritize payment of expenses to stabilize the reactor to a safe condition and decontaminate the plant site.
The Price Anderson Act has been represented as a subsidy to the US nuclear industry. If considered thus, the value of the subsidy is the difference between the premium for full coverage and the premium for $10 billion in coverage. On the basis of data obtained from two studies - one conducted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the other by the Department of Energy (DOE) - the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the subsidy probably amounts to less than 1 percent of the levelized cost for new nuclear capacity.
The Price Anderson Act does not fully align with international conventions in that legal channelling is forbidden by state laws, so the Act allows only economic channelling, whereby the operator is economically liable but other entities may be held legally liable. This is a complication regarding any future universal compensation regime, though a provision was written into the CSC to allow the USA to join despite this situation. Hence the CSC may prove the most realistic basis for any universal third party regime.
Japan
Japan is not party to any international liability convention but its law generally conforms to them. Two laws governing them are revised about every ten years: the Law on Compensation for Nuclear Damage and Law on Contract for Liability Insurance for Nuclear Damage.
Plant operator liability is exclusive and absolute, and power plant operators must provide a financial security amount of JPY 120 billion (US$ 1.4 billion) - half that to 2010. The government may relieve the operator of liability if it determines that damage results from "a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character", and in any case liability is unlimited.
For the Fukushima accident in 2011 the government set up a new state-backed institution to expedite payments to those affected. The body is to receive financial contributions from electric power companies with nuclear power plants in Japan, and from the government through special bonds that can be cashed whenever necessary. The government bonds total JPY 5 trillion ($62 billion). The new institution will include representatives from other nuclear generators and will also operate as an insurer for the industry, being responsible to have plans in place for any future nuclear accidents. The provision for contributions from other nuclear operators is similar to that in the USA. The government estimates that Tepco will be able to complete its repayments in 10 to 13 years, after which it will revert to a fully private company with no government involvement. Meanwhile it will pay an annual fee for the government support, maintain adequate power supplies and ensure plant safety.
In relation to the 1999 Tokai-mura fuel plant criticality accident, insurance covered JPY 1 billion and the parent company (Sumitomo) paid the balance of JPY 13.5 billion.
Other countries
In the UK, the Energy Act 1983 brought legislation into line with earlier revisions to the Paris/Brussels Conventions and set a new limit of liability for particular installations. In 1994 this limit was increased again to £140 million for each major installation, so that the operator is liable for claims up to this amount and must insure accordingly. The majority of this insurance is provided by a pool of UK insurers comprising 8 insurance companies and 16 Lloyds syndicates - - Nuclear Risk Insurers. Beyond £140 million, the current Paris/Brussels system applies, with government contribution to SDR 300 million (c €360 million). The government is proposing legislation which would require operators' insurance of EUR 1.2 billion. The level would initially be set at EUR 700 million specified under the 2004 Paris/Brussels Protocol (when it enters force) and then increased by EUR 100 million annually. Also, proposals allow for the government to provide waivers, indemnity, and government-provided insurance to nuclear operators in cases where commercial insurance or other financial security measures are unavailable in the private market. A public consultation on this is under way until the end of April 2011.
In mainland Europe, individual countries have legislation in line with the international conventions and where set, cap levels vary. Germany has unlimited operator liability and requires €2.5 billion security which must be provided by the operator for each plant. This security is partly covered by insurance, to €256 million. France requires financial security of EUR 91 million per plant. Switzerland (which has signed but not yet ratified the international conventions) requires operators to insure to €600 million. It is proposed to increase this to €1.1 billion and ratify the Paris and Brussels conventions.
Finland has ratified the 2004 Joint Protocol relating to Paris and Vienna conventions and in anticipation of this coming into force it passed a 2005 Act which requires operators to take at least € 700 million insurance cover. Currently the level is only EUR 300 million. Also operator liability is to be unlimited beyond the € 1.5 billion provided under the Brussels Convention. "Nuclear damage" is as defined in revised Paris Convention, and includes that from terrorism.
Sweden has also ratified the 2004 Joint Protocol relating to Paris and Vienna conventions. The country's Nuclear Liability Act requires operators to be insured for at least SEK 3300 million (EUR 345 million), beyond which the state will cover to SEK 6 billion per incident. However, Sweden is reviewing how this relates to the EUR 700 million operator's liability under the Joint Protocol amending the Paris convention, and has announced that it will seek unlimited operator liability.
The Czech Republic is moving towards ratifying the amendment to the Vienna Convention and in 2009 increased the mandatory minimum insurance cover required for each reactor to CZK 8 billion (EUR 296 million).
In Europe there are two mutual insurance arrangements which supplement commercial insurance pool cover for operators of nuclear plants. The European Mutual Association for the Nuclear Industry (EMANI) was founded in 1978 and European Liability Insurance for the Nuclear Industry (ELINI) created in 2002. ELINI plans to make EUR 100 million available as third party cover, and its 28 members have contributed half that to late 2007 for a special capital fund. ELINI's members comprise most EU nuclear plant operators. EMANI has some 70 members and covers over 100 sites, mostly in Europe. Its funds are about EUR500 million.
In Canada the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act is also in line with the international conventions and establishes the licensee's absolute and exclusive liability for third party damage. Suppliers of goods and services are given an absolute discharge of liability. The limit of C$75 million per power plant set in 1976 as the insurance cover required for individual licensees was increased to $650 million in the Act's 2008 revision, though this has not yet passed. Cover is provided by a pool of insurers, and claimants need not establish fault on anyone's part, but must show injury. Beyond the cap level, any further funds would be provided by the government.
