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Friday, November 18, 2011

Naked Match FIXING by the Brahaminical Hegemony!It is reported that at an hour-long meeting with US President Barack Obama, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stood firm on the contentious issue of India's nuclear liability rules.Ahead of the Bali ASEAN M


Naked Match FIXING by the Brahaminical Hegemony!It is reported that at an hour-long meeting with US President Barack Obama, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stood firm on the contentious issue of India's nuclear liability rules.Ahead of the Bali ASEAN Meeting with OBAMA, Government of India Incs passed Nuclear Liability Bill diluting Suppliers` Liability and now the Firmness is Hyped to boost Blind Nationalism! At the same time the Brahaminical Zionist Media and Intelligentsia is Fanning a Virtual SINO India war!Singh also urged Obama that US companies should begin nuclear trade with India, while ruling out any major changes in liability law in the future.India will explore oil in South China Sea.On the other hand,China has warned Barack Obama about "interference" in east Asia after the US president said that the region's seething row over the South China Sea should be discussed at a major summit.


The Finance Ministry on Thursday increased the investment limit for foreign institutional investors (FII) in government securities (G-secs) and corporate bonds by $5 billion each, a move that will enhance capital flows and increase the availability of resources for corporates. The FIIs can now invest up to $15 billion in G-secs and $20 billion in corporate bonds, according to a Finance Ministry statement.

No change in disinvestment target as of now, says Pranab


Centre preparing for Oil India disinvestment!


Time for Azharuddin to take a stance and clear his name: Ganguly

Let Congress decide on alliance; we don't need them: Mamata Banerjee

Sukhram convicted in 1996 telecom scam!

P Chidambaram expresses concern on UIDAI data collection process

Indian Holocaust My Father`s Life and

Time - SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY TWO

Palash Biswas

http://indianliberationnews.com/

http://indianholocaustmyfatherslifeandtime.blogspot.com/





http://basantipurtimes.blogspot.com/


Power Diplomacy in the Pacific
US base? Australia may get caught in crossfire: China
Beijing reacted strongly to the American move to deploy 2,500 marines close to the South China Sea in northern Australia.
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics/nation/parliamentary-panel-members-seek-status-of-black-money-cases/articleshow/10785444.cms

Naked Match FIXING by the Brahaminical Hegemony!

P Chidambaram expresses concern on UIDAI data collection process!

Former telecom ministerSukhram in PV Narasimha Rao's cabinet has been convicted for awarding a lucrative contract to a private telecom firm for supplying cables to the government at inflated rates after receiving a bribe of Rs 3 lakh 15 years back.

Special Judge RP Pandey, who convicted 84-year-old Sukhram also on charges of misusing his official position in awarding the contract and causing loss to the state exchequer, is likely to decide on quantum of sentence to him on Saturday.

The corruption case dates back to 1996, when the telecom ministry under Sukhram's stewardship had awarded private firm Haryana Telecom Limited (HTL) a contract worth Rs 30 crore to supply 3.5 Lakh Conductor Kilometers (LCKM) of Polythene Insulated Jelly Filled (PIJF) cables to the telecom department.

Sukhram had been put on trial along with HTL chairman Devinder Singh Choudhary who had died during the trial.

"Sukhram also obtained (illegal) gratification other than legal remunerations from Choudhary as a motive or reward for showing the favour to the said firm (HTL)," the judge said.

The court convicted Sukhram, brushing aside his defence counsel argument that had he caused a huge pecuniary gain to HTL, he would not have taken a paltry sum of Rs 3 Lakh. The court termed the argument as "devoid of merit."

"It is not the prosecution case that Sukhram got only this much amount in this deal which runs into crores of rupees. The prosecution case is that the amount of Rs 3 lakh which was recovered from him was the bribe money.

"It is a matter of common knowledge that it is virtually impossible to get any direct evidence where both i.e bribe giver and the person who takes the bribe, worked in joint concert," ASJ Pandey said in his 188-page order.

Home Minister P Chidambaram has expressed concern over the data collection process of Unique Identification Authority of India saying there was real chance of inclusion of non-usual residents and creation of false profile in the project which may compromise internal security.


In a letter to Planning Commission Deputy ChairmanMontek Singh Ahluwalia, Chidambaram said the process of the National Population Register being prepared by the Registrar General of India have been carefully devised after considerable deliberations at the level of an Empowered Group of Ministers, pilot trials, consultations with state governments.


"The data collected by multiple registrars of the UIDAIdoes not meet the degree of assurance required under the NPR from the point of view of internal security," he said.


The Home Minister said the UIDAI process of enrolment is based on production of documents and, in the absence of documents, through an introducer based mechanism. It was due to the fact that document based systems are not feasible in rural areas especially among the poor, illiterate, landless and women.


"If the UIDAI process is to be introduced in NPR, it would lead to large scale exclusions. The possibility of inclusion of non-usual residents in the local register and the creation of false identity profiles is also real. This would defeat the purpose of creation of NPR. There are also a number of legal, technical and practical issues that makes it difficult to accept data collected by other registrars," he said in the letter.

Centre preparing for Oil India disinvestment

SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT
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The Disinvestment Ministry is gearing up for sale of government equity in Oil India Ltd. (OIL) following clearance from the Oil and Natural Gas Ministry.
"Correspondence was going on for the last six months...We got (the) Petroleum Ministry in-principle approval on Thursday for disinvestment in OIL," said Disinvestment Secretary Mohammad Haleem Khan.
Stating that the details regarding the OIL disinvestment were being worked out, Mr. Khan said the total government shares in OIL that would be sold was yet to be decided. "The process of inter-ministerial consultation is on," he said. The Centre owns 78.43 per cent in OIL.
In September, 2009, OIL's initial public offer (IPO) had helped the government garner over Rs.4,900 crore. As part of the IPO, the government offloaded its 10 per cent equity, while company issued 11 per cent fresh equity.
Mr. Khan also said the government had also identified GAIL (India) for sale of stake, but he did not mention if the OIL and GAIL issues would be done in the current fiscal.
The Centre has plans to raise Rs.40,000 crore through the sale of stake in public sector undertakings in the current fiscal, but it has so far been able to mop up only Rs.1,145 crore due to weak market conditions.
Mr. Khan further said the government would stick to the public offer route for stake sale in ONGC and BHEL, in which it plans to divest 5 per cent stake. While BHEL has prepared a Rs.4,000-crore follow-on public offer, the disinvestment of ONGC will help the government mop up about Rs.12,000 crore.
Keywords: Oil India disinvestment, government equity, Oil India IPO
http://www.thehindu.com/business/companies/article2639764.ece

It is reported that at an hour-long meeting with US President Barack Obama, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stood firm on the contentious issue of India's nuclear liability rules.Ahead of the Bali ASEAN Meeting with OBAMA, Government of India Incs passed Nuclear Liability Bill diluting Suppliers` Liability and now the Firmness is Hyped to boost Blind Nationalism! At the same time the Brahaminical Zionist Media and Intelligentsia is Fanning a Virtual SINO India war!Singh also urged Obama that US companies should begin nuclear trade with India, while ruling out any major changes in liability law in the future.India will explore oil in South China Sea. On the other hand,China has warned Barack Obama about "interference" in east Asia after the US president said that the region's seething row over the South China Sea should be discussed at a major summit.


Mohammad Azharuddin should take a strong stance following the claims made against him by Vinod Kambli and put an end to all the "whispers" surrounding the former skipper's name, says Sourav Ganguly.

Former cricketer Vinod Kamblion Thursday raised suspicion on the 1996 World Cup semifinal between India and Sri Lanka and said he found "something amiss" in the game which brought an end to his international career.

Kambli, who scored 1084 runs in 17 Tests and 2477 runs in 104 ODIs for India, said he was suspicious of then captain Mohammed Azharuddin's decision to field first in the semifinal which was eventually awarded to Sri Lanka because of crowd problem.

Kambli claims that his suspicion arose due to Mohammed Azharuddin's decision to field first even though it was unanimously decided that the team would bat after winning the toss.

"I will never forget the 1996 match because my career ended after this and I was dropped from the team. I was stunned by India's decision to field," Kambli said while participating in a news channel debate on ex-chief of ICC anti-corruption unit Paul Condon's statement that in the 90s and in the following years all of cricket's leading countries were involved in fixing major matches.

"I was standing on one side and on the other end my fellow batsman was telling me that we would chase the target. However, soon after they quickly got out one by one. I don't know what transpired.

"Something was definitely amiss. However, I was not given a chance to speak and was dropped soon after. Our team manager at that time Ajit Wadekar was aware of everything. He had even written an article afterwards that Vinod Kambli had been made a scapegoat," he said.

Kambli said he was shocked when it came to know that they have to field when everybody was mentally prepared to bat.

"We had been playing well during the entire World Cup and even defeated the likes of WestIndies and Pakistan to reach the semifinal. Our openers were all set to bat, however, at the nick of time, we learnt we had to field. I got a huge shock after learning this," he said.

"I cried because I thought I was robbed of a chance to do it for my country. The entire team hugged me. Most of us were crying, he recalled. It was not only Tendulkar and other cricketers' dream to win the Cup but mine too," he added.

Sri Lanka won the first semifinal over India at the Eden Gardens when chasing a total of 251 for 8, the hosts slumped to 120 for 8 in the 35th over and that led to crowd disturbance.

The players left the field for 20 minutes in an attempt to quiet the crowd. When the players returned for play, more bottles were thrown onto the field, forcing Match referee Clive Lloyd to award the match to Sri Lanka, the first default ever in Test or one-day international.

"Azhar should take a stance. It's upto him how he deals with it. But the time has come for Azhar to clear his name. There are too many whispers going around," Ganguly said when asked about Kambli's claims that the 1996 World Cup semifinal between India and Sri Lanka could have been fixed.

Ganguly also rubbished Kambli's claim that the match at the Eden Gardens ruined his career.

"His (Kambli's) claim that his career was finished because of that game is rubbish. How can that game ruin his career, he was not out then," Ganguly told Headlines Today.

Ganguly said the decision to field could have been the result of Sri Lanka's earlier league match against India at the Feroz Shah Kotla here, where Sri Lanka chased down 270-odd runs with ease.

"I can sympathise with Azhar. I can understand the reasons of putting Sri Lanka in. If you remember Srio Lanka chased 270-odd runs in Delhi in an earlier match."

Ganguly further hoped that Kambli has his facts right. Meanwhile 1983 World Cup winning skipper Kapil Dev asked if Kabmli was sleeping all these 15 years.

The media should not give credence to all this statements, Kapil felt.

Kambli, a former Indian cricketer who has often been embroiled in controversies both on and off the field, yesterday raised suspicion on the 1996 World Cup semi-final between India and Sri Lanka and said he found "something amiss" in the game.

It has been a busy day for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Bali. He held back-to-back meetings with US President Barack Obama and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao on Friday, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit.

Former Indian captain Mohammed Azharuddin on Friday lashed out at Vinod Kambli for hinting that India's 1996 World Cup semifinal match could have been fixed, saying the allegations have been made by a person who lacks character and were "absolutely rubbish".

"Absolutely rubbish, whatever he (Kambli) is talking. He doesn't know what he is talking, when you have people who have no character and no background come on TV and talk absolute rubbish in front of the nation and demeaning all the players who played in the team, it is totally disrespectful and its very sad," a livid Azhar told reporters.

Azhar, who was the Indian captain at that time, said the decision to field first was a collective decision. "May be when he was sitting in the meeting, he must have been sleeping," he added.

Kambli, a former Indian cricketer who has often been embroiled in controversies both on and off the field, on Thursday raised suspicion on the 1996 World Cup semifinal between India and Sri Lanka and said he found "something amiss" in the game.

"I will never forget the 1996 match because my career ended after this and I was dropped from the team. I was stunned by India's decision to field," Kambli had said.

Azhar, however, refuted all the allegations leveled against him saying it was a team decision to field after winning the toss.

"It was a team decision which was taken by all the team members that when we win the toss we will field. Whatever he is talking is absolutely rubbish and nonsense".

Azhar also refuted the claims that Kambli was made a scapegoat, saying the cricketer got enough chances to prove himself but failed to capitalise on the opportunities.

"He is not made a scapegoat. First of all the way he played his cricket, everybody knows how he played his cricket and what he used to do. So he cannot say he has been made a scapegoat, because he got selected again in 1998 but got injured in one of the matches where he was substituting for some player, I don't know when...in Cuttack or some other place," Azhar said.

"I think if he had taken his cricket seriously he wouldn't be in this position now," the former captain added.

Azhar said the only reason behind India's defeat against Sri Lanka in the contentious semifinal match at Eden Gardens was that the team did not perform up to the mark.

"We played badly, we lost the match. There is nothing to do with toss or batting first or fielding first. If you don't play well you lose the match, as simple as that," said Azhar.

The cricketer also rebutted the call for a probe into the match saying will you have a probe for every match India lost.

"Why should there be a probe after so many years. What is the probe you are talking about, I don't know why people talk about this probe, then for every match there is probe," Azhar said.

Meanwhile, the then manager of the Indian team and former captain, Ajit Wadekar, doubted the timing of Kambli's statement.

"My question is, if he knew everything, why did he wait for 15 years," Wadekar said.

Kambli had claimed that Wadekar knew everything about the incident and had even criticised the decision.

"Our team manager at that time Ajit Wadekar was aware of everything. He had even written an article afterwards that Vinod Kambli had been made a scapegoat," he said.
Wadekar, however, said that electing to field first was a collective decision as the team felt that Sri Lankan's were good chasers.

"In the team meeting before the match it was decided that India would field in the event of winning the toss. The decision was taken after consultation with the entire team," Wadekar said.

Wadekar added that even though he and Sandeep Patil were of the opinion that the wicket would turn, the team still decided to field keeping in mind the chasing prowess of the Sri Lankans.

Former cricketers Arun Lal and Atul Wassan also criticised Kambli for raking up the issue after nearly 15 years.

"Kambli's credibility is a problem, I dont know why he is talking about it after so many years," Wassan pointed out.

Manmohan Singh, in his 55-minute long meeting with his Chinese counterpart for 55 mins asserted India's right to explore oil in the South China Sea, which china claims as its exclusive domain.
  1. South China Sea row rules PM-Jiabao meet

  2. Business Standard - 20 minutes ago

  3. If there is one issue that has dominated the meetings leading up to the Asean and East Asia summits this week, it has been the South China Sea dispute, ...

  4. India tells China its interest in disputed sea 'purely commercial'The Hindu

  5. India will explore oil in South China Sea: PMIBNLive.com

  6. China warns Barack Obama over South China Sea 'interference'Telegraph.co.uk

  7. AFP - BBC News

  8. all 1739 news articles »

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  10. The Hindu

  11. South China Sea Making Space for Two Elephants

  12. Asia Sentinel - Khanh Vu Duc - 7 hours ago

  13. Why the South China Sea disputes suddenly matter, and why it doesn't matter? The real question at hand is how a small, global community makes room for a ...

  14. South China Sea conflict can have global fall-out: Indian NavyEconomic Times

  15. South China sea conflict to have global implications: Navy ChiefIndian Express

  16. South China sea an area of 'significant concern': Navy chiefTimes of India

  17. Wall Street Journal - Hindustan Times

  18. all 61 news articles »

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  20. Jakarta Post

  21. China in a corner at the East Asia Summit

  22. Business Standard - Ajai Shukla - 10 minutes ago

  23. That and the PM's remark that China's claims over the South China Sea "should be resolved according to international law and practice" highlights a new ...

  24. China, Philippines Spar Over Sea Claims as Obama Arrives for Asean ...Bloomberg

  25. US assures Manila of 2nd warship amid Spratlys rowBusinessWeek

  26. China morning round-up: Asean South China Sea warningBBC News

  27. The Australian - Sydney Morning Herald

  28. all 553 news articles »

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  30. Bloomberg

  31. Obama stirs up China's sea of troubles

  32. BBC News - Damian Grammaticas - 2 hours ago

  33. The US, he said, wanted to discuss the disputed South China Seas at the East Asia ... The South China Sea matters not only because it has rich oil and gas ...

  34. Sea disputes deserve summit dialogue:ObamaSydney Morning Herald

  35. Gillard pushes for free trade at Asian summitABC Online

  36. US, China set to clash over maritime disputeVancouver Sun

  37. The Hindu - Daily Mail

  38. all 5749 news articles »

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  40. Daily Mail

  41. US, China in verbal duel over maritime claims

  42. Hindustan Times - 11 minutes ago

  43. The US wants the dispute over the South China Sea discussed at meetings of the ASEAN and eight regional powers including the US, China, Russia and Japan.

  44. US-China tension spills over into Asia summitLivemint

  45. all 3 news articles »

  46. Obama's Pacific tour: South China Sea change

  47. The Guardian - 20 hours ago

  48. This is not so much a sea change as a South China Sea change. This is a maritime region, rich in energy and fisheries resources, which China claims as its ...

  49. US-China relations call for determined diplomacyThe Korea Herald

  50. Ensuring China's Peaceful RiseThe Diplomat

  51. Maritime talks next for NodaThe Japan Times

  52. China Daily

  53. all 15 news articles »

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  55. The Diplomat

  56. Start N-trade but within our laws: PM to Obama

  57. IBNLive.com - 5 hours ago

  58. In that context, there was a mention of South China Sea to which the Prime ...China, which lays claim over entire South China Sea, had openly attacked ...

  59. 'India will have to work within its laws,' PM tells Obama on ...NDTV

  60. India PM Meets Obama Over Nuclear LawWall Street Journal

  61. all 238 news articles »

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  63. The Hindu

  64. Hillary Clinton warns against intimidation in South China Sea dispute

  65. Economic Times - 2 days ago

  66. MANILA: US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Wednesday urged claimants to the South China Sea not to resort to intimidation to push their cause in the ...

  67. US Secretary of State Backs Philippines in South China Sea DisputeVoice of America

  68. Clinton: South China Sea Dispute Must Be Resolved PeacefullyWall Street Journal

  69. Clinton warns against intimidation in South China Sea disputeReuters India

  70. eTaiwan News - Times of India

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  73. Wall Street Journal

  74. US looking out for Philippines, Obama tells Noy

  75. Philippine Star - Aurea Calica - 2 hours ago

  76. The Philippines has been seeking to build a united front against China over Beijing's territorial claims in the South China Sea in two days of ASEAN ...

  77. President Aquino, Obama agree on SpratlysInquirer.net

  78. US, PH 'look out for each other'Manila Bulletin

  79. Obama cites Aquino's leadership, performanceTempo

  80. AngolaPress

  81. all 36 news articles »

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  83. AFP

  84. China Cautious on Myanmar Reforms

  85. Wall Street Journal - Brian Spegele - 2 hours ago

  86. Beijing is embroiled in territorial disputes with neighbors in the South China Sea. The US has deepened cooperation with Vietnam, another of China's ...

  87. Jet-setting Obama catches up with globe-trotting Hillary Clinton ...Daily Mail

  88. Obama sending Clinton to boost Burma reformsThe Australian

  89. Obama sends Clinton to Burma to fan 'flickers' of democratic reformNational Post

  90. Fox News - Boston.com

  91. all 1553 news articles »

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  93. Sydney Morning Herald


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    When Jiabao met Manmohan Singh, they resolved to take ties to a new level.
    Meanwhile, Singh also urged Obama that US companies should begin nuclear trade with India, while ruling out any major changes in liability law in the future.

    Manmohan Singh and Barack Obama were meeting after a gap of almost a year. That and the recent hiccups on military and nuclear deals had set off talk of a drift in ties - it was an impression which the Prime Minister wanted to dispel when he said there were no irritants in the bilateral relationship.

    "I'm very happy to report to you that today there are no irritants whatsoever in our working on a multiplicity of areas," Manmohan Singh said.

    That sentiment got a boost with India moving the last mile on the nuclear pact. Supplier liability has been limited to 5 years and capped at Rs 1,500 crores and the Prime Minister told Obama that law would be no hurdle to US companies wishing to invest in India's nuclear sector.

    While India and China try to keep tensions down, the region's powers are playing for high stakes in multiple balancing acts.

    With an eye on China, America plans to increase its military presence in Australia and India is developing military ties with Vietnam and Cambodia.

    The Finance Ministry on Thursday increased the investment limit for foreign institutional investors (FII) in government securities (G-secs) and corporate bonds by $5 billion each, a move that will enhance capital flows and increase the availability of resources for corporates. The FIIs can now invest up to $15 billion in G-secs and $20 billion in corporate bonds, according to a Finance Ministry statement.

    The investment limit in long-term infrastructure bonds, however, has been kept unchanged at $25 billion. A notification giving effect to the new FII investment ceilings will be issued by the Securities and Exchange Board of India soon.

    "The present enhancement will increase investment in debt securities and help in further development of the government securities and corporate bond markets in the country," the statement said. The decision, which was taken after a review of the macro—economic situation, would enhance capital flows and make additional financial resources available to the Indian corporate sector, the statement added. The official added that the increase in investment limits became necessary as "...little space was available for further FII investment in G-secs and corporate bonds.'' As against the FII investment ceiling of Rs.43,650 crore in G-secs, foreign institutions had invested Rs.41,253 crore as of October 31, 2011.

    Similarly, in the case of corporate bonds, FIIs have invested Rs.68,289 crore (as of October 31, 2011) as against the ceiling of Rs.74,416 crore.

    The infrastructure development in the country is being hit hard by a slow pace of reforms and limited long-term funding options and this trend can deter the economic growth, rating agency Standard & Poor's has warned.

    In a report analysing the key factors hindering the infrastructure growth, S&P has said that the government has stepped up infrastructure spending in recent years, but a slow pace of reforms and a lack of long-term funding options were constraining the sector's growth.
    "India's inadequate infrastructure is a major roadblock to the country's target of achieving a 9-9.5 per cent annual growth in 2012-17," said the report, titled "Can India's developing infrastructure keep pace with economic growth?"

    "An immediate consequence of increasing urbanisation in India in recent years has been manifold growth in demand for infrastructure," S&P's credit analyst Rajiv Vishwanathan said adding that demand was likely to keep increasing in step with growth in the Indian economy.
    In order to keep up the pace of infrastructure development, reforms are necessary to create a robust framework with transparent policies for project execution and funding, S&P said.
    "Constraints in securing clearances, land rights, and long-term funding could cause companies to fall short of their targets," Vishwanathan added.

    The country's power deficit is fuelling demand for energy projects, while rapid industrialisation and urbanisation are creating an urgent need for efficient road and rail network and other improvements in infrastructure, Mr. Vishwanathan added.

    The XII Plan focuses on removing some of these roadblocks and creating a sustainable frameworkfor private sector participation.

    "The fate of the infrastructure sector over the next few years will depend on the ability of India's leaders to execute these plans," the report said.

    Let Congress decide on alliance; we don't need them: Mamata Banerjee

    KOLKATA: "Decide whether you want to stay with us or not" -- was a fresh ultimatum served to the Congress party by Trinamool Congresssupremo and West Bengal chief ministerMamata Banerjee on Friday after a protest rally by Youth Congress against alleged attacks on party workers by Trinamool activists.


    A fiery Banerjee said the Congress has to decide both at the centre and the state whether to carry on the alliance with the Trinamool and added that her party does not need the Congress support.


    "It is for the Congress to decide whether to support Trinamool or extend indirect support toCommunist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M). It will be sorted out because this thing cannot go hand in hand. They (Congress) have earlier done the same thing. Trinamool doesn't want to stay with political parties which have covert relations with CPI-M," said Banerjee.


    Banerjee said it was for the Congress to decide whether they want to stay with Trinamool or forge an alliance with the Communists.


    "The Congress leaders are abusing us everyday. What do they think? In Delhi they don't have majority to run the central government but we have the majority in Bengal for running the state government. We don't need to depend on them to run the government," said Banerjee.


    The Youth Congress on Friday took out a protest rally against alleged violence by Trinamool Congress activists on Congress workers across the state.


    "What are they trying to achieve by taking out this rally in the South Kolkata area just before Lok Sabha by polls. Do they want to strengthen the hands of CPI-M? If they are taking out rallies then we can also take out rallies. People of Bengal are well aware of everything. They are with us," said Banerjee.


    Asked whether she will register an official complaint with Congress president Sonia Gandhi or the prime minister regarding the rally, Banerjee said: "I don't believe in complaining. I hope they will get the message from what I said just now. It's better to stay separately than letting our supporters get thrashed by Congress supporters."


    Earlier, on the issue of repeated petrol price hikes, Banerjee had threatened that her party - the second largest partner in the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) - would not stay with the central government and demanded a roll-back.


    3 mega infrastructure projects worth Rs 25,000 cr put on fast track

    : The government today said three mega infrastructure projects envisaging an investment of Rs 25,000 crore have been accorded regulatory clearances and many more would be put on fast track in a month's time.

    "Because of initiative of Finance Minister and other senior ministers, three projects of Rs 25,000 crore have been cleared and are under implementation stage", Financial Services Secretary D K Mittal told reporters after a project review meeting chaired by Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee.

    The projects which were approved include power project of Hinduja in Vishakhapatnam, metro rail project of L & T in Hyderabad and road project in Andhra Pradesh. These projects were held up because of regulatory bottlenecks.

    The Government has started reviewing large projects after a meeting between Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee and India Inc on August 1. The initiative follows concerns expressed by industry leaders who had urged the government to speed up clearances.

    Twelve large infrastructure projects were taken up in the last review meeting and another 12 projects valued between Rs 1,500 crore and Rs 5,000 crore were taken up today.

    "Three projects have been cleared and it is expected that for the rest of the projects clearances would be available before the next meeting," Mittal said.

    Mukherjee is reviewing implementation of infrastructure projects valued at Rs 100 crore and above which have loan sanctions from public sector banks but are held up due to regulatory clearances.

    Commerce and Industry Minister Anand Sharma, Environment Minister Jayanthi Natarajan and Power Minister Sushilkumar Shinde also attended the review meeting.

    Mittal said the FIPB had approved Hinduja Power project in Vishakhapatnam envisaging an investment of Rs 6,000 crore, though L&T's Metro project in Hydrabad was still facing some legal obstacles. The highway project in Andhra Pradesh was held up due to environment clearance.

    The Secretary said in the next meeting, likely next month, projects between Rs 1,000 crore and Rs 1,500 crore would be reviewed.

    Moreover, Mittal added, "money of state owned banks is involved and if these projects are not implemented, it will become non-performing assets ( NPA)".

    6 SEP, 2011, 04.19AM IST, ET BUREAU

    Cracks appear in Unique Identification Authority of India's enrolment process


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    NEW DELHI: The Home Ministry has identified flaws in the enrolment process followed by the Unique Identification Authority of India, citing cases where people have got UID numbers on the basis of false affadivits.


    In a note written to the Cabinet Committee on UIDAI headed by Prime Minister Mannohan Singh, the ministry has questioned the security of the biometric data captured by the UIDAI and pointed out uncertainties in its revenue model.


    The UIDAI has sought an additional 15,000 crore to do biometric scanning of all residents of the country through its own registrars, a proposal that is being opposed by the home ministry and the planning commission, as the government has already tasked the census office with the primary responsibility of collecting biometric data of all indian residents for a National Population register card.


    The data collected by the census office is supposed to be shared with the UIDAI and every NPR card will carry the UID number of the card holder. The census office is part of the home ministry and so far has collected biometric data for 30 lakh individuals.


    In its comments on the UIDAI's proposal, reviewed by ET, the home ministry has urged the Cabinet to restrict the authority's multi-registrar model of biometric enrolment to the already decided level of 20 crore by March 2012. The UIDAI has issued 2.87 crore unique IDs by August 24.


    "The home ministry, the Planning Commission and others have given their comments," Home Minister P Chidambaram said about the UIDAI proposal for more funding on Thursday. He also said that the Cabinet Committee on UIDAI (CCUIDAI) would take a call on the overlap between the NPR and the UIDAI.


    "Cases have come to light wherein enrolments were being done on the basis of affidavits which were being sold by unscrupulous persons without any verification," the ministry has warned in a note to the CCUIDAI, stressing that UIDAI registrars enrol residents on a 'walk-in' basis, based on documents whose authenticity is not checked.

    http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/software/Cracks-appear-in-Unique-Identification-Authority-of-Indias-enrolment-process/articleshow/9878215.cms
    1. South China Sea - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    2. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_China_Sea

    3. The South China Sea is a marginal sea that is part of the Pacific Ocean, encompassing an area from the Singapore and Malacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan of...

    4. Names - Geography - Extent - Resources

    5. Images for South China Sea

    6. - Report images

    7. BBC News - Wen warns US on South China Sea dispute

    8. www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15790287

    9. 7 hours ago – China has warned "external forces" not to get involved in its maritime disputes with neighbouring countries over the South China Sea.

    10. WWW South China Sea Virtual Library

    11. www.southchinasea.org/

    12. An online resource for students, scholars and policy-makers interested in South China Sea regional development, environment, and security issues. ...

    13. News for South China Sea

    14. IBNLive.com

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    18. India will explore oil in South China Sea: PM to Jiabao - IBNLive.com -

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    21. China warns against South China Sea meddling - World Wires ...

    22. www.miamiherald.comNewsWorldWorld Wires

    23. 6 hours ago – China's premier has warned against outside interference in the South China Sea in an apparent challenge to the United States.

    24. South China Sea: Latest News, Videos, Photos | Times of India

    25. timesofindia.indiatimes.comTopics

    26. See South China Sea Latest News, Photos, Biography, Videos and Wallpapers. South China Sea profile on Times of India.

    27. Tarun Vijay: India and China compete for influence in South China sea

    28. tarun-vijay.blogspot.com/.../india-and-china-compete-for-influence.h...

    29. 21 Sep 2011 – Vice President of Strategic Intelligence Rodger Baker explains how increasing Indian involvement in the South China Sea is a maneuver to ...

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    31. India will explore oil in South China Sea: PM to Wen Jiabao - India ...

    32. ibnlive.in.com/news/india-will...in-south-china-sea.../203597-3.html

    33. 3 hours ago – It has been a busy day for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Bali. He held back-to-back meetings with US President Barack Obama and ...

    34. South China Sea Project - SCS Home

    35. www.unepscs.org/

    36. Results 1 - 7 of 37 – South China Sea Project - The UNEP/GEF Project Entitled "Reversing Environmental Degradation in the South China Sea and Gulf of ...

    37. Asia Sentinel

    38. www.asiasentinel.com/

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    Wen warns US on South China Sea dispute

    A Chinese frigate sits berthed in Shanghai on September 22, 2011.China's growing naval power has encouraged it to be more assertive

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    China has warned "external forces" not to get involved in its maritime disputes with neighbouring countries over the South China Sea.

    In comments apparently directed at the US, Premier Wen Jiabao said that the disputes should be resolved by "relevant sovereign states".

    Mr Wen spoke at a regional summit in Bali that US President Barack Obama is also attending.

    But other nations want the contentious issue to be tackled at the forum.

    The South China Sea contains some of the world's busiest shipping lanes, as well as oil and gas reserves.

    China claims a huge U-shaped area of the sea - a claim that overlaps areas which Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Brunei say belong to them.

    China's increasingly assertive behaviour over its claim in recent months has alarmed several of its neighbours.

    They are keen to negotiate with China as a bloc - but China prefers to tackle the issue through bilateral negotiations, and it does not want the US involved at all.

    "External forces should not use any excuse to interfere," he said in a speech carried by state news agency Xinhua.

    "The dispute on the South China Sea is a matter that been going on for years. It should be resolved by the relevant sovereign states through friendly consultation and discussion directly."

    Mr Obama, who is on a nine-day tour of Asia, said that the summit provided a good arena to work on the issue of maritime security.

    On Thursday in a speech to the Australian parliament, he pledged increased US engagement with the region and a strong military presence, including the deployment of US Marines to Darwin in Australia.

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    No change in disinvestment target as of now, says Pranab

    SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT
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    UNLOCKING VALUE: Pranab Mukherjee, Union Finance Minister, releasing ICICI Securities' white paper on PSU disinvestment along with Chanda Kochhar, MD and CEO, ICICI Bank, at a seminar on PSU disinvestment in New Delhi on Friday. Photo: V.V. Krishnan
    The Centre will retain at least 51 % shareholding in PSUs
    Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee on Friday indicated that he was not contemplating any downward revision in the disinvestment target of Rs.40,000 crore set for the current fiscal, as of now. The government's effort would be to achieve it but much would depend on various other factors.
    "I am not revising it [disinvestment target] right now. We have fixed the target and we will try to achieve it, but it depends on many other situations, particularly the economic health conditions," Mr. Mukherjee told the media on the sidelines of a seminar on disinvestment.
    Till date, the government has been able to mop up a mere Rs.1,145 crore through the sole equity sell-off in the Power Finance Corporation (PFC). Stock markets have remained either very volatile or in a tailspin in the wake of the global economic uncertainties such as the slowdown in the U.S. and the ongoing eurozone sovereign debt crisis.
    As a result, all public offerings of public sector undertakings (PSUs) lined up for stake sale in 2011-12 have been kept in abeyance. With more than half the fiscal year over, questions are not being raised in various quarters as to whether the disinvestment target can at all be met. Referring to these concerns, Mr. Mukherjee said: "All these aspects have to be taken into account and the government will take a decision at the appropriate time."
    PSUs that were initially lined up for stake sale were SAIL and Hindustan Copper (HCL), ONGC, BHEL, RINL, Hindustan Aeronautics and NBCC, among others.
    Earlier, inaugurating the seminar on 'PSU disinvestment through listing — a tool for improved corporate governance' here, Mr. Mukherjee maintained that the government would retain at least 51 per cent shareholding in PSUs to keep them in the public sector fold while pointing out that a higher stake unnecessarily locked up capital which could otherwise be deployed in social sector development. "Keeping more than 51 per cent equity in government companies locked-up does not make economic sense when such valuable resources are required for redeployment in area where development is needed … Retaining more than 51 per cent government shareholding in a company has no impact on its character as a CPSE [Central public sector enterprise] and it only keeps government investment locked up, often at a value which may be lower than what the market would offer," he said.
    Mr. Mukherjee said there were 50 listed Central PSUs now which accounted for 22.25 per cent share of the total market capitalisation on the Bombay Stock Exchange. "Through the public offerings of CPSE, the government has endeavoured to unlock the true nature of these public sectors and, most important, to provide an opportunity to the people of India to become shareholders in these companies," he said. Mr. Mukherjee asserted that the true worth of a company could only be gauged on its listing and when its shares were publicly traded, which unlocked the true value of the company.
    Keywords: disinvestment target, Indian economy, Pranab Mukherjee
    http://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/article2639743.ece

    Parliamentary panel members seek status of black money cases
    Members of parliament's standing committee on finance Friday called upon the government to take quick action on black money, with some members seeking to know about status of existing cases in the next few days.

    Sources said the issue of black money was raised by members at the meeting of the committee withBharatiya Janata Party (BJP) members on the panel asking the government to take more concerted action to get names of offenders from foreign governments.

    Some members asked the government to give status of cases of those having accounts in HSBC Geneva according to information shared by the French government.

    They asked the government to expeditiously commence the prosecution proceedings against the persons whose names figure in such information provided by France and other countries so that their names come out in public domain.

    The members also called upon the government to periodically apprise them of progress in the cases

    The sources said that on the inquiry made byCongress MP Rashid Alvi, finance ministry officials expressed hope of completing investigations in the list given by foreign countries in the next three months.

    The officials said that the names will be told to the court concerned on completion of investigations.

    The opposition is likely to aggressively raise the issue of black money in the winter session of Parliament.

    The standing committee on Finance is headed by senior BJP leader Yashwant Sinha.

    Senior officials with the Income Tax department had said last month that they were investigating 782 people suspected of having stashed away unaccounted wealth in accounts with the HSBC Bank in Geneva.

    A senior official with the department, on condition of anonymity, had said the newly-created Directorate of Criminal Investigation had started sending notices to individuals, seeking explanation on the source of funds in these accounts in Geneva. He had said that information about these people had been provided by France.

    Ban on SPOs will apply only to Chhattishgarh: Supreme Court

    The Supreme Court on Friday ruled that its earlier order banning Special Police Officers (SPOs) like those under the Salwa Judum would only apply to Chhattisgarh.
    A bench of justices Altamas Kabir and S.S. Nijjar said its July 5, 2011 judgement restraining the Union government from funding SPOs was confined only to Chhattisgarh and not other parts of the country.
    The bench passed the order on an application by the Centre seeking clarification on the court's earlier order.
    Solicitor General Rohinton Nariman and counsel Siddharth Dave, appearing for the Centre, pleaded that if the July 5, 2011 order was to be implementedin toto, it would pose severe difficulty for the government in undertaking anti-insurgency operations in the Northeast and other parts of the country.
    The Supreme Court, in its earlier order, had come down heavily on the practice of deploying vigilante groups in the fight against Maoists. The bench had asked the Centre and Chhattisgarh government to desist from arming tribals in the name of SPOs, saying it was "unconstitutional".
    The court had criticised the governments for supporting and funding creation of SPOs under various titles like "Koya Commandos" and Salwa Judum whose numbers had gone up from 3,000 to 6,500 within a year.
    State laws mandated SPOs to help people during natural or man-made disasters and to assist administration in carrying out relief work, the apex court had in its July 5, 2011 ruling said, adding that the case of Chhattisgarh SPOs, however, violated Constitutional boundaries.
    Giving statistics about the SPOs killed and injured during the anti-Maoist operations in Chhattisgarh, the bench had said, "It is also equally clear to us that in this policy, of using local youth, jointly devised by the Union and the States facing Maoist insurgency, as implemented in the State of Chhattisgarh, the young tribals have literally become canon fodder in the killing fields of Dantewada and other districts of Chhattisgarh."
    The Bench had criticised both the State government and the Centre for compromising with educational qualification and training programme for the SPOs.
    It had said all appropriate measures must be taken to prevent the operation of all such groups, including Salwa Judum and "Koya Commandos".
    The court had directed the Chhattisgarh government to desist forthwith from using SPOs in any manner aimed at controlling, countering, mitigating or eliminating Maoist / Naxalite activities in the state.
    The bench, which was critical of providing the young SPOs with firearms, had directed the Chhattisgarh government to disarm them forthwith by recalling all firearms issued to them.
    Complied with Supreme Court direction: Chhattisgarh
    Reacting to the Supreme Court's observations, Meanwhile, Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman Singh on Friday said there are no SPOs in his State now as they have been absorbed as a "special auxiliary force" to combat Maoists.
    "We have dissolved SPO positions. All they have been absorbed as special auxiliary force and they are not SPOs now. Permanent recruitment procedure, training, education and all (other things)... 100 per cent we have done as per the directions of the Supreme Court," Mr. Singh told PTI.
    The Chief Minister said the new Act allows the State to give them proper training, education and other basic infrastructure to combat extremism as per the directions of the Supreme Court.
    "Based on special provisions of the Chattisgarh Police Act which was an old Act, the erstwhile SPOs have 25-25 per cent of State and Centre share. But now based on the directives of the court, we have absorbed them. Now we don't have any SPOs," he said.

    RBI monitoring rupee; will intervene when necessary: Pranab

    PTI
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    Union Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee and Planning Commission Deputy Chairman Montek Singh Ahluwalia leave after a cabinet meeting in New Delhi on Wednesday. Photo: PTI

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    As the rupee depreciated to a new 32-month low against the US dollar, Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee on Wednesday said the Reserve Bank is monitoring the situation and will intervene in the forex market "as and when necessary".

    His was speaking to reporters on the the sidelines of CAG even. The apex bank had said on Tuesday that it would intervene in the foreign exchange market only to arrest volatility.

    "We intervene when there is a very strong movement in a particular direction or extreme volatility and the objective is to smooth that volatility and not fix a rate," RBI Deputy Governor Subir Gokarn had said.

    The Indian rupee fell by 24 paise to a fresh 32-month low of Rs 50.91 against the US dollar in early trade today amid depreciation of the euro due to the deepening debt crisis in the euro-zone nations.

    The Indian rupee is the fourth most depreciated currency in the world and most depreciated in the Asian continent.

    RBI has attributed the movement to the demand-supply factor, and said it is happening globally.

    Mr. Gokarn had said that RBI would opt for open market operations to manage liquidity in the system only if there is a stress and not to influence government bond yields.

    A weaker rupee is a matter of concern for India as it depends on imports for over 70 per cent of its oil and gas requirements and the depreciation in the local currency have made imports expensive.

    This has come at a time when headline inflation has remained above the 9 per cent mark for 11 consecutive months.

    Keywords: rupee value

    'Will address grievances, but within our law'

    PTI
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    PTIPrime Minister Manmohan Singh with U.S. President Barack Obama after their meeting in Bali, Indonesia. Photo: PTI

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    U.S. "studying" Indian nuclear liability regulationsNo scope for change in liability regime, India will tell ObamaNew rules give some relief to nuclear suppliersCPI(M) wants dilution of nuclear liability law reviewedCould the U.S. become a proliferator?Operator will be at supplier's mercy: Left partiesCabinet clears nuclear liability billBJP hands over note to Chavan on nuclear liability bill

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    diplomacyIndia-United States
    energy and resourcenuclear power

    Asserting that there were "no irritants" in India and the U.S. working together, Dr. Singh said India had already "gone some way to respond to the concerns of American companies" with the nuclear liability law.

    Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and U.S. President Barack Obama met here on Friday and declared their intention to push the Indo-U.S. cooperation both at bilateral and at multilateral forums.

    Dr. Singh and Mr. Obama, who met here on the sidelines of ASEAN and East Asia Summits, talked about strengthening the bonds of strategic ties put in place during the U.S. President's visit to India in November last year.

    Recalling the Mr. Obama's "historic visit" to India, Dr. Singh said, "in the last one year, we have made progress in every direction, strengthening our bilateral cooperation in investment, trade, higher education, clean energy and defence."

    "I am very happy to report to you that today there are no irritants whatsoever in our working together in multiplicity of areas both bilaterally and on global issues," Dr. Singh said. "We have strengthened in many ways the path set out during the historic visit, whether it is civil nuclear cooperation, whether it is humanitarian relief, in disaster management, or maritime security, all the issues which unite us in our quest for a world free from war," he added.

    In his opening remarks, the U.S. president referred to his "extraordinary" trip to India during which the two sides strengthened the bonds of friendship, commercial links and security cooperation.

    "We continue to make progress on a wide range of issues. The bonds between our two countries are not just at the leadership level but also at personal levels," said Mr. Obama.

    "This is an outstanding opportunity for us to continue to explore how we can work together," Mr. Obama said, identifying some of the issues as maritime security, non-proliferation and terrorism.

    Among the issues discussed was the implementation of civil nuclear deal against the backdrop of apprehensions among American companies over the liability aspect.

    "We have gone some way to respond to the concerns of American companies," Dr. Singh on notification of nuclear liability law. "Within the four corners of the law, we are ready to address any specific grievances," he added.

    Ahead of the meeting, India had asserted that its domestic laws with regard to nuclear liability and compensation will have to prevail and any contention otherwise would not be realistic after the Fukushima incident.

    Keywords: Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, Manmohan-Obama meet, Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, ASEAN Summit.

    CPI(M) wants dilution of nuclear liability law reviewed

    SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT
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    The Communist Party of India (Marxist) on Thursday pointed out that the move to notify diluted rules for the Civil Nuclear Liability Act was to meet the objections of the United States and demanded its review by Parliament.
    Reacting to the government notification, as reported byThe Hindu, the party's Polit Bureau said in a statement that the right to recourse for the operator to claim damages from the foreign supplier was limited to the duration of the initial licence period or the product liability period, whichever is longer.
    "The initial duration of the licence is normally five years and the product liability period will also be limited. Such rules do not cover a reasonable period of the functioning of the reactor and its equipment," it said.
    "Interestingly, these rules have been notified on the eve of the Prime Minister's meeting with the U.S. President during the Asean summit meeting.
    "Obviously these rules have been framed in order to meet the objections of the U.S., which wants the foreign suppliers' liability itself to be nullified," the statement said.
    The CPI(M) demanded that Parliament review the rules and adopt steps to ensure that the spirit and content of the law was not diluted in any way.
    Keywords: Civil Nuclear Liability Act

    http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2636856.ece

    Kudankulam: Talks between Central panel, protesters fail

    PTI
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    Convenor of the Central panel of experts on the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project A.E. Muthunayagam addresses the media after talks with the State-appointed panel on the issue, in Tirunelveli on Friday. Photo: A. Shaik Mohideen

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    Forum plans fast on Saturday in support of nuclear projectCases against priests for encouraging protestsRamadoss wants Kalpakkam power station shut by 2020Kudankulam: Central panel promises unbiased report

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    energy and resourcenuclear power
    politicsnuclear policy
    unrest, conflicts and wardemonstration

    Talks to break the logjam over the controversial Koodankulam Nuclear Power Project made no headway on Friday with protestors terming as "failure" the discussions with the Central government's expert committee on the issue.

    The 15-member panel on a three-day visit to the plant as part of efforts to allay people's fears over safety aspects, also met the six-member State committee constituted by the State government on the Kudankulam issue in Tirunelveli.

    "Our mandate is to talk to the forum (the six-member State panel) provided by the Tamil Nadu government. We cannot go on talking to the people in Tirunelveli district," K. Balu, a Central committee member told reporters after the meeting, also attended by representatives from the protesters.

    He said the project has "much more than what is necessary to ensure safety as far as environment and people are concerned."

    Mr. Balu said the committee sought to clarify questions raised by the protestors, who have been on a month-long fast in the second phase of their agitation, demanding scrapping of the Indi-Russia venture.

    However, unhappy over the outcome of the talks, M. Pushparayan, one of the leaders spearheading the stir claimed the Central committee was neither interested in removing doubts raised by them at the last meeting nor had the Central panel given the documents the protestors asked for.

    "They gave only a 38-page report instead of giving the documents we asked. The report did not have any documentary evidence and so we will continue our protests and the two-hour talks ended in a failure," he said.

    The Rs. 13,600-crore project, whose first unit (1,000 MWe) was scheduled to be commissioned in December, has run into trouble following protests from locals who are demanding that it be scrapped on grounds of safety.

    A.E. Muthunayagam, an expert in environmental science and oceanography and convenor of the Central committee, said the group had even planned presentations on six issues such as safety, radiation, cancer threat, possibility of incidents like Fukushima here, waste disposal and trends of nuclear energy.

    "Our friends (the protestors) say we are not satisfied. We have not come here to listen to your lecture," he said.

    Asked whether the meeting ended abruptly, Mr. Muthunayagam said, "They took our report and went away."

    He said the committee would continue giving answers and clarifying issues and bring facts to the people. "We will see to it that some solution is reached."

    Making it clear there was no need for the committee to submit a report to the Central government, Mr. Balu said the panel was set up to allay the fears of the locals and would talk to the people, through their representatives.

    Renowned oncologist and a member of the panel, V. Shantha said, "There is a lot of misconception on radiation. Lots of studies have been done even in Kalpakkam and other areas. There is no need for any fear or panic about radiation."

    Keywords: Kudankulam issue, Central experts panel, State commitee, anti-KNPP protests, Idinthakarai fast


    India tells China its interest in disputed sea 'purely commercial'

    B. MURALIDHAR REDDY
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    PTIPrime Minister Manmohan Singh with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Bali, Indonesia on Friday. Photo: Subhav Shukla

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    Amid negative vibes on border management and exploration of South China Sea resources in recent weeks, India and China on Friday reiterated their commitment to developing the "best of relations."

    Meeting on the sidelines of the Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean) and East Asia Summit, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao spoke the language of camaraderie as "large growing economies of Asia" and agreed on the need to work together as there was "enough space" and areas for them to work together for mutual benefit.

    The exploration of oil and gas resources in the South China Sea and border management came up during the 55-minute meeting.

    Dr. Singh maintained that Indian exploration of oil and gas in the South China Sea was "purely commercial." He did convey to Mr. Wen that the issue of sovereignty over the Sea waters should be resolved according to international law and practice.

    On border management, both took note of the "tranquillity and peace" and referred to the coming engagement at the level of Defence Secretaries. The decision to set up a mechanism to ensure against any misunderstandings on the management of the disputed border was touched upon.

    The Indian activity in the South China Sea was raised by Dr. Singh in the context of China's misgivings over a recent pact between India and Vietnam on oil exploration.

    Bone of contention

    Jurisdiction over the territorial waters of the Sea is a bone of contention between China and several south-east Asian nations, including Vietnam.

    Maintaining that the issue needs to be resolved in accordance with the international law and practice, India is stressing the freedom of navigation and right to passage in these waters given its importance as a trade route.

    Keywords: East Asia Summit, India-China talks, border disputes

    http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2638645.ece

    China warns Barack Obama over South China Sea 'interference'

    China has warned Barack Obama about "interference" in east Asia after the US president said that the region's seething row over the South China Sea should be discussed at a major summit.

    By Alex Spillius
    2:28PM GMT 18 Nov 20112 Comments
    The Chinese government has declared that the long-running dispute should be off-limits at talks to be held in Indonesia on Saturday, which will be attended by Mr Obama, Wen Jiabao, the China premier, and 16 other nations including several with claims over the waterway.
    But Mr Obama said the gathering, held this year on the Indonesian resort island of Bali, "can be the premier arena for us to be able to work together on a wide range of issues – maritime security or non-proliferation".
    The president has irritated China with his effort to enhance America's role as a regional power.
    On a nine-day journey across the Pacific, he has declared that the US was "all in" for the coming Asian century. He announced the creation of a US marine post in Darwin, northern Australia and pushed for a potentially transformational trans-Pacific trade pact.
    Beijing sees the initiatives as intruding into its own sphere of influence, with the dispute over the South China Sea putting the two major world powers' differences into stark focus.

    RELATED ARTICLES


    Mr Wen warned against interference by "external forces" in the wrangle.
    China claims all of the strategic area, as does Taiwan, while four Southeast Asian countries declare ownership of parts of it, with Vietnam and the Philippines accusing Beijing's forces of increasing aggression there.
    The region is a conduit for more than one-third of the world's seaborne trade and half its traffic in oil and gas, and major petroleum deposits are believed to lie below the seabed.
    China and ASEAN – another regional grouping – agreed a non-binding "declaration of conduct" to cover the area in 2002, but it has yet to be fully implemented.
    http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8899244/China-warns-Barack-Obama-over-South-China-Sea-interference.html

    Justice Markandey Katju clarifies

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    The HinduJustice Markandey Katju, Chairman, Press Council of India. File photo

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    Justice Markandey Katju, Chairman, Press Council of India, has issued the following clarification on his critical observations of the Indian media.

    I have expressed my views relating to the media in several T.V. interviews I gave as well as in my articles in some newspapers.

    However, many people, including many media people, wanted clarification and amplification of some of the issues I had raised. Many media people (including several T.V. channels) wanted interviews with me but I told them that I will not give interviews for some time, since it does not create a good impression if one keeps giving interviews frequently. However, since some controversy appears to have been raised about what I said a clarification is in order.

    Today India is passing through a transitional period in our history, the transition being from feudal agricultural society to modern industrial society. This is a very painful and agonizing period in history. The old feudal society is being uprooted and torn apart, but the new modern industrial society has not been fully and firmly established. Old values are crumbling, but new modern values have not yet been put in place. Everything is in flux, in turmoil. What was regarded good yesterday, is regarded bad today, and what was regarded bad is regarded good. As Shakespeare said in Macbeth "Fair is foul and foul is fair".

    If one studies the history of Europe from the 16th to the 19th Centuries, when the transition from feudalism to modern society was taking place, one will know that this transitional period was full of turbulence, turmoil, wars, revolutions, chaos, social churning, and intellectual ferment. It was only after going through this fire that modern society emerged in Europe. India is presently going through that fire. We are going through a very painful period in our country's history, which, I guess, will last another 15 to 20 years. I wish this transition would take place painlessly and immediately but unfortunately that is not how history functions.

    In this transition period the role of ideas, and therefore of the media, becomes extremely important. At a particular historical juncture, ideas become a material force. For instance, the ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity, and of religious freedom (secularism) became powerful material forces during the Age of Enlightenment in Europe and particularly during the American and French Revolutions. In the age of transition in Europe, the media (which was only the print media at that time) played a great, historical role in the transformation of feudal Europe to modern Europe.

    Historically, the print medium arose as an organ of the people against feudal oppression. At that time, the established organs of power were all in the hands of the feudal, despotic authorities (kings, aristocrats, etc.). Hence the people had to create new organs which could represent their interests. That is why the print medium became known as the Fourth Estate. In Europe and America it represented the voice of the future, as a contrast to the established feudal organs which wanted to preserve status quo.

    Great writers like Voltaire, Rousseau, Thomas Paine, 'Junius' (whose real name we yet do not know) played an outstanding role in this connection (see Will Durant's 'The Age of Voltaire' and 'Rousseau and Revolution'). The Encyclopaedists like Voltaire, Diderot, Helvetius, Holbach etc. created the Age of Reason, which paved the way for a modern Europe. Diderot wrote that "Men will be free when the last king is strangled with the entrails of the last priest". Voltaire, in his satirical novels 'Candide' and 'Zadig' lashed out at religious bigotry, superstitions, and irrationalism. Rousseau in his 'Social Contract' attacked feudal despotism by propounding the theory of the 'general will' (which broadly stands for popular sovereignty). Thomas Paine wrote about the Right of Man, and Junius attacked the corruption of the Ministers of the despotic George III. Dickens criticized the terrible social conditions in 19th Century England. These, and many others, were responsible for creating modern Europe.

    In my opinion the Indian media too should play a progressive role similar to the one played by the European media. This it can do by attacking backward and feudal ideas and practices like casteism, communalism, superstitions, oppression of women, etc. and propagating modern rational and scientific ideas, secularism, and tolerance.

    At one time a section of our media played a great role in our country. Raja Ram Mohan Roy courageously attacked backward customs like sati, child marriage, purda, etc in his newspapers 'Miratul Akbhar' and 'Sambad Kaumudi'. Nikhil Chakravarty wrote about the horrors of the Bengal Famine of 1943. Munshi Premchand and Sharat Chandra Chattopadhyaya wrote against feudal practices and oppression of women. Saadat Hasan Manto wrote about the horrors of Partition.

    When I criticized the Indian media, and particularly the electronic media for not playing such a progressive and socially responsible role, I was furiously attacked by a section of the media for my views. Some even launched a personal attack on me saying that I was an agent of the government.

    I could have retaliated back in the same tone by saying that most media persons are agents of the corporates who have hired them, but I refrained from doing so as I did not want to stoop down to their level. When serious issues are raised about the functioning of the media it was expected that those issues would be addressed seriously instead of launching personal attacks on me, or simply dismissing me as 'irresponsible' (as one Exalted Person has done).

    By criticizing the media I wanted to persuade the media to change its manner of functioning and not that I wanted to destroy it. The Indian media has a historical role to play in the age of transition, and I wanted to remind the media persons of their historical duty to the nation. Instead of taking my criticism in the correct spirit, a veritable diatribe was launched against me by a section of the media, which painted me as some kind of dictatorial monster.

    The great Hindi poet Rahim has written:

    "Nindak nearey raakhiye

    Aangan kuti Chawaye"

    The media should regard me as their well wisher. I criticized them because I wanted media persons to give up many of their defects (some of which I had mentioned in my T.V. interviews and articles) and follow the path of honour which the European media was following, and which will give them the respect of the Indian people.

    I mentioned that 80% of our countrymen are living in horrible poverty, there is massive unemployment, skyrocketing prices, lack of medical care, education etc. and barbaric social practices like honour killing, dowry death, caste oppression, religious bigotry, etc. Instead of seriously addressing these issues 90% of the coverage of our media goes to entertainment, e.g., lives of film stars, fashion parades, pop music, disco dancing, cricket etc, or showing superstitions like astrology.

    No doubt the media should provide some entertainment also to the people, but if 90% of its coverage is devoted to entertainment, and only 10% to all the socio-economic issues put together, then the sense of priorities of the media has gone haywire. The real issues before the people are the socio-economic issues, and the media is seeking to divert their attention to the non issues like film stars, fashion parades, disco, pop, cricket etc. Does a hungry or unemployed man require entertainment, or food and a job? It is because of this lack of a sense of priorities and for showing superstitions, that I criticized the media.

    One should not be afraid of criticism, nor should one resent it. People can criticize me as much as they like, I will not resent it, and maybe I will benefit from it. But similarly the media too should not mind if I criticize them. My aim in doing so is to make them better media people.

    While criticizing, however, fairness requires that one should report the words of one's opponent accurately, without twisting or distorting them. That was the method used by our philosophers. They would first state the views of their opponent, in what was called as the 'purvapaksha'. This was done with such accuracy and intellectual honesty that if the opponent were present he could not have stated his views better. Thereafter it was sought to be refuted. In this connection one may read Madhavacharya's 'Sarva Darshan Sangrah' (Madhavacharya was the founder of the Dvait school of Vedanta). The views of the Charvaks (Materialist thinkers), the Buddhists, Jains, etc are stated in the 'purvapaksha' with such accuracy that if they were present they could not have put them better.

    Unfortunately, this practice is often not followed by our media, and my words were distorted by many, and then I was furiously attacked. To give only two examples: (1) In my interview to Mr. Karan Thapar, I stated that in my opinion the majority of media people are of a poor intellectual level. This statement of mine was twisted and distorted by several persons on T.V. channels who quoted me as saying that all media persons are 'uneducated' and 'illiterate'. I telephoned the lady journalist who anchored one of such T.V. panel discussions and asked her why she had distorted my words. She had begun the panel discussion by saying "Katju called journalists uneducated". She said she only interpreted what I said. I told her that first she should have quoted my exact words, and then only should she have interpreted them. I would like to clarify this further.

    Firstly, I did not make a statement about all media people but only of the majority. There are many media people for whom I have great respect. I had mentioned the name of Mr. P. Sainath, whose name should be written in letters of gold in the history of India journalism (for highlighting farmer's suicides and other farmers issues). I can name several others. Mr. Paranjoy Guha Thakurta and Mr. Shreenivas Reddy did a commendable job in exposing in detail the scandal of paid news. I also have high respect for Mr. Vinod Mehta, Mr. Vinod Sharma, Mr. N. Ram and many others.

    I may also mention that before my interview with Mr. Karan Thanpar I sat for about 10 minutes in his office having a cup of coffee with him. At that time I mentioned the name of Emile Zola to him, and he immediately said 'J' Accuse'. That one word made him go up high in my esteem. I earlier did not have a very high opinion of him, but that single word completely changed my opinion, and I realized I was in the presence of a highly educated man.

    So I wish to clarify have that I did not paint the entire media with the same brush, but my words were totally distorted.

    Secondly, I did not say that this majority was uneducated or illiterate. This again was a deliberate distortion of what I said. I never used the word 'uneducated'. I said that the majority is of a poor intellectual level. A person may have passed B.A. or M.A. but yet may be of a poor intellectual level.

    Thirdly, even if one did not agree with my view, he could have coolly and patiently disagreed in a civil tone and expressed his own views instead of shouting and raving on the TV screen and giving an ugly display of temper. And this by a person who belongs to a profession a large section of which is accused of the scandal of paid news, Radia tapes, etc. Really, the Lady doth protest too much! (Shakespeare: Hamlet).

    (2) I have again and again said in my articles, speeches and TV interviews that I am not in favour of harsh measures against the media. In a democracy, issues are ordinarily resolved by discussion, persuasion, consultation, and dialogue, and that is the method I prefer, rather than using harsh measures. If a channel/newspaper has done something wrong I would prefer to call the persons responsible ad patiently explain to them that what they have done is not proper. I am sure that in 90% or more cases that would be sufficient. I strongly believe that 90% of people who are doing wrong things can be reformed and made good people.

    It is only in extreme cases, which would only be about 5 to 10%, that harsh measures would be required, and that too after repeated use of the democratic method has failed and the person proves incorrigible.

    This statement of mine was again distorted and a false impression created that I wanted to impose emergency in the country, cartoons were published in some newspapers showing me as some kind of dictator, etc., etc.

    The truth is that I have always been a strong votary for liberty, and the proof of this is my judgments in the Supreme Court and the High Court in which I have consistently held that judges are guardians of the liberties of the citizens, and they will be failing in their duties if they do not uphold these liberties. However, liberty does not mean license to do anything one wishes. All freedoms are subject to reasonable restrictions in the public interest, and are coupled with responsibilities.

    We may now discuss the question of self regulation.

    Self regulation by electronic media

    At present, there is no regulatory authority to cover the electronic media. The Press Council of India governs only the print media, and even in cases of violation of journalistic ethics by the latter the only punishment which can be given is admonition or censure.

    I have written to the Prime Minister requesting him to initiate legislation to amend the Press Council Act by (1) bringing electronic media also under the ambit of the Press Council, and (2) giving more teeth to the Press Council.

    The electronic media has strongly opposed bringing it under the Press Council. Their claim is of self regulation. But even Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts do not have such an absolute right. They can be impeached by Parliament for misconduct. Lawyers are under the Bar Council, who can suspend or cancel their license for professional misconduct. Doctors come under the Medical Council who can suspend/cancel their license. Auditors are in the same position. Why then is the electronic media shy of coming under any regulatory authority? Why these double standards? If they do not wish to come under the Press Council (because the present Chairman is a wicked and/or undesirable person) then the N.B.A., and B.E.A. should indicate under which regulatory authority they wish to come. Are they willing to come under the proposed Lokpal? I have repeatedly raised this question in several newspapers, but my question has always been met either by stony silence on the part of the N.B.A., and B.E.A. or dismissing the very question as 'irresponsible'.

    T.V. news and shows have a large influence on a wide section of our public. Hence in my opinion T.V. channels must also be made accountable to the public.

    If the electronic media insists on self regulation, then by the same logic politicians, bureaucrats, etc., must also be granted the right of self regulation, instead of being placed under the Lokpal. Or does the electronic media regard itself so holy, so 'doodh ka dhula' that nobody should regulate it except itself. In that case, what is paid news, Radia tapes, etc? Is that the work of saints?

    In fact there is no such thing as self regulation, which is an oxymoron. Everybody is accountable to the people in a democracy, and so is the media.

    Keywords: Katju, media Katju spat, media responsibility, regulation

    http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2629257.ece?homepage=true

    South China Sea

    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
    Not to be confused with East China Sea.

    South China Sea

    *

    A map of the South China Sea

    Chinese name

    Traditional Chinese

    南海 or 南中國海

    Simplified Chinese

    南海 or 南中国海

    Hanyu Pinyin

    Nán Hǎi (South Sea) orNán Zhōngguó Hǎi(South China Sea)

    [show]Transcriptions


    Filipino name

    Tagalog

    Dagat Timog Tsina

    (South China Sea)

    Dagat Luzon

    (Luzon Sea)

    Dagat Kanlurang Pilipinas

    (West Philippine Sea)

    Indonesian name

    Indonesian

    Laut Cina Selatan /

    Laut Tiongkok Selatan

    (South China Sea)

    Japanese name

    Kanji

    南支那海 or 南シナ海(literally "South Shina Sea")

    Hiragana

    みなみシナかい

    [show]Transcriptions


    Malay name

    Malay

    Laut Cina Selatan

    (South China Sea)

    Portuguese name

    Portuguese

    Mar da China Meridional

    (South China Sea)

    Thai name

    Thai

    ทะเลจีนใต้

    [tʰáʔlēː tɕīːnáʔ tɑ̂i]

    (South China Sea)

    Vietnamese name

    Vietnamese

    Biển Đông

    (East Sea)

    Chữ nôm

    匾東


    *

    This article contains Chinesetext. Without proper rendering support, you may see question marks, boxes, or other symbolsinstead of Chinese characters.


    The South China Sea is a marginal sea that is part of the Pacific Ocean, encompassing an area from the Singapore and Malacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan of around 3,500,000 square kilometres (1,400,000 sq mi). The area's importance largely results from one-third of the world's shipping transiting through its waters, and that it is believed to hold huge oil and gas reserves beneath its seabed.[1]
    It is located
    The minute South China Sea Islands, collectively an archipelago, number in the hundreds. The sea and its mostly uninhabited islands are subject to competing claims of sovereignty by several countries. These claims are also reflected in the variety of names used for the islands and the sea.

Names

Sunset on the South China Sea off Mui Ne village on the south-east coast ofVietnam

South China Sea is the dominant term used in English for the sea, and the name in most European languages is equivalent, but it is sometimes called by different names in neighboring countries, often reflecting historical claims to hegemony over the sea.
The English name is a result of early European interest in the sea as a route from Europe andSouth Asia to the trading opportunities of China. In the sixteenth century Portuguese sailors called it the China Sea (Mar da China); later needs to differentiate it from nearby bodies of water led to calling it the South China Sea.[2] The International Hydrographic Organization refers to the sea as "South China Sea (Nan Hai)".[3]
In Southeast Asia it was once called the Champa Sea aka Sea of Cham, after the maritime kingdom of Champa that flourished there before the sixteenth century. The majority of the sea came under Japanese naval control during World War II following the military acquisition of many surrounding South East Asian territories in 1941. Japan calls the sea Minami Shina Kai "South China Sea". This was written 南支那海 until 2004, when the Japanese Foreign Ministry and other departments switched the spelling 南シナ海, which has become the standard usage in Japan.
In China, it is called the "South Sea", 南海 Nánhǎi, and in Vietnam the "East Sea", Biển Đông.[4][5][6] In the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia it was long called the "South China Sea" (Dagat Timog Tsina in Tagalog, Laut China Selatan in Malay), with the part within Philippine territorial waters often called the "Luzon Sea", Dagat Luzon, by the Philippines. However, following an escalation of the Spratly Islands dispute in 2011, various Philippine government agencies started using the neologism "West Philippine Sea". A Pagasa spokesperson said that the sea to the east of the Philippines will continue to be called the Philippine Sea.[7]

Geography

States and territories with borders on the sea (clockwise from north) include: the People's Republic of China (including Macau and Hong Kong), the Republic of China (Taiwan), thePhilippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam.
Major rivers that flow into the South China Sea include the Pearl, Min, Jiulong, Red, Mekong,Rajang, Pahang, Pampanga, and Pasig Rivers.

Extent

The International Hydrographic Organization defines the limits of the South China Sea as follows:[3]
On the South. The Eastern and Southern limits of Singapore and Malacca Straits [A line joining Tanjong Datok, the Southeast point of Johore (1°22′N 104°17′E) through Horsburgh Reef to Pulo Koko, the Northeastern extreme of Bintan Island (1°13.5′N 104°35′E). The Northeastern coast of Sumatra] as far West as Tanjong Kedabu (1°06′N 102°58′E) down the East coast of Sumatra to Lucipara Point (3°14′S 106°05′E) thence to Tanjong Nanka, the Southwest extremity of Banka Island, through this island to Tanjong Berikat the Eastern point (2°34′S 106°51′E), on to Tanjong Djemang (2°36′S107°37′E) in Billiton, along the North coast of this island to Tanjong Boeroeng Mandi (2°46′S 108°16′E) and thence a line to Tanjong Sambar (3°00′S 110°19′E) the Southwest extreme of Borneo.
On the East. From Tanjong Sambar through the West coast of Borneo to Tanjong Sampanmangio, the North point, thence a line to West points of Balabac and Secam Reefs, on to the West point of Bancalan Island and to Cape Buliluyan, the Southwest point of Palawan, through this island to Cabuli Point, the Northern point thereof, thence to the Northwest point ofBusuanga and to Cape Calavite in the island of Mindoro, to the Northwest point of Lubang Island and to Point Fuego (14°08'N) in Luzon Island, through this island to Cape Engano, the Northeast point of Luzon, along a line joining this cape with the East point of Balintang Island (20°N) and to the East point of Y'Ami Island (21°05'N) thence to Garan Bi, the Southern point of Taiwan(Formosa), through this island to Santyo (25°N) its North Eastern Point.
On the North. From Fuki Kaku the North point of Formosa to Kiushan Tao (Turnabout Island) on to the South point of Haitan Tao (25°25'N) and thence Westward on the parallel of 25°24' North to the coast of Fukien.
On the West. The Mainland, the Southern limit of the Gulf of Thailand and the East coast of the Malay Peninsula.

Geology

The sea lies above a drowned continental shelf; during recent ice ages global sea level was hundreds of metres lower, and Borneo was part of the Asian mainland.
The South China Sea opened after around 45 million years ago when the Dangerous Grounds (Reed Tablemount) were rifted away from southern China. Extension culminated in seafloor spreading around 30 million years ago, a process that propagated to the SW resulting in the V-shaped basin we see today. Extension ceased around 17 million years ago. Arguments have continued about the role of tectonic extrusion in forming the basin. Paul Tapponnier and colleagues have argued that as India collides with Asia it pushes Indochina to the SE. The relative shear between Indochina and China caused the South China Sea to open. This view is disputed by geologists who do not consider Indochina to have moved far relative to mainland Asia. Recent marine geophysical studies by Peter Clift has shown that the Red River Fault was active and causing basin formation at least by 37 million years ago in the NW South China Sea, consistent with extrusion playing a part in the formation of the sea. Since opening the South China Sea has been the repository of large sediment volumes delivered by the Mekong River, Red River and Pearl River. Several of these deltas are rich in oil and gas deposits.

Islands and seamounts

See also: South China Sea Islands
The South China Sea contains over 250 small islands, atolls, cays, shoals, reefs, and sandbars, most of which have no indigenous people, many of which are naturally under water at high tide, and some of which are permanently submerged. The features are grouped into three archipelagos (listed by area size), Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal:

South China Sea


The Spratly Islands spread over an 810 by 900 km area covering some 175 identified insular features, the largest being Taiping Island (Itu Aba) at just over 1.3 km long and with its highest elevation at 3.8 metres.
The largest singular feature in the area of the Spratly Islands is a 100 km wide seamount called Reed Tablemount, also known as Reed Bank, in the northeast of the group, separated from Palawan Island of thePhilippines by the Palawan Trench. Now completely submerged, with a depth of 20 m, it was an island until it sank about 7,000 years ago due to the increasing sea level after the last ice age. With an area of 8,866 km², it is one of the largest submerged atoll structures of the world.

Resources

It is an extremely significant body of water in a geopolitical sense. It is the second most used sea lane in the world, while in terms of world annual merchant fleet tonnage, over 50% passes through the Strait of Malacca, the Sunda Strait, and the Lombok Strait. Over 1.6 million m³ (10 million barrels) of crude oil a day are shipped through the Strait of Malacca, where there are regular reports of piracy, but much less frequently than before the mid-20th century.
The region has proven oil reserves of around 1.2 km³ (7.7 billion barrels), with an estimate of 4.5 km³ (28 billion barrels) in total. Natural gasreserves are estimated to total around 7,500 km³ (266 trillion cubic feet).
According to studies made by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Philippines, this body of water holds one third of the entire world's marine biodiversity, thereby making it a very important area for the ecosystem.

Territorial claims

Main article: Territorial disputes in the South China Sea

Map of various countries occupying the Spratly Islands

Maritime claims in the South China Sea

Several countries have made competing territorial claims over the South China Sea. Such disputes have been regarded as Asia's most potentially dangerous point of conflict. BothPeople's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) claim almost the entire body as their own, demarcating their claims within what is known as the nine-dotted line, which claims overlap with virtually every other country in the region. Competing claims include:
  • Indonesia, China, and Taiwan over waters NE of the Natuna Islands
  • The Philippines, China, and Taiwan over the Malampaya and Camago gas fields.
  • The Philippines, China, and Taiwan over Scarborough Shoal.
  • Vietnam, China, and Taiwan over waters west of the Spratly Islands. Some or all of the islands themselves are also disputed between Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines.
  • The Paracel Islands are disputed between the PRC/ROC and Vietnam.
  • Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam over areas in the Gulf of Thailand.
  • Singapore and Malaysia along the Strait of Johore and the Strait of Singapore.

China and Vietnam have both been vigorous in prosecuting their claims. The People's Republic of China and South Vietnam each controlled part of the Paracel Islands before 1974. A brief conflict in 1974 resulted in 18 soldiers being killed, and China has controlled the whole of Paracel since then.[citation needed] The Spratly Islands have been the site of a naval clash, in which over seventy Vietnamese sailors were killed just south of Chigua Reef in March 1988. Disputing claimants regularly report clashes between naval vessels.[citation needed]
ASEAN in general, and Malaysia in particular, has been keen to ensure that the territorial disputes within the South China Sea do not escalate into armed conflict. As such, Joint Development Authorities have been set up in areas of overlapping claims to jointly develop the area and dividing the profits equally without settling the issue of sovereignty over the area. This is true, particularly in the Gulf of Thailand. Generally, China has preferred to resolve competing claims bi-laterally,[8]while ASEAN countries prefer multi-lateral talks,[9] believing that they are disadvantaged in bi-lateral negotiations with the much larger China and that because many countries claim the same territory only multilateral talks could effectively resolve the competing claims.[10]
The overlapping claims over Pedra Branca or Pulau Batu Putih including neighboring Middle Rocks by both Singapore and Malaysia were settled in 2008 by the International Court of Justice, awarding Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh to Singapore and Middle Rocks to Malaysia.
In July 2010, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for the Peoples Republic of China to resolve the territorial dispute. China responded by demanding the US keep out of the issue. This came at a time when both countries have been engaging in naval exercises in a show of force to the opposing side, which increased tensions in the region.[11] The US Department of Defense released a statement on August 18 where it opposed the use of force to resolve the dispute, and accused China of assertive behaviour.[12]
Chinese objection to Indian naval presence and oil exploration
On July 22, 2011, one of India's amphibious assault vessels, the INS Airavat which was on a friendly visit to Vietnam, was reportedly contacted at a distance of 45 nautical miles from the Vietnamese coast in the disputed South China Sea, was contacted on open radio channel identifying itself as the Chinese Navy and stating that the ship was entering Chinese waters.[13] [14] The spokesperson for the Indian Navy clarified that as no ship or aircraft was visible from INS Airavat it proceeded on her onward journey as scheduled. The Indian Navy further clarified that "[t]here was no confrontation involving the INS Airavat. India supports freedom of navigation in international waters, including in the South China Sea, and the right of passage in accordance with accepted principles of international law. These principles should be respected by all." [15]
In September 2011, shortly after China and Vietnam had signed an agreement seeking to contain a dispute over the South China Sea, India's state-run explorer, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) said that its overseas investment arm ONGC Videsh Limited had signed a three-year deal with PetroVietnam for developing long-term cooperation in the oil sector and that it had accepted Vietnam's offer of exploration in certain specified blocks in the South China Sea. [16] In response, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu, without referring to India by name, stated as follows: "China enjoys indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea and the island. China's stand is based on historical facts and international law. China's sovereign rights and positions are formed in the course of history and this position has been held by Chinese Government for long. On the basis of this China is ready to engage in peaceful negotiations and friendly consultations to peacefully solve the disputes over territorial sovereignty and maritime rights so as to positively contribute to peace and tranquillity in the South China Sea area. We hope that the relevant countries respect China's position and refrain from taking unilateral action to complicate and expand the issue. We hope they will respect and support countries in the region to solve the bilateral disputes through bilateral channels. As for oil and gas exploration activities, our consistent position is that we are opposed to any country engaging in oil and gas exploration and development activities in waters under China's jurisdiction. We hope the foreign countries do not get involved in South China Sea dispute."[17][18] The spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India responded by saying that "The Chinese had concerns but we are going by what the Vietnamese authorities have told us and have conveyed this to the Chinese."[19] The Indo-Vietnamese deal was also denounced by the Chinese state-run newspaper Global Times. [20] [21]

South China Sea in astronomy

South China Sea is associated with the star Xi Serpentis in asterism Left Wall, Heavenly Market enclosure (see Chinese constellation).[22]

See also


References

  1. ^ A look at the top issues at Asian security meeting Associated Press, ROBIN McDOWELL, July 21 2011. Retrieved July 21 2011
  2. ^ Tønnesson, Stein (2005). Locating the South China Sea. In Kratoska, Paul et al., eds. Locating Southeast Asia: geographies of knowledge and politics of space. Singapore: Singapore University Press. p. 203-233.
  3. ^ a b "Limits of Oceans and Seas, 3rd edition". International Hydrographic Organization. 1953. Retrieved 7 February 2010.
  4. ^ "VN and China pledge to maintain peace and stability in East Sea". Socialist Republic of Vietnam Government Web Portal.
  5. ^ "FM Spokesperson on FIR control over East Sea". Embassy of Vietnam in USA. March 11, 2001.
  6. ^ "The Map of Vietnam". Socialist Republic of Vietnam Government Web Portal.
  7. ^ Quismundo, Tarra (2011-06-13). "South China Sea renamed in the Philippines". Philippine Daily Inquirer. Retrieved 2011-06-14.
  8. ^ http://www.china.org.cn/world/2010-07/26/content_20571259.htm
  9. ^ http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20100723/pl_afp/aseanarfchinausmilitary_20100723133312
  10. ^ http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/05/world/asia/05hanoi.html?scp=2&sq=ASEAN%20South%20china%20sea%20multilateral&st=cse
  11. ^ [1][dead link]
  12. ^ [2][dead link]
  13. ^ DNA: India-China face-off in South China Sea [3]
  14. ^ South Asia Analysis Group [4]
  15. ^ DNA: India-China face-off in South China Sea [5]
  16. ^ Reuters: China paper warns India off Vietnam oil deal [6]
  17. ^ South Asia Analysis Group[ [7]
  18. ^ The Hindu: China warns India on South China Sea exploration projects [8]
  19. ^ South Asia Analysis Group[ [9]
  20. ^ Reuters: China paper warns India off Vietnam oil deal [10]
  21. ^ The Hindu: China warns India on South China Sea exploration projects [11]
  22. ^ (Chinese) AEEA (Activities of Exhibition and Education in Astronomy) 天文教育資訊網 2006 年 6 月 23 日

Further reading


External links

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Wikimedia Commons has media related to: South China Sea

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Sino-Indian War

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Sino-Indian War
Part of Cold War
India China Locator.png
The Sino-Indian War occurred between India and China.
Date20 October[1] – 21 November 1962
LocationAksai Chin and South Tibet
ResultChinese military victory, then unilateral withdrawal
Territorial
changes
Status quo ante bellum
Belligerents
India
India
China
China
Commanders and leaders
India Brij Mohan Kaul
India Jawaharlal Nehru
India V. K. Krishna Menon
India Pran Nath Thapar
China Zhang Guohua[2]
China Mao Zedong
China Liu Bocheng
China Lin Biao
China Zhou Enlai
Strength
10,000–12,00080,000[3][4]
Casualties and losses
1,383 Killed[5]
1,047 Wounded [5]
1,696 Missing[5]
3,968 Captured[5]
722 Killed.[5]
1,697 Wounded[5][6]

The Sino-Indian War (Hindiभारत-चीन युद्ध Bhārat-Chīn Yuddh), also known as theSino-Indian Border Conflict (simplified Chinesetraditional Chinese:pinyinZhōng-Yìn Biānjìng Zhànzhēng), was a war between China andIndia that occurred in 1962. A disputed Himalayan border was the main pretext for war, but other issues played a role. There had been a series of violent border incidents after the 1959 Tibetan uprising, when India had granted asylum to the Dalai Lama. India initiated a Forward Policy in which it placed outposts along the border, including several north of the McMahon Line, the eastern portion of a Line of Actual Control proclaimed by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1959.

The Chinese launched simultaneous offensives in Ladakh and across the McMahon Line on 20 October 1962, coinciding with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Chinese troops advanced over Indian forces in both theatres, capturing Rezang la in Chushul in the western theatre, as well as Tawang in the eastern theatre. The war ended when the Chinese declared a ceasefire on 20 November 1962, and simultaneously announced its withdrawal from the disputed area.

The Sino-Indian War is notable for the harsh conditions under which much of the fighting took place, entailling large-scale combat at altitudes of over 4,250 metres (14,000 feet).[7] This presented enormous logistics problems for both sides. The Sino-Indian War was also noted for the non-deployment of the navy or air force by either the Chinese or Indian sides.

Contents

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Location

China and India shared a long border, sectioned into three stretches by NepalSikkim (now Indian state of Sikkim) and Bhutan, which follows the Himalayas between Burma and what was then West Pakistan. A number of disputed regions lie along this border. At its western end is the Aksai Chin region, an area the size of Switzerland, that sits between the Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang and Tibet (which China declared as an autonomous region in 1965). The eastern border, between Burma and Bhutan, comprises the present Indian state ofArunachal Pradesh (formerly the North East Frontier Agency). Both of these regions were overrun by China in the 1962 conflict.

Most combat took place at high altitudes. The Aksai Chin region is a vast desert of salt flats around 5,000 metres above sea level, andArunachal Pradesh is extremely mountainous with a number of peaks exceeding 7000 metres. According to military doctrine, to be successful an attacker generally requires a 3:1 ratio of numerical superiority over the defender for foot soldiers[citation needed]; in mountain warfare this ratio should be considerably higher as the terrain favours defence.[citation needed] Despite the disadvantage of this, China was able to take advantage of the terrain: the Chinese Army had possession of the highest ridges in the regions. The high altitude and freezing conditions also cause logistical and welfare difficulties; in past similar conflicts (such as the Italian Campaign of World War I) more casualties have been caused by the harsh conditions than enemy action. The Sino-Indian War was no different, with many troops on both sides dying in the freezing cold.[8]

Background

Pre-Simla British map published in 1909 shows the so called "Outer Line" as India's northern boundary.

The cause of the war was a dispute over the sovereignty of the widely-separated Aksai Chin andArunachal Pradesh border regions. Aksai Chin, claimed by India to belong to Kashmir and by China to be part of Xinjiang, contains an important road link that connects the Chinese regions of Tibet and Xinjiang. China's construction of this road was one of the triggers of the conflict.Arunachal Pradesh (called South Tibet by China) is also claimed by both nations — although it is roughly the size of Austria, it was sparsely inhabited in the days of the war (by numerous local tribes) due to its mountainous terrain.[citation needed] However, it has a population of over one million today.

The Johnson Line

The western portion of the disputed boundary.

The western portion of the Sino-Indian boundary originated in 1834, with the Sikh Confederation'sconquest of Ladakh. In 1842, the Sikh Confederacy, which at the time ruled over much of Northern India (including the frontier regions of Jammu and Kashmir), signed a treaty which guaranteed the integrity of its existing borders with its neighbours.[9] The British defeat of the Sikhs in 1846resulted in transfer of sovereignty over Ladakh, part of the Jammu and Kashmir region, to the British, and British commissioners contacted Chinese officials to negotiate the border. The boundaries at its two extremities, Pangong Lake and Karakoram Pass, were well defined, but the Aksai Chin area in between lay undefined.[10]

W. H. Johnson, a civil servant with the Survey of India proposed the "Johnson Line" in 1865, which put Aksai Chin in Kashmir.[11] Johnson presented this line to the Maharaja of Kashmir, who then claimed the 18,000 square kilometres contained within[11]. Johnson's work was severely criticized for gross inaccuracies, with description of his boundary as "patently absurd" who even extended his claim 80 miles further into China when India and China went into conflict over the border.[7]Johnson was reprimanded by the British Government for crossing into Khotan without permission and resigned from the Survey.[7][11][12] According to Francis Younghusband, who explored the region in the late 1880s, there was only an abandoned fort and not one inhabited house at Shahidulla when he was there - it was just a convenient staging post and a convenient headquarters for the nomadic Kirghiz.[13] The abandoned fort had apparently been built a few years earlier by the Kashmiris.[14] In 1878 the Chinese had reconquered Xinjiang, and by 1890 they already had Shahidulla before the issue was decided.[11] By 1892, China had erected boundary markers at Karakoram Pass.[7]

Throughout most of the 19th century the expanding British and Russian empires were jockeying for influence in Central Asia, and Britain decided to hand over Aksai Chin to the Chinese administration as a buffer against a Russian invasion. The newly-created border was known as the MacCartney-MacDonald Line, and both British-controlled India and China now began to show Aksai Chin as Chinese.[11] In 1911 theXinhai Revolution resulted in power shifts in China, and by 1918 (in the wake of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution) the British no longer saw merit in China's continuing possession of the region. On British maps, the border was redrawn as the original Johnson Line,[7] but despite this reversion, the new border was left unmanned and undemarcated.[7][11] According to Neville Maxwell, the British had used as many as 11 different boundary lines in the region, as their claims shifted with the political situation.[15] By the time of Indian independence in 1947, the Johnson Line had become India's official western boundary.[7] On 1 July 1954, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru definitively stated the Indian position.[12] claimed that Aksai Chin had been part of the Indian Ladakh region for centuries, and that the border (as defined by the Johnson Line) was non-negotiable.[16] According to George N. Patterson, when the Indian government finally produced a report detailing the alleged proof of India's claims to the disputed area, "the quality of the Indian evidence was very poor, including some very dubious sources indeed".[17][18]

In 1956–57, China constructed a road through Aksai Chin, connecting Xinjiang and Tibet, which ran south of the Johnson Line in many places.[7][11][16] Aksai Chin was easily accessible to the Chinese, but access from India, which meant negotiating the Karakoram mountains, was more problematic.[16] Consequently India did not even learn of the existence of the road until 1957 — finally confirmed when the road was shown in Chinese maps published the following year.[2]

The McMahon Line

The McMahon Line is the red line marking the northern boundary of the disputed area.

In 1826, British India gained a common border with China after the British wrested control ofManipur and Assam from the Burmese, following the First Anglo-Burmese War of 1824–1826. In 1847, Major J. Jenkins, agent for the North East Frontier, reported that the Tawang was part of Tibet. In 1872, four monastic officials from Tibet arrived in Tawang and supervised a boundary settlement with Major R. Graham, NEFA official, which included the Tawang Tract as part of Tibet. Thus, in the last half of the 19th century, it was clear that the British treated the Tawang Tract as part of Tibet. This boundary was confirmed in a 1 June 1912 note from the British General Staff in India, stating that the "present boundary (demarcated) is south of Tawang, running westwards along the foothills from near Ugalguri to the southern Bhutanese border."[7] A 1908 map of The Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam prepared for the Foreign Department of the Government of India, showed the international boundary from Bhutan continuing to the Baroi River, following the Himalayas foothill alignment.[7] In 1913, representatives of Great Britain, China and Tibet attended a conference in Simla regarding the borders between Tibet, China and British India. Whilst all three representatives initialed the agreement, Beijing later objected to the proposed boundary between the regions of Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet, and did not ratify it. The details of the Indo-Tibetan boundary was not revealed to China at the time.[7] The foreign secretary of the British Indian government, Henry McMahon, who had drawn up the proposal, decided to bypass the Chinese (although instructed not to by his superiors) and settle the border bilaterally by negotiating directly with Tibet.[16] According to later Indian claims, this border was intended to run through the highest ridges of the Himalayas, as the areas south of the Himalayas were traditionally Indian.[19] However, the McMahon Line lay south of the boundary India claims.[16] India's government held the view that the Himalayas were the ancient boundaries of the Indian subcontinent, and thus should be the modern boundaries of India,[19] while it is the position of the Chinese government that the disputed area in the Himalayas have been geographically and culturally part of Tibet since ancient times.[20]

Months after the Simla agreement, China set up boundary markers south of the McMahon Line. T. O'Callaghan, an official in the Eastern Sector of the North East Frontier, relocated all these markers to a location slightly south of the McMahon Line, and then visited Rima to confirm with Tibetan officials that there was no Chinese influence in the area.[7] The British-run Government of India initially rejected the Simla Agreement as incompatible with the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which stipulated that neither party was to negotiate with Tibet "except through the intermediary of the Chinese government".[21] The British and Russians cancelled the 1907 agreement by joint consent in 1921.[22] It was not until the late 1930s that the British started to use the McMahon Line on official maps of the region.

China took the position that the Tibetan government should not have been allowed to make a such a treaty, rejecting Tibet's claims of independent rule.[16] For its part, Tibet did not object to any section of the McMahon Line excepting the demarcation of the trading town ofTawang, which the Line placed under British-Indian jurisdiction.[16] However, up until World War II, Tibetan officials were allowed to administer Tawang with complete authority. Due to the increased threat of Japanese and Chinese expansion during this period, British Indian troops secured the town as part of the defence of India's eastern border.[7]

In the 1950s, India began actively patrolling the region. It found that, at multiple locations, the highest ridges actually fell north of the McMahon Line.[16] Given India's historic position that the original intent of the line was to separate the two nations by the highest mountains in the world, in these locations India extended its forward posts northward to the ridges, regarding this move as compliant with the original border proposal, although the Simla Convention did not explicitly state this intention.[16]

Events leading up to war

Tibet and the border dispute

The 1940s saw huge change in South Asia with the Partition of India in 1947 (resulting in the establishment of the two new states of India andPakistan), and the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. One of the most basic policies for the new Indian government was that of maintaining cordial relations with China, reviving its ancient friendly ties. India was among the first nations to grant diplomatic recognition to the newly-created PRC.[23]

At the time, Chinese officials issued no condemnation of Nehru's claims or made any opposition to Nehru's open declarations of control over Aksai Chin. In 1956, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai stated that he had no claims over Indian controlled territory.[23] He later argued that Aksai Chin was already under Chinese jurisdiction, implying that there was therefore no contradiction with his earlier statement, since China did not regard the region as "Indian controlled", and that since the British hand-over, China had regarded the McCartney MacDonald Line as the relevant border.[16] Zhou later argued that as the boundary was undemarcated and had never been defined by treaty between any Chinese or Indian government, the Indian government could not unilaterally define Aksai Chin's borders.[15]

In 1950, the Chinese People's Liberation Army annexed Tibet and later the Chinese extended their influence by building a road in 1956–67 [7]and placing border posts in Aksai Chin.[11] India found out after the road was completed, protested against these moves and decided to look for a diplomatic solution to ensure a stable Sino-Indian border.[11][23] To resolve any doubts about the Indian position, Prime MinisterJawaharlal Nehru declared in parliament that India regarded the McMahon Line as its official border (what year was this? cannot see link to the reference).[23] The Chinese expressed no concern at this statement,[11][23] and in 1951 and 1952, the government of China asserted that there were no frontier issues to be taken up with India.[23]

The Indian government's 1950 maps show the Sino-Indian border using undemarcated lines and the Aksai Chinfrontier is labelled "boundary undefined".
The Indian government's 1954 maps unilaterally delimited the Sino-Indian border in the Aksai Chin, and Sino-Indian borders are no longer indicated as undemarcated.

In 1954, Prime Minister Nehru wrote a memo calling for India's borders to be clearly defined and demarcated;[12] in line with previous Indian philosophy, Indian maps showed a border that, in some places, lay north of the McMahon Line.[24] Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, in November 1956, again repeated Chinese assurances that the People's Republic had no claims on Indian territory, although official Chinese maps showed 120,000 square kilometres (46,000 sq mi) of territory claimed by India as Chinese.[23] CIA documents created at the time revealed that Nehru had ignored Burmese premierBa Swe when he warned Nehru to be cautious when dealing with Zhou.[25] They also allege that Zhou purposefully told Nehru that there were no border issues with India.[25]

In 1954, China and India negotiated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, by which the two nations agreed to abide in settling their disputes. India presented a frontier map which was accepted by China, and the Indian government under Prime Minister Nehru promoted the slogan Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers). According to Georgia Tech political analystJohn W Garver, Nehru's policy on Tibet was to create a strong Sino-Indian partnership which would be catalysed through agreement and compromise on Tibet. Garver believes that Nehru's previous actions had given him confidence that China would be ready to form an "Asian Axis" with India.[2]

This apparent progress in relations suffered a major setback when, in 1959, Nehru accommodated the Tibetan religious leader at the time, the 14th Dalai Lama, who fled Lhasa after a failed Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule. The Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, was enraged and asked the Xinhua News Agency to produce reports on Indian expansionists operating in Tibet.[citation needed]

Border incidents continued through this period. In August 1959, the People's Liberation Army took an Indian prisoner at Longju, which had an ambiguous position in the McMahon Line,[7][11][24][26] and two months later in Aksai Chin, a clash led to the death of nine Indian frontier policemen.[11]

On 2 October, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev defended Nehru in a meeting with Mao. This action reinforced China's impression that the Soviet Union, the United States and India all had expansionist designs on China. The People's Liberation Army went so far as to prepare a self-defence counterattack plan.[2] Negotiations were restarted between the nations, but no progress was made.[12][27]

As a consequence of their non-recognition of the McMahon Line, China's maps showed both the North East Frontier Area (NEFA) and Aksai Chin to be Chinese territory.[19] In 1960, Zhou Enlai unofficially suggested that India drop its claims to Aksai Chin in return for a Chinese withdrawal of claims over NEFA. Adhering to his stated position, Nehru believed that China did not have a legitimate claim over either of these territories, and thus was not ready to concede them. This adamant stance was perceived in China as Indian opposition to Chinese rule in Tibet.[2] Nehru declined to conduct any negotiations on the boundary until Chinese troops withdrew from Aksai Chin, a position supported by the international community.[16] India produced numerous reports on the negotiations, and translated Chinese reports into English to help inform the international debate.[citation needed] China believed that India was simply securing its claim lines in order to continue its "grand plans in Tibet".[2] India's stance that China withdraw from Aksai Chin caused continual deterioration of the diplomatic situation to the point that internal forces were pressuring Nehru to take a military stance against China.

The Forward Policy

At the beginning of 1961, Nehru appointed General B. M. Kaul as army Chief of General Staff,[28] but he refused to increase military spending and prepare for a possible war.[28] According to James Barnard Calvin of the U.S. Navy, in 1959, India started sending Indian troops and border patrols into disputed areas. This program created both skirmishes and deteriorating relations between India and China.[7] The aim of this policy was to create outposts behind advancing Chinese troops to interdict their supplies, forcing them north of the disputed line.[7][23][26][29] There were eventually 60 such outposts, including 43 north of the McMahon Line, to which India claimed sovereignty.[7][12]China viewed this as further confirmation of Indian expansionist plans directed towards Tibet. According to the Indian official history, implementation of the Forward Policy was intended to provide evidence of Indian occupation in the previously unoccupied region through which Chinese troops had been patrolling. Kaul was confident, through contact with Indian Intelligence and CIA information, that China would not react with force.[16] Indeed, at first the PLA simply withdrew, but eventually Chinese forces began to counter-encircle the Indian positions which clearly encroached into the north of McMahon Line. This led to a tit-for-tat Indian reaction, with each force attempting to outmanoeuver the other. However, despite the escalating nature of the dispute, the two forces withheld from engaging each other directly.[2]

Chinese attention was diverted for a time by the military activity of the Nationalists on Taiwan, but on 23 June the U.S. assured China that a Nationalist invasion would not be permitted.[30] China's heavy artillery facing Taiwan could then be moved to Tibet.[31] It took China six to eight months to gather the resources needed for the war, according to Anil Athale, author of the official Indian history.[31] The Chinese sent a large quantity of non-military supplies to Tibet through the Indian port of Calcutta.[31]

Early incidents

Various border conflicts and "military incidents" between India and China flared up throughout the summer and autumn of 1962. In May, theIndian Air Force was told not to plan for close air support, although it was assessed as being a feasible way to counter the unfavourable ratio of Chinese to Indian troops.[32] In June, a skirmish caused the deaths of dozens of Chinese troops. The Indian Intelligence Bureau received information about a Chinese buildup along the border which could be a precursor to war.[32]

During June–July 1962, Indian military planners began advocating "probing actions" against the Chinese, and accordingly, moved mountain troops forward to cut off Chinese supply lines. According to Patterson, the Indian motives were threefold:

  1. Test Chinese resolve and intentions regarding India.
  2. Test whether India would enjoy Soviet backing in the event of a Sino-Indian war.
  3. Create sympathy for India within the U.S., with whom relations had deteriorated after the Indian annexation of Goa.[17][33]

On 10 July 1962, 350 Chinese troops surrounded an Indian occupied post in Chushul (north of the McMahon Line) but withdrew after a heated argument via loudspeaker.[8] On 22 July, the Forward Policy was extended to allow Indian troops to push back Chinese troops already established in disputed territory.[23] Whereas Indian troops were previously ordered to fire only in self-defence, all post commanders were now given discretion to open fire upon Chinese forces if threatened.[23] In August, the Chinese military improved its combat readiness along the McMahon Line and began stockpiling ammunition, weapons and gasoline.[7]

The Chinese had advance knowledge about the coming Cuban Missile Crisis, and Mao Zedong could pursue Nikita Khrushchev to reverse Russians policy backing India temporarily. Indians were stunned when Pravda in mid-October editorially advised to maintain peace "Chinese brothers" and "Indian friends". This situation lasted however only till the end of the Cuban confrontation and Mao publicly reprimanded him for "perfidy in the Himalayas"(against Indians) and "cowardice in the Caribbean"(against Americans).[34]

Confrontation at Thag La

In June 1962, Indian forces established an outpost at Dhola, on the southern slopes of the Thag La Ridge.[7] Dhola lay north of the McMahon Line but south of the ridges along which India interpreted the McMahon Line to run.[citation needed][16][24][35] In August, China issued diplomatic protests and began occupying positions at the top of Thag La.[7][2] On 8 September, a 60-strong PLA unit descended to the south side of the ridge and occupied positions that dominated one of the Indian posts at Dhola. Fire was not exchanged, but Nehru said to the media that the Indian Army had instructions to "free our territory" and the troops had been given discretion to use force.[2] On 11 September, it was decided that "all forward posts and patrols were given permission to fire on any armed Chinese who entered Indian territory".[23]

However, the operation to occupy Thag La was flawed in that Nehru's directives were unclear and it got underway very slowly because of this.[7][16] In addition to this, each man had to carry 35 kilograms (77 lb) over the long trek and this severely slowed down the reaction.[36] By the time the Indian battalion reached the point of conflict, Chinese units controlled both banks of the Namka Chu River.[7] On 20 September, Chinese troops threw grenades at Indian troops and a firefight developed, triggering a long series of skirmishes for the rest of September.[7][36]

Some Indian troops, including Brigadier Dalvi who commanded the forces at Thag La, were also concerned that the territory they were fighting for was not strictly territory that "we should have been convinced was ours".[26] According to Neville Maxwell, even members of the Indian defence ministry were categorically concerned with the validity of the fighting in Thag La.[16]

On 3 October, a week before the start of the war, Zhou Enlai visited Nehru in New Delhi promising there would be no war.[citation needed] On 4 October, Kaul assigned some troops to secure regions south of the Thag La Ridge.[7] Kaul decided to first secure Yumtso La, a strategically important position, before re-entering the lost Dhola post.[23] Kaul had then realised that the attack would be desperate and the Indian government tried to stop an escalation into all-out war. Indian troops marching to Thag La had suffered in the previously unexperienced conditions; two Gurkha soldiers died of pulmonary edema.[36]

On 10 October, an Indian Punjabi patrol of 50 troops to Yumtso La were met by an emplaced Chinese position of some 1,000 soldiers.[7]Indian troops were in no position for battle, as Yumtso La was 16,000 feet (4,900 m) above sea level and Kaul did not plan on having artillery support for the troops.[36] The Chinese troops opened fire on the Indians under their belief that they were north of the McMahon Line. The Indians were surrounded by Chinese positions which used mortar fire. However, they managed to hold off the first Chinese assault, inflicting heavy casualties.[7]

At this point, the Indian troops were in a position to push the Chinese back with mortar and machine gun fire. However, Brigadier Dalvi opted not to fire, as it would mean decimating the Rajput who were still in the area of the Chinese regrouping. They helplessly watched the Chinese ready themselves for a second assault.[36] In the second Chinese assault, the Indians began their retreat, realising the situation was hopeless. The Indian patrol suffered 25 casualties, and the Chinese 33. The Chinese troops held their fire as the Indians retreated, and then buried the Indian dead with military honours, as witnessed by the retreating soldiers. This was the first occurrence of heavy fighting in the war.[7]

This attack had grave implications for India and Nehru tried to solve the issue, but by 18 October, it was clear that the Chinese were preparing for an attack on India, with massive troop buildups on the border.[7] A long line of mules and porters had also been observed supporting the buildup and reinforcement of positions south of the Thag La Ridge.[36]

Chinese and Indian preparations

Motives

Two of the major factors leading up to China's eventual conflicts with Indian troops were India's stance on the disputed borders and perceived Indian subversion in Tibet. There was "a perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian efforts to undermine Chinese control of Tibet, Indian efforts which were perceived as having the objective of restoring the pre-1949 status quo ante of Tibet". The other was "a perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian aggression against Chinese territory along the border". John W. Garver argues that the first perception was incorrect based on the state of the Indian military and polity in the 1960s. It was, nevertheless a major reason for China's going to war. However, he argues the Chinese perception of Indian aggression to be "substantially accurate".[2]

The CIA's recently declassified POLO documents reveal contemporary American analysis of Chinese motives during the war. According to this document, "Chinese apparently were motivated to attack by one primary consideration — their determination to retain the ground on which PLA forces stood in 1962 and to punish the Indians for trying to take that ground".[25]

Another factor which might have affected China's decision for war with India was a perceived need to stop a Soviet-U.S.-India encirclement and isolation of China.[2] India's relations with the Soviet Union and United States were both strong at this time, but the Soviets (and Americans) were preoccupied by the Cuban Missile Crisis and would not interfere with the Sino-Indian War.[7] Regarding why China waited till October of the year to launch the attack, P. B. Sinha suggests that China timed the war exactly in parallel with American actions so as to avoid any chance of American or Soviet involvement. Although American buildup of forces around Cuba occurred on the same day as the first major clash at Dhola, and China's buildup between 10 and 20 October appeared to coincide exactly with the United States establishment of a blockade against Cuba which began 20 October, the Chinese probably prepared for this before they could anticipate what would happen in Cuba.[23] Another explanation is that the confrontation in the Taiwan Strait has eased by then.

Garver argues that the Chinese correctly assessed Indian border policies, particularly the Forward Policy, as attempts for incremental seizure of Chinese-controlled territory. On Tibet, Garver argues that one of the major factors leading to China's decision for war with India was a common tendency of humans "to attribute others behavior to interior motivations, while attributing their own behavior to situational factors". Studies from China published in the 1990s confirmed that the root cause for China going to war with India was the perceived Indian aggression in Tibet, with the forward policy simply catalysing the Chinese reaction.[2]

Neville Maxwell and Allen Whiting argue that the Chinese leadership believed they were defending territory they believed to be legitimately Chinese, and which was already under de facto Chinese occupation prior to Indian advances, and regarded the Forward Policy as an Indian attempt at creeping annexation.[2] Mao Zedong himself compared the Forward Policy to a strategic advance in Chinese chess:

Their [India's] continually pushing forward is like crossing the Chu Han boundary. What should we do? We can also set out a few pawns, on our side of the river. If they don't then cross over, that's great. If they do cross, we'll eat them up [chess metaphor meaning to take the opponent's pieces]. Of course, we cannot blindly eat them. Lack of forbearance in small matters upsets great plans. We must pay attention to the situation.[2]

India claims that the motive for the Forward Policy was to cut off the supply routes for Chinese troops posted in NEFA and Aksai Chin.[7]According to the official Indian history, the forward policy was continued because of its initial success, as it claimed that Chinese troops withdrew when they encountered areas already occupied by Indian troops. It also claimed that the Forward Policy was having success in cutting out supply lines of Chinese troops who had advanced South of the McMahon Line, though there was no evidence of such advance before the 1962 war. However, the Forward Policy rested on the assumption that Chinese forces "were not likely to use force against any of our posts, even if they were in a position to do so". No serious re-appraisal of this policy took place even when Chinese forces ceased withdrawing.[23] Nehru's confidence was probably justified given the difficulty for China to supply the area over the high altitude terrain over 5000 km from the more populated areas of China.

The Chinese leadership initially held a sympathetic view towards India as the latter had been ruled by British colonial masters for centuries. However, Nehru's forward policy convinced PRC leadership that the independent Indian leadership was a reincarnation of British imperialism. Mao Zedong stated: "Rather than being constantly accused of aggression, it's better to show the world what really happens when China indeed moves its muscles."

By early 1962, the Chinese leadership began to fear that India's intentions were to launch a massive attack against Chinese troops, and that the Indian leadership wanted a war.[7][2] In 1961, the Indian army had been sent into Goa, a small region without any other international borders apart from the Indian one, after Portugal refused to surrender the exclave colony to the Indian Union. Although this action met little to no international protest or opposition, China saw it as an example of India's expansionist nature, especially in light of heated rhetoric from Indian politicians. India's Home Minister declared, "If the Chinese will not vacate the areas occupied by it, India will have to repeat what she did in Goa. India will certainly drive out the Chinese forces",[7] while another member of the Indian Congress Party pronounced, "India will take steps to end [Chinese] aggression on Indian soil just as she ended Portuguese aggression in Goa".[17] By mid-1962, it was apparent to the Chinese leadership that negotiations had failed to make any progress, and the Forward Policy was increasingly perceived as a grave threat as Delhi increasingly sent probes deeper into border areas and cut off Chinese supply lines.[17] Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi commented at one high-level meeting, "Nehru's forward policy is a knife. He wants to put it in our heart. We cannot close our eyes and await death."[2]The Chinese leadership believed that their restraint on the issue was being perceived by India as weakness, leading to continued provocations, and that a major counterblow was needed to stop perceived Indian aggression.[2]

Xu Yan, prominent Chinese military historian and professor at the PLA's National Defense University, gives an account of the Chinese leadership's decision to go to war. By late September 1962, the Chinese leadership had begun to reconsider their policy of "armed coexistence", which had failed to address their concerns with the forward policy and Tibet, and consider a large, decisive strike.[2] On 22 September 1962, the People's Daily published an article which claimed that "the Chinese people were burning with 'great indignation' over the Indian actions on the border and that New Delhi could not 'now say that warning was not served in advance'."[37][38]

Military planning

The Indian side was confident war would not be triggered and made little preparations. India had only two divisions of troops in the region of the conflict.[39] In August 1962, Brigadier D. K. Palit claimed that a war with China in the near future could be ruled out.[39] Even in September 1962, when Indian troops were ordered to "expel the Chinese" from Thag La, Maj. General J. S. Dhillon expressed the opinion that "experience in Ladakh had shown that a few rounds fired at the Chinese would cause them to run away."[2][23] Because of this, the Indian army was completely unprepared when the attack at Yumtso La occurred.[7][39]

Recently declassified CIA documents which were compiled at the time reveal that India's estimates of Chinese capabilities made them neglect their military in favour of economic growth.[40] It is claimed that if a more military-minded man had been in place instead of Nehru, India would have been more likely to have been ready for the threat of a counter-attack from China.[40]

On 6 October 1962, the Chinese leadership convened. Lin Biao reported that PLA intelligence units had determined that Indian units might assault Chinese positions at Thag La on 10 October (Operation Leghorn). The Chinese leadership and the Central Military Council decided upon war to launch a large-scale attack to punish perceived military aggression from India.[2] In Beijing, a larger meeting of Chinese military was convened in order to plan for the coming conflict.[2]

Mao and the Chinese leadership issued a directive laying out the objectives for the war. A main assault would be launched in the eastern sector, which would be coordinated with a smaller assault in the western sector. All Indian troops within China's claimed territories in the eastern sector would be expelled, and the war would be ended with a unilateral Chinese ceasefire and withdrawal to prewar positions, followed by a return to the negotiating table.[2] India led the Non-Aligned Movement, Nehru enjoyed international prestige, and China, with a larger military, would be portrayed as an aggressor. However, he said that a well-fought war "will guarantee at least thirty years of peace" with India, and determined the benefits to offset the costs.[2]

On 8 October, additional veteran and elite divisions were ordered to prepare to move into Tibet from the Chengdu and Lanzhou military regions.[2]

On 12 October, Nehru declared that he had ordered the Indian army to "clear Indian territory in the NEFA of Chinese invaders" and personally met with Kaul, issuing instructions to him.

On 14 October, an editorial on People's Daily issued China's final warning to India: "So it seems that Mr. Nehru has made up his mind to attack the Chinese frontier guards on an even bigger scale....It is high time to shout to Mr. Nehru that the heroic Chinese troops, with the glorious tradition of resisting foreign aggression, can never be cleared by anyone from their own territory... If there are still some maniacs who are reckless enough to ignore our well-intentioned advice and insist on having another try, well, let them do so. History will pronounce its inexorable verdict... At this critical moment...we still want to appeal once more to Mr. Nehru: better rein in at the edge of the precipice and do not use the lives of Indian troops as stakes in your gamble." [38]

Marshal Liu Bocheng headed a group to determine the strategy for the war. He concluded that the opposing Indian troops were among India's best, and to achieve victory would require deploying crack troops and relying on force concentration to achieve decisive victory. On 16 October, this war plan was approved, and on the 18th, the final approval was given by the Politburo for a "self-defensive counter-attack", scheduled for 20 October.[2]

Chinese offensive

On 20 October 1962, the Chinese People's Liberation Army launched two attacks, 1000 kilometres apart. In the western theatre, the PLA sought to expel Indian forces from the Chip Chap valley in Aksai Chin while in the eastern theatre, the PLA sought to capture both banks of the Namka Chu river. Some skirmishes also took place at the Nathula Pass, which is in the Indian state of Sikkim (an Indian protectorate at that time). Gurkha rifles travelling north were targeted by Chinese artillery fire. After four days of fierce fighting, the three regiments of Chinese troops succeeded in securing a substantial portion of the disputed territory.[7]

Eastern theatre

Chinese troops launched an attack on the southern banks of the Namka Chu River on 20 October.[36] The Indian forces were undermanned, with only an understrength battalion to support them, while the Chinese troops had three regiments positioned on the north side of the river.[36] The Indians expected Chinese forces to cross via one of five bridges over the river and defended those crossings.[7] However, the PLA bypassed the defenders by crossing the shallow October river instead. They formed up into battalions on the Indian-held south side of the river under cover of darkness, with each battalion assigned against a separate group of Rajputs.[36]

At 5:14 am, Chinese mortar fire began attacking the Indian positions. Simultaneously, the Chinese cut the Indian telephone lines, preventing the defenders from making contact with their headquarters. At about 6:30 am, the Chinese infantry launched a surprise attack from the rear and forced the Indians to leave their trenches.[36]

The Chinese troops overwhelmed the Indians in a series of flanking manoeuvres south of the McMahon Line and prompted their withdrawal from Namka Chu.[36] Fearful of continued losses, Indian troops escaped into Bhutan. Chinese forces respected the border and did not pursue.[7] Chinese forces now held all of the territory that was under dispute at the time of the Thag La confrontation, but they continued to advance into the rest of NEFA.[36]

On 22 October, at 12:15 am, PLA mortars fired on Walong, on the McMahon line.[41] Flares launched by Indian troops the next day revealed numerous Chinese milling around the valley.[41] The Indians tried to use their mortars against the Chinese but the PLA responded by lighting a bushfire, causing confusion amongst the Indians. Some 400 Chinese troops attacked the Indian position. The initial Chinese assault was halted by accurate Indian mortar fire. The Chinese were then reinforced and launched a second assault. The Indians managed to hold them back for four hours, but the Chinese used sheer weight of numbers to break through. Most Indian forces to withdraw to established positions in Walong, while a company supported by mortars and medium machine guns remained to cover the retreat.[41]

On the morning 23 October, the Indians discovered a Chinese force gathered in a cramped pass and opened fire with mortars and machine guns, leading to heavy fighting. About 200 Chinese soldiers were killed and wounded in this action. Nine Indian soldiers were also killed. The fighting continued well into the afternoon, until the company was ordered to withdraw. Meanwhile, the 4th Sikhs made contact with the Chinese and subjected them to withering mortar and machine gun fire as the Chinese set off a brushfire and attempted to sneak forward. Sepoy Piara Singh tried to douse the fire while fighting the enemy, but died after he was wounded and refused to be evacuated.

Elsewhere, Chinese troops were launched a three-pronged attack on Tawang, which the Indians evacuated without any resistance.[7]

Over the following days, there were clashes between Indian and Chinese patrols at Walong as the Chinese rushed in reinforcements. On 25 October, the Chinese made a probe, which was met with resistance from the 4th Sikhs. As some Chinese soldiers began to close in, Sepoy Kewal Singh charged them with his bayonet and killed a few of them in hand-to-hand combat, but he himself was killed. The following day, a patrol from the 4th Sikhs was encircled, and after being unable to break the encirclement, an Indian unit sneaked in and attacked the Chinese flank, allowing the Sikhs to break free.[41]

Western theatre

The disputed areas in the western sector

On the Aksai Chin front, China already controlled most of the disputed territory. Chinese forces quickly swept the region of any remaining Indian troops.[42] Late on 19 October, Chinese troops launched a number of attacks throughout the western theatre.[8] By 22 October, all posts north of Chushul had been cleared.[8]

On 20 October, the Chinese easily took the Chip Chap Valley, Galwan Valley, and Pangong Lake.[43] Many outposts and garrisons along the Western front were unable to defend against the surrounding Chinese troops. Most Indian troops positioned in these posts offered resistance but were either killed or taken prisoner. Indian support for these outposts was not forthcoming, as evidenced by the Galwan post, which had been surrounded by enemy forces in August, but no attempt made to relieve the besieged garrison. Following the 20 October attack, nothing was heard from Galwan.[7]

On 24 October, Indian forces fought hard hold the Rezang La Ridge, in order to prevent a nearby airstrip from falling to the Chinese .[44]

After realising the magnitude of the attack, the Indian Western Command withdrew many of the isolated outposts to the south-east. Daulet Beg Oldi was also evacuated, but it was south of the Chinese claim line and was not approached by Chinese forces. Indian troops were withdrawn in order to consolidate and regroup in the event that China probed south of their claim line.[7]

Lull in the fighting

By 24 October, the PLA had entered territory previously administered by India to give the PRC a diplomatically strong position over India. The majority of Chinese forces had advanced sixteen kilometres south of the control line prior to the conflict. Four days of fighting were followed by a three-week lull. Zhou ordered the troops to stop advancing as he attempted to negotiate with Nehru. The Indian forces had retreated into more heavily fortified positions around Se La and Bombdi La which would be difficult to assault.[7] Zhou sent Nehru a letter, proposing

  1. A negotiated settlement of the boundary
  2. That both sides disengage and withdraw twenty kilometres from present lines of actual control
  3. A Chinese withdrawal north in NEFA
  4. That China and India not cross lines of present control in Aksai Chin.[7]

Nehru's 27 October reply expressed interest in the restoration of peace and friendly relations and suggested a return to the "boundary prior to 8 September 1962". He was categorically concerned about a mutual twenty kilometre withdrawal after "40 or 60 kilometres of blatant military aggression". He wanted the creation of a larger immediate buffer zone and thus resist the possibility of a repeat offensive. Zhou's 4 November reply repeated his 1959 offer to return to the McMahon Line in NEFA and the Chinese traditionally claimed MacDonald Line in Aksai Chin. Facing Chinese forces maintaining themselves on Indian soil and trying to avoid political pressure, the Indian parliament announced a national emergency and passed a resolution which stated their intent to "drive out the aggressors from the sacred soil of India". The United States and the United Kingdom supported India's response, however the Soviet Union was preoccupied with the Cuban Missile Crisis and did not offer the support it had provided in previous years. With the backing of other great powers, a 14 November letter by Nehru to Zhou once again rejected his proposal.[7]

Neither side declared war, used their air force, or fully broke off diplomatic relations; however, the conflict is commonly referred to as a war. This war coincided with the Cuban Missile Crisis and was viewed by the western nations at the time as another act of aggression by the Communist bloc.[7][45] According to Calvin, the Chinese side evidently wanted a diplomatic resolution and discontinuation of the conflict.[7]

Continuation of war

After Zhou received Nehru's letter (rejecting Zhou's proposal), the fighting resumed on the eastern theatre on 14 November (Nehru's birthday), with an Indian attack on Walong, claimed by China, launched from the defensive position of Se La and inflicting heavy casualties on the Chinese. The Chinese resumed military activity on Aksai Chin and NEFA hours after the Walong battle.[7]

Eastern theatre

On the eastern theatre, the PLA attacked Indian forces near Se La and Bomdi La on 17 November. These positions were defended by theIndian 4th Infantry Division. Instead of attacking by road as expected, PLA forces approached via a mountain trail, and their attack cut off a main road and isolated 10,000 Indian troops.

Se La occupied high ground, and rather than assault this commanding position, the Chinese captured Thembang, which was a supply route to Se La.[7]

Western theatre

On the western theatre, PLA forces launched a heavy infantry attack on 18 November near Chushul. Their attack started at 4:35 am, despite a mist surrounding most of the areas in the region. At 5:45 the Chinese troops advanced to attack 2 platoons of Indian troops at Gurung Hill.

The Indians did not know what was happening, as communications were dead. As a patrol was sent, China attacked with greater numbers. Indian artillery could not hold off against superior Chinese forces. By 9:00 am, Chinese forces attacked Gurung Hill directly and Indian commanders withdrew from the area.[8]

The Chinese had been simultaneously attacking Rezang La which was held by 123 Indian troops. At 5:05 am, Chinese troops launched their attack audaciously. Chinese medium machine gun fire pierced through the Indian tactical defences.[8]

At 6:55 am the sun rose and the Chinese attack on the 8th platoon began in waves. Fighting continued for the next hour, until the Chinese signaled that they had destroyed the 7th platoon. Indians tried to use light machine guns on the medium machine guns from the Chinese but after 10 minutes the battle was over.[8] Logistical inadequacy once again hurt the Indian troops.[46] The Chinese gave the Indian troops a respectful military funeral.[46] The battles also saw the death of Major Shaitan Singh of the Kumaon Regiment, who had been instrumental in the first battle of Rezang La.[46] Over 1,000 Chinese soldiers were killed or wounded. Out of the 123 Indian defenders, 109 were killed and 9 of the survivors were severely injured.[47] The Indian troops were forced to withdraw to high mountain positions. Indian sources believed that their troops were just coming to grips with the mountain combat and finally called for more troops. However, the Chinese declared a ceasefire, ending the bloodshed.[8]

Indians suffered heavy casualties, with dead Indian troops' bodies being found in the ice, frozen with weapons in hand. Chinese forces also suffered heavy casualties, especially at Rezang La. This signalled the end of the war in Aksai Chin as China had reached their claim line – many Indian troops were ordered to withdraw from the area. China claimed that the Indian troops wanted to fight on until the bitter end. However, the war ended with their withdrawal, so as to limit the amount of casualties.[7]

The PLA penetrated close to the outskirts of Tezpur, Assam, a major frontier town nearly fifty kilometres from the Assam-North-East Frontier Agency border.[16] The local government ordered the evacuation of the civilians in Tezpur to the south of the Brahmaputra River, all prisons were thrown open, and government officials who stayed behind destroyed Tezpur's currency reserves in anticipation of a Chinese advance.[23]

Ceasefire

China had reached its claim lines so the PLA did not advance farther, and on 19 November it declared a unilateral cease-fire. Zhou Enlai declared a unilateral ceasefire to start on midnight, 21 November. Zhou's ceasefire declaration stated,

Beginning from 21 November 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will cease fire along the entire Sino-Indian border. Beginning from 1 December 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw to positions 20 kilometres behind the line of actual control which existed between China and India on 7 November 1959. In the eastern sector, although the Chinese frontier guards have so far been fighting on Chinese territory north of the traditional customary line, they are prepared to withdraw from their present positions to the north of the illegal McMahon Line, and to withdraw twenty kilometres back from that line. In the middle and western sectors, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw twenty kilometres from the line of actual control.

Zhou had first given the ceasefire announcement to Indian chargé d'affaires on 19 November, (before India's request for United States air support) but New Delhi did not receive it until 24 hours later. The aircraft carrier was ordered back after the ceasefire and thus American intervention on India's side in the war was avoided. Retreating Indian troops, who hadn't come into contact with anyone knowing of the ceasefire, and Chinese troops in NEFA and Aksai Chin, were involved in some minor battles[7] but for the most part the ceasefire signalled an end to the fighting. The United States Air Force flew in supplies to India in November 1962, but neither side wished to continue hostilities.

Toward the end of the war India increased her support for Tibetan refugees and revolutionaries, some of them having settled in India, as they were fighting the same common enemy in the region. The Nehru administration ordered the raising of an elite Indian-trained "Tibetan Armed Force" composed of Tibetan refugees.[48] The CIA had already begun operations in bringing about change in Tibet.

World opinion

The Chinese military action has been viewed by the United States as part of the PRC's policy of making use of aggressive wars to settle its border disputes and to distract from its internal issues.[49] According to James Calvin from the United States Marine Corps, western nations at the time viewed China as an aggressor during the China-India border war, and the war was part of a monolithic communist objective for a world dictatorship of the proletariat. This was further triggered by Mao Zedong's views that: "The way to world conquest lies through Havana,Accra, and Calcutta". Calvin believes that Chinese actions show a "pattern of conservative aims and limited objectives, rather than expansionism" and blames this particular conflict on India's provocations towards China. However, Calvin also expresses that China, in the past, has been adamant to gain control over regions to which it has a "traditional claim", which triggered the dispute over NEFA and Aksai Chin and indeed Tibet. Calvin's assumption, based on the history of the Cold War and the Domino Effect, assumed that China might ultimately try to regain control of everything that it considers as "traditionally Chinese" which in its view includes the entirety of South East Asia.[7]

The Kennedy administration was disturbed by what they considered "blatant Chinese communist aggression against India". In a May 1963National Security Council meeting, contingency planning on the part of the United States in the event of another Chinese attack on India was discussed. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor advised the president to use nuclear weapons should the Americans intervene in such a situation. Kennedy insisted that Washington defend India as it would any ally, saying, "We should defend India, and therefore we will defend India".[50] The Johnson Administration considered and then rejected giving nuclear weapons technology to the Indians.

The non-aligned nations, perhaps unsurprisingly, remained non-aligned, and only the United Arab Republic openly supported India.[51] Of the non-aligned nations, six, EgyptBurmaCambodiaSri LankaGhana and Indonesia, met in Colombo on 10 December 1962.[52] The proposals stipulated a Chinese withdrawal of 20 km from the customary lines without any reciprocal withdrawal on India's behalf.[52] The failure of these six nations to unequivocally condemn China deeply disappointed India.[51]

In 1972, Chinese Premier Zhou explained the Chinese point of view to President Nixon of the US. As for the causes of the war, Zhou asserted that China did not try to expel Indian troops from south of the McMahon line and that three open warning telegrams were sent to Nehru before the war. However, Indian patrols south of the McMahon line were expelled and suffered casualties in the Chinese attack.[53] Zhou also told Nixon that Chairman Mao ordered the troops to return to show good faith.[54] The Indian government maintains that the Chinese military could not advance further south due to logistical problems and the cut-off of resource supplies.

While Western nations did not view Chinese actions favourably because of fear of the Chinese and competitiveness,[7] Pakistan, which had had a turbulent relationship with India ever since the Indian partition, improved its relations with China after the war.[55] Prior to the war, Pakistan also shared a disputed boundary with China, and had proposed to India that the two countries adopt a common defence against "northern" enemies (i.e. China), which was rejected by India.[23] However, China and Pakistan took steps to peacefully negotiate their shared boundaries, beginning on 13 October 1962, and concluding in December of that year.[16] Pakistan also expressed fear that the huge amounts of western military aid directed to India would allow it to threaten Pakistan's security in future conflicts. Mohammed Ali, External Affairs Minister of Pakistan, declared that massive Western aid to India in the Sino-Indian dispute would be considered an unfriendly act towards Pakistan. As a result Pakistan made efforts to improve its relations with China. The following year, China and Pakistan peacefully settled disputes on their shared border, and negotiated the China-Pakistan Border Treaty in 1963, as well as trade, commercial, and barter treaties.[55] On 2 March 1963, Pakistan conceded its northern claim line in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir to China in favor of a more southerly boundary along the Karakoram Range.[16][52][55] The border treaty largely set the border along the MacCartney-Macdonald Line.[12] India's military failure against China would embolden Pakistan to initiate the Second Kashmir War with India. However, it effectively ended in a stalemate as Calvin states that the Sino-Indian War had caused the previously passive government to take a stand on actively modernising India's military.[7] China offered diplomatic support to Pakistan in this war but did not offer military support.[52] In January 1966, China condemned the Tashkent Agreement between India and Pakistan as a Soviet-US plot in the region.[52] In the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, Pakistan expected China to provide military support, but it was left alone as India successfully helped the rebels in East Pakistan to found the new nation-state of Bangladesh.[56]

Involvement of other nations

During the conflict, Nehru wrote two desperate letters to JFK, requesting 12 squadrons of fighter jets. These jets were necessary to beef up Indian air strength so that an air war could be initiated safely from the Indian perspective. This request was rejected. According to former Indian diplomat G Parthasarathy, "only after we got nothing from the US did arms supplies from the Soviet Union to India commence." [57] In 1962, President of Pakistan Ayub Khan made clear to India that Indian troops could safely be transferred from the Pakistan frontier to the Himalayas.[58]

Aftermath

China

According to the China's official military history, the war achieved China's policy objectives of securing borders in its western sector, as China retained de facto control of the Aksai Chin. After the war, India abandoned the Forward Policy, and the de facto borders stabilised along theLine of Actual Control.

According to James Calvin, even though China won a military victory it lost in terms of its international image. Western nations, especially the United States, were already suspicious of Chinese attitudes, motives and actions. These nations saw China's goals as world conquest and clearly viewed China as the aggressor in the Border War.[7] China's first nuclear weapon test in October 1964 and her support of Pakistan in the 1965 India Pakistan War tended to confirm the American view of communist world objectives, including Chinese influence over Pakistan.[7]

Lora Saalman opined in a study of Chinese military publications, that while the war led to much blame, debates and ultimately acted as causation of military modernization of India but the war is now treated as basic reportage of facts with relatively diminished interest by Chinese analysts.[59]

India

The aftermath of the war saw sweeping changes in the Indian military to prepare it for similar conflicts in the future, and placed pressure on Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who was seen as responsible for failing to anticipate the Chinese attack on India. Indians reacted with a surge in patriotism and memorials were erected for many of the Indian troops who died in the war. Arguably, the main lesson India learned from the war was the need to strengthen its own defences and a shift from Nehru's foreign policy with China based on his stated concept of "brotherhood". Because of India's inability to anticipate Chinese aggression, Prime Minister Nehru faced harsh criticism from government officials, for having promoted pacifist relations with China.[16] Indian President Radhakrishnan said that Nehru's government was crude and negligent about preparations. Nehru admitted that Indians had been living in a world of own understanding. The Indian politicians spent considerable efforts on removing Defence Minister Krishna Menon for losing complete focus on pushing back the invaders. The Indian army was divided because of Krishna Menon's playing favorites, and overall 1962 war was seen as a combination of a military debacle and as bad a political disaster by Indians. Under American advice (by American envoy John Kenneth Galbraith who made and ran American policy on the war as all other top policy makers in USA were absorbed in coincident Cuban Missile Crisis[60]) Indians refrained, not according to the best choices available, from using the Indian air force to beat back the Chinese advances. The CIA later revealed that at that time the Chinese had neither the fuel nor runways long enough for using their air force effectively in Tibet.[34] Indians in general became highly sceptical of China and its military. Many Indians view the war as a betrayal of India's attempts at establishing a long-standing peace with China and started to question Nehru's usage of the term "Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai" (meaning "Indians and Chinese are brothers"). The war also put an end to Nehru's earlier hopes that India and China would form a strong Asian Axis to counteract the increasing influence of the Cold War bloc superpowers.[2]

The unpreparedness of the army was blamed on Defence Minister Menon, who resigned his government post to allow for someone who might modernise India's military further. India's policy of weaponisation via indigenous sources and self-sufficiency was thus cemented. Sensing a weakened army, Pakistan, a close ally of China, began a policy of provocation against India by infiltrating Jammu and Kashmir and ultimately triggering the Second Kashmir War with India in 1965 and Indo-Pakistani war of 1971. Attack of 1965 was successfully stopped and ceasefire was negotiated under international pressure [61]. In Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 India won a clear victory, resulting in liberation of Bangladesh (formerly East-Pakistan).[62][63]

In 1967, there was a short border skirmish known as the Chola Incident between Chinese and Indian soldiers. In this incident 8 Chinese soldiers and 4 Indian soldiers were killed.[64]

British journalist Neville Maxwell, who was known for his pessimistic views on India [65][66][67] wrote that the "hopelessly ill-prepared Indian Army that provoked China on orders emanating from Delhi … paid the price for its misadventure in men, money and national humiliation".[68]As a result of the war, the Indian government commissioned an investigation, resulting in the classified Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat Report on the causes of the war and the reasons for failure. India's performance in high-altitude combat in 1962 led to an overhaul of the Indian Army in terms of doctrine, training, organisation and equipment. Maxwell also claimed that the Indian role in international affairs after the border war was also greatly reduced after the war and India's standing in the non-aligned movement suffered.[16]

According to James Calvin, an analyst from the U.S. Navy, India gained many benefits from the 1962 conflict. This war united the country as never before. India got 32,000 square miles (8.3 million hectares, 83,000sq.km.) of disputed territory even if she felt that NEFA was hers all along. The new Indian republic had avoided international alignments; by asking for help during the war, India demonstrated her willingness to accept military aid from several sectors. And, finally, India recognised the serious weaknesses in her army. She would more than double her military manpower in the next two years and she would work hard to resolve the military's training and logistic problems to later become the third-largest army in the world. India's efforts to improve her military posture significantly enhanced her army's capabilities and preparedness.[7] This played a role in subsequent wars against Pakistan.

Later skirmishes

India also reported a series of skirmishes after the 1962 war, which were never confirmed by China. One report provided by India shows that in late 1967, there were two skirmishes between Indian and Chinese forces in Sikkim. The first one was dubbed the "Nathu La incident", and the other the "Chola incident". Prior to these incidents had been the Naxalbari uprising in India by the Communist Naxalites and Maoists.[69]

Diplomatic process

In 1993 and 1996, the two sides signed the Sino-Indian Bilateral Peace and Tranquility Accords, agreements to maintain peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LoAC). Ten meetings of a Sino-Indian Joint Working Group (SIJWG) and five of an expert group have taken place to determine where the LoAC lies, but little progress has occurred.

On 20 November 2006 Indian politicians from Arunachal Pradesh expressed their concern over Chinese military modernization and appealed to parliament to take a harder stance on the PRC following a military buildup on the border similar to that in 1962.[70] Additionally, China's military aid to Pakistan as well is a matter of concern to the Indian public,[39] as two sides have engaged in various wars.

On 6 July 2006, the historic Silk Road passing through this territory via the Nathu La pass was reopened. Both sides have agreed to resolve the issues by peaceful means.

In Oct 2011, it was stated that India and China will formulate a border mechanism to handle different perceptions as to the LAC and resume the bilateral army exercises between Indian and Chinese army from early 2012.[71][72]

In Popular Culture

See also

Further reading

  • Calvin, James Barnard (April 1984). "The China-India Border War". GlobalSecurity.org. Retrieved 2006-06-14.
  • Lamb, Alastair (1964). The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries. L. Oxford University Press.
  • Neville Maxwell's India's China WarPantheon Books, USA, 1971
  • Gunnar MyrdalAsian Drama; An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. New York: Random House, 1968
  • History of the Conflict with China, 1962. P.B. Sinha, A.A. Athale, with S.N. Prasad, chief editor, History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1992. — Official Indian history of the Sino-Indian War.
  • Allen S. Whiting. The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina.
  • The Sino-Indian Boundary Question [Enlarged Edition], Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1962

References

  1. ^ Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English language: Chronology of Major Dates in History, page 1686. Dilithium Press Ltd., 1989
  2. a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z China's Decision for War with India in 1962 by John W. Garver
  3. ^ H.A.S.C. by United States. Congress. House Committee on Armed Services — 1999, p. 62
  4. ^ War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Tibet by Eric S. Margolis, p. 234.
  5. a b c d e f The US Army [1] says Indian wounded were 1,047 and attributes it to Indian Defence Ministry's 1965 report, but this report also included a lower estimate of killed.
  6. ^ Mark A. Ryan; David Michael Finkelstein; Michael A. McDevitt (2003). Chinese warfighting: The PLA experience since 1949. M.E. Sharpe. pp. 188–. ISBN 9780765610874. Retrieved 14 April 2011.
  7. a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah aiaj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az ba bb bc Calvin, James Barnard (April 1984). "The China-India Border War". Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Retrieved 2011-10-15.
  8. a b c d e f g h Battle of Chushul
  9. ^ The Sino-Indian Border Disputes, by Alfred P. Rubin, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1. (Jan., 1960), pp. 96–125.
  10. ^ Maxwell, Neville (9 September 2006). "Settlements and Disputes: China's Approach to Territorial Issues" (PDF). Economic and Political Weekly 41 (36): 3876. Archived from the original on 2006-10-01. Retrieved 2006-09-29.
  11. a b c d e f g h i j k l Mohan Guruswamy, Mohan, "The Great India-China Game", Rediff, June 23, 2003.
  12. a b c d e f Noorani, A.G. (30 August-12 September 2003). "Fact of History"Frontline (Madras: The Hindu group) 26 (18). Retrieved 24 August 2011
  13. ^ Younghusband, Francis E. (1896). The Heart of a Continent. John Murray, London. Facsimile reprint: (2005) Elbiron Classics, pp. 223-224.
  14. ^ Grenard, Fernand (1904). Tibet: The Country and its Inhabitants. Fernand Grenard. Translated by A. Teixeira de Mattos. Originally published by Hutchison and Co., London. 1904. Reprint: Cosmo Publications. Delhi. 1974, pp. 28-30.
  15. a b China and India: The Un-Negotiated Dispute. Neville Maxwell. The China Quarterly, No. 43. (Jul. – Sep., 1970), pp. 47–80.
  16. a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t Maxwell, Neville (1970). India's China War. New York: Pantheon. Retrieved 17 October 2011.
  17. a b c d George W. Patterson, Peking Versus Delhi, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963
  18. ^ Patterson, p. 275.
  19. a b c VK Singh resolving the boundary dispute
  20. ^ The Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute, Foreign Language Press of the People's Republic of China, 1961
  21. ^ GUPTA, Karunakar, "The McMahon Line 1911–45: The British Legacy", The China Quarterly, No. 47. (Jul. – Sep., 1971), pp. 521–45.
  22. ^ Free Tibet Campaign, "Tibet Facts No.17: British Relations with Tibet".
  23. a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q History of the Conflict with China, 1962. P.B. Sinha, A.A. Athale, with S.N. Prasad, chief editor, History Division, Ministry of Defence, Govt. of India, 1992.
  24. a b c A.G. Noorani, "Perseverance in peace process", India's National Magazine, 29 August 2003.
  25. a b c Chinese deception and Nehru's naivete led to 62 WarTimes of India
  26. a b c India's Forward Policy, Review author[s]: A. G. Noorani, The China Quarterly © 1970 School of Oriental and African Studies
  27. ^ "The Shade of the Big BanyanTime, Dec. 14, 1959.
  28. a b Maxwell, Neville (April 2001). "Henderson Brooks Report: An Introduction". stratmag.com. Retrieved 2006-08-18.
  29. ^ Gregory Clark, "Remembering a War — The 1962 India-China Conflict", Rediff
  30. ^ Chang, Jung and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (2006), pp. 568, 579.
  31. a b c "Military Nonsense"
  32. a b CIA Journals 1962 India-China War and Kargil 1999: Restrictions on Air Power by R. Sukumaran
  33. ^ Patterson, p. 279
  34. a b http://www.indianexpress.com/news/ghosts-of-black-november/394274/0
  35. ^ JOSHI Manoj, "Line of Defence", Times of India, 21 October 2000
  36. a b c d e f g h i j k l Battle of Namka Chu
  37. ^ People's Daily, 22 September 1962 issue, pp. 1
  38. a b http://www.foia.cia.gov/CPE/POLO/polo-09.pdf
  39. a b c d Swaminathan South Asia Analysis Group Lessons of 1962: A stock taking after 40 years.
  40. a b China feared military coup in India during 60s DNA India
  41. a b c d The Battle of Walong
  42. ^ eg. Chip Chap Valley, Pangong
  43. ^ Burkitt, Laurie; Scobell, Andrew; Wortzel, Larry M. (July 2003).THE LESSONS OF HISTORY: THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY AT 75Strategic Studies Institute. pp. 340–341. ISBN 1-58487-126-1.
  44. ^ Men of Steel on Icy Heights Mohan Guruswamy Deccan Chronicle.
  45. ^ Goldman, Jerry; Stein, Giel (October 1997). "The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 18–29 1962". hpol.org. Retrieved 2006-08-18.
  46. a b c YADAV, Atul, Injustice to the Ahir Martyrs of the 1962 War.The Tribune. 18 November 1999
  47. ^ Shaitan_singh encyclopedia topics. Reference.com. Retrieved on 2011-04-14.
  48. ^ Chushi Gangdruk "Chushi Gangdruk: History", ChushiGangdruk.Org
  49. ^ Abstract of "Fighting to Make a Point: Policy-Making by Aggressive War on the Chinese Borders" by Jr Pettis Roy C. — National War College
  50. ^ [2] — Taipei Times,[3] Indian American Center for Political Awareness
  51. a b "India: A Year of Stability and Change". Ralph J. Retzlaff. Asian Survey, Vol. 3, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1962: Part II. (Feb., 1963), pp. 96–106.
  52. a b c d e Rediff Indo-China timeline
  53. ^ "China", "Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XVII, p. 722", October 1971 – February 1972 (Declassified)
  54. ^ "China", "Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XVII, p. 723", October 1971 – February 1972 (Declassified)
  55. a b c Dobell, W. M. (Autumn 1964). "Ramifications of the China-Pakistan Border Treaty". Pacific Affairs 37 (3): 283–95.doi:10.2307/2754976JSTOR 2754976.
  56. ^ The Men Behind Yahya in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 by Stephen R. Shalom, professor of Political Science
  57. ^ "Jawaharlal Nehru pleaded for US help against China in 1962"The Times Of India. 16 November 2010.
  58. ^ "Asia: Ending the Suspense"Time. 17 September 1965.
  59. ^ Saalman, Lora (Spring/Summer 2011). Divergence, Similarity and Symmetry in Sino-Indian Threat Perceptions64Journal of International Affairs. p. 125.
  60. ^ http://www.indianexpress.com/news/whoever-has-seen-aksai-chin-as-i-have-would-want-someone-else-to-have-it/3634/0
  61. ^ Indo-Pakistan War of 1965
  62. ^ http://www.subcontinent.com/1971war/surrender.html
  63. ^ http://www.sify.com/news/1971-war-i-will-give-you-30-minutes-news-columns-jmqlV0fcjja.html
  64. ^ "The Chola Incident". Bharat Rakshak.
  65. ^ Ramachandra Guha (2005-07-17). "Past & Present: Verdicts on India". The Hindu. Retrieved 2007-05-13.
  66. ^ George Rosen (1966). Democracy and economic change in India. Cambridge University Press. p. 285.
  67. ^ Ramachandra Guha. India After Gandhi. Macmillan. pp. 416-418.
  68. ^ [4], Rediff.com
  69. ^ Remembering Naxalbari Day
  70. ^ India soft on Arunachal Pradesh
  71. ^ India-China to resume annual defence dialogue early next year
  72. ^ India-China border mechanism by year-end
  73. ^ Khubchandani, Lata (2003). GulzarGovind Nihalani, Saibal Chatterjee. ed. Encyclopaedia of Hindi Cinema. Popular Prakashan. pp. 486–487. ISBN 8179910660.
  74. ^ "Kavi Pradeep, master of the patriotic song, dies at 84".Rediff.com. 1998-12-11. Retrieved 2010-11-04.

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मैं नास्तिक क्यों हूं# Necessity of Atheism#!Genetics Bharat Teertha

হে মোর চিত্ত, Prey for Humanity!

मनुस्मृति नस्ली राजकाज राजनीति में OBC Trump Card और जयभीम कामरेड

Gorkhaland again?আত্মঘাতী বাঙালি আবার বিভাজন বিপর্যয়ের মুখোমুখি!

हिंदुत्व की राजनीति का मुकाबला हिंदुत्व की राजनीति से नहीं किया जा सकता।

In conversation with Palash Biswas

Palash Biswas On Unique Identity No1.mpg

Save the Universities!

RSS might replace Gandhi with Ambedkar on currency notes!

जैसे जर्मनी में सिर्फ हिटलर को बोलने की आजादी थी,आज सिर्फ मंकी बातों की आजादी है।

#BEEFGATEঅন্ধকার বৃত্তান্তঃ হত্যার রাজনীতি

अलविदा पत्रकारिता,अब कोई प्रतिक्रिया नहीं! पलाश विश्वास

ভালোবাসার মুখ,প্রতিবাদের মুখ মন্দাক্রান্তার পাশে আছি,যে মেয়েটি আজও লিখতে পারছেঃ আমাক ধর্ষণ করবে?

Palash Biswas on BAMCEF UNIFICATION!

THE HIMALAYAN TALK: PALASH BISWAS ON NEPALI SENTIMENT, GORKHALAND, KUMAON AND GARHWAL ETC.and BAMCEF UNIFICATION! Published on Mar 19, 2013 The Himalayan Voice Cambridge, Massachusetts United States of America

BAMCEF UNIFICATION CONFERENCE 7

Published on 10 Mar 2013 ALL INDIA BAMCEF UNIFICATION CONFERENCE HELD AT Dr.B. R. AMBEDKAR BHAVAN,DADAR,MUMBAI ON 2ND AND 3RD MARCH 2013. Mr.PALASH BISWAS (JOURNALIST -KOLKATA) DELIVERING HER SPEECH. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oLL-n6MrcoM http://youtu.be/oLL-n6MrcoM

Imminent Massive earthquake in the Himalayas

Palash Biswas on Citizenship Amendment Act

Mr. PALASH BISWAS DELIVERING SPEECH AT BAMCEF PROGRAM AT NAGPUR ON 17 & 18 SEPTEMBER 2003 Sub:- CITIZENSHIP AMENDMENT ACT 2003 http://youtu.be/zGDfsLzxTXo

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THE HIMALAYAN TALK: PALASH BISWAS BLASTS INDIANS THAT CLAIM BUDDHA WAS BORN IN INDIA

THE HIMALAYAN TALK: INDIAN GOVERNMENT FOOD SECURITY PROGRAM RISKIER

http://youtu.be/NrcmNEjaN8c The government of India has announced food security program ahead of elections in 2014. We discussed the issue with Palash Biswas in Kolkata today. http://youtu.be/NrcmNEjaN8c Ahead of Elections, India's Cabinet Approves Food Security Program ______________________________________________________ By JIM YARDLEY http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/indias-cabinet-passes-food-security-law/

THE HIMALAYAN TALK: PALASH BISWAS TALKS AGAINST CASTEIST HEGEMONY IN SOUTH ASIA

THE HIMALAYAN VOICE: PALASH BISWAS DISCUSSES RAM MANDIR

Published on 10 Apr 2013 Palash Biswas spoke to us from Kolkota and shared his views on Visho Hindu Parashid's programme from tomorrow ( April 11, 2013) to build Ram Mandir in disputed Ayodhya. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=77cZuBunAGk

THE HIMALAYAN TALK: PALASH BISWAS LASHES OUT KATHMANDU INT'L 'MULVASI' CONFERENCE

अहिले भर्खर कोलकता भारतमा हामीले पलाश विश्वाससंग काठमाडौँमा आज भै रहेको अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय मूलवासी सम्मेलनको बारेमा कुराकानी गर्यौ । उहाले भन्नु भयो सो सम्मेलन 'नेपालको आदिवासी जनजातिहरुको आन्दोलनलाई कम्जोर बनाउने षडयन्त्र हो।' http://youtu.be/j8GXlmSBbbk

THE HIMALAYAN DISASTER: TRANSNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT MECHANISM A MUST

We talked with Palash Biswas, an editor for Indian Express in Kolkata today also. He urged that there must a transnational disaster management mechanism to avert such scale disaster in the Himalayas. http://youtu.be/7IzWUpRECJM

THE HIMALAYAN TALK: PALASH BISWAS CRITICAL OF BAMCEF LEADERSHIP

[Palash Biswas, one of the BAMCEF leaders and editors for Indian Express spoke to us from Kolkata today and criticized BAMCEF leadership in New Delhi, which according to him, is messing up with Nepalese indigenous peoples also. He also flayed MP Jay Narayan Prasad Nishad, who recently offered a Puja in his New Delhi home for Narendra Modi's victory in 2014.]

THE HIMALAYAN TALK: PALASH BISWAS CRITICIZES GOVT FOR WORLD`S BIGGEST BLACK OUT

THE HIMALAYAN TALK: PALASH BISWAS CRITICIZES GOVT FOR WORLD`S BIGGEST BLACK OUT

THE HIMALAYAN TALK: PALSH BISWAS FLAYS SOUTH ASIAN GOVERNM

Palash Biswas, lashed out those 1% people in the government in New Delhi for failure of delivery and creating hosts of problems everywhere in South Asia. http://youtu.be/lD2_V7CB2Is

THE HIMALAYAN TALK: PALASH BISWAS LASHES OUT KATHMANDU INT'L 'MULVASI' CONFERENCE

अहिले भर्खर कोलकता भारतमा हामीले पलाश विश्वाससंग काठमाडौँमा आज भै रहेको अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय मूलवासी सम्मेलनको बारेमा कुराकानी गर्यौ । उहाले भन्नु भयो सो सम्मेलन 'नेपालको आदिवासी जनजातिहरुको आन्दोलनलाई कम्जोर बनाउने षडयन्त्र हो।' http://youtu.be/j8GXlmSBbbk