Indian Holocaust My Father`s Life and Time - Four Hundred Twenty Four
Palash Biswas
http://indianholocaustmyfatherslifeandtime.blogspot.com/
A security lockdown and a general strike called by separatists crippled life in Indian-ruled Kashmir on Sunday after a brief calm returned to the region on Saturday.Meanwhile,Army has lodged a strong protest with their Pakistani counterparts over recent ceasefire violations, when six Indian Forward Posts along LoC in Poonch sector were targeted by mortar and small arms firing.
A railway bridge was damaged in a powerful blast in Udalguri district and an IED planted at Fancy Bazar area here exploded while being defused leading to high alert being sounded across Assam Friday. No one was injured in either of the blasts, officials said.
The bomb planted under the railway bridge over a river at Dhansiri between Rowta and Mazbat railway stations went off at 9 am damaging the bridge and the tracks, they said.Train movement over the bridge came to a halt after the blast which is suspected to have been triggered by the anti-talk Daimary faction of the NDFB, they said.
On the other hand,a drunk CRPF constable sprayed bullets from his AK-47 assault rifle on his colleagues, killing six, including an assistant commandant who had berated him for drinking on duty. The man, identified as Harpinder Singh, was gunned down at the camp, 90km from Jamshedpur, after a four-hour drama early Saturday morning.
CRPF sources said an altercation broke out between the drunk constable of the 196th battalion and others over the quantity of food being wasted in the mess. The constable was on sentry duty at the Kuchai camp in Seraikela-Kharsawan district.
Sources said assistant commandant Bikau Singh called the brawling men to his tent to sort out the issue, found Harpinder drunk, reprimanded him and ordered him to go for a medical test.
Harpinder responded by picking up his AK-47 rifle and gunning down four colleagues, including the assistant commandant. For four hours after that, he refused to surrender. He was finally shot dead after he killed a sentry atop a watchtower around 2 am, an officer said.
During mid eighties, my short story YUDDH NAHEE CHAHIYE, War Unawanted was published in Vartaman Sahitya edited by Bibhuti Narayan Roy. I ahd also written a Cover Story in PARIVARTAN, FAUZ SE MAT KHELIYE, Do Not Play with Armed Forces.I was in Ranchi during Operation Blue Star and the resultant Sikh Revolt in Indian Army. I was just joined Dainik Prabhat Khabar owned by Gyanranjan with SN Vinod as Editor. The Newpaper was not Published as yet and we were working on Dummy. Within months, I had to shift in Dainik Jagaran Meerut as I ahd to leave Prabhat Khabar as Vinod had jammed my Bank Salary account as I had gone Home for an emergency getting permission from the News editor.I simply resigned and joined Meerut Jagaran. Mind you, it was Meerut where the Blue Print of Operation Blue star was prepared.I had the real taste of Army Presence outside the Cant area in Meerut in sustained Riots.
In DSB Nainital Postgraduation days, I had a Classmate directly from the Indian Army, Lance Nayak Jagat Ram Beri Reservist who rooted in Berinag Pithoragarh and had been recruited in Kumun Regiment. He had faught the 1971 Indo Pak war as an Artllery Man. During Post Graduation, he had to attend Refresher Course in Nasic Sveral times. As Beri was my best friend in the College during those days as Mohan Kapilesh Bhoj was away in Almora College, Pawan Rakesh had left the campus and rajiv Kumar just joined as a BA Previous student and zahur Alam had already passed his M.com.We shared our experiences often. During same period, Captain Ghosh was also appeared in MA English Exams. He was stationed in Naintal cant and later , unfortunately, Untimely expired in an air Crash. His wife Mrs Ghosh was very good Host, a sweet lady.During this period, I got the feel of the HEAT of being in action on Civil Duty as a recruit in Indian Armed Forces. I had been in Meerut and Bareilly where I had friends in the Cant Area and continued to be lucky enough to be befriended with some Army Officials. I may feel well the Bleeding within the Armed Hearts. Beri had been on duty in Kashmir and North east and he was suffering fromTrauma. The Drink , Action, Passion and Psyche intermingled with my routine. We got reports from middle east very late about the Trauma sufered by US Army personnels. But I had dealt with the subject well before the Gulf War first and S Second both as a Journalist as well as Creative Writer!Later, I had a few opportunities to interact with the Armed forces Posted in the Northeast also.
Choosing the least worst option
Using the development pacakge to cover up for vacillation and prevarication by the political leadership in undertaking security operations against the Maoists is a recipe for disaster. For the UPA government, development — without security — is the abiding mantra when it comes to solving the Maoist problem. Indian Express reports that "the Planning Commission [...]
The mobile towering fallacy of development
In the Maoist-infested areas, security without development is meaningless; but development, without security, is unachievable. Even after having spent more than six years in power, the UPA government has been unable to articulate its strategy to deal with the Maoists so far; simply because the ruling alliance and the government have not yet been able [...]
IEDs kill… so what
The Maoists can continue to inflict casualties with IEDs because the government won't employ army's demining teams. The complete focus of the mainstream media continues to be on the forthcoming trip of the Union Home Minister to Pakistan. As a consequence of this obsession with theatrics, important decisions being taken by the Cabinet Committee on [...]
Hack the long rope
Ominous signs that the delicate balance of civil-military relations in this country is under strain. The perspicacious Srinath Raghavan, in his op-ed in the Telegraph, hits the nail on the head with the most damaging fallout of keeping the Henderson-Brooks report secret. The committee's approach and findings reflected the dominant view in the military regarding [...]
Defeating IEDs
Let us start with our counter-IED effort against the Maoists. Now. Two significant stories in the newspapers today highlight the criticality of countering the menace of the Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) or road-side bombs or the erstwhile booby-traps in Maoist areas. The first report is about the recovery and subsequent destruction of five IEDs containing [...]
A win-win strategy
A follow-up to the previous blogpost on a politically attractive anti-Maoist strategy. Today's Hindu has a brilliant piece by Praveen Swami explaining in great detail, and in a very rational manner, that the only way to secure victory against the Maoists is to build the local police forces and establish intelligence collection mechanisms at grassroots [...]
A politically attractive anti-Maoist strategy
A security strategy for the Maoists that the political leadership can embrace. It stalls the momentum of the Maoist onslaught, shows immediate successful results, and reinforces the success in the long-term. More than 148 Indians have been killed in a Railway accident — or incident in official parlance, whereas a Maoist attack would be a [...]
Expressing grief not good enough
The nation needs to know from the Union government what its anti-Maoist strategy is. So this was the reaction of Union Railway Minister, Ms Mamata Banerjee to the horrific mishap that took place in West Bengal's West Midnapore district on the Gyaneshwari Express. "Trains have been made soft targets. We have appealed repeatedly that rail [...]
Planning development
The new member-secretary of the Planning Commission has got the right ideas about the development-security paradigm in the areas affected by the Maoist problem. Here are a couple of extracts from an interview with Sudha Pillai, member secretary of the Planning Commission, who is responsible for planning development for areas affected by the Maoist problem. [...]
The answer that the PM never gave
To the question about his government's failure to estimate the Maoist threat. At the Prime Minister's press conference, one of the questions that evoked a lot of interest in the media coverage afterwards came from Smita Prakash, Editor (News), Asian News International. Asked if his government had underestimated the Naxals, the Prime Minister said, "We [...]
No to International Humanitarian Laws
Let us not digress from the Maoist challenge with red herrings of Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols. The latest incident of bombing the bus in Dantewada district saw some respected media commentators raise the spectre of invoking International Humanitarian Law [IHL] against the Maoists. Legally speaking, India is a signatory to the Four Geneva Conventions [...]
IAF against Maoists
Two questions. After the recent bus-bombing incident at Dantewada, there have been renewed emotional calls from some quarters for the use of offensive air power against the Maoists. It is a very sensitive issue in India which is still being debated at the highest levels. Two such questions raised then are here in an email [...]
Confusing considerations
Employment of armed forces against the Maoists is based on security and political considerations, not ethical ones. There has been some debate over the use of the armed forces against the Maoists. While the Home Minister of Chhattisgarh has explicitly demanded that army be called in to counter the Maoists, the service chiefs have publicly [...]
The right role
To begin with, can we articulate a proper role for the CRPF? The recent performance of the Central Reserve Police Force [CRPF] against the Maoists has been under the scanner. Based on the results so far, it has rightly attracted a fair share of criticism from most knowledgeable quarters. Valid questions have been raised about [...]
A la Marines: ARF against Maoists
Employing an Indian version of Aerial Reaction Force against the Maoists is an idea worthy of serious consideration. It is gratifying to hear that the government has not closed its options over use of air power in security operations against the Maoists. Indian Air Force is also debating the subject at CAPS later this week [...]
Maoists are not tribals
Demolishing the myth that Maoists are tribals. The debate about Maoists in the public space is shrill and noisy and those opposing Government of India's security offensive against the Maoists resort to subterfuge in their arguments. They interchangeably use the words Maoists and Tribals in their language. This is how it usually works. A question [...]
Reading the end-game
A précis of the new RAND monograph, How Insurgencies End. The RAND Corporation has recently released a monograph with an attention-grabbing title: How Insurgencies End. The publicly released report [pdf here] is the unclassified portion of a two-part study that undertook a quantitative examination of 89 cases of insurgencies in great detail. Here are the [...]
Air power against Maoists
Although easy in theory, the practical challenges in employing air power in a kinetic role against the Maoists are too many. Sudhanshu Sarangi, who was the head of counter-insurgency operations and intelligence in Orissa till June 2009, makes a passionate case in Hindustan Times for using the assets of the Indian Air Force (IAF) against [...]
AFSPA is not worth it
As the recent J&K beggar killing incident shows, there is a compelling case for a comprehensive amendment of, if not scrapping the AFSPA altogether. The killing of a 70-year old beggar in J&K last week — in a fake encounter by the army or while caught in the crossfire between the troopers and the terrorists, [...]
A politically incorrect idea
The government must stop all development in areas under Maoist control and redouble its development activities in areas contiguous to those under Maoist control. In a sense, it was nice to see the Parliament get down to the business of discussing Maoists. By all accounts, the debate in the Rajya Sabha [pdf] was of a [...]
http://pragmatic.nationalinterest.in/category/internal-security/
Indian Army to probe high stress levels of soldiers
Dated 3/11/2006
Printer Friendly 
Subscribe
India's army is investigating several recent cases of soldiers fatally shooting their colleagues in the country's Islamic terror infested portion of Kashmir, where years of heavy fighting are taking their toll on stressed, isolated troops.
In the past 10 days there have been at least four cases of distraught soldiers in Kashmir fatally shooting colleagues, then committing suicide.
Gen. J.J. Singh, the army chief, ordered the probe Wednesday after the latest incident, in which an army soldier shot and killed his unit commander one day earlier, said an army spokesman, Vijay Joshi.
"The inquiry will go into the circumstances which led to the shooting" in Srinagar, the summer capital of India's Jammu-Kashmir state, Joshi said Thursday.
Certainly some of this is about simple opportunity: Soldiers have ready access to dangerous weapons. But military officials say 17 years of bloody insurgencies in Kashmir, and to a lesser degree in India's remote northeast, are wearing down the military.
During this year's Hindu festival of Diwali, when most Indians feast with their families, a soldier in Kashmir shot dead four others, then killed himself with his AK-47 assault rifle.
The army gave no reason for the shooting, but news reports said the soldier had been refused leave to visit his family over the holiday.
More than a dozen Islamic militant groups have been fighting Indian security forces since 1989 in Muslim-majority Kashmir, seeking the Himalayan territory's independence from predominantly Hindu India or its merger with mostly Muslim Pakistan. Both countries claim of all of Kashmir, which is divided between them.
India has an estimated 700,000 soldiers in Kashmir, many along the frontier with Pakistan, but plenty more in dangerous, violence-savaged towns and villages. In many areas, the region has the feel of an occupied country, with soldiers in full combat gear patrolling streets and frisking civilians at checkpoints. Kashmiri civilians make little secret of their anger at the Indian military, which is regularly accused of human rights violations.
Living amid hatred takes its toll on the soldiers.
"This is an insurgency-wracked area. Soldiers operate in an environment where they are not sure about the future. This situation generates a lot of stress, and sometimes results in these kinds of incidents," said Col. Hemant Juneja, an army spokesman in Srinagar.
Also contributing to the pressure are changes in Indian society, like the breakdown of the tradition of men staying with their parents _ even after marrying and having their own children.
"A soldier who went off to war was sure his wife and children would be looked after in the event of his being killed in battle. With modern nuclear families, the soldier is always beset by concerns about his family's future," Juneja said.
There are other changes in India as well. The military, long a high-status profession, has been eclipsed by the far-better-paying jobs in the private sector.
But prolonged deployment in dangerous situations is the largest factor in increasing stress levels, says Brig. Harwant Singh, a retired army officer.
"In terrorist- and militancy-affected areas, the potential presence of terrorists in close proximity takes its toll," said Brig. Singh. "This makes them edgy, resulting in some taking the extreme step of either shooting themselves or their superiors whom they perceive to be the cause of all their miseries."
Military experts also say that the army is becoming "overstretched" with soldiers having to do long spells in difficult areas. The solution, they say, lies not in increasing the size of the army _ already among the world's largest with more than 1 million soldiers _ but in training paramilitary troops to take over some of the duties now left to the army.
"The army can then keep its powder dry for its real task," said retired Gen. Ashok Mehta, a military commentator.
The new inquiry will help pinpoint what plays on soldiers' minds when serving in tough areas, and what could help keep them calm.
In Srinagar, the army spokesman said soldiers were being taught yoga to help them cope.
After a spate of similar shootings in the early 1990s, the army had reformed its rules, easing conditions for leave and salary hikes for soldiers serving in difficult areas, Gen. Mehta said.
"It's time for a re-look at these issues. Clearly, more reforms are needed," he said.
indepthcoverage
RELATED TOPICS
SIMILAR REPORTS
- Additional Indian Army Officers Training Academy to be Set up
- Indian Army to increase intake from National Cadet Corps
- Indian Army Recruitment Process to Include Personality Tests
- Air Force Squadrons Airlift 200 Tonnes of Relief Material
- More army choppers, boats, medical teams for flood-hit Bihar
- Indian Army Chief to Visit United Kingdom
- Indian Army Begins Air dropping Relief Material in Flood Hit Bihar
- Indian Army Officers to be Trained for Optimal Utilization of Space Based Resources
- Armed Forces Medical Services Get 117 More Posts
- Army To Host Meet On Handling Insurgency Emergencies
LATEST REPORTS
- Russia Offer Development of Advanced RADARs to India
- Indian Navy Orders Six Naval Tejas LCA Fighters; Infuses Rs.900 Crore in Programme
- Ladakh-Nyoma Airstrip to be Expanded, Converted to Advanced Landing Ground
- Indian Air Force MiG 29 Fighters Upgradation to be Completed by 2013
- GE Aviation's F414 Engines for HAL Tejas Fighters?