Russia is party to the Vienna Convention since 2005 and has a domestic nuclear insurance pool comprising 23 insurance companies covering liability of some $350 million. It has a reinsurance arrangement with Ukraine and is setting one up with China. It has some "interim" bilateral agreements to cover entities working under safety assistance programs, but the legislative deficit here is a deterrent to Western contractors in particular..
Ukraine adopted a domestic liability law in 1995 and has revised it since in order to harmonise with the Vienna Convention, which it joined in 1996. It is also party to the Joint Protocol and has signed the CSC. Operator liability is capped at 150 million SDRs (c €180 million). Special provisions provisions apply to work on the Chernobyl shelter so as to extend coverage outside the Vienna Convention countries.
China is not party to any international liability convention but is an active member of the international insurance pooling system, which covers both first party risks and third party liability once fuel is loaded into a reactor. China's 1986 interim domestic law on nuclear liability issued by the State Council contains most of the elements of the international conventions and the liability limit was increased to near international levels in September 2007. It is also setting up a reinsurance arrangement with Russia which is more symbol than substance.
(For insurance of the plants themselves, Hong Kong-listed Ping'an Insurance Company accounts for more than half of China's nuclear power insurance market, with its clients including nuclear power plants in Guangdong, Jiangsu and both first- and second-phase projects of Qinshan Nuclear Power Station in Zhejiang. Four Chinese Insurance companies provided US$ 1.85 billion worth of insurance to Tianwan Nuclear Power Station in Jiangsu, most of which will be reinsured internationally. About RMB 40 billion ($5.85 billion) insurance for the first two EPR units of the Taishan nuclear plant in being provided by Ping'an, All Trust, CPIC, PICC and others. In late 2009 seven insurance companies and China Power Investment Corporation (CPI) signed a RMB 100 billion insurance cooperation agreement with China Guangdong Nuclear Power Co to insure the ten CPR-1000 units that CGNPC plans to build in the next three years. In December 2007 Ningde Nuclear Power had announced a US$2 billion insurance agreement with Ping An Insurance Corp for its 4-unit CPR-1000 nuclear power project in Fujian Province. All this is first party cover only.)
The Indian government has introduced a bill which will bring the country's nuclear liability provisions broadly into line internationally, making operators liable for any nuclear accident, and protecting third party suppliers. Operators need to take out insurance up to the liability cap of $110 million, and other provisions are related to the IAEA's Vienna Convention (1997 amendment).
Sources:
IAEAWorldatom web site
Nuclear Risks, by G.C.Warren, British Nuclear Insurers, 2000 (now: Nuclear Risk Insurers)
Brown, O.F. 2004, Nuclear Liability paper at WNA-NEI conference, Madrid.
Brain, S. 2006, personal communication (former chairman of the Australian Nuclear Insurance Pool from 1985 to 1997) re initial section.
NRC factsheet on Nuclear Insurance, May 2005.
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf67.html
Nuclear Liability Bill
 | This article needs attention from an expert on the subject. See the talk page for details. Consider associating this request with a WikiProject. (December 2010) |
The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill 2010 or Nuclear Liability Bill is a highly debated and controversial bill which was passed by both houses of Indian parliament. The Bill aims to provide a civil liability for nuclear damage and prompt compensation to the victims of a nuclear incident through a nofault liability to the operator, appointment of Claims Commissioner, establishment of Nuclear Damage Claims Commission and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.[1]
This is one of the last steps needed to activate the 2008 Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear agreement as the United state nuclear reactor manufacturing companies will require the liability bill to get insurance in their home state. After this bill becomes an act, India will become a member of the international convention on liability in the civil nuclear arena.
The government has encountered fierce opposition when trying to push this bill through parliament on several occasions. This is because it contains several controversial clauses that the opposition parties claim to be 'unconstitutional'.[2] The opposition believes the bill is being pushed through due to US pressure though this is denied by the government.
The bill effectively caps the maximum amount of liability in case of each nuclear accident at 
1,500 crore (US$334.5 million) to be paid by the operator of the nuclear plant.
The bill will require amendments in the Atomic Energy Act 1962 allowing private investment in the Indian nuclear power program. The issue of an accident is sensitive in India, where a gas leak in a Union Carbide factory in Bhopal city killed about 3,800 people in 1984 in one of the world's worst industrial disasters.
Contents[hide] |
[edit]Necessity of the Nuclear Liability Bill
India has an ambitious goal to increase 5-fold the amount of electricity produced from nuclear power plants to 20,000 MWe by 2020. This will be further increased to 63,000 MWe by 2032.[3] In this way, India will produce 25 percent of its electricity from nuclear power plants by 2050. India's present production of electricity through nuclear power is 4780 MWe. To increase the share of nuclear power, foreign companies would need to be involved in the manufacture and supply of nuclear reactors.
Although there is no international obligation for such a bill, in order to attract the US companies involved in nuclear commerce such asGeneral Electric and Westinghouse, it is necessary to introduce a liability bill which would help these private companies in getting insurance cover in their home state. Thus, the bill will help in the realization of the Indo-U.S. Nuclear deal.[citation needed]
Another motive for the bill is to legally and financially bind the operator and the government to provide relief to the affected population in the case of a nuclear accident.[citation needed] In consideration of the long-term costs related to clean-up and shut-down activities if a nuclear accident were to occur, prominent members of the civil society in India have called on the Government and political parties to hold nuclear suppliers responsible and liable for nuclear accidents.
Advances in nuclear technology have significantly reduced the probability of a nuclear catastrophe and is considered an environment friendly and sustainable source of energy. However, it is still necessary to keep in mind the negative aspects of the nuclear energy and measures must be taken for its peaceful use. However the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster have created once again a debate in India (and the world over) over the destructive nature of nuclear energy.[4]
A major point of debate is the amount of financial assistance to be provided under such circumstances as it is considered insufficient and unsatisfactory. Other than this, the bill contain certain clauses which if implemented will let free the manufacturer and supplier legally and to a large extent financially as well.
[edit]Criticism
[edit]Clause 7
The clause 7 defines the share of financial liability for each of the culpable groups. It states that the operator will have to pay Rs. 500 crore and the remaining amount will be paid by the Indian government. If written into the contract, the operator can claim the liabilities from the manufacturer and supplier. But the maximum amount payable by the foreign companies will be limited to a meagre sum of Rs. 1500 crore .
This is considered as a moot point as the operator will be the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL) which itself is a government owned facility. In other words, the government may have to foot the entire bill thereby exonerating the manufacturer/supplier.
[edit]Clause 17
This clause deals with the legal binding of the culpable groups in case of a nuclear accident. It allows only the operator (NPCIL) to sue the manufacturers and suppliers. Victims will not be able to sue anyone. In reality, no one will be considered legally liable because the recourse taken by the operator will yield only1,500 crore (US$334.5 million).
[edit]Clause 18
Clause 18 of the nuclear liability bill limits the time to make a claim within 10 years. This is considered to be too short as there may be long term damage due to a nuclear accident.
[edit]Clause 35
Clause 35 extends the legal binding that the responsible groups may have to face. The operator or the responsible persons in case of a nuclear accident will undergo the trial under Nuclear Damage Claims Commissions and no civil court is given the authority. The country will be divided into zones with each zone having a Claims Commissioner. This is in contrast to the US counterpart – the Price Anderson Act, in which lawsuits and criminal proceedings proceed under the US courts.
[edit]See also
Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear agreement
[edit]External links
- Highlights of the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill, 2010
- Nuclear Power and Civil Liability
- Bill as passed by Lok Sabha (Amendments marked on the original Bill)
[edit]References
- ^ "Rajya Sabha clears nuclear liability Bill". New Delhi: The Hindu Business Line. August 31, 2010. Retrieved 8 December 2010.
- ^ Nuclear liability bill introduced, BJP walks out of Lok Sabha
- ^ ANALYSIS - Land, liability bill keep India nuclear power in dark
- ^ http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/MC17Df02.html
-
India – United States relations
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
This article may require copy editing for grammar, style, cohesion, tone, or spelling. You can assist by editing it. (July 2011) 
This article or section may be slanted towards recent events. Please try to keep recent events in historical perspective. (November 2010) Indo-American relations 
India
United StatesIndo-American relations or India – United States relations refers to international relations between the Republic of India and the United States of America.
Despite being one of the pioneers and founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement, India developed a closer relationship with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. India's strategic and military relations with Moscow and strong socialist policies had an adverse impact on its relations with the United States. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, India began to review its foreign policy in a non-polar world following which, it took steps to develop closer ties with the European Union and the United States. Today, India and the U.S. share an extensive cultural, strategic, military and economic relationship.[1][2]
Long considered a "strategic backwater" from Washington's perspective, India emerged in the 21st century as increasingly vital to core U.S. foreign policy interests. India, the region's dominant actor with more than one billion citizens, is often characterized as a nascent great power and "indispensible partner" of the United States, one that many analysts view as a potential counterweight to China's growing clout. Since 2004, Washington and New Delhi have been pursuing a "strategic partnership" based on shared values and apparently convergent geopolitical interests. Numerous economic, security, and global initiatives, including plans for civilian nuclear cooperation, are underway. This latter initiative, first launched in 2005, reversed three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy. Also in 2005, the United States and India signed a ten-year defense framework agreement to expanding bilateral security cooperation. The two countries now engage in numerous and unprecedented combined military exercises, and major U.S. arms sales to India are underway. The value of all bilateral trade tripled from 2004 to 2008 and continues to grow; significant two-way investment also flourishes. The influence of a large Indian-American community is reflected in Congress's largest country-specific caucus. More than 100,000 Indian students are attending American universities.
Thus During the tenure of the Clinton and Bush administration, relations between India and the United States blossomed primarily over common concerns regarding growing Islamic extremism, energy security and climate change.[3]
According to some foreign policy experts, there was a slight downturn in India-U.S. relations following the election of Barack Obama as thePresident of the United States in 2009. This was primarily due to Obama administration's desire to improve relations with China,[4] and Barack Obama's protectionist views on dealing with the economic crisis.[5]. However, the leaders of the two countries have repeatedly dismissed these concerns.[6] In November 2010, United States President Obama visited India and addressed a join session of the Indian Parliament, where he backed India's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.[7]
Contents
[hide][edit]Country comparison
India
United StatesPopulation 1,210,193,422 311,792,000 Area 3,287,240 km2 (1,269,210 sq mi) 9,850,476 km2 (3,803,290 sq mi) Population Density 356/km² (922/sq mi) 31/km² (80/sq mi) Capital New Delhi Washington, D.C. Largest City Mumbai – 13,922,125 (21,347,412 Metro) New York City – 8,363,710 (19,006,798 Metro) Government Federal parliamentary constitutional republic Federal presidential constitutional republic Official languages Hindi and English, 21 other constitutionally recognized languages English (de facto) Main religions 80.5% Hinduism, 13.4% Islam, 2.3% Christianity, 1.9%Sikhism, 0.8% Buddhism, 0.4% Jainism 76% Christianity, 16.1% non-Religious, 2 % Judaism,1%Buddhism. 0.4% Hinduism Ethnic groups See Ethnic Groups of India 74% White American, 14.8% Hispanic and Latino Americans(of any race), 13.4% African American,
6.5% Some other race, 4.4% Asian American, 2.0% Two or more races,
0.68% American Indian or Alaska Native, 0.14% Native Hawaiian or Pacific IslanderGDP (nominal) $1.430 trillion ($1,176 per capita)[8] $14.256 trillion ($46,381 per capita) GDP (PPP) $4.001 trillion ($3,290 per capita)[9] $14.256 trillion ($46,381 per capita) Indian Americans 60,000 American born people living in India 2,765,815 People of Indian origin living in the USA Military expenditures $37.6 billion (FY 2011-12) $663.7 billion (FY 2010) [10] [edit]History
The historic relationship between India and the United States was very strong. One event is the visit of Swami Vivekananda who introduced Yoga and Vedanta to America. Vivekananda was the first known Hindu Sage to come to the West, where he introduced Eastern thought at the World's Parliament of Religions, in connection with the World's Fair in Chicago, in 1893]. Here, his first lecture, which started with this line "Sisters and Brothers of America," [6] made the audience clap for two minutes just to the address, for prior to this seminal speech, the audience was always used to this opening address: "Ladies and Gentlemen". It was this speech that catapulted him to fame by his wide audiences in Chicago and then later everywhere else in America, including far-flung places such as Memphis, Boston, San Francisco, New York, Los Angeles, and St. Louis.
After Indian independence until the end of the cold war, the relationship between the two nations has often been thorny. Dwight Eisenhower was the first U.S. President to visit India in 1959. He was so supportive of India that the New York Times remarked "It did not seem to matter much whether Nehru had actually requested or been given a guarantee that the U.S. would help India to meet further Chinese communist aggression. What mattered was the obvious strengthening of Indian-American friendship to a point where no such guarantee was necessary."
During John F. Kennedy's period as President, he saw India as a strategic partner against the rise of communist China. He said "Chinese Communists have been moving ahead the last 10 years. India has been making some progress, but if India does not succeed with her 450 million people, if she can't make freedom work, then people around the world are going to determine, particularly in the underdeveloped world, that the only way they can develop their resources is through the Communist system." The administration was disturbed by what they considered "blatant Chinese communist aggression against India" after the Sino-Indian War. In a May 1963 National Security Council meeting, contingency planning on the part of the United States in the event of another Chinese attack on India was discussed. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor advised the president to use nuclear weapons should the Americans intervene in such a situation. Kennedy insisted that Washington defend India as it would any ally, saying, "We should defend India, and therefore we will defend India".[11]
Kennedy's ambassador was the noted Canadian-American economist John Kenneth Galbraith. While in India, he also helped establish one of the first computer science departments, at the Indian Institute of Technology in Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh. As an economist he also presided over the largest (to that date) US-Foreign Aid program to any country.
From 1961 to 1963 there was a promise to help set up a large steel mill in Bokaro that was withdrawn by the U.S. The 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani wars did not help their relations. During the Cold War, the U.S. asked for Pakistan's help because India was seen to lean towards the Soviet Union. Later, when India would not agree to support the anti-Soviet operation in Afghanistan, it was left with few allies. Not until 1997 was there any effort to improve relations with the United States.
Soon after Atal Bihari Vajpayee became Indian Prime Minister, he authorized a nuclear weapons test in Pokhran
The United States strongly condemned the test and promised sanctions, and voted in favor of aUnited Nations Security Council Resolution condemning it. United States President Bill Clintonimposed economic sanctions on India. These consisted of the cutting off of all military and economic aid, freezing loans by American banks to state-owned Indian companies and loans to the Indian government for all except food purchases, prohibiting American technology and uranium exports, and required the United States to oppose all loan requests by India to international lending agencies.[12] However, these sanctions proved ineffective. India was experiencing a strong economic rise, and its trade with the United States only constituted a small portion of its GDP. Only Japan joined the U.S. in imposing direct sanctions, while most other nations continued to trade with India. The sanctions were soon lifted. The Clinton administration and Vajpayee exchanged representatives to help build relations. In March 2000, President Bill Clinton visited India. He had bilateral and economic discussions with Prime Minister Vajpayee. Over the course of improved diplomatic relations with the Bush administration, India has agreed to allow close international monitoring of its nuclear weapons development while refusing to give up its current nuclear arsenal. India and the U.S. have also greatly enhanced their economic ties.
After the September 11 attacks in 2001, President George W. Bush collaborated with India to control and police the extremely crucial Indian Ocean sea-lanes from the Suez to Singapore. The December 2004 tsunami saw the U.S. and Indian navies cooperating in search and rescue operations and reconstruction of affected areas. An Open Skies Agreement was made in April 2005. This helped enhance trade, tourism, and business by the increased number of flights. Air India purchased 68 U.S. Boeing aircraft, which cost $8 billion.
Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have made recent visits to India as well. After Hurricane Katrina, India donated $5 million to the American Red Cross and sent two plane loads of relief supplies and materials to help. And on 1 March 2006, President Bush made another diplomatic visit to expand relations between India and the United States.
[edit]Military relations
The U.S.-India defense relationship derives from a common belief in freedom, democracy, and the rule of law, and seeks to advance shared security interests. These interests include maintaining security and stability, defeating terrorism and violent religious extremism, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and associated materials, data, and technologies and protecting the free flow of commerce via land, air and sea lanes.
In recent years India has conducted joint military exercises with the U.S. in the Indian Ocean.
Recognizing India as a key to strategic U.S. interests, the United States has sought to strengthen its relationship with India. The two countries are the world's largest democracies, both committed to political freedom protected by representative government. India is also moving gradually toward greater economic freedom. The U.S. and India have a common interest in the free flow of commerce and resources, including through the vital sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. They also share an interest in fighting terrorism and in creating a strategically stable Asia.
There were some differences, however, including over India's nuclear weapons programs and the pace of India's economic reforms. In the past, these concerns may have dominated U.S. thinking about India, but today the U.S. views India as a growing world power with which it shares common strategic interests. A strong partnership between the two countries will continue to address differences and shape a dynamic and collaborative future.
In late September 2001, President Bush lifted sanctions imposed under the terms of the 1994 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act following India's nuclear tests in May 1998. The nonproliferation dialogue initiated after the 1998 nuclear tests has bridged many of the gaps in understanding between the countries. In a meeting between President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee in November 2001, the two leaders expressed a strong interest in transforming the U.S.-India bilateral relationship. High-level meetings and concrete cooperation between the two countries increased during 2002 and 2003. In January 2004, the U.S. and India launched the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP), which was both a milestone in the transformation of the bilateral relationship and a blueprint for its further progress.
In July 2005, President Bush hosted Prime Minister Singh in Washington, DC. The two leaders announced the successful completion of the NSSP, as well as other agreements which further enhance cooperation in the areas of civil nuclear, civil space, and high-technology commerce. Other initiatives announced at this meeting include: an U.S.-India Economic Dialogue, Fight Against HIV/AIDS, Disaster Relief, Technology Cooperation, Democracy Initiative, an Agriculture Knowledge Initiative, a Trade Policy Forum, Energy Dialogue and CEO Forum. President Bush made a reciprocal visit to India in March 2006, during which the progress of these initiatives were reviewed, and new initiatives were launched.
In December 2006, Congress passed the historic Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Cooperation Act, which allows direct civilian nuclear commerce with India for the first time in 30 years. U.S. policy had opposed nuclear cooperation with India because the country had developed nuclear weapons in contravention of international conventions and never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The legislation clears the way for India to buy U.S. nuclear reactors and fuel for civilian use.
In July 2007, the United States and India reached a historic milestone in their strategic partnership by completing negotiations on the bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation, also known as the "123 agreement." This agreement, signed by Secretary of State Rice and External Affairs Minister Mukherjee on October 10, 2008, governs civil nuclear trade between the two countries and opens the door for American and Indian firms to participate in each other's civil nuclear energy sector. The U.S. and India seek to elevate the strategic partnership further to include cooperation in counter-terrorism, defense cooperation, education, and joint democracy promotion.
[edit]Economic relations
The United States is also one of India's largest direct investors. From 1991 to 2004, the stock of FDI inflow has increased from USD $11.3 million to $344.4 million, totaling $4.13 billion. This is a compound rate increase of 57.5% annually. Indian direct investments abroad were started in 1992. Indian corporations and registered partnership firms are allowed to invest in businesses up to 100% of their net worth. India's largest outgoing investments are manufacturing, which account for 54.8% of the country's foreign investments. The second largest are non-financial services (software development), which accounts for 35.4% of investments.
[edit]Trade relations
The United States is one of India's largest trading partners. In 2007, the United States exported $17.24 billion worth goods to India and imported $24.02 billion worth of Indian goods.[13] Major items exported by India to the U.S. include Information Technology Services, textiles, machinery,ITeS, gems and diamonds, chemicals, iron and steel products, coffee, tea, and other edible food products. Major American items imported by India include aircraft, fertilizers, computer hardware,scrap metal and medical equipment.[14][15]
The United States is also India's largest investment partner, with American direct investment of $9 billion accounting for 9% of total foreign investment into India. Americans have made notable foreign investment in India's power generation, telecommunications, ports, roads, petroleum exploration/processing, and mining industries.[15]
In July 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singhcreated a new program called the Trade Policy Forum. It is run by a representative from each nation. The United States Trade Representative is Rob Portman and the Indian Commerce Secretary is Minister of Commerce Kamal Nath. The goal of the program is to increase bilateral trade which is a two-way trade deal and the flow of investments.
There are five main sub-divisions of the Trade Policy Forum which include: Agricultural Trade group- This group has three main objectives: agreeing on terms that will allow India to export mangoes to the United States, permitting India's Agricultural and Process Food Products Export Development Authority (APEDA) to certify Indian products to the standards of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and executing regulation procedures for approving edible wax on fruit.
Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers group- Goals of the group include: agreeing that insecticides that are manufactures by United States companies can be sold throughout India. India had agreed to cut special regulations on trading carbonated drinks, many medicinal drugs, and lowering regulations on many imports that are not of agricultural nature. Both nations have agreed to discuss improved facets on the trade of Indianregulation requirements, jewelry, computer parts, motorcycles, fertilizer, and those tariffs that affect the American process of exporting boric acid.
The two nations have discussed matters such as those who wish to break into the accounting market, Indian companies gaining licenses for the telecommunications industry, and setting policies by the interaction of companies from both countries regarding new policies related toIndian media and broadcasting. This group has strived to exchange valuable information on recognizing different professional services offered by the two countries, discussing the movement and positioning of people in developing industries and assigning jobs to those people, continuation of talks in how India's citizens can gain access into the market for financial servicing, and discussing the limitation of equities.
The two countries have had talks about the restriction of investments in industries such as financial services, insurance, and retail. Also, to take advantage of any initiatives in joint investments such as agricultural processing and the transportation industries. Both countries have decided to promote small business initiatives in both countries by allowing trade between them.
The majority of exports from the United States to India include: aviation equipment, engineering materials and machinery, instruments used in optical and medical sectors, fertilizers, and stones and metals.
Below are the percentages of traded items India to U.S. increased by 21.12% to $6.94 billion.
- Diamonds & precious stones (25%)
- Textiles (29.01%)
- Iron & Steel (5.81%)
- Machinery (4.6%)
- Organic chemicals (4.3%)
- Electrical Machinery (4.28%)
Major items of export from U.S. to India: For the year 2006, figures are available up to the month of April. Merchandise exports from U.S. to India increased by 20.09.26% to U.S. $2.95 billion. Select major items with their percentage shares are given below
- Engineering goods & machinery (including electrical) (31.2%)
- Aviation & aircraft ( 16.8%)
- Precious stones & metals (8.01%)
- Optical instruments & equipment (7.33%)
- Organic chemicals (4.98%)
[edit]Ties under Obama administration
Just days into President Barack Obama's term, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and India's external affairs minister agreed to "further strengthen the excellent bilateral relationship" between the United States and India. Soon after, President Obama issued a statement asserting that, "Our rapidly growing and deepening friendship with India offers benefits to all the world's citizens" and that the people of India "should know they have no better friend and partner than the people of the United States." As part of her confirmation hearing to become Secretary of State, Clinton told Senators she would work to fulfill President Obama's commitment to "establish a true strategic partnership with India, increase our military cooperation, trade, and support democracies around the world."
Despite such top-level assurances from the new U.S. Administration, during 2009 and into 2010, many in India became increasingly concerned that Washington was not focusing on the bilateral relationship with the same vigor as did the Bush Administration, which was viewed in India as having pursued both broader and stronger ties in an unprecedented manner.
Many concerns have arisen in New Delhi, among them that the Obama Administration was overly focused on U.S. relations with China in ways that would reduce India's influence and visibility; that it was intent on deepening relations with India's main rival, Pakistan, in ways that could be harmful to Indian security and perhaps lead to a more interventionist approach to the Kashmir problem; that a new U.S. emphasis on nonproliferation and arms control would lead to pressure on India join such multilateral initiatives as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty; and that the Administration might pursue so-called protectionist economic policies that could adversely affect bilateral commerce in goods and services.
New Delhi has long sought the removal of Indian companies and organizations from U.S. export control lists, seeing these as discriminatory and outdated. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian affairs Robert Blake contends that much progress has been made in this area, with less than one-half of one percent of all exports to India requiring any license. India also continues to seek explicit U.S. support for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, support that has not been forthcoming. The Obama Administration recognizes a "need to reassess institutions of global governance" and asserts that India's rise "will certainly be a factor in any future consideration of reform" of that Council.
Secretary of State Clinton was widely seen to have concluded a successful visit to India in July 2009, inking several agreements, and also making important symbolic points by staying at Mumbai's Taj Mahal hotel (site of a major Islamist terrorist attack in 2008) and having a highprofile meeting with women's groups. While in New Delhi, Clinton set forth five key "pillars" of the U.S.-India engagement: (1) strategic cooperation; (2) energy and climate change; (3) economics, trade, and agriculture; (4) education and development; and (5) science technology and innovation.
In November 2009, President Obama hosted his inaugural state visit when Prime Minister Singh dined at the White House. Despite the important symbolism, the resulting diplomacy was seen by many proponents of closer ties as disappointing (if not an outright failure) in its outcome, at least to the extent that no "breakthroughs" in the bilateral relationship were announced. Yet from other perspectives there were visible ideational gains: the relationship was shown to transcend the preferences of any single leader or government; the two leaders demonstrated that their countries' strategic goals were increasingly well aligned; and plans were made to continue taking advantage of complementarities while differences are well managed. Perhaps most significantly, the visit itself contributed to ameliorating concerns in India that the Obama Administration was insufficiently attuned to India's potential role as a U.S. partner.
President Obama's May 2010 National Security Strategy noted that, "The United States and India are building a strategic partnership that is underpinned by our shared interests, our shared values as the world's two largest democracies, and close connections among our people": "Working together through our Strategic Dialogue and high-level visits, we seek a broadbased relationship in which India contributes to global counterterrorism efforts, nonproliferation, and helps promote poverty-reduction, education, health, and sustainable agriculture. We value India's growing leadership on a wide array of global issues, through groups such as the G-20, and will seek to work with India to promote stability in South Asia and elsewhere in the world."
June 2010 Strategic Dialogue
In June 2010, the United States and India formally reengaged the U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue initiated under President Bush when a large delegation of high-ranking Indian officials led by External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna visited Washington, DC. As leader of the U.S. delegation, Secretary of State Clinton lauded India as "an indispensible partner and a trusted friend." President Obama appeared briefly at a State Department reception to declare his firm belief that "the relationship between the United States and India will be a defining partnership in the 21st century."
The Strategic Dialogue produced a joint statement in which the two countries pledged to "deepen people-to-people, business-to-business, and government-to-government linkages … for the mutual benefit of both countries and for the promotion of global peace, stability, and prosperity." It outlined extensive bilateral initiatives in each of ten key areas: (1) advancing global security and countering terrorism; (2) disarmament and nonproliferation; (3) trade and economic relations; (4) high technology; (5) energy security, clean energy, and climate change; (6) agriculture; (7) education; (8) health; (9) science and technology; and (10) development. Secretary Clinton confirmed President Obama's intention to visit India in November 2010.
President Obama's Planned Travel to India
Main article: 2010 Barack Obama visit to IndiaWhile U.S.-India engagement under the Obama Administration has not (to date) realized any groundbreaking initiatives as was the case under the Bush Administration, it may be that the apparently growing "dominance of ordinariness" in the relationship is a hidden strength that demonstrates its maturing into diplomatic normalcy. In this way, the nascent partnership may yet transform into a "special relationship" similar to those the United States has with Britain, Australia, and Japan, as is envisaged by some proponents of deeper U.S.-India ties.
As the U.S.President planned his November 2010 visit to India, an array of prickly bilateral issues confronted him, including differences over the proper regional roles to be played by China and Pakistan; the status of conflict in Afghanistan; international efforts to address Iran's controversial nuclear program; restrictions on high-technology exports to India, outsourcing, and sticking points on the conclusion of arrangements for both civil nuclear and defense cooperation, among others.
According to some foreign policy experts, Obama's India visit was going to change US approach towards India permanently. This was later proved when President Obama saw India as prominent Future Power on world stage and declared it as one of the important ally to US. US President Obama openly Supports India's Bid for a permanent Seat in the United Nations Security Council.
Analyst expressed their views immediately that US now sees India with the same trust as it sees its main ally Briton, Australia and Japan. Obama's India Visit is seen by Foreign relation experts as the most successful US Presidential Visit.
[edit]Foreign policy issues
According to some analysts, India-U.S. relations have strained over Obama administration's approach in handling the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan.[16][17] India's National Security Adviser, M.K. Narayanan, criticized the Obama administration for linking theKashmir dispute to the instability in Pakistan and Afghanistan and said that by doing so, President Obama was "barking up the wrong tree".[18] The Foreign Policy too criticized Obama's approach towards South Asia saying that "India can be a part of the solution rather than part of the problem" in South Asia and suggested India to take a more proactive role in rebuilding Afghanistan irrespective of the attitude of the Obama administration.[19] In a clear indication of growing rift between India and the U.S., the former decided not to accept a U.S. invitation to attend a conference on Afghanistan.[20] Bloomberg reported that since 2008 Mumbai attacks, the public mood in India has been to pressure Pakistan more aggressively to take actions against the culprits behind the terrorist attack and this might reflect on the upcominggeneral elections in May 2009. Consequently, the Obama administration may find itself at odds with India's rigid stance against terrorism.[21]
Robert Blake, assistant secretary of United States' Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, dismissed any concerns over a rift with India regarding United States' AfPak policy. Calling India and the United States "natural allies",[6] Blake said that the United States cannot afford to meet the strategic priorities in Pakistan and Afghanistan at "the expense of India".[22]
[edit]Economic relations
India strongly criticized Obama administration's decision to limit H-1B visas and India's External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, said that his country would argue against U.S. "protectionism" at various international forums.[23] The Vishwa Hindu Parishad, a close aide of India's main opposition party the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), said that if the United States continues with its anti-outsourcing policies, then India will "have to take steps to hurt American companies in India."[24] India's Commerce Minister, Kamal Nath, said that India may move against Obama's outsourcing policies at the World Trade Organization.[25] However, the outsourcing advisory head of KPMG said that India had no reason to worry since Obama's statements were directed against "outsourcing being carried out by manufacturing companies" and not outsourcing of IT-related services.[26]
In May 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama reiterated his anti-outsourcing views and criticized the current U.S. tax policy "that says you should pay lower taxes if you create a job in Bangalore, India, than if you create one in Buffalo, New York."[27] However, during the U.S.-India Business Council meet in June 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton advocated for stronger economic ties between India and the United States. She also rebuked protectionist policies saying that "[United States] will not use the global financial crisis as an excuse to fall back on protectionism. We hope India will work with us to create a more open, equitable set of opportunities for trade between our nations."[28]
In June 2009, United States provided diplomatic help in successfully pushing through a US$2.9 billion loan sponsored by the Asian Development Bank, despite considerable opposition from the People's Republic of China.[29]
[edit]Strategic and military relations
" "As part of that strategy, we [India and U.S.] should expand our broader security relationship and increase cooperation on counterterrorism and intelligence sharing." " In March 2009, the Obama administration cleared the US$2.1 billion sale of eight P-8 Poseidons to India.[30] This deal, and the US$5 billion agreement to provide Boeing C-17 military transport aircraft and General Electric F404engines announced during Obama's November 2010 visit, makes the U.S. one of the top three military suppliers for India, following Israel and Russia.[31]
India expressed its concerns that Obama administration's non-military aid to Pakistan will not be used for counter-insurgency, but for building up its military against India.[32] However, Robert Blake, assistant secretary of Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, said that the Pakistani Government was increasingly focused at fighting the Taliban insurgency and expressed hope that the people of India would "support and agree with what we are trying to do".[22]
Concerns were raised in India that the Obama administration was delaying the full implementation of the Indo-U.S. Nuclear Deal.[33] The Obama administration has also strongly advocated for the strengthening of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and has pressurized India to sign the agreement. India's special envoy, Shyam Saran, "warned" the United States that India would continue to oppose any such treaty as it was "discriminatory".[34] In June 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that the Obama administration was "fully committed" to the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear agreement.[35]
U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen encouraged stronger military ties between India and the United States and said that "India has emerged as an increasingly important strategic partner [of the U.S.]".[36] U.S. Undersecretary of State William Joseph Burns said, "Never has there been a moment when India and America mattered more to each other." [37]
[edit]2010 visit by President Obama
In November 2010 Obama became the second U.S. President after Richard Nixon (in 1969) to undertake a visit to India in his first term in office. On November 8 Obama became the 2nd U.S. President ever to address a joint session of the Parliament of India. In a major policy shift Obama declared U.S. support for India's permanent membership of United Nations Security Council.[38] Calling India-U.S. relationship a defining partnership of 21st century he also announced removal of export control restrictions on several Indian companies and concluded trade deals worth $10 billion which are expected to create/support 50,000 jobs in the U.S. during this visit.[39]
[edit]See also
- India as an emerging superpower
- Embassy of India in Washington
- Foreign relations of India
- Foreign relations of the United States
- United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act
[edit]Notes
- ^ India-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations
- ^ The Evolving India-U.S. Strategic Relationship
- ^ [1]
- ^ India frets over Obama's Chinamania
- ^ India renews criticism of "Buy American" drift
- ^ a b Reflections on U.S. - India Relations - Robert O. Blake
- ^ Obama supports India on UN Security Council
- ^ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_india
- ^ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_india
- ^http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy10/pdf/budget/defense.pdf
- ^ [2] — Taipei Times,[3] Indian American Center for Political Awareness
- ^ http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/clinton-imposes-full-sanctionsindia/22222/
- ^ Foreign Trade Census
- ^ India - U.S. Trade and Economic Relations
- ^ a b India (10/07)
- ^ [4]
- ^ [5]
- ^ Obama should not link Kashmir with Pak's problems: NSA
- ^ India needs a lot more love from Obama
- ^ India not to attend conference on Afghanistan with Pakistan, U.S.
- ^ India's Terror Stance Vexes Obama Amid Voter Ire at Pakistan
- ^ a b New Strategic Partnerships Robert O. Blake
- ^ India says it will oppose U.S. 'protectionism'
- ^ Anger Grows in India over U.S. Visa Rules
- ^ India may contest Obama's move against outsourcing in WTO
- ^ 'Obama on outsourcing is no reason to panic'
- ^ U.S.-India Relations Strained under Obama
- ^ a b Remarks at U.S.-India Business Council's 34th Anniversary "Synergies Summit"
- ^ The China-India Border Brawl
- ^ U.S. OKs record $2.1 billion arms sale to India
- ^ Cohen, Stephen and Sanil Dasgupta. "Arms Sales for India". Brookings Institution. Retrieved 18 March 2011.
- ^ Indian Vote May Revive Stalled U.S. Defense, Nuclear Exports
- ^ Indo-U.S. nuclear deal in jeopardy
- ^ India warns Obama on nuclear test ban treaty
- ^ Hillary: fully committed to nuclear deal
- ^ India has emerged as a strategic partner for U.S.: Mullen
- ^ http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20100602_6708.php
- ^ Stolberg, Sheryl (8 November 2010). [http://www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20100131/spectrum/main1.htmRichard Nixon visited India in 1969 after becoming the presidenthttp://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/world/asia/09prexy.html"Obama Backs India for Seat on Security Council"]. The New York Times. Retrieved 8 November 2010.[dead link]
- ^ Reynolds, Paul (8 November 2010). "Obama confirms U.S. strategic shift towards India". BBC. Retrieved 8 November 2010.
India US TradeIndia US Trade in 2015US Trade with BRIC:China holds the key Economic profile of India and the United States iyty
[edit]Sources
- Blake, Jr., Robert O. "U.S.-India Relations: the Making of a Comprehensive Relationship." U.S. Embassy India. Army War College, Indore, India. 23 August 2004, 6 October 2006 <www.state.gov>.
- "India - U.S. Economics Relations." Embassy of India - Washington DC. 8 October 2006
- Kronstadt, K. A. India-U.S. Relations. Library of Congress. 2006. 17–19. 8 October 2006.
- Roy, Dr. P. C. Indo-U.S. Economic Relations. Rajouri Garden, New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1986. 73–125.
[edit]External links
- Indian Embassy: India – U.S. Relations: A General Overview
- A Way Forward in U.S.-India Defense Cooperation, July 2011 interview with Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta
- Charting the Future of U.S.-India Relations, June 2011 interview with Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering
- U.S. Department of state: The Future of US-India Relations
- U.S. Department of Agriculture: U.S.–India Trade Relations
- India US Trade Summary
[show] Foreign relations of India[show] 
Foreign relations of the United States -
Articles about Nuclear Liability - Times Of India
BJP firm, says it will never accept nuclear liability Bill. March 16, 2010 | By TNN ... Law firms hired to allay US fears onnuclear liability bill ...
-
Government finalises rules of nuclear liability law - Economic Times
7 Jul 2011 – NEW DELHI: Government has finalised the much-awaited rules of ... -
What is Nuclear Liability Bill?
25 Aug 2010 – Here are some questions and answers on thenuclear commerce liability bill.
-
Category:Nuclear liability - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Nuclear_liability - CachedCategory:Nuclear liability. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia ... Pages in category "Nuclear liability". The following 12 pages are in this category, ...
-
After Japan, India Likely to Be Tougher on Nuclear Liability ...
blogs.wsj.com/.../03/.../india-likely-to-be-tougher-on-nuclear-liabilit... - Cached15 Mar 2011 – Japan's nuclear crisis may cause India to be tougher on foreign firms hoping to supply technology to the market.
-
India Weighs Measure to Ease Nuclear LiabilityLaw - WSJ.com
10 Oct 2010 – India is drafting new regulations to assuagenuclear-power ...
-
Why a nuclear liability bill is essential - Rediff.com India News
28 Aug 2010 – The oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and the Bhopal tragedy have brought back into focus the issue of industrial accidents, ...
-
The Hindu : Front Page : India signs nuclear liability treaty
28 Oct 2010 – That would leave the Supreme Court of India as the only forum competent to rule on the compatibility of the CivilLiability for Nuclear ...
-
PRS | Bill Track | The Civil Liability for NuclearDamage Bill 2010
www.prsindia.org/.../the-civil-liability-for-nuclear-damage-bill-201... - CachedThe Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill, 2010 seeks to create a mechanism for compensating victims of nucleardamage arising from a nuclear incident. ...
.jpg)
Posts
No comments:
Post a Comment