- Indian Army Inducts DRDOs NBC Weapons Detection Vehicle
- Indian Army to Induct Nag Missiles Soon: DRDO
- United States Offers India to Lease 12 Surveillance Helicopters
- India to Receive Three Russian Krivak IV Class Frigates by 2012
- Indian Army Trains Regular Troops to Counter Terrorism
- http://www.india-defence.com/reports/2649
7 die as fire within bleeds CRPF | |
OUR BUREAU | |
July 17: Seven personnel died a bloody death in a Jharkhand CRPF camp last night, falling prey not to Maoists but to a comrade who had apparently cracked under the constant strain of fighting the rebels. Head constable Harpinder Singh, 35, was allegedly drinking in violation of rules and when colleagues threatened to report him, went berserk. He gunned down six persons before being himself shot dead at the camp in Kuchai, some 60km from Jamshedpur, police said. The incident of "fragging" — Americanism for a soldier killing a colleague — suggests the strain of duty in Maoist zones may be getting as heavy to bear as that in militancy-hit Northeast and Kashmir from where most such "fratricides" have been reported. Many CRPF jawans are known to take a few swigs to relieve the stress although drinking is banned in camps in Maoist zones, such as the Kuchai camp in Seraikela-Kharsawan district that was set up for long-range patrols. CRPF sources said it all started with a fight between Harpinder and some others over food at the mess, following which assistant commandant Bikau Singh called them to his tent. Bikau found Harpinder drunk and apparently ordered someone to smell his breath, infuriating the head constable. Harpinder rushed to his barracks and came out spraying bullets from his AK-47, killing Bakau and four others. This was around 10pm. "The jawans ran helter-skelter. The lights at the camp were switched off," a police source said. "For a while, many in the camp thought it was a Maoist attack and took up position." For four hours, the men at the camp tried to persuade Harpinder to surrender but when he killed a sentry atop a watchtower, the others shot him dead around 2am. Sources said 450 bullets were fired and that at one point, the troops had tried to surround Harpinder with armoured vehicles as he tried to rush out of the camp. Fragging is mostly seen among troops who, stressed out by the relentless pressure and long separation from their families, crack when they are denied leave. But Harpinder had returned from a vacation on June 18, CRPF director-general Vikram Srivastava said. He added that although it was yet to be established whether Harpinder had indeed been a victim of stress, his action was an example of what stress could do to jawans. A neighbour from the head constable's village of Baba Bakala, about 40km from Amritsar, said: "We asked his wife and other family members if Harpinder had complained against his seniors or service conditions while on leave. They told us that despite the tough conditions, he was looking forward to rejoining." Harpinder, who leaves behind a son and two daughters, came from a family used to sending its men to the armed forces and had joined the CRPF nearly two decades ago. He was an introvert, the neighbour said. Compared with the army, stress and frustration are more rampant among the CRPF ranks. The paramilitary force's jawans have no "peace postings", which means they may be transferred around from Kashmir to the Northeast to the Maoist belt within a few months. Today's dead include Bi-kau — who took three bullets and died on his way to hospital -— M.L. Patil (assistant sub-inspector), I.N. Harinath, P.T. Rao and Jadhav Bhan Singh (head constables) and Vijay Kumar (constable). Sub- inspector Bandhu Oraon, shot through the palm, is in hospital. |
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1100718/jsp/frontpage/story_12697478.jsp
Drunk CRPF jawan kills 6 colleagues
Times of India - 17 hours agoJAMSHEDPUR/RANCHI: A drunk CRPF constable sprayed bullets from his AK-47 assault rifle on his colleagues, killing six, including an assistant commandant who had berated him for drinking on duty. The man, identified as Harpinder Singh, was gunned down ...
7 die as fire within bleeds CRPF
Calcutta Telegraph - 18 hours agoJuly 17: Seven personnel died a bloody death in a Jharkhand CRPF camp last night, falling prey not to Maoists but to a comrade who had apparently cracked under the constant strain of fighting the rebels. Head constable Harpinder Singh, 35, ...
CRPF man kills 6 others, is shot dead
Hindustan Times - 20 hours agoA Central Reserve Police Force jawan, allegedly angry at being ticked off for being drunk, turned his AK-47 rifle on his commanding officer and colleagues on Friday night, killing six of them and injuring one. Harpinder Singh (40), from Punjab, ...
MHA admits to increase in fragging incidents
Times of India - Himanshi Dhawan - 16 hours agoNEW DELHI: The latest incident of a CRPF jawan killing six of his colleagues following a minor altercation over wastage of food has raised concern for the Centre about the increasing stress levels in paramilitary forces. The CRPF has ordered an inquiry ...
Drunk CRPF jawan kills six colleagues, is shot dead
Daily News & Analysis - Suman Sharma - 19 hours agoRanchi: Seven CRPF (Central Reserve Police Force) troops were killed in a fratricide incident that took place in the 196 Battalion deployed in Jharkhand's Maoist-hit Kuchai area in Saraikela on Friday night. Havildar Harpinder Singh, 40, a resident of ...
CRPF orders inquiry into 'killing spree' in Jharkhand camp
Sify - Jul 17, 2010The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) on Saturday ordered an inquiry into the killing of six of its personnel, including an Assistant Commandant, by one of their colleagues in Kuchai village in Jharkhand's Saraikela District. ...
'Drunk' CRPF man kills six after mess fight
Asian Age - 12 hours agoA drunk CRPF constable, Harpinder Singh, opened fire with an AK-47, killing six personnel over three hours, including one assistant commandant, after a brawl erupted over was-tage of food at the CRPF mess in Saraikela district of Jharkhand. ...
4-hr firing spree at CRPF camp: constable kills six colleagues, is shot dead
Indian Express - 15 hours agoA "drunk" CRPF constable allegedly shot dead six of his colleagues at a camp at Kuchai block in Saraikela district of Jharkhand last night, before he was killed. The dead included an officer who, minutes before, had reprimanded Constable Harpinder ...
All 17 related articles »
Prabhakaran was not our enemy: Chidambaram
Union Home Minister P Chidambaram has said slain LTTE leader V Prabhakaran would have been "Mudisooda Mannan" (uncrowned monarch) of the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka had he accepted the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan agreement as requested by former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Addressing a public meeting here last night, Chidambaram said he had met Prabhakaran and talked with him for hours."He (Prabhakaran) was not our enemy. We were opposed to the path chosen by him.
" Virudhunagar is the home constituency of MDMK chief Vaiko, a known LTTE supporter. Vaiko was defeated by Congress nominee Manick Tagore by 15,000 votes in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections.
Chidambaram said a country needs peace for development. "Violence and rioting will not develop a country.
" There had been heavy loss of lives and properties in Sri Lanka (during the war against the LTTE). Claiming that peace had returned to the island nation, he said India had given Rs 3,600 crore for the benefit of the internally displaced Tamils.
The government had also allocated Rs 1,000 crore for the construction of 50,000 houses in northern Sri Lanka. The Home Minister said efforts are underway to renovate Kangesanthurai port and repair Palali airport.
He said he was confident that in another two years, 2.5 lakh displaced Tamils would get their houses and they would be rehabilitated. Chidambaram was participating in the 108th birth anniversary celebrations of former Chief Minister Kamaraj and 125th anniversary of the Congress party.
Separatist shutdown, restrictions paralyses Kashmir
A shutdown called by separatists and restrictions imposed by authorities paralysed life in Srinagar Sunday, a day after normalcy was restored following 12 days of turmoil. Baramulla town was tense after a boy drowned while allegedly being chased by security men.In Baramulla residents alleged a Class 7 student, identified as Faizan Ahmad Buhroo, drowned in the Jhelum river after being chased by security forces.
Security personnel had reportedly chased a stone-pelting mob at Azadgunj Bridge in the town Saturday evening. The teenager, who was among the mob, jumped into the river to escape security forces, reports said.
Baramulla administration sought the help of army divers Sunday afternoon to fish out the body of the teenager.
'Army divers have been pressed into service to look for the body,' a senior police officer told IANS over phone from Baramulla.
The divers conducted searches in the Jhelum river downstream from Azadgunj Bridge in the town, from where the boy had reportedly jumped into the water, reports said.
'So far, we haven't met any success, but the search is going on,' said another official of the Baramulla district administration.
Irate youth attacked police and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) contingents deployed to enforce restrictions in the town following tension triggered in the town over the reported drowning of the youth.
District Magistrate (Baramulla) Bashir Ahmad Bhat told reporters: 'Circumstances leading to the boy's drowning will be thoroughly probed once we recover his body.'
In the neighbouring Sopore town, which is the hotbed of separatist violence, authorities Sunday imposed restrictions to maintain law and order.
Life was paralyzed as the hardline separatist Hurriyat group headed by Syed Ali Geelani called for a valley-wide shutdown Sunday to protest alleged human rights violations by security forces in Kashmir.
The shutdown was part of the group's continuing 'Quit Kashmir' programme.
'Restrictions have been imposed in Srinagar's Old City areas and uptown Maisuma, Batmaloo and Humhama localities to prevent violence,' a police officer said here early this morning.
Police and CRPF contingents moved out early morning to enforce restrictions in the city.
Traffic intersections were blocked with coils of razor-fitted wire in the Old City and in Maisuma and Batmaloo areas. Both vehicular and pedestrian movement has been disallowed by security forces.
The Kashmir Valley witnessed normalcy Saturday after 12 days of separatist shutdowns and official restrictions. Hundreds of vehicles were seen on Srinagar roads. Traffic jams were reported in some areas.
People came out in large numbers Saturday to buy essential items fearing another spell of shutdowns and restrictions.
Fourteen civilians have been killed across the Valley since June 11 in incidents of firing by security forces at stone-pelting mobs.
The state government has decided to conduct an independent enquiry into the circumstances leading to the civilian deaths.
Security forces defuse two powerful IEDs in J&K
Two powerful Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) were defused by security forces in Jammu and Kashmir''s Baramulla and Anantnag districts. An IED, weighing 12 kg, was planted by militants under a culvert at Harithrath near Pattan, 27 kms from here, on Srinagar-Baramulla National Highway, a police spokesman said.Acting on a tip-off, police detected the IED which was concealed in a tin box at around 8.50 am, he said, adding it was later defused by bomb disposal squad. Troops of 34 Rashtriya Rifles also detected a powerful IED, planted on the main road, at village Manznoo, 65 kms from here in Anantnag district, the spokesman said, adding the IED was later detonated by bomb disposal squad at an open field.
Meanwhile, one person was injured today when he stepped on a landmine in a village near the Line of Control (LoC) in Uri Sector of Baramulla district. Munir Ahmad Khatana accidentally stepped on the landmine at village Churanda, 140 kms from here, this morning, police said.
Security blitz, strike break calm in Indian KashmirAFP - 6 hours agoSRINAGAR, India — A security lockdown and a general strike called by separatists crippled life in Indian-ruled Kashmir on Sunday after a brief calm returned ... Curfew-like situation in KashmirDaily News & Analysis - 7 hours agoPTI Srinagar: A curfew-like situation prevailed in Kashmir today as separatists enforced a shutdown while authorities imposed curfew in Sopore town and ... Separatist shutdown, restrictions cripple Srinagar againEconomic Times - 8 hours agoSRINAGAR: A shutdown called by separatists and restrictions imposed by authorities paralysed life in Srinagar Sunday, just a day after a semblance of ... Youths enforce shutdown, streets deserted again in KashmirTimes of India - Jul 17, 2010SRINAGAR: Streets wore a deserted look in Kashmir again with youths enforcing shutdown at many places as six people were injured in a clash between ... Life returns to normal in KashmirSify - Jul 17, 2010An uneasy calm prevails in the Kashmir Valley.Schools and business establishments have reopened after a 21 daylong strike. Vehicles too have come back on ... Normalcy returns to Valley after days of unrestIndian Express - Jul 17, 2010Vehicles plying on roads in Srinagar on Saturday as normal life resumes in Kashmir Valley after eleven days of curfew. Life in the Kashmir Valley returned ... Kashmir Valley back on its feet after strikes, curfewEconomic Times - Jul 16, 2010SRINAGAR: Life limped back to normal in summer capital Srinagar and other parts of the Kashmir Valley Saturday after 11 days of separatist shutdowns and ... Curfew reimposed in Held KashmirDaily Times - Jul 16, 2010SRINAGAR: Indian security forces reimposed a strict curfew in Indian-held Kashmir's summer capital on Friday after a decision to ease restrictions for the ... Clashes After Friday Prayers in Indian KashmirVoice of America - Jul 16, 2010Photo: AP Hundreds of anti-India protesters clashed with security forces Friday in Indian-controlled Kashmir's main city, even as authorities reimposed a ... Curfew re-imposed in Srinagar, six injured in clashesHindustan Times - Jul 16, 2010Curfew was re-imposed and strictly enforced in Srinagar city and many other districts of Kashmir on Friday as the state government feared protests in ... All 81 related articles » | RelatedKashmirSrinagar India All Parties Hurriyat Conference Syed Ali Shah Geelani Timeline of articles Number of sources covering this story
ImagesAFPAFP  AFP  The Hindu  GreaterKashmir....  Press TV  GreaterKashmir....  Press TV  GreaterKashmir.... All related images » |
At CRPF camp, dispirited jawans count their blessings
Supriya Sharma, TNN, Jul 2, 2010, 03.10am ISTNARAYANPUR (CHHATTISGARH): ''Sabka mood off hai (everyone's upset),'' was the terse response of the man guarding the entrance to the CRPF camp which lost 27 of its men on Tuesday. He spoke through a thin wedge in the barricaded gates, beyond which a few jawans could be seen walking around dispiritedly. The guard stubbornly refused access to the camp.
In just three months, the CRPF has lost more than a hundred men in Bastar. Almost an entire company of 76 men was wiped out in April in Chintalnar in Dantewada district. This week, in another part of Bastar, near Dhaudai, close to Maharashtra, nearly half of a road opening party was killed.
Unlike Chintalnar, where CRPF jawans burst out in anger at journalists who landed up at the camp the day after, in Dhaudai they had decided to maintain a stubborn, difficult silence.
The Dhaudai camp functions out of a police station. The station in-charge finally allowed journalists inside
but politely said no one would talk.
But, while walking out, a jawan in a vest and khaki trousers could not resist a quick exchange. He said he survived the attack by ''crawling'' through scrub for a long distance. He knew he was lucky. Apart from the 18 bodies found in an open field, at least four were found in the bushes — the men probably shot dead as they tried, like him, to ''crawl'' to safety.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/At-CRPF-camp-dispirited-jawans-count-their-blessings/articleshow/6117260.cms
CRPF not suited for work in Ch'garh: Cops
Shishir Arya & Soumitra S Bose, TNN, Jul 1, 2010, 04.40am ISTKANKER/NAGPUR: The Naxal attack on a CRPF party on Tuesday again brought to fore the lack of co-ordination and mistrust between the paramilitary force and the local police. A senior police officer said, "We were again told a lie that only four CRPF jawans were injured and the Naxals had surrounded the party. Our intelligence sources, however, told us about 25 CRPF jawans getting killed. We were told that the Naxals had disappeared into the forests by 2 pm."
Such gaps in information -- some officials go to the extent of calling it 'mistrust' -- have persistently proved fatal for armed forces deployed in Chhattisgarh. The lack of coordination was also stated to be one of the reasons for the ambush at Dantewada in which 76 CRPF jawans were killed in April.
More than a year ago, a joint operational command was established between the paramilitary forces and the state police. Apart from CRPF, other forces like Border Security Force (BSF) and Indo-Tibet Border Police (ITBP) are also deployed in this Maoist-hit state.
However, senior officials of both CRPF and state police mince no words while criticising each other. The police say that the CRPF is not conditioned for an operation in an area like Chhattisgarh. The Dantewada incident has put them in an insulation mode. "They patrol no more than five km and simply don't go further. After the Chintalnar fiasco, there are orders that to ensure that there are no more CRPF casualties.
However, even the new strategy of playing safe is catching them off guard," said a senior police officer.
On the other hand, one of the major reasons that the CRPF does not trust the police is that they suspect that Maoists have infiltrated police ranks due to which they are getting killed, added a source. Those at CRPF also say that it's the police which does not know the rules of the game. "We are the muscle and they are the brains. There can be no operation without intelligence inputs, which the local police does not get," a senior CRPF official said.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/nagpur/CRPF-not-suited-for-work-in-Chgarh-Cops/articleshow/6112806.cms
Srinagar singesHindustan Times - Jun 29, 2010Three more youths were killed today when CRPF allegedly opened fire during clashes with protestors in Anantnag as violence spread to south Kashmir and more ... Three more die as protests escalate in Indian KashmirAFP - Izhar Wani - Jun 29, 2010SRINAGAR, India — Indian security forces opened fire on demonstrators in Indian Kashmir again on Tuesday, killing three teenagers in violence that risks ... Three more killed in fresh firing on Kashmir protestersSify - Jun 29, 2010Three teenagers were killed in Indian Kashmir on Tuesday when security forces opened fire on stone-throwing protesters during an anti-India demonstration, ... Police firing kills 2 Kashmir protestersArab News - Mukhtar Ahmad - Jun 29, 2010A Kashmiri man beats up a policeman during a protest on the outskirts of Srinagar, capital of Indian Kashmir, on Monday. (AP) By MUKHTAR AHMAD | ARAB NEWS ... Crackdown widens in Indian KashmirAFP - Izhar Wani - Jun 29, 2010SRINAGAR, India — Police in Indian-ruled Kashmir placed more towns under curfew and banned mobile phone text messages Tuesday in an attempt to dampen ... India imposes curfew in Kashmir as protests spreadYnetnews - Jun 29, 2010India imposed a curfew in parts of Kashmir and deployed thousands of troops on Tuesday to quell huge anti-India protests in a region at the core of its ... Tense Omar dials DelhiHindustan Times - Jun 28, 2010Fresh clashes today broke out between locals protesting the killing of youths in alleged CRPF firing and security forces in parts of Srinagar, Baramulla and ... Kashmir protesters exploiting teenagers: Home SecretaryNDTV.com - Jun 28, 2010New Delhi: The Kashmir Valley is tense after two more civilians, including a young boy, were allegedly killed in CRPF firing on Monday. ... Indian Kashmir on the boil againAFP - Izhar Wani - Jun 28, 2010SRINAGAR, India — Indian Kashmir is on the boil again: this time over the killing of eight young Kashmiris in less than three weeks allegedly at the hands ... Security Forces Fire on Kashmir ProtestersWall Street Journal - Tom Wright - Jun 28, 2010NEW DELHI—Indian security forces killed two protesters in Kashmir on Monday as a tense standoff between the forces and separatists threatened ... All 237 related articles » | RelatedJammu and KashmirSrinagar Sopore Timeline of articles Number of sources covering this story
ImagesAFPArab News AFP  NDTV.com  AFP  Indian Express  The Canadian Pr...  Oneindia  AFP All related images » |
CRPF deployment issue sorted out: Pillay
Supriya Sharma, TNN, Jul 6, 2010, 12.19am ISTKANKER: On an overcast day, Union home secretary G K Pillai landed in Bastar to clear the air between the Chhattisgarh police and the Central Reserve Police Force, although he preferred to downplay the differences between the forces, calling media reports an over-reaction.
Speaking exclusively to TOI, he said, "My two-day visit to Chhattisgarh was planned much earlier to review the induction of paramilitary forces into Kanker and Rajnandgaon and resolve the problems of deployment.''
Deployment has been the key area of differences between the CRPF and the state cops. Last week a Maoist ambush in Dhaudai left 27 CRPF men dead, triggering off a shadow blame game between the forces. This came just three months after the CRPF lost 76 men in Chintalnar in the worst-ever Maoist attack.
Pillai said, "The issue of deployment has been mutually solved. The CRPF was deployed in Chintalnar and Dhadhai in 2006-07 to open up certain roads. But now there is a case to consolidate their posts in a grid, on the lines of their deployment at Singhbhum in Jharkhand or Lalgarh in West Bengal.''
According to Pillai, the consolidation process could involve the CRPF retreating from certain posts which would be taken over by the state police. When asked whether the state cops would face shortage of manpower as they will have to move into Bastar from other districts, he said, "The key challenge was to increase numbers of both police and paramilitary forces. You need sheer manpower to cover these areas. Right now, half of Narayanpur and Dantewada districts don't have policemen.''
He said the Centre planned to raise eight battalions of CRPF this year and the state cops needed to increase their strength by another 20,000. "Chhattisgarh has already doubled its force in a very short time,'' he said, trying to strike a sympathetic note towards a state that despite being ruled by BJP is seen as the Union home ministry's key ally in the fight against the Maoists.
Critics, however, say that the redeployment of CRPF won't make up for the laxity in its operational functions.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/CRPF-deployment-issue-sorted-out-Pillay/articleshow/6132242.cms
After Naxal attacks, CRPF desires to withdraw from Bastar
Press Trust Of India
Raipur, July 05, 2010
First Published: 21:06 IST(5/7/2010)
Last Updated: 21:08 IST(5/7/2010)
The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) has expressed a desire to withdraw from all interior locations of the worst-hit Naxal area of Bastar in Chattisgarh, a move opposed by the state police. Official sources, who referred to this wish by CRPF, said the para-military force has also approached Chhattisgarh Police to provide security to its camps at
related stories
- No need to deploy army in Naxal-hit regions: GK Pillai
- Maoists unleash violence; blow up tower, fire at cops
Narayanpur where 27 security personnel were killed in a Naxal ambush recently.
Immediately after the attack, senior CRPF officials were up in arms and said they would be abandoning the post at Durai road if the state police did not guard the two camps in the area, about 300 km from Raipur.
Around 50 police personnel each were rushed to these two camps, a move which was seen as "strengthening of the camps."
At least 26 CRPF personnel and one state policeman were killed by Maoists on June 29 when they were returning from road opening duties.
The CRPF has also listed four places in Narayanpur and Dantewada from where they would be shifting their base, the sources said, adding initially the para-military forces wanted to shift their camps closer to the National Highways, which was, however, objected to by the state police.
The CRPF has demanded presence of one-third of district police in every operation and for road opening party. A meeting between the state authorities and the CRPF witnessed heated arguments over the issue and it was decided that road opening duty was exclusively of CRPF domain and there would be no local presence, the sources said.
Union Home Minister P Chidambaram has also indicated that the CRPF in Chattishargh needs to be relocated and reconfigured. Taking a cue from this, the CRPF has decided to keep a minimum strength of 200 personnel in each camp.
About the rescue and relief on the June 29 killings, the sources said the state authorities pointed out that no help was received from the two camps which were located within five kilometres of the area. The first rescue team came from a CRPF camp located nine kilometres away.
Valley not out of the woods yet, says OmarHindustan Times - Jul 2, 2010Troops noticed a group of heavily-armed militants along the LoC late last night. The intruders were challenged and in the subsequent gunbattle, ... IHK CM urges calm as 14 more injured in skirmishesDaily Times - Iftikhar Gilani - Jul 2, 2010NEW DELHI: Indian-held Kashmir (IHK) Chief Minister Omar Abdullah on Friday appealed to the youth to restore calm, even as reports said ... 'Job of J&K CM the most analysed one'Hindustan Times - Jul 2, 2010In an exclusive interview to Hindustan Times, Jammu and Kashmir chief minister Omar Abdullah has said the situation in the Valley was difficult at the ... Kashmir needs a political solution, says OmarSify - Jul 2, 2010Srinagar: Chief Minister Omar Abdullah on Friday said a political solution, not jobs, was needed to solve the Kashmir problem as curfew continued in the ... Cong backs Omar, but wants him to act firmlyHindustan Times - Jul 2, 2010With Kashmir reeling under a curfew for a straight fifth day today and stray protests on despite security restrictions, Chief Minister Omar Abdullah sought ... Omar cool to PC's advice on trouble spotsTimes of India - Arati R Jerath, Saleem Pandit - Jul 1, 2010SRINAGAR: The response from Jammu and Kashmir chief minister Omar Abdullah to union home minister P Chidambaram's ``advice'' to visit the troubled areas was ... Mehbooba, Mirwaiz to Delhi: Wake upBusiness Standard - Jul 1, 2010At her home overlooking the picturesque Dal Lake, president of People's Democratic Party (PDP) Mehbooba Mufti Sayeed slamed the central and state ... Flare up in Kashmir (Article)Oneindia - Jul 1, 2010New Delhi, July 1 (ANI): No end appears to be in sight of the trouble brewing in the Kashmir valley. Protests against the killing of youth in firing ... Kashmir hit by protest shutdownBBC News - Jul 1, 2010A protest shutdown has paralysed normal life for a fourth successive day in Indian-administered Kashmir. The strike has been called in protest at the recent ... Exercise maximum restraint in JK: CentreOneindia - Jun 30, 2010New Delhi, Jul 1: Central Government on Wednesday, Jun 30, advised Omar Abdullah, Jammu Kashmir Chief Minister and his ministers to visit the areas under ... All 190 related articles » | RelatedKashmirSrinagar Omar Abdullah New Delhi Pakistan India Timeline of articles Number of sources covering this story
ImagesOneindiaThe Hindu Oneindia AFP Oneindia DAWN.com Indian Express Arab News  Aljazeera.net All related images » |
What They Said: Anti-Naxal Unified CommandWall Street Journal (blog) - Jul 16, 2010India Real Time presents a round-up of commentary and analysis of one of the key news events this week: The decision by the Indian government to set up a ... Unified command flopped last time, will it work now?Times of India - Supriya Sharma - Jul 16, 2010RAIPUR: It was the Centre's big announcement this week: Unified Command for anti-Maoist operations in four states including Chhattisgarh. ... Don't join Unified Command, Maoists appeal to Army menThe Hindu - Jul 16, 2010The Communist Party of India (Maoist) criticised on Friday the Centre's decision to appoint a retired Major-General of the Army as a member of the Unified ... Rebels blow up PS in NabarangpurTimes of India - Satyanarayan Pattnaik - Jul 16, 2010KORAPUT: The outlawed CPI (Maoist) blew up a police station in Nabarangpur district on Thursday night. There was no casualty. A group of around 50 armed ... Five cops killed in Jharkhand landmine blastSify - Jul 16, 2010Five policemen were killed and 10 injured in a landmine blast triggered by Maoists in Jharkhand's Latehar district Friday, police said. ... Two Maoists lynched in JharkhandSify - Jul 16, 2010Ranchi: Angry villagers lynched two Maoists in Jharkhand's Latehar district after the rebels assaulted some people and demanded money, police said on Friday ... Jharkhand: Angry villagers lynch two MaoistsOneindia - Jul 15, 2010Ranchi, Jul 16: In an incident that indicates the kind of growing anger against Maoists in all spheres, angry villages lynched two red rebels in Jharkhand's ... Orissa: Maoists blow up police stationNewsX - Jul 15, 2010Maoists blow up a police station at Nabarangpur in Orissa. No casualties are reported as yet. All 32 related articles » | RelatedJharkhandMaoist Orissa Chhattisgarh Unified Combatant Command West Bengal Timeline of articles Number of sources covering this story
ImagesOneindiaOrissadiary.com All India Radio India Talkies TopNews TopNews All related images » VideosOrissa: Maoists blow up police stationNewsX - Jul 15, 2010 Watch video <div class="video-thumb thumbnail"><a class="js-link thumbnail-toggle" href="javascript:void(0);" onclick="return false;"><img src="http://i.ytimg.com/vi/v_eMm6uZw6c/default.jpg" alt="" class="thumbnail" width="120" height="90"> <div class="icon play-icon"></div></a></div> <div class="video-details"><a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v_eMm6uZw6c">Orissa: Maoists blow up police station</a> <span class="source">NewsX</span> - Jul 15, 2010 <div class="icon video-icon"></div> <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v_eMm6uZw6c">Watch video</a></div>
Integrated action plan needed to tackle Maoists: Raman Singh Asian News International (ANI) - Jul 15, 2010 Watch video <div class="video-thumb thumbnail"><a class="js-link thumbnail-toggle" href="javascript:void(0);" onclick="return false;"><img src="http://i.ytimg.com/vi/lgsaRhb1vWo/default.jpg" alt="" class="thumbnail" width="120" height="90"> <div class="icon play-icon"></div></a></div> <div class="video-details"><a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lgsaRhb1vWo">Integrated action plan needed to tackle Maoists: Raman Singh</a> <span class="source">Asian News International (ANI)</span> - Jul 15, 2010 <div class="icon video-icon"></div> <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lgsaRhb1vWo">Watch video</a></div>
All related videos » |
SCENARIOS-Possible options for India in fight against Maoists
18 May 2010 12:52:09 GMT
Source: Reuters
By Krittivas Mukherjee and Bappa Majumdar NEW DELHI, May 18 (Reuters) - Pressure is mounting on India's Prime Minister Manhoman Singh to send in the military to quell a growing Maoist insurgency after a string of attacks this year. For the main story, please click [nSGE64H05H] Here are possible options for the Indian government to tackle the decades-long insurgency which has killed thousands of people, mostly police, and has now spread to rural pockets in 20 of India's 28 states. MILITARY DEVISES STRATEGY WITHOUT GETTING INVOLVED A likely scenario is that the government asks military strategists to take over operations planning and train police and other government forces in anti-guerrilla warfare. The military is not directly involved now in tackling the insurgency, which virtually keeps the Indian state out of a large swathe of mineral-rich central and eastern regions with business potential worth billions of dollars. This move could see operations brought under the authority of a senior military commander. It could involve the use of air force planes for non-combat operations such as casualty evacuation, use of the military intelligence apparatus and the army's expertise in clearing land mines, which have killed more security men than gunfights. The government has previously used reconnaissance drones but use of any air power is unlikely. The strategy will save the government the embarrassment of conceding the failure of police while also infusing the offensive against the rebels with new expertise. The ruling Congress party is aware that failure to tackle the Maoist insurgency quickly could hurt its prospects in eight state elections lined up over the next two years. MILITARY IS CALLED IN This scenario is highly unlikely. India's ill-equipped and under-trained police, though much larger in numbers, have failed to take on the rebels who have an estimated 20,000 combatants, including up to 6,000-8,000 hardcore fighters. But it is unlikely the government will turn exclusively to the military to fight the rebels and back the offensive with air power which could result in large-scale civilian casualties. A purely military offensive could further alienate the poor in the region and send them deeper into the folds of the Maoists, and potentially lead to a loss of votes for the Congress. There is support for the Maoists among a section of urban intelligentsia and leftist liberals who warn that military action could breed further violence that spins into a civil war with the rural poor on one side and the Indian state on the other. India's military is involved in counter-insurgency operations in the disputed northern region of Kashmir and in northeast India, and in the past, was involved in the northern state of Punjab. In most cases, the presence of the military has been resented by locals and soldiers have been accused of human rights violations and other excesses. Some Congress allies, who face state elections over the coming year, may not back a move to involve the military for fear of upsetting voters. GOVERNMENT PERSISTS WITH POLICE ACTION This option is fast becoming unfeasible. A string of deadly attacks this year has exposed the limitations of police in tackling the insurgency. In many of the deadly attacks, standard operating procedures such as changing patrol routes and backup reinforcement for patrols were not followed. Most police deaths have occurred because of a lack of proper training and limited knowledge of the "red corridor" stretching from the southern state of Andhra Pradesh to the central state of Chhattisgarh and into West Bengal, bordering Nepal and Bhutan. If Prime Minister Singh persists with the current police action, he runs the risk of being seen as weak in tackling violent groups and his Congress party's prospects in upcoming state elections could be hurt.
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/SGE64H08P.htm
India Has No Military Option Against Naxals
Manmohan Singh
Feeling of Déjà vu
Sri Lankans in this little island who had witnessed such horrendous massacres of even a greater scale with extensive damage to state and private property in a 30- year-war may have viewed this tragedy with sympathy and also with some irony. The Naxalite movement that has its origins in 1967 in the village of Naxalbari in West Bengal has continued unabated, with success and failures, despite the tremendous resources in manpower possessed by the Indian government. Today they have reached a position of strength great enough for Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to say that it 'constitutes the greatest security threat now faced by India.'
Indian political analysts point out that in November 2003 it was estimated that 55 districts in 9 Indian states were listed as 'Maoist affected'. Last year Home Minister P. Chidambaram announced that 223 districts in 20 states were affected. An Indian political analyst has said that despite this spread, by no means could it be said that that the country is being captured by Maoists although some areas are seething with violence generated by Naxals. The government of India faces other insurgent and separatist movements such as in Kashmir and in the north east in the states of Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura. They have been contained to various degrees but now the Naxalite threat looms the largest of all.
Indulgence
Like in Sri Lanka where governments of the UNP and SLFP treated the JVP and even the LTTE, half-heartedly, it does appear that the Maoist movement too has been fortunate enough to be treated in a like manner. Critics of successive Indian governments' counter insurgency strategies point out to the lack of direction and coherence. The debate of whether the solution should be military or political has been on for long years. Indian politicians have shied away from resorting to a determined military effort.
In 2005, Home Minister Shivaji Patil had publicly declared that the government was not interested in using weapons to contain the movement. 'The Naxalites are our brothers and sisters and we know that this is a socio- economic problem rather than that of law and order,' he had said. Pranab Mukherjee, when defence minister had declared that while the movement caused some concern, it was manageable and there was no need for panic.
Massive effort
Following the re-election of the Sonia Gandhi government there has been severe criticism of the unplanned and ill conceived counter insurgency strategy. It led to government inspired leaks and even announcements of an intended massive push against the Naxals in the vast area in which they were now operating.
Naxalites following this announcement of a massive confrontation have resorted to typical guerrilla tactics using to their advantage the vast swathes of land across districts they operate on and the thin spread of security forces deployed against them. A recent politburo statement of the Naxals in response to the intention of the government to deploy a massive force against them have pointed out to the severe difficulties that would be experienced in implementing such a plan such as; in the immediate context the government would have difficulties in sending forces required by each state.
Taking this into consideration, the organisation called for the aggravation of the situation and creation of more difficulties to the 'enemy' by expanding the guerrilla war to new areas and intensifying attacks in other areas to disperse the 'enemy' over a sufficiently wide area. The politburo statement also says that tactical counter offensives should be stepped up and also taken to new areas to divert a section of the 'enemy forces' from attacking guerrilla bases.
Defence analysts say that this diversification of Naxalite violence has shown results in recent success scored by the insurgent groups in remote areas.
Police effort only and dialogue
Recent reports say that the Home Ministry has dismissed the intention of the government launching a 'massive operation' as a 'media invention' and said that a more coordinated effort by the state police to re- assert control over territory where the administration has lost control of would be launched.
Minister Chidambaram has also been openly calling for a dialogue with the insurgents but apparently they are not willing to abide by the Minister's call to 'abjure violence'.
Last week in a written interview with The Hindu newspaper a spokesman for the Naxalites has said that they unilaterally rejected the call to 'abjure from violence' but were prepared to accept a mutual ceasefire with security forces across the country. They have described the demand to renounce violence as being 'absurd' and called for cessation of hostilities by both sides to create a conducive atmosphere to hold talks while also lifting a ban placed on the organisation. Another demand is to release some key Naxal prisoners now being held by the government.
All this is very familiar to Sri Lankans — no military solution, only a political solution, ceasefire on both sides, lifting of the proscription placed on the organisation backed of course by an abundance of 'winning hearts and minds' rhetoric.
The parallels
Even though some parallels on how to fight insurgencies may be evident in the Sri Lankan and Indian cases, it is evident that India cannot opt for a military solution as Sri Lanka did or even as Indira Gandhi did in crushing the Sikh rebellion and with it the call for an independent state of Khalistan. India is now attempting to enter the 'Great Power' league and claiming for a seat with veto powers in the UN Security Council. It cannot be accused of killing its own citizens by resorting to a military option and then hope to be one of the big six in the Security Council.
Popularity: unranked [?]
Related posts:
- India Declares War On Maoists The biggest threat to the security of the Indian state is not China or Pakistan but the Naxalite movement. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh himself declared...
- India Under Threat Despite India's demonstration of its military and economic prowess beyond its borders, very recent events have demonstrated the extreme vulnerability of its internal security. On...
http://www.thesundayleader.lk/2010/04/11/india-has-no-military-option-against-naxals/
Ending Maoist Insurgency in India: Practical Propositions
PublicationsPublished April 23, 2010 at 1:55 amEnding the Maoist insurgency is not a mission too far. Experiences of several nations across the globe suggest that such insurgencies can be brought to an end by the State through a deft application of political and security strategies.
The CPI-Maoist, created through the merger of the People's War Group and Maoist Communist Center (MCC) in September 2004, is currently active in 20 states and 180 districts of India . The situation is so grave in the states of Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa and West Bengal that the Home Minister convened an extraordinary meeting of the Chief Ministers of the four eastern states on February 9, 2010, in a bid to chart out a new strategy that tackle the insurgency. To understand the nature of the Maoist insurgency, we must first understand the nature of the challenge that it poses to the Indian State.
Sizing up the Maoists
Maoists in forest areas, Source: Udumula Sudhakar Reddy's BlogIndia's Maoist insurgents do not recognize the Indian State. They decry its democratic system, pointing out its many flaws, and prefer to call for a "people's revolution". Most Maoist insurgents today have only a rudimentary plan for post-revolutionary governance and ad-hoc rule of law is the norm in areas controlled by the insurgents. However what the Maoists lack in terms of agenda, they make up for it in terms of ideological passion, as well as hard-learned tactics of guerrilla warfare. Mao believed that if the countryside were to be liberated, the cities would fall themselves. This, rather than the failed tactics of Che Guevara and other Marxist revolutionaries, is the ideology guiding the insurgents' leadership. Today's Maoists have inherited the rich experience of their predecessors such as the People's War Group in guerrilla warfare. Although police in various states cracked down on the arms supply routes of the Maoists at various points in time, lack of coordination between the various states' police forces has helped the Maoists. The LTTE was known to be a consistent supplier of arms and communication equipment to the Naxals. After the end of the LTTE in Sri Lanka, and police crackdowns on various supply routes, for a while the Maoists changed tactics. Instead of ambushes with small arms, they increasingly relied on IED/ mine attacks. These Improvised Explosive Devices were often built from explosives stolen or grabbed by force for quarry owners in the territory where they operated. However, of late, the Maoists have started manufacturing/reverse engineering their own small arms (A CRPF battalion recently found a Maoist arms factory that manufactured duplicate AK-47s and AK-56s in Jharkhand) increasing the lethality of their arsenal.
The cohesion in the Maoist ranks stems in part from the fact that it is well funded. The Maoist insurgency is believed to make as much as Rs 150 crore annually – primarily through extortion, with foot soldiers getting a stipend of upto Rs 1,500 per month. The Maoists' linkages with the Nepalese Maoists have among other things, been a source of concern, primarily because the latter have invaluable experience in fighting against the Royal Nepalese army which was trained along Indian lines which they could share.
In addition, political parties in various Maoist-afflicted states have used the movement and disaffected people to gain tactical political objectives. In some cases, these political parties have inexcusably ignored the Maoist infiltration of protest movements organized by them, as seen in the case of the People's Committee Against Police Atrocities (PCPA) in West Bengal.
The Maoists have been able to rapidly extend their base of supporters and sympathizers in the urban areas both in India as well as abroad through adept use of technology for propaganda. In addition to traditional print media, several Maoist blog sites have sprung up which use sophisticated methods to hide IP addresses and resurface with different names if blocked by the authorities. In order to reach their target population in the tribal areas with propaganda, Maoists in Chhatisgarh have even started an FM radio station. For now, the government is losing the information war against the Maoists.
The causes of discontent
What propels a youth in the Indian heartland to take up arms against the State and join the Maoists? Deprivation, unemployment and exclusion from national mainstream are common grievances among the rural population in east and Central India (especially east of the so-called "Kanpur-Chennai meridian"). States such as Chhattisgarh, Orissa, West Bengal and Jharkhand are the most mineral-rich states in India and yet Indians living in these states count among the poorest. (For instance, as against India's national per capita income of Rs 24,295, the per capita income of Chattisgarh (2008-09) stands at a mere Rs 16,740!)India Chattisgarh Jharkhand Orissa West Bengal
Rs 24,295 Rs 16,740 Rs 15,303 Rs 16,149 Rs 23,229
Some grievances are a by-product of the nature of the Indian federal system itself. For instance, tribals (adivasis) in mineral-rich districts such as Bastar in Chattisgarh do not get a fair share of the revenues from mining in the forests that they inhabit. The Central government corners the lion's share of royalties from mining in India. Till a few years ago, the "freight equalization policy" of the government hampered these states from translating their natural resources' advantage into industrial growth. The lack of investment in industrial skill development by successive governments has rendered the local population unemployable. The capital-intensive nature of the mining and mineral processing industry meant that those who stood to lose their land to such projects opposed them fervently, as witnessed in the cases of POSCO, Tata Steel and Vedanta. However, one cannot ignore the fact, that these inequalities may only represent a part of the story. Empirical evidence suggests that in any country with robust economic growth the Gini Coefficient (a measure of economic inequality) undergoes an initial increase before it begins to decline. India is now in the first half of this cycle of growth and hence economic growth has happened in parallel with a rise in inequalities and the quantum of disaffected people.
Security or Development – What comes first?
The big debate in Indian policymaking today lies in deciding whether the Maoist insurgency should be addressed as a development issue or a security issue. Most people agree that it is both. But if so, in what sequence should development and security measures be applied?The Indian government's traditional strategy in dealing with insurgencies is to first wear out the insurgents through a war of attrition, and then offer them the olive branch through measures such as a general amnesty, co-option into the governance structures and selective acceptance of the insurgents' demands subject to constitutional limits. This process has been employed with varied amounts of success against the Khalistani, Mizo, Bodo and ULFA separatists. However this strategy may not work in the case of Maoists.
Firstly, the Maoists are not an ethnicity or region-specific entity that can be dealt with in isolation. The Maoist agenda serves as a platform for a section of the population disaffected from or opposed to globalization, poor governance and corruption. Secondly, unlike regional separatists, the Maoists have not declared war against India, only against the Indian state. This distinction makes them use of force against them a less popular option among policymakers. Thirdly, the demands of the Maoists are not only disparate but in as much as they demand the change of the very nature of governance in India, i.e. democracy, are impossible to reconcile with. This however does not mean that the causes of disaffection cannot be addressed. It is clear therefore that only a mix of security and economic approaches can end the Maoist insurgency.
Current Situation
Red Corridor, Source: PlanemadAs of now the Maoists claim to be in the process of establishing "Red Corridor" and the "Compact Revolutionary Zone" or the "CRZ". More than 6000 lives have been lost as a result of this violence and with the renewed vigor of the insurgency witnessed in 2009, things threaten to go out of hand. In the absence of well-trained police forces, Chhatisgarh state started a much criticized scheme of forming a tribal militia called "Salwa Judum". The Salwa Judum resorted to extra-legal measures for countering Naxalites and after severe reprimands from the Central government, the Chhattisgarh state government allowed the movement to wither away in 2009.
The Government of India has thus far desisted from declaring a state of emergency in the severely affected states of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand and has refrained from promulgating the Disturbed Areas Act (D.A.A) and the Armed Forced Special Powers Act (A.F.S.P.A) in these areas. Thus the insurgency continues to be treated, perhaps rightly, as an internal security problem that is to be handled through policing rather than military measures. The pitfall of this approach however lies in the intransigence adopted by the ideologues of the Maoists who mistake the response of the government to represent its weakness and who believe that the Government of India has reached the limits of its capacity.
The violence perpetrated by Maoists is also hampering the delivery of public services to the people living in the insurgency-affected areas. For instance, doctors are less than willing to travel to Maoist affected areas, social infrastructure such as schools and hospitals faces daily threats of being blown up by the Maoists, and most economic activity barring mining (often illegal) has come to a halt in the Maoist affected areas even as vigilante justice has become the norm in these areas. Given the current gridlock in terms of development activity and rising security forces' casualties, the status quo is untenable.
ENDING THE INSURGENCY
International experiences
Given the highly organized and multi-state nature of this insurgency and the complicating factor of Centre-state relations, there is no precedent to eradicating such an insurgency within India. However there are precedents in countries that have faced and eradicated similarly placed Maoist insurgencies with varying tactics and degrees of success. Columbia, after a two-decade long struggle with the FARC Marxist rebels, used sustained military action including airpower to defeat the insurgency. Philippines which fought the CPP-PLA (Huk Balaha) formed special para-military forces, enlisted local leaders and undertook reforms to eradicate the "Huk" militia and their support base. Sendero Luminoso or "Shining Path" movement in Peru is another movement similar to the Maoists. After the Senderistas enforced a widespread boycott of elections in 1980, the government declared an emergency and gave extensive powers to the Army. The authorities there too created a peasants' militia called "Rondas" (similar to Chattisgarh's Salwa Judum militia) which only led to an escalation of violence. Ultimately the movement was eliminated through military action and decapitation of the leadership. The British experience in Malaya in the early 1950s is often considered a copybook case for counterinsurgency. A national "liberation" struggle launched by the Leftist guerrillas against the British led to widespread violence and human rights abuses from both sides. The strategy eventually adopted by the British had two key elements. Firstly, extensive propaganda warfare was launched against the guerrillas and the testimonies of captured guerrillas were deftly used to sow dissension in the guerrillas' ranks. The British also adopted an "oil spot" strategy (often used when the guerrillas have extensive control over a large swathe of territory) in which small pockets were "liberated" by the government, and provided opportunities for rapid development, which slowly reduced the guerrillas' support base in the neighboring districts and helped the government then extend its control over them. The oil spot strategy has been used by the French in Algeria and the Americans in Iraq with mixed results.When it comes to pre-empting conditions conducive to insurgencies through overwhelmingly development-based strategies, measures that significantly reduced poverty in a short span of time were successful. For instance, in Brazil, policymakers targeted inter-generational poverty propagation since it engenders a sense of injustice. Brazil started the Bolsa Familia program in 2003. The program consisted of conditional cash transfers to Below Poverty Line (BPL) families subject to their fulfillment of conditions such as school attendance of their children, vaccination etc. This program was directly responsible for a 20-25 % reduction of Brazil's recent reduction in inequality. The basic idea behind this program was to prevent a poor man's children from inheriting his poverty, illiteracy and lack of access to gainful economic activity. Since social stratification is often the fuel for socio-economic insurgencies, pre-empting insurgencies should involve rendering (through state intervention) an individual's class at birth an insignificant factor for his success in life.
Defeating the Indian Maoists
A police commando trains in camouflage for counter-Maoist operations, Source: Udumula Sudhakar Reddy's BlogTo deal with the Indian Maoists decisively, we propose a hybrid and yet nationally coherent strategy. Currently, different states in India pursue different strategies to deal with the Maoists insurgency with mixed results. For instance, Andhra Pradesh succeeded in almost ending the insurgency through the creation of a police force recruited from among the tribal population (as opposed to a mere Maoist-focused militia), state-funded microfinance schemes and improved healthcare delivery. Chattisgarh created a tribal militia aimed at dividing the recruitment base of the Maoists and to complement state security forces. The controversial measure led to an escalation of violence and has not yielded desired results thus far. Jharkhand, afflicted by constant political instability, is yet to face up to the Maoist challenge. In West Bengal, where the insurgency became a tool for games of political one-upmanship, the government is yet to evolve a political consensus against the Maoists. In Orissa, the state government, despite adequate political will, lacks the resources to carry out a successful security forces' campaign and has been negotiating with the Central government for a larger share of royalties from mineral extraction in the state.
Such varied approaches may stem from the varied nature of local grievances, but often fail given the fact that state borders and jurisdictions have little meaning for the Maoists. The Central government has taken some steps to rectify the situation. For instance, an intelligence sharing mechanism was institutionalized to improve information sharing between the police forces of different states, but this is yet to deliver comprehensive results. Schemes such as the National Rural Employment Guarantee (NREGA) have been enthusiastically implemented in the insurgency affected areas. But, this too has not delivered expected results since the Maoists have been more than ready to allow schemes that involve direct cash transfers in areas controlled by them. What is now needed is a coherent new strategy, ideally led by the central government, which can deal with the insurgency at various levels.
A layer-based strategy
There are three layers apparent to the Maoist insurgency. The first layer consists of the sympathizers and ideologues that are above ground and often resident in cities and urban areas (such as Kobad Ghandy and Gaddar). The second layer consists of operational commanders at various levels (Kishenji is one of the more senior ones among them). The third layer consists of foot soldiers who are mostly semi-literate or illiterate youth who are unemployed. These three layers have different reasons for being part of the movement, and different levels of motivation and hence need to be addressed through different strategies.The intellectuals of the first layer are hanging onto irrelevant and redundant ideologies and are suspicious of every move of the state and distrustful of democracy in general. While their propaganda networks should be disrupted, these individuals should in general be simply ignored. The operational commanders in the second layer are vital. They can be attracted into the mainstream through co-option into democratic governance at various levels of the government. If necessary, quasi-autonomous bodies such as Tribal Area Development Councils under Sixth schedule of Constitution of India could be created. The third layer of the Maoists, the foot soldiers, can be separated from the insurgency through socio-economic initiatives in the region, such as programs which involve better distribution of mining royalties (distributive justice) and creation of employment and a sustained de-radicalization program based on human values education to prevent recidivism.
POLICY PROPOSITIONS
Even as we recognize that there is no one-size-fits-all solution the Maoist challenge, a multi-pronged policy that targets the structure, genesis and support base of the Maoists can be most effective in ending the insurgency.Political and Governance Solutions: The government of India should co-opt and accommodate the Layer 2 Maoist cadres composed of field commanders and leaders (as described above) into the democratic mainstream to engage and empower the motivated and disaffected youth. The foot-soldiers also need to be offered a general rehabilitation package which consolidates various local amnesty schemes. Surrendered foot soldiers must be provided security guarantees against retribution, but where feasible, should also be used in crafting an aggressive information warfare campaign against the Maoists. Use of the Right to Information Act to force local authorities to yield information about developmental schemes can also increase transparency and accountability and lead to real, tangible change in governance. A responsive and responsible government can go a long way towards alleviating grievances, and the restoration of rule of law in the Maoist affected areas.
Security Solution: Security solutions within India have only been partly successful at ending insurgencies. That the Naxalbari Andolan was finished through ruthless application of force, should not be adequate reason to implement the same against the Maoists. In fact, creation of civilian militias such as Salwa Judum should be shunned because they expose civilians to unnecessary danger, and only translate into an abdication of security responsibility by the State. Instead, a special recruitment drive should be launched to take in tribal youth into the police and Army from the insurgency affected areas. If wielded well, a carrot and stick policy can wean away less motivated cadres into the mainstream.
Economic Solutions: The deprived population of the mineral rich regions should be provided conditional cash transfers that focus on hindering the inter-generational propagation of poverty and to also counter the widespread deprivation in the region thus reducing the recruitment pool of Maosists. A self sustaining economic scheme funded largely by mining revenues of the State can be implemented to provide skills, literacy, healthcare, employment and above all dignity and social justice to the people on the fringes of the national mainstream.
Civil Society: Civil society organizations comprising of intellectuals, eminent citizens, businesses, politicians, spiritual leaders and NGOs need to step forwards and mediate between GOI and the Maosists. Instead of consistently taking the path of mere protection of human rights or intercession in large scale development projects, civil society organizations should act as neutral mediators at the very local/ district level to persuade the insurgents to give up arms and convince authorities to deal justly with those that surrender.
The consequences of the Maoist insurgency are severe enough to warrant any kind of action and resources by the Indian State. India cannot afford a "lost generation" in the insurgency-affected areas even as it takes rapid steps towards becoming a major power in the international system. Ending the Maoist insurgency needs to become a national priority.
Tags: National Security, Publications
http://tirgroup.org/pub/ending-maoist-insurgency-in-india-practical-propositions
Counter-insurgency
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
| Warfare |
|---|
| Portal |
Counter-insurgency (COIN is a popular acronym) is a military term for the armed conflict against an insurgency by forces aligned with the recognized government of the territory in which the conflict takes place.[1] In the main, the insurgents seek to destroy or erase the political authority of the defending authorities in a population they seek to control, and the counter-insurgent forces seek to protect that authority and reduce or eliminate the supplanting authority of the insurgents.
Counter-insurgency operations are common during occupation and armed rebellions. Counter-insurgency may be armed suppression of a rebellion, coupled with tactics such as divide and rule designed to fracture the links between the insurgency and the population in which the insurgents move. Because it may be difficult or impossible to distinguish between an insurgent, a supporter of an insurgency who is a non-combatant, and entirely uninvolved members of the population, counter-insurgency operations have often rested on a confused, relativistic, or otherwise situational distinction between insurgents and non-combatants.
Contents[hide] |
[edit] Models
The guerrilla must swim in the people as the fish swims in the sea.
Counter-insurgency is normally conducted as a combination of conventional military operations and other means, such as propaganda, psy-ops, and assassinations. Counter-insurgency operations include many different facets: military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency.
To understand counter-insurgency, one must understand insurgency to comprehend the dynamics of revolutionary warfare. Insurgents capitalize on societal problems, often called gaps; counter-insurgency addresses closing the gaps. When the gaps are wide, they create a sea of discontent, creating the environment in which the insurgent can operate.[3]
In The Insurgent Archipelago John Mackinlay puts forward the concept of an evolution of insurgency from the Maoist paradigm of the golden age of insurgency to the global insurgency of the start of the twenty-first century. He defines this distinction as 'Maoist' and 'post-Maoist' insurgency.[4]
[edit] Legal and ethical challenges
William B. Caldwell wrote:
The law of armed conflict requires that, to use force, "combatants" must distinguish individuals presenting a threat from innocent civilians. This basic principle is accepted by all disciplined militaries. In the counterinsurgency, disciplined application of force is even more critical because our enemies camouflage themselves in the civilian population. Our success in Iraq depends on our ability to treat the civilian population with humanity and dignity, even as we remain ready to immediately defend ourselves or Iraqi civilians when a threat is detected.[5]
[edit] Strategies
[edit] B. H. Liddell Hart
The majority of counter-insurgency efforts by major powers in the last century have been spectacularly unsuccessful. This may be attributed to a number of causes. First, as B. H. Liddell Hart pointed out in the Insurgency addendum to the second version of his book Strategy: The Indirect Approach, a popular insurgency has an inherent advantage over any occupying force. He showed as a prime example the French occupation of Spain during the Napoleonic wars. Whenever Spanish forces managed to constitute themselves into a regular fighting force, the superior French forces beat them every time.
However, once dispersed and decentralized, the irregular nature of the rebel campaigns proved a decisive counter to French superiority on the battlefield. Napoleon's army had no means of effectively combatting the rebels, and in the end their strength and morale were so sapped that when Wellington was finally able to challenge French forces in the field, the French had almost no choice but to abandon the situation.
Counter-insurgency efforts may be successful, especially when the insurgents are unpopular. The Philippines, Peru, and Malaya have been the sites of failed insurgencies.
Hart also points to the experiences of T. E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt during World War I as another example of the power of the rebel/insurgent. Though the Ottomans often had advantages in manpower of more than 100 to 1, the Arabs' ability to materialize out of the desert, strike, and disappear again often left the Turks reeling and paralyzed, creating an opportunity for regular British forces to sweep in and finish the Turkish forces off.
In both the preceding cases, the insurgents and rebel fighters were working in conjunction with or in a manner complementary to regular forces. Such was also the case with the French Resistance during World War II and the National Liberation Front during the Vietnam War. The strategy in these cases is for the irregular combatant to weaken and destabilize the enemy to such a degree that victory is easy or assured for the regular forces. However, in many modern rebellions, one does not see rebel fighters working in conjunction with regular forces. Rather, they are home-grown militias or imported fighters who have no unified goals or objectives save to expel the occupier.
In these cases, such as the Israeli occupation of Lebanon, which ended in 2000, and the current Iraqi insurgency, the goal of the insurgent is not to defeat the occupying military force; that is almost always an impossible task given the disparity in resources. Rather, they seek through a constant campaign of sneak attacks to inflict continuous casualties upon their superior enemy forces and thereby over time demoralize the occupying forces and erode political support for the occupation in the homeland of the occupying forces. It is a simple strategy of repeated pin-pricks and bleedings that, though small in proportion to the total force strength, sap the will of the occupier to continue the fight.
According to Liddell Hart, there are few effective counter-measures to this strategy. So long as the insurgency maintains popular support, it will retain all of its strategic advantages of mobility, invisibility, and legitimacy in its own eyes and the eyes of the people. So long as this is the situation, an insurgency essentially cannot be defeated by regular forces. The US in Vietnam attempted to neutralize this advantage by simply taking away the civilian population that shielded the insurgents; however, this had the foreseeable effect of alienating the populace and further fueling support for the rebels. In the current operations against insurgents in the War on Terror, such ruthless tactics are not available to commanders, even if they were effective.
Another option in combating an insurgency would be to make the presence of troops so pervasive that there is simply no place left for insurgents to hide, as demonstrated in Franco's conquest of Republican Spain during the Spanish Civil War or the Union occupation of Confederate States with Federal troops following the American Civil War. In each of these cases, enormous amounts of manpower were needed for an extended period of time to quell resistance over almost every square kilometre of territory. In an age of ever shrinking and increasingly computerized armed forces, this option too is precluded from a modern commanders options.
Essentially, then, only one viable option remains. The key to a successful counter-insurgency is the winning-over of the occupied territory's population. If that can be achieved, then the rebellion will be deprived of its supplies, shelter, and, more importantly, its moral legitimacy. Unless the hearts and minds of the public can be separated from the insurgency, the occupation is doomed to fail. In a modern representative democracy, in the face of perceived incessant losses, no conflict will be tolerated by an electorate without significant show of tangible gains.
It should be noted that though the United States and its ARVN allies won every single major battle with North Vietnamese forces and their opponents suffered staggering losses (2 million+ casualties), the cost of victory was so high in the opinion of the US public (58,193 U.S. casualties) that it came to see any further possible gains as not worth the troop losses. As long as popular support is on their side, an insurgency can hold out indefinitely, consolidating its control and replenishing its ranks, until the occupiers simply leave.
[edit] David Galula
David Galula gained his practical experience in counter insurgency as a French officer in the Algerian War. His theory of counterinsurgency is not primarily military, but a combination of military, political and social actions under the strong control of a single authority.
Galula proposes four "laws" for counterinsurgency:[6]
- The aim of the war is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory.
- Most of the population will be neutral in the conflict; support of the masses can be obtained with the help of an active friendly minority.
- Support of the population may be lost. The population must be efficiently protected to allow it to cooperate without fear of retribution by the opposite party.
- Order enforcement should be done progressively by removing or driving away armed opponents, then gaining support of the population, and eventually strengthening positions by building infrastructure and setting long-term relationships with the population. This must be done area by area, using a pacified territory as a basis of operation to conquer a neighbouring area.
Galula contends that:
A victory [in a counterinsurgency] is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgent's forces and his political organization. ... A victory is that plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population, but maintained by and with the population. ... In conventional warfare, strength is assessed according to military or other tangible criteria, such as the number of divisions, the position they hold, the industrial resources, etc. In revolutionary warfare, strength must be assessed by the extent of support from the population as measured in terms of political organization at the grass roots. The counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embedded in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population.[7]
With his four principles in mind, Galula goes on to describe a general military and political strategy to put them into operation in an area that is under full insurgent control:
In a Selected Area
1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed insurgents.
2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent's comeback in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives.
3. Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerillas.
4. Destroy the local insurgent political organization.
5. Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities.
6. Test those authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the softs and the incompetents, give full support to the active leaders. Organize self-defense units.
7. Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement.
8. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants.[7]
According to Galula, some of these steps can be skipped in areas that are only partially under insurgent control, and most of them are unnecessary in areas already controlled by the government.[7] Thus the essence of counterinsurgency warfare is summed up by Galula as "Build (or rebuild) a political machine from the population upward."[8]
[edit] Martin van Creveld
Military historian Martin van Creveld, noting that almost all attempts to deal with insurgency have ended in failure, advises:
The first, and absolutely indispensable, thing to do is throw overboard 99 percent of the literature on counterinsurgency, counterguerrilla, counterterrorism, and the like. Since most of it was written by the losing side, it is of little value.[9]
In examining why so many counterinsurgencies by powerful militaries fail against weaker enemies, Van Creveld identifies a key dynamic that he illustrates by the metaphor of killing a child. Regardless of whether the child started the fight or how well armed the child is, an adult in a fight with a child will feel that they are acting unjustly if they harm the child, foolish if the child harms them and wonder if the fight is necessary.
Van Creveld argues that "by definition, a strong counterinsurgent who uses his strength to kill the members of a small, weak organization of insurgents - let alone the civilian population by which it is surrounded, and which may lend it support - will commit crimes in an unjust cause," while "a child who is in a serious fight with an adult is justified in using every and any means available - not because he or she is right, but because he or she has no choice."[10] Every act of insurgency becomes, from the perspective of the counterinsurgent, a reason to end the conflict, while also being a reason for the insurgents to continue until victory. Dang Xuan Khu, second in command to Ho Chi Minh of Vietnam, wrote in his Primer for Revolt:
The guiding principle of the strategy for our whole resistance must be to prolong the war. To protract the war is the key to victory. Why must the war be protracted? ... If we throw the whole of our forces into a few battles to try to decide the outcome, we shall certainly be defeated and the enemy will win. On the other hand, if while fighting we maintain our forces, expand them, train our army and people, learn military tactics ... and at the same time wear down the enemy forces, we shall weary and discourage them in such a way that, strong as they are, they will become weak and will meet defeat instead of victory[11]
Van Creveld thus identifies "time" as the key factor in counterinsurgency. In an attempt to find lessons from the few cases of successful counterinsurgency, of which he lists two clear cases: the British efforts during The Troubles of Northern Ireland and the 1982 Hama massacre carried out by the Syrian government to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood, he asserts that the "core of the difficulty is neither military nor political, but moral" and outlines two distinct methods.[12]
The first method relies on superb intelligence, provided by those who know the natural and artificial environment of the conflict as well as the insurgents. Once such superior intelligence is gained, the counterinsurgents must be trained to a point of high professionalism and discipline such that they will exercise discrimination and restraint. Through such discrimination and restraint, the counterinsurgents do not alienate members of the populace besides those already fighting them, while delaying the time when the counterinsurgents become disgusted by their own actions and demoralized.
General Patrick Walters, British commander of troops in northern Ireland, explicitly stated that his objective was not to kill as many terrorists as possible, but to ensure that as few people on both sides were killed. In the vast majority of counterinsurgencies, the "forces of order" kill far more people than they lose. In contrast and using very rough figures, of the approximately 3000 British killed during The Troubles, 1700 were civilians and 1000 were British soldiers and members of security forces, translating into an three-to-one kill ratio in favor of the terrorists.[13]
If the prerequisites for the first method - excellent intelligence, superbly trained and disciplined soldiers and police, and an iron will to avoid being provoked into lashing out - are lacking, van Creveld posits that counterinsurgents who still want to win must use the second method exemplified by the Hama massacre. In 1982 the regime of Syrian president Hafez al-Assad was on the point of being overwhelmed by the countrywide insurgency of the Muslim Brotherhood. al-Assad sent a division under his brother Rifaat to the city of Hama, known to be the center of the resistance.
Following a counterattack by the Brotherhood, Rifaat used his heavy artillery to demolish the city, killing between ten and 25 thousand people, including many women and children. Asked by reporters what had happened, Hafez al-Assad exaggerated the damage and deaths, promoted the commanders who carried out the attacks, and razed Hama's well-known great mosque, replacing it with a parking lot. With the Muslim Brotherhood scattered, the population was so cowed that it would years before opposition groups would dare disobey the regime again and, van Creveld argues, the massacre most likely saved the regime and prevented a bloody civil war.
Van Creveld condenses al-Assad's strategy into five rules, while noting that they could easily have been written by Niccolò Machiavelli:[13]
- There are situations in which cruelty is necessary, and refusing to apply necessary cruelty is a betrayal of the people who put you into power. When pressed to cruelty, never threaten your opponent but disguise your intention and feign weakness until you strike.
- Once you decide to strike, it is better to kill too many than not enough. If another strike is needed, it reduces the impact of the first strike. Repeated strikes will also endanger the morale of the counterinsurgent troops; soldiers forced to commit repeated atrocities will likely begin to resort to alcohol or drugs to force themselves to carry out orders and will inevitably lose their military edge, eventually turning into a danger to their commanders.
- Act as soon as possible. More lives will be saved by decisive action early, than by prolonging the insurgency. The longer you wait, the more inured the population will be to bloodshed, and the more barbaric your action will have to be to make an impression.
- Strike openly. Do not apologize, make excuses about "collateral damage", express regret, or promise investigations. Afterwards, make sure that as many people as possible know of your strike; media is useful for this purpose, but be careful not to let them interview survivors and arouse sympathy.
- Do not command the strike yourself, in case it doesn't work for some reason and you need to disown your commander and try another strategy. If it does work, present your commander to the world, explain what you have done and make certain that everyone understands that you are ready to strike again.[14]
[edit] David Kilcullen
In "The Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency", Dr. David J. Kilcullen, the Chief Strategist of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the U.S. State Department in 2006, described a framework for interagency cooperation in counterinsurgency operations. His pillars – Security, Political and Economic – support the overarching goal of Control, but are based on Information:
This is because perception is crucial in developing control and influence over population groups. Substantive security, political and economic measures are critical but to be effective they must rest upon, and integrate with a broader information strategy. Every action in counterinsurgency sends a message; the purpose of the information campaign is to consolidate and unify this message. ... Importantly, the information campaign has to be conducted at a global, regional and local level — because modern insurgents draw upon global networks of sympathy, support, funding and recruitment.[15]
Kilcullen considers the three pillars to be of equal importance, because
unless they are developed in parallel, the campaign becomes unbalanced: too much economic assistance with inadequate security, for example, simply creates an array of soft targets for the insurgents. Similarly, too much security assistance without political consensus or governance simply creates more capable armed groups. In developing each pillar, we measure progress by gauging effectiveness (capability and capacity) and legitimacy (the degree to which the population accepts that government actions are in its interest).[15]
The overall goal, according to this model, "is not to reduce violence to zero or to kill every insurgent, but rather to return the overall system to normality — noting that 'normality' in one society may look different from normality in another. In each case, we seek not only to establish control, but also to consolidate that control and then transfer it to permanent, effective and legitimate institutions.[15]"
[edit] Tactics
[edit] Population control
With regard to tactics, the terms "drain the water" or "drain the swamp" involves the forced relocation of the population ("water") to expose the rebels or insurgents ("fish"). In other words, relocation deprives the aforementioned of the support, cover, and resources of the local population.
A somewhat similar strategy was used extensively by US forces in South Vietnam until 1969, initially by forcing the rural population into fenced camps, referred to as Strategic Hamlets, and later by declaring the previous areas as free-fire zones to remove the rest from their villages and farms. Widespread use was made of Agent Orange, sprayed from airplanes, to destroy crops that might have provided resources for Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops and their human support base. These measures proved ineffective, as the Viet Cong often relocated activists and sympathizers inside the new communities. In any event, the Vietnam War was only partly a counter-insurgency campaign, as it also involved conventional combat between US/ARVN forces, Vietcong Main Force Battalions, and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA).
According to a report of the Australian military:
Among the most effective means are such population-control measures as vehicle and personnel checkpoints and national identity cards. In Malaya, the requirement to carry an ID card with a photo and thumbprint forced the communists to abandon their original three-phase political-military strategy and caused divisive infighting among their leaders over how to respond to this effective population-control measure."[16]
[edit] Oil spot
The oil spot approach is a descriptive term for the concentration of counter-insurgent forces into an expanding, secured zone. The origins of the expression is to be found in its initial use by Marshal Hubert Lyautey, the main theoretician of French colonial warfare and counter-insurgency strategy.[17][18] The oil spot approach was later one of the justifications given in the Pentagon Papers[19] for the Strategic Hamlet Program.
[edit] Cordon and search
Cordon and search is a military tactic to cordon off an area and search the premises for weapons or insurgents.[20][21] It is one of the basic counter insurgency operations.[22] Other related operations are Cordon and Knock[23][24][25] and Cordon and Kick.
It has taken over the old term of a simple house search. It is part of new doctrine called Stability and Support Operations or SASO. It is a technique used where there is no hard intelligence of weapons in the house and therefore is less intense than a normal house search. It is used in urban neighborhoods. The purpose of the mission is to search a house with as little inconvenience to the resident family as possible.
[edit] Air operations
Air power can play an important role in counter-insurgency, capable of carrying out a wide range of operations:
- Transportation in support of combattants and civilians alike, including casualty evacuations;
- Intelligence gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
- Psychological operations, through leaflet drops, loudspeakers, and radio broadcasts;
- Air-to-ground attack against 'soft' targets.[26]
[edit] Specific doctrines
[edit] British Empire
[edit] Malaya
British forces were able to employ the relocation method with considerable success during the "Malayan Emergency". The Briggs Plan, implemented fully in 1950, relocated Chinese Malayans into protected "New Villages", designated by British forces. By the end of 1951, some 400,000 ethnic Chinese had moved into the fortifications. Of this population, the British forces were able to form a "Home Guard", armed for resistance against the Malayan Communist Party, an implementation mirrored by the Strategic Hamlet Program later used by US forces in South Vietnam.[27][28] Despite British claims of a victory in the Malayan Emergency, military historian Martin van Creveld has pointedly noted that the end result of the counterinsurgency, namely the withdrawal of British forces and establishment of an independent state, are identical to that of Aden, Kenya and Cyprus, which are not considered victories.[29]
[edit] France
France had major counterinsurgency wars in its colonies in Indochina and Algeria. McClintock cited the basic points of French doctrine as:[30]
- Quadrillage (an administrative grid of population and territory)
- Ratissage (cordoning and "raking")
- Regroupement (relocating and closely controlling a suspect population)
- 'Tache d'huile' – The 'oil spot' strategy
- Recruitment of local leaders and forces
- Paramilitary organization and militias
Much of the thinking was informed by the work of earlier leading French theoreticians of colonial warfare and counter-insurgency, Marshals Bugeaud, Gallieni and Lyautey.[18]
While McClintock cites the 1894 Algerian governor, Jules Cambon, as saying "By destroying the administration and local government "we were also suppressing our means of action." "The result is that we are today confronted by a sort of human dust on which we have no influence and in which movements take place which are unknown to us." Cambon's philosophy, however, did not seem to survive into the Algerian War of Independence, (1954–1962).
[edit] Indochina
Post-WWII doctrine, as in Indochina, took a more drastic view of "Guerre Révolutionnaire", which presented an ideological and global war, with a commitment to total war. Countermeasures, in principle, needed to be both political and military; "No measure was too drastic to meet the new threat of revolution". French forces taking control from the Japanese did not seem to negotiate seriously with nationalist elements in what was to become Vietnam,[32] and reaped the consequences of overconfidence at Dien Bien Phu.[33]
It occurred to various commanders that soldiers trained to operate as guerrillas would have a strong sense of how to fight guerrillas. Before the partition of French Indochina, French Groupement de Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés (GCMA), led by Roger Trinquier,[34] took on this role, drawing on French experience with the Jedburgh teams.[35] GCMA, operating in Tonkin and Laos under French intelligence, was complemented by Commandos Nord Viêt-Nam in the North. In these missions, the SOF teams lived and fought with the locals. One Laotian, who became an officer, was Vang Pao, who was to become a general in Hmong and Laotian operations in Southeast Asia while the US forces increased their role.
[edit] Algeria
The French counterinsurgency in colonial Algeria was a savage one. The 1957 Battle of Algiers resulted in 24,000 detentions, with most tortured and an estimated 3,000 killed. It may have broken the FLN infrastructure in Algiers, but it also killed off French legitimacy as far as "hearts and minds" went.[30][36]
Counter-insurgency requires an extremely capable intelligence infrastructure endowed with human sources and deep cultural knowledge. This contributes to the difficulty that foreign, as opposed to indigenous, powers have in counter-insurgent operations. One of France's most influential theorists was Roger Trinquier. The Modern Warfare counterinsurgency strategy described by Trinquier, who had led anti-communist guerillas in Indochina, was a strong influence on French efforts in Algeria.
Trinquier suggested three principles:
- separate the guerrilla from the population that supports him;
- occupy the zones that the guerrillas previously operated from, making the area dangerous for the insurgents and turning the people against the guerrilla movement; and
- coordinate actions over a wide area and for a long enough time that the guerrilla is denied access to the population centres that could support him.
Trinquier's view was that torture had to be extremely focused and limited, but many French officers considered its use corrosive to its own side. There were strong protests among French leaders: the Army's most decorated officer, General Jacques Pâris de Bollardière, confronted General Jacques Massu, the commander of French forces in the Battle of Algiers, over orders institutionalizing torture, as "an unleashing of deplorable instincts which no longer knew any limits." He issued an open letter condemning the danger to the army of the loss of its moral values "under the fallacious pretext of immediate expediency", and was imprisoned for sixty days.[30]
As some of the French Army protested, other parts increased the intensity of their approach, which led to an attempted military coup against the French Fourth Republic itself. Massu and General Raoul Salan led a 1958 coup in Algiers, demanding a new Republic under Charles de Gaulle. When de Gaulle's policies toward Algeria, such as a 1961 referendum on Algerian self-determination, did not meet the expectations of the colonial officers, Salan formed the underground Organisation de l'armée secrète (OAS), a right-wing terrorist group, whose actions included a 1962 assassination attempt against de Gaulle himself.
[edit] Subsaharan Africa
France has had taken Barnett's Leviathan role[37] in Chad and Ivory Coast, the latter on two occasions, most significantly in 2002-2003.[38] The situation with France and Ivory Coast is not a classic FID situation, as France attacked Ivorian forces that had attacked UN peacekeepers.
[edit] India
There have been many insurgencies in India from its creation in 1947.
The Naga Insurgency was the first insurgency after the nation was formed. Addressed by both political and military means, it resulted in the creation of state of Nagaland and a peace accord between Indian government and the rebel group.
The Punjab insurgency was driven by the Khalistan movement. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill (KPS Gill), was credited with breaking the back of this insurgency in the early 1990s, after it peaked in the 1980s with widespread terrorism, bank robberies, murders and intimidation. There are allegations that this insurgency was supported heavily by Pakistan through weapons and training. The Indian border with Pakistan was fenced[citation needed] and Punjab police and Indian Government armed forces were eventually successful in suppressing the violence.
The Kashmir insurgency, which started by 1989, is largely blamed on mismanagement of polls by Indian and state governments. It was brought under control by Indian government and violence has been reduced. The Army's elite Rashtriya Rifles (RR) played a major role in putting down the insurgency. The RR was well supported by Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Border Security Force (BSF) and state government police. Successful conduct of a state election was a major victory against insurgents. In a effort to keep the insurgency alive, Pakistan-based foreign militants allegedly sneak through the border.
The Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) is located in the north-eastern town of the Indian state of Mizoram. Personnel from the countries such as the US, Britain, France, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Vietnam have attended this school. Soldiers from India and the United States participate in long exercises in guerrilla warfare in the Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School at Vairengte in Mizoram.[39] Graduate level, high quality education by a joint staff of highly trained special operators at Camp Taji Phoenix Academy and the Counterinsurgency Center For Excellence is provided in Iraq. This facility is used to train the US military training team members (MTT)[40] as well as many Iraqi Officers.
[edit] United States
The United States has conducted counterinsurgency campaigns during the Philippine–American War, the Vietnam War, the post-2001 War in Afghanistan, and the Iraq War. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted in increased interest in counterinsurgency within the American military, exemplified by the 2006 publication of a new counterinsurgency field manual, FM 3-24.[41]
[edit] See also
[edit] References
[edit] Notes
- ^ An insurgency is a rebellion against a constituted authority (for example an authority recognized as such by the United Nations) when those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents (Oxford English Dictionary second edition 1989 "insurgent B. n. One who rises in revolt against constituted authority; a rebel who is not recognized as a belligerent.")
- ^ Mao Zedong. On Guerilla Warfare (1937), Chapter 6 - "The Political Problems of Guerilla Warfare":
Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy's rear. Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together? It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of its native element cannot live.
- ^ Eizenstat, Stuart E.; John Edward Porter and Jeremy M. Weinstein (January/February 2005). "Rebuilding Weak States" (PDF). Foreign Affairs 84 (1). http://www.cgdev.org/doc/commentary/15_Eizenstat.pdf
- ^ John Mackinlay, The Insurgent Archipelago, (London: Hurst, 2009).
- ^ Caldwell, William B. (8 March 2008). ([dead link] – Scholar search)Washington Times. http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20070208-084406-5379r.htm
- ^ Reeder, Brett. "Book Summary of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice by David Galula". Crinfo.org (The Conflict Resolution Information Source). http://www.crinfo.org/booksummary/10672/. Retrieved 2008-09-22.
- ^ a b c Galula, David Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 1964. ISBN 0-275-99303-5 p.54-56
- ^ Galula p.95
- ^ van Creveld, Martin, The Changing Face of War: Combat from the Marne to Iraq, 2008, New York: Ballantine, ISBN 978-0-89141-902-0, p. 268
- ^ van Creveld, p. 226
- ^ van Creveld, pp. 229-230
- ^ van Creveld, p. 269
- ^ a b van Creveld, p. 235
- ^ van Creveld, pp. 241-245
- ^ a b c Kilcullen, David (28 September 2006). "Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency" (PDF). http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uscoin/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf.
- ^ Sepp, Kalev I. (May-June 2005). "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," (PDF). Military Review: 8–12. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/sepp.pdf
- ^ Lyautey, Hubert. Du rôle colonial de l'armée (Paris: Armand Colin, 1900)
- ^ a b Porch, Douglas. "Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: The Development of French colonial warfare", in Paret, Peter; Craig, Gordon Alexande; Gilbert, Felix (eds). Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 376-407.
- ^ "Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 3, Chapter 1, "US Programs in South Vietnam, Nov. 1963-Apr. 1965,: section 1". Mtholyoke.edu. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon3/pent1.htm. Retrieved 2009-10-03.
- ^ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1995/call-95-2_peace-ops-vignettes_vign7.htm
- ^ "Tactics 101: 026. Cordon and Search Operations". Armchair General. http://www.armchairgeneral.com/tactics-101-026-cordon-and-search-operations.htm. Retrieved 2009-10-03.
- ^ "Basic Counter-Insurgency". Military History Online. http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/general/articles/counterinsurgency.aspx. Retrieved 2009-10-03.
- ^ Chronology: How the Mosul raid unfolded. Retrieved 28.07.2005.
- ^ U.S. Detains 6 Iranians in Irbil Raid Accessed Jan 11 2007 -- included use of "stun bombs" in the operation.
- ^ Used in "Operation Quick Strike" in Iraq on August 6, 2005. Retrieved 11 January 2007.
- ^ Sagraves, Robert D (April 2005) (PDF). The Indirect Approach: the role of Aviation Foreign Internal Defense in Combating Terrorism in Weak and Failing States. Air Command and Staff College. https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2005/acsc/3569%20-%20Sagraves.pdf
- ^ Nagl, John (2002). Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Praeger Publishers. ISBN 0-275-97695-5
- ^ Thompson, Robert (1966). Defeating Communist Insurgency: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Chatto & Windus. ISBN 0-7011-1133-X
- ^ van Creveld, p. 221
- ^ a b c McClintock, Michael (November 2005). "Great Power Counterinsurgency". Human Rights First. http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/programareas/conferences/presentations/McClintock,%20Michael.ppt.
- ^ Pike, Douglas. PAVN: Peoples Army of Vietnam. (Presidio: 1996) pp. 37-169
- ^ Patti, Archimedes L.A. (1980). Why Vietnam? Prelude to America's Albatross. University of California Press. ISBN 0520041569.
- ^ Fall, Bernard B (2002). Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu. Da Capo Press. ISBN 030681157X.
- ^ Trinquier, Roger (1961). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. ISBN 0275992675. http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/trinquier/trinquier.asp
- ^ Porte, Rémy. "Intelligence in Indochina: Discretion and Professionalism were rewarded when put into Practice." (PDF). http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/doctrine/doctrine09/us/lessons_learned/art01.pdf. Retrieved 2007-11-26.
- ^ Tomes, Robert R. (2004). "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare" (PDF). Parameters (United States Army War College). http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/PARAMETERS/04spring/tomes.pdf
- ^ Barnett, Thomas P.M. (2005). The Pentagon's New Map: The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century. Berkley Trade. Barnett-2005. ISBN 0425202399.
- ^ Corporal Z.B.. "Ivory Coast – Heart of Darkness". http://www.kepi.cncplusplus.com/Ivory_Coast/Ivory_Coast.htm.
- ^ Dawn Online. 10 April 2004. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/607801.cms
- ^ IRNA - Islamic Republic News Agency. "US army officers will receive training in guerrilla warfare in Mizoram". Globalsecurity.org. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/09/mil-050901-irna01.htm
- ^ http://www.everyspec.com/ARMY/FM+-+Field+Manual/FM_3-24_15DEC2006_13424/
[edit] Bibliography
- Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), ISBN 0-521-54869-1.
- Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. "Tunnel at the End of the Light: A Critique of U.S. Counter-terrorist Grand Strategy," Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2002), pp. 549–563.
- Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. "How to Lose a War on Terror: A Comparative Analysis of a Counterinsurgency Success and Failure," in Jan Ångström and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Eds., Understanding Victory and Defeat in Contemporary War. (London: Frank Cass, 2007).
- Burgoyne, Michael L. and Albert J. Marckwardt (2009). The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa With E. D. Swinton's "The Defence of Duffer's Drift". University of Chicago Press. ISBN 9780226080932.
- Callwell, C. E. Small Wars: Their Principles & Practice. (Lincoln, Nebraska: Bison Books, 1996), ISBN 0-8032-6366-X.
- Cassidy, Robert M. Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).
- Catignani, Sergio. Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the two Intifadas: Dilemmas of a Conventional Army. (London: Routledge, 2008), ISBN 978-0-415-43388-4.
- Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. (Wesport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1964), ISBN 0275992691.
- Joes, James Anthony. Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency. (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), ISBN 0-8131-9170-X.
- Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. (London: Hurst, 2009).
- Kitson, Frank, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping. (1971)
- Larson, Luke. Senator's Son: An Iraq War Novel. (Phoenix: Key Edition, 2010), ISBN 0615353797.
- Mackinlay, John. The Insurgent Archipelago. (London: Hurst, 2009).
- Mao Zedong. Aspects of China's Anti-Japanese Struggle (1948).
- Merom, Gil. How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), ISBN 0-521-00877-8.
- Zambernardi, Lorenzo. "Counterinsurgency's Impossible Trilemma," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2010), pp. 21-34.
[edit] External links
 | Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Counter-insurgency warfare |
- Small Wars Journal: Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Research page
- The U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual
- Terrorism prevention in Russia: one year after Beslan
- "Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict" U.S. Depts. of the Army and Air Force
- "Inside Counterinsurgency" by Stan Goff, ex - U.S. Special Forces
- "Instruments of Statecraft – U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940 –1990 by Michael McClintock
- "Counter-Revolutionary Violence – Bloodbaths in Fact & Propaganda by Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman
- "The Warsaw Ghetto Is No More" by SS Brigade Commander Jürgen Stroop
- "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century" by Steven Metz and Raymond Millen
- Wired News article on game theory in war on terror
- Military forces in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations at JihadMonitor.org
- "Counter Insurgency Jungle Warfare School India"
- "Bibliography: Theories of Limited War and Counterinsurgency" by Edwin Moise (Vietnam-era)
- "Bibliography: Doctrine on Insurgency and Counterinsurgency" Edwin Moise (recent)
- "Military Briefing Book" news regarding counter-insurgency
Indian Armed Forces
.
Security Environment - An Overview
| India 's security concerns are defined by a dynamic global security environment and the perception that South Asia region is of particular global security interest. The continuing presence of terrorist and fundamentalist forces in its neighbourhood has prompted India to maintain a high level of defence vigilance and preparedness to face any challenge to its security. The security challenges facing India are varied and complex. The country faces a series of low intensity conflicts characterized by tribal, ethnic and left wing movements and ideologies as also the proxy war conducted by Pakistan and various radical jehadi outfits through the instrumentality of terrorism. India is also affected by the trafficking in drugs and proliferation of small arms and the fact that it is surrounded by two neighbours with nuclear weapons and missiles and history of past aggressions and war. There is also the ever present possibility of hostile radical fundamentalist elements gaining access to the weapons of mass destruction in Pakistan . The country has experienced four major conventional border wars besides an undeclared war at Kargil. India 's response to these threats and challenges has always been restrained, measured and moderate in keeping with its peaceful outlook and reputation as a peace loving country |
| National Security Objectives India's national security objectives have evolved against a backdrop of India's core values namely, democracy, secularism and peaceful co-existence and the national goal of social and economic development. These are:-
India is strategically located in relation to both continental Asia as well as the Indian Ocean region. India 's geographical and topographical diversity, especially on its borders, poses unique challenges to our armed forces in terms of both equipment and training. It's peninsular shape provides India a coastline of about 7600 kms and an exclusive economic zone(EEZ) of over 2 million sq kms. The island territories in the East are 1,300 kms away from the main land, physically much closer to South East Asia . The peninsular India is adjacent to one of the most vital sea-lanes stretching from the Suez canal and Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca through which much of the oil from the Gulf region transits. This is an area which has attracted super power rivalries in the past and continues to be a region of heightened activity by extra regional navies on account of current global security concerns. India's size, strategic location, trade interests and a security environment that extends from the Persian Gulf in the west to the Straits of Malacca in the east and from the Central Asian Republics in the north to near the equator in the south, underpin India's security response. In view of this strategic spread, it is essential for the country to maintain a credible land, air and maritime force to safeguard its security interests. The Regional PictureThough there have been positive developments in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, a closer look at the neighbourhood and the wider region continues to present a disturbing picture. Many of the countries face internal instability threatening their economic progress and peace. However, the single greatest threat to peace and stability in the region is posed by the combination of terrorism nurtured in and by Pakistan for its strategic objectives, and the ingrained adventurism of the Pakistani military motivated by its obsessive and compulsive hostility towards India. Virtually every terrorist act anywhere in the world today has a Pakistani fingerprint somewhere. It is the root and epicentre of international terrorism in the region and beyond. Afghanistan has, with the intervention of the international community, only just emerged from the dark years of a reactionary, medieval and fundamentalist regime essentially created by Pakistan. While the new Government has international legitimacy, the task of reconstruction and rebuilding the institutions is formidable. Pakistan has a vested interest in a weak and unstable Afghanistan which provides it an opportunity to meddle in the internal affairs of the country in pursuit of its quest for strategic depth vis a vis India and Central Asia .Any revival of jehadi activities supported by Pakistan is of direct security concern to India in view of their linkages with terrorism and the proxy war against India. India is also committed to international engagement in Afghanistan so that Pakistan cannot exploit the neglect and inattention of the international community, as it did after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, to sponsor jehadi politics and training in the region. In Pakistan, fundamentalist political parties have taken advantage of the manipulated elections that debarred the two most popular political leaders from contesting, to seize power in two provincial governments and a share in the coalition government at the Centre. Reports and evidence mount of both inward and outward proliferation of nuclear weapon technologies. Pakistan has also not lived up to its much-publicised promises to the international community to cease cross-border terrorism against India reversing even those cosmetic steps that it took at the beginning of the year, under international pressure, against fundamentalist organizations. Worse still, periodic Pakistani nuclear sabre-rattling, veiled and unveiled, has passed virtually unreprimanded by the international community. In Bangladesh too, conservative, right wing, religious fundamentalist political parties now have a place in the coalition government. Pakistan continues to take advantage of a favourable environment in Bangladesh and of weak government in Nepal , to promote fundamentalist thinking and ISI activities in India in both these countries. In Sri Lanka, the ceasefire between the LTTE and the government is a positive development though the LTTE remains a potent non-state military force that continues to arm itself, and the danger of backsliding of the political process remains. In Myanmar, the tussle between the forces of democracy and the military government remains alive. Further west of the region, the US-led war against Iraq has generated a series of security concerns for India notably in relation to the security of the large Indian community resident there, and of oil and energy supplies. There is also a very real risk that the US-led coalition war in Iraq will distract attention from Pakistani behaviour in its neighbourhood, particularly in India but also Afghanistan, which Pakistan will use to step up its adventurist activities in the region as it did after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan . The war against Iraq could also aggravate the divide between the Muslim and non-Muslim world. Against this backdrop, India remains fully committed to maintaining peace with its neighbours and stability in the region through a combination of defence-preparedness and unilateral restraint, confidence building and dialogue and expanding bilateral interactions. In the area of defence-preparedness, it has reformed its higher defence management and streamlined procurement procedures. Its defence policy and force postures remain defensive in orientation while its nuclear policy is characterized by a commitment to no-first-use, moratorium on nuclear testing, minimum credible nuclear deterrence, and the rejection of an arms race or concepts and postures from the Cold War era. |
 |  |
| Pakistan Pakistan's polity has been repeatedly hijacked by the military who have a vested interest in tension with India as it strengthens their pre-eminence in the Pakistani power structure. The past year witnessed a progressive consolidation of the role of the military, and in particular that of Gen. Musharraf, in the Pakistani polity through the " referendum" of April 2002, the Legal Framework Order (LFO) of August, the enhanced and institutionalized role of the army in the strengthened National Security Council of Pakistan, and the patently manipulated elections of October. Together with the rise of fundamentalist MMA, these developments do not augur well for India's security. India has been on the receiving end of Pakistan 's policy of a proxy war against India using terrorism for several decades now, first in the Punjab and then in Jammu & Kashmir and elsewhere. Pakistani provocation reached a dangerous point with the December 13, 2001 attack on the Parliament. A more forceful response became necessary. Additional troops were moved along the Line of Control (LoC) and the International Boundary in a state of readiness, inter-alia to prevent further infiltration of terrorists into India. In response to these measures and international pressure, Pakistani President, General Pervez Musharraf announced in a speech on January 12, 2002, that "Pakistan will not allow its territory to be used for any terrorist activity anywhere in the world", that "no organization will be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir" and that "anyone found involved in any terrorist act would be dealt with sternly". There was a temporary crackdown on extremists in Pakistan . Terrorist groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba were banned and some of their financial assets were frozen. Some leaders were placed under house arrest and around 2000 low-level cadres of terrorist organizations were arrested. There was a temporary decline in cross border infiltration and terrorist violence linked to it in the months of January-March 2002 while 'jehadi' cadres were advised to lie low. However, cross border infiltration and terrorist violence continued and increased as the measures were relaxed with time. On May 14, 2002 , terrorists attacked family lines of an army camp in Kaluchak, Jammu district, killing 32 civilians including 11 women and 11 children. On May 18, 2002 , India asked the Government of Pakistan to recall their High Commissioner in New Delhi in view of Pakistan's continued support to cross border terrorism. Once again, under pressure, General Musharraf responded in his speech of May 27, 2002 with a commitment to stop cross border infiltration and terrorism on a permanent basis. Despite Gen. Musharraf's commitments, cross border infiltration and related terrorist violence increased from July 2002 onwards. On July 13, 2002 Pak-based terrorists attacked a low-income neighbourhood in Qasimnagar. Attacks on soft targets calculated to inflame sentiments have continued . These include the attacks on temples at Akshardham, and in Jammu and on women in J&K. As recently as on March 20, 2003 , Kashmiri Hindus living in Nadimarg, Jammu were targeted in which 24 Pundits, including 11 women and 2 children were massacred in cold blood. These incidents underscore once again that there has been no respite in terrorism from Pakistan . They also underline the need for Pakistan to take decisive steps to end infiltration on a permanent basis and wind down the infrastructure of support to terrorism. Cross border infiltration and linked terrorist violence reached a height in the run up to the Jammu & Kashmir Legislative Assembly election. However, the successful conduct of elections to the Jammu & Kashmir Assembly with a voter participation of 43.70% in the face of terrorist threats and intimidation, and public satisfaction with the results, was seen as a vindication of the desire of the people of Jammu & Kashmir for peace and of the credibility of the elections. On October 16, 2002 , the Government decided to re-deploy the troops from positions on the international border as the Armed Forces were deemed to have achieved the immediate objectives assigned to them. It was also decided that there would be no lowering of the vigil in Jammu & Kashmir. India remains firmly committed to the path of dialogue and reconciliation in keeping with the Simla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration and has repeatedly called upon Pakistan to end its sponsorship of terrorism in India so that a conducive environment can be created for the resumption of bilateral dialogue. Should Pakistan move purposefully towards eradicating cross border terrorism, India will be prepared to resume bilateral dialogue to address differences and enhance cooperation. It should not be forgotten that the two most bold and meaningful initiatives for dialogue at Lahore and Agra came from India . With this in background the latest peace initiative of Prime Minister will make worthwhile progress only with end of cross-border terrorism. China China, India's largest neighbour, is passing through a period of rapid economic growth and modernization with the aim of achieving great power status in the shortest time possible. India 's border with China is almost 3,500 km long. China continues to occupy approx. 38,000 sq. km of Indian territory mainly in the Aksai Chin Area, and claims yet another 90,000 sq km in the Eastern Sector. Further, 5,180 sq. km of territory under Pak occupation in Northern Kashmir was illegally ceded to China by Pakistan in 1963. (Whilst several rounds of Border Talks have been held with China, a number of disputed pockets remain ). China is rapidly modernising its Armed Forces. In its White Paper on National Defence issued recently, China has stressed the vital importance of maintaining international stability and a global strategic balance, as also a legal regime governing international arms control and disarmament, in order to address an international situation that is undergoing profound changes including a serious disequilibrium in the balance of military power especially between the developed and developing countries. As reported by the Chinese Government to the 16th National Party Congress in November 2002, strengthening of national defence is a "strategic task in China's modernization drive". As far as India is concerned, it cannot be ignored that every major Indian city is within reach of Chinese missiles and this capability is being further augmented to include Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles(SLBMs). The asymmetry in terms of nuclear forces is pronouncedly in favour of China and is likely to get further accentuated as China responds to counter the US missile defence programme. China's close defence relationship with Pakistan takes a particular edge in view of latter's known belligerence and hostility to India and its acquisition of nuclear assets. Notwithstanding these concerns, India continues its endeavour to seek a long term and stable relationship with China, based on the principles of Panchsheel, mutual sensitivity to each other's concerns and equality and is committed to the process of dialogue to resolve all outstanding differences. Some Confidence Building Measures(CBMs) have been initiated and while these are bearing fruit incrementally, the pace of progress has been less than satisfactory. A number of high level visits have taken place in recent years. The President of India visited China in the year 2000. This was followed by Mr. Li Peng's visit to India in January 2001. These high level visits have improved bilateral relations and understanding of each other's viewpoint thereby contributing to further reduction in tension. Important developments marking the progress of India-China relations in 2002-03 included the initiation of direct Delhi-Beijing flights, the first meeting of the India-China dialogue mechanism on counter terrorism, the completion of the process of exchange of maps for clarification of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Middle Sector, the implementation of the MOU (signed during Premier Zhu's visit) on sharing hydrological data from the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra and accordance of 'Approved Tourist Destination Status' to India by China. The Joint Working Group on the Boundary Question met in its 14th session in November 2002. The first informal Foreign Minister level India-China-Russia dialogue took place in September 2002 on the sidelines of the UNGA. Interaction in other agreed dialogue mechanisms also continued. India has, of late, commenced some cooperation with the armed forces of China . Naval Ships of both the countries have been exchanging visits and some of India 's mid level officers are undergoing courses in Chinese institutions. During 2002-2003, exchange of high level defence delegations continued. Bangladesh India's relation with Bangladesh is characterized by both affinity and occasional friction. Key security concerns relate to the problem of uncontrolled migration, which Bangladesh refuses to recognize, across the 4,000 kms common boundary, the presence and activities of Indian insurgent groups and leaders from the north-east of India on Bangladeshi soil which it refuses to acknowledge, the rising influence of political parties and organizations of radical Islamic and fundamentalist orientation within and outside the coalition government led by the Bangladesh National Party, and border demarcation and border management problems which give rise to ugly incidents from time to time. Border management problems, such as smuggling, illegal immigration, insurgency, trafficking of women and children, and the construction, repair and maintenance of boundary-related structures are addressed through Border Coordination Conferences between the Border Security Force (BSF) and Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) while issues such as exchange of enclaves and adverse possessions are addressed by the Joint Boundary Working Groups (JBWGs) constituted for the purpose. Following the elections, India continued with its policy of close engagement with its eastern neighbour discussing all issues in a forthright manner. |
| |
| Nepal Relations between India and Nepal have consistently been close and extensive, reflecting the historical, geographical, cultural and linguistic links between the two nations. In keeping with this close relationship, several high-level interactions took place between India and Nepal . Defence relations too have been traditionally close. During the year, Nepal was beset on the one hand by a political and constitutional crisis and on the other, by a growing Maoist insurgency and violence that had spread to almost all the districts of Nepal, with mid-West to Western districts as thrust areas. Another area of growing concern for India's security is the increased activities of Pak ISI and terrorist organizations amongst Nepal's Muslim minority. Sri Lanka The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka has, over the years, extracted a severe political and security cost for India, internally and externally, that goes beyond the assassination of a former Prime Minister through a terrorist act and serious casualties incurred by the Indian Armed Forces in an effort to ameliorate the situation. It has created the possibility for countries hostile or unfriendly to India to establish a foothold there in a manner inimical to India 's security interests. The LTTE remains a proscribed terrorist organization in India and its leader, a proclaimed offender under the law. The keystone of the Government of India's policy towards the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is a firm commitment to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and to the restoration of a lasting peace through a peaceful, negotiated settlement that meets the just aspirations of all elements of Sri Lankan society. On the political front, India continues to support the activities of the Sri Lankan Government towards the Peace Process. The Government of India welcomed the ceasefire agreement stating that it would provide an opportunity to both sides to move forward towards a substantive dialogue for a negotiated political settlement of the ethnic conflict. Myanmar Myanmar remains an area of security interest for India not only on account of the activities of north-eastern insurgent groups that have set up camps across the Indian border, but also because of the activities of countries working against India's legitimate security concerns and the repercussions of the tussle between the forces of democracy and military government on these interests. India welcomes the greater openness of the Myanmar government in its external relations and steps towards political reconciliation, internally. Bhutan India shares a relationship based on close friendship, good neighbourliness and mutual trust with Bhutan underpinned by a strong and diverse mutually beneficial partnership in the sphere of economic and social development and a tradition of high-level visits, most recently the vist to New Delhi by King of Bhutan. Traditionally, Bhutan has been sensitive and mindful of India's security concerns. The two countries continue to be in close touch with each other on the issue of presence of ULFA-Bodo militants in Southern Bhutan . Afghanistan India is closely watching the changing scenario in Afghanistan since it has ramifications on the security scenario of the region and the country, including in the state of Jammu and Kashmir . India would not like to see Afghanistan once again becoming a breeding ground for terrorism, or a victim of terrorism sponsored from across its borders. India was amongst the first countries to appoint a Defence Attaché in Kabul . India-Afghanistan ties continued to expand and strengthen during the year . In general, the situation in Afghanistan has improved. However, the security situation in crucial parts of Afghanistan is still not stable. Two senior ministers have been assassinated. Armed clashes have been taking place between different groups in Northern and Western Afghanistan . Of particular concern are the signs of the regrouping of the Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants and the forces of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in the southern and eastern Afghanistan . Central Asian Republics (CARS) The strategic map of Central Asia has changed almost unrecognisably since the disintegration of the former Soviet Union . Post Cold War, it has become a theatre of a new 'great game' not only because of its strategic location but also its natural resources, notably oil and natural gas. Since 9/11, it has also acquired a new layer of strategic interest because of its vantage point vis-à-vis the central security concerns of the region namely terrorism in its local, regional and global aspects. Pakistani vanguards, including the ISI are widely viewed as continuing their destabilizing activities of recruiting and training fundamentalist elements and encouraging radical movements in the Central Asian Republics . This has the twin objectives of extending their influence in the region and promoting anti-India activities. Major players are actively using defence diplomacy to advance their interests. Central Asia is an area of vital importance to India not only on account of its geographical proximity and India's historical and cultural links with the region, but also because of the common challenge they face from jehadi terrorism. Relations, based on a shared commitment to open and progressive societies, secularism and democracy, have been reinforced by similarity of views in the fight against terrorism. India and countries of Central Asia also share views with regard to checking the menace of drugs trafficking. Relations with Central Asian countries have been informed by a shared interest in mutual benefit and all round growth. Economic relations are showing steady improvement. Raksha Mantri visited Tajikisthan in April 2002 and Uzbekistan in February 2003. Other senior level visits also took place. In the sphere of defence, cooperation is taking the form of a security dialogue and training of armed forces personnel many of whom are presently undergoing courses in Indian defence training establishments. The Asia-Pacific Reverberations of religious fundamentalism and terrorism were heard in parts of South East Asia too especially in Indonesia where a blast in October 2002 took toll of about one hundred tourists in Bali. The Bali bombings focussed international attention on South East Asia as a nodal point in international terrorism and an emerging hub of militant Islam. This prompted the US to step up its military presence in, and assistance to the region and to seek alternative solutions to the problem of terrorism ranging from cooperative security to controversial pre-emptive doctrines. Elsewhere in Asia , the stand-off on DPRK's nuclear programme set off alarms regarding DPRK's nuclear intentions and the source of some of its nuclear technologies. Given that India shares maritime boundaries with some of the countries of the South East Asia and is within the periphery of the Asia-Pacific, these developments have relevance for India. Keeping this in view, India has initiated discussions with the governments concerned on terrorism and related issues such as trafficking in drugs, people and small arms, piracy etc. At the India-ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh in November 2002, the Prime Minister conveyed India's decision to subscribe to the ASEAN Declaration on Terrorism, and also willingness to enter into a similar declaration on India-ASEAN cooperation in this field. Defence cooperation relationships with countries of South-east Asia and the Pacific have been growing steadily focussing mainly on exchanges of high-level visits, strategic dialogues, port calls, training exchanges and some sourcing of defence equipment. Prospects of their further development are good. Mechanisms for defence cooperation already exist with Malaysia, Vietnam , Indonesia, Australia and Laos, and more are under process of conclusion. The 4th Malaysia-India Defence Committee meeting held in September 2002 and the 2nd India-Australia Strategic Dialogue held in March 2003 provided opportunities to discover new areas of convergence and cooperation in security matters. Defence exchanges between India and Japan and also the ROK reflected the mutual recognition that strengthened cooperation between them was a positive factor for maintenance of peace and stability West Asia / Gulf India's security environment is closely linked to that of the neighbouring West Asia region. As a member of the international community, India has been gravely concerned with the vicious cycle of violence and counter-violence and the consequent serious deterioration of the security situation in West Asia and has repeatedly called for de-escalation of tensions. In the Persian Gulf, the growing tension between the US and Iraq finally exploded into war on March 20, 2003 with the failure of diplomatic efforts under the auspices of the UN Security Council. The full political and security implications are still to unfold and will take some time to assess, but it would be safe to assume that they will be far reaching in terms of their strategic impact. Europe India's relations with the European Union and individual member countries in the field of defence and security cover a broad spectrum of activities including training exchanges, joint exercises and defence procurement, production and R&D. A mechanism for a security dialogue exists with France at the highest executive levels. Mechanisms for defence cooperation also exist with the UK and Italy. Fresh agreements on defence cooperation providing for an enhanced level of cooperation were signed with Italy and Poland in February 2003 during the visits of the Italian Defence Minister and the Polish Prime Minister to India . Defence-related exchanges have also been expanding with other countries in Europe like Germany, the Czech Republic, Ukraine and Belarus . Cooperation with Europe on defence procurement and production could be greater still if it were not for mechanisms that introduce uncertainties in the fulfilment of contracts on extraneous political grounds. The evolving relationship with France shows that there is a good potential for a path-breaking defence-industrial relationship in areas of advanced technologies cutting across the normal grain of North-South relations as epitomized during the visit of the Prime Minister of France to the Aero India Air Show in Bangalore in February 2003.
Russia Indo-Russian relations pursued a steady, all-round and strategic course during the year covering the gamut of political, defence, security and economic fields. The two sides continued to deepen their consultations on strategic and mutual security concerns. Bilateral defence cooperation was fortified through several meetings and visits by the high dignitaries of the two countries. Raksha Mantri visited the Russian Federation in April 10-13, 2002 . The third session of the Inter-Governmental Commission on Military Technical Cooperation (IGC-MTC) was held in Moscow in January, 2003, co-chaired by Raksha Mantri and the Minister of Science and Technology and Industry of the Russian Federation Mr. Ilya Klebanov. Discussions covered acquisition, licensed production, R&D, product support and new areas and forms of cooperation in the defence field. United States of America Following the end of the Cold War and in response to the changing international environment, Indo-U.S. relations are undergoing a qualitative transformation. Cooperation and consultations have broadened and diversified considerably. Both the countries have recognised that closer Indo-US relations would be an important and a positive factor both for stability of the region as well as in the global affairs. There has been a significant progress in defence and security relationship between India and the United States during last year. As part of the enhanced bilateral engagement on these matters, there were several important bilateral visits and meetings in the context of cross-border terrorism by Pakistan and in pursuit of a shared objective of building a strategic relationship. With a view to accelerating the pace of Indo-U.S. defence cooperation, the apex level Defence Policy Group (DPG) met for a second time in May 2002 after its resumption in December 2001. Apart from the DPG, bilateral Executive Steering Groups of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Security Cooperation Group (to advance a defence supply relationship) and the Joint Technical Group (to advance R & D collaboration in defence) have also been meeting or are scheduled to meet. The two countries have conducted mutually beneficial combined exercises in India and United States besides stepping up training exchanges. The terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 and on the Parliament on December 13, 2001 have led to a deepening of Indo-US cooperation in combating international terrorism. Terrorism India has been a victim of terrorism for many decades, much before the West experienced its deadly reality on September 11, 2001 . The terrorist menace in Jammu and Kashmir has its roots in Pakistan and is supported financially and materially by the government and institutions of that country. The Indian Armed Forces have dealt with the problem of cross-border terrorism with a multi-pronged strategy that includes psychological warfare, innovative military tactics and counter intelligence methods. These efforts have met with reasonable success but this is a prolonged battle. India's long experience in tackling terrorism can be of valuable help to other countries that are facing similar challenges now. Infiltration: Despite the assurances of the Pakistani Government, infiltration continues across the border. For any terrorist movement to be contained, the Government's resolve and the security forces' firmness are a must. India 's fight against terrorism has been a long and arduous one and the Indian Armed Forces are fully geared to handle any problem that may arise in future. It is important that the state support for any form of terrorism must cease. Terrorist organisations have long arms and global reach. The world, therefore, has to fight a united battle by pooling resources in order to remove this scourge from the face of the earth. India's Nuclear Policy India remains a firm and consistent proponent of general and complete disarmament and attaches the highest priority to global nuclear disarmament. India's policy on disarmament also takes into account changes that have taken place in the world, especially in the 1990s. The nuclear tests of May 1998 do not dilute India 's commitment to this long-held objective. As a nuclear weapon State , India is even more conscious of its responsibility in this regard and, as in the past, continues to take initiatives in pursuit of global nuclear disarmament both individually and collectively. The steps that were announced after the tests and the initiatives that India has taken since, strengthen this commitment. India's nuclear weapons capability is meant only for self-defence and seeks only to ensure that India's security, independence and integrity are not threatened in the future. India is not interested in a nuclear arms race. This is the rationale behind the two pillars of India's nuclear policy – minimum deterrence and no-first use. The determination of the profile of this deterrent, including accurate and refined delivery systems, is a sovereign responsibility. After concluding the series of tests of May 1998, India announced a voluntary moratorium on further underground nuclear test explosions. In announcing this moratorium, India accepted the core obligation of a test ban and also addressed the general wish of the international community to foreswear testing. This moratorium continues, subject to the supreme national interests, a provision granted under the CTBT to every country. India has also announced its willingness to move towards a de jure formalisation of this voluntary undertaking.
|
| |
| The basic responsibility of the Army is to safeguard the territorial integrity of the nation against external aggression. Due to the country's long borders encompassing different geographical and climatic conditions such as desert terrain on the west, snow-covered mountains in the north and thick rainfed mountainous jungles in the east, the Army has to constantly prepare itself for diverse challenges. In addition, the Army is often required to assist the civil administration during internal security disturbances and in the maintenance of law and order, in organising relief operations during natural calamities like floods, earthquakes and cyclones and in the maintenance of essential services. Demands on the Army have increased manifold due to continuous deployment of its forces in intense counter insurgency operations in Jammu & Kashmir and the North East parts of the country. To achieve these objectives, the Army has to be constantly modernised, suitably structured, equipped and trained. The Indian Army is organised into five regional commands
In addition, there is a Army Training Command at Shimla for the purpose of laying down the training policy for the Army. The Indian Army is divided into the following two broad categories:- Arms Arms cover those troops which carry out actual operations. They consist of
These are organised into units and sub-units at various echelons of commands. Services The remaining components of the Army are the Services. Their primary duty is to provide the logistic and administration for the Army. For more detail please do visit http://armedforces.nic.in/
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| |
The Indian Air Force (IAF) today, having completed more than six decades of dedicated service to the nation, is a modern, technology-intensive force distinguished by its commitment to excellence and professionalism. Keeping space with the demands of contemporary advancements, the IAF continues to modernise in a phased manner and today it stands as a credible air power as the nation marches into the next millennium.
With the ever escalating costs of operations, great emphasis is being placed on cost effective training, reducing expenditure, optimising output and minimising wastage. The Air Force has implemented a number of measures to enhance the quality of life of its personnel in Key welfare areas of housing, education and hostel facilities.
In addition to the traditional wartime roles of the IAF of counter air, counter surface, strategic and combat support operations, the Air Force has provided significant aid to civil authorities during natural calamities. The Siachen glacier lifeline continues to be monitored by the Indian Air Force, fully supporting the Indian Army in fighting on the world's highest battlefield. The IAF has also provided aid to civil authorities for the large scale movement of military and para military personnel to maintain law and order as well as to cater for the needs of a large number of airmen and jawans in remote and inaccessible outposts.
The Indian Air Force has seven commands, of which five are operational and two functional, namely :
- HQ Central Air Command, Allahabad
- HQ Eastern Air Command, Shillong
- HQ Western Air Command, New Delhi
- HQ Southern Air Command, Thiruvananthapuram
- HQ South-Western Air Command, Gandhi Nagar
- HQ Maintenance Command, Nagpur and
- HQ Training Command, Bangalore
The Indian Air Force is divided into the following broad categories :
- Flying operations
- Maintenance & Logistics
- Administration and
- Training
For more detail please do visit http://armedforces.nic.in/
Analysis
India's Internal Security Management:
Putting People First
by Col. Rahul K. Bhonsle
India's internal security management has undergone a full cycle from, "masterly inaction," adopted by former Home Minister Mr. Shivraj Patil to the proactive approach of the current Home Minister Mr. P Chidambaram. A new trajectory appears to be in the offing given the recent discourse on tackling resurgent Left Wing Extremism. To the credit of the current national security managers there has been considerable capacity building in countering the challenge from terrorism in the hinterland not with standing the recent incidents in Pune and Bangalore. While a terror free India is 'work in progress', we seem to be going in the right direction.
However in other spheres particularly in tackling Naxalism there has been a setback. The 'Quiet Diplomacy' heralded in Kashmir has not taken off partly due to clear signals for non cooperation to moderate separatist leaders from Islamabad. The Prime Minister's recent visit to the Valley on 7 and 8 June was under curfew like conditions, a painful experience no doubt for the head of government of the World's most populous democracy. While the cold response was partially due to allegations of a fake encounter by the security forces on the Line of Control, the larger reality of disconnect with the people cannot be lost sight of.
In the North East, the overland route to Manipur, where a festering ethno-nationalist insurgency continues to thrive was cut off from rest of the country since 12 April and has been reportedly restored on 19 June. The people of the state stoically bore the brunt even as the Centre and the State government have locked horns over visit of the 'rebel' Naga leader T Muivah to his native village in Somdal, Manipur.
The Naxals seem to be expanding their foot print exploiting the hiatus from the ongoing strategic debate to advantage. A study of recent incidents of violence in Chhattisgarh and West Bengal indicates some amount of grass roots support to the movement.
The Central Government on the other hand is engaged at present on deciding whether to expand the security foot print against Naxalism by directly employing the Armed Forces. Given the intense debate in the media which has focused more on differences between the Ministry of Home and Defence rather than highlighting core issues, the Centre may be forced into taking a hasty decision of deploying the military in case another major Naxal incident occurs.
A common trend in these events in the past few months is possible loss of faith and support of the people to the Government be it in Kashmir, Manipur or in Naxal affected Central India. In each case the reason appears to be different. In Kashmir inability to transform drop in violence into a security dividend so that people can live without fear of the uniformed in their alleys and by lanes, in Manipur lack of sensitivity to the delicate ethnic balance between the Nagas and Meiteis and in Naxal areas vacuum of an empathetic state administration has resulted in the people turning to those who are seen more proximate to their needs even though they may wield the gun or foster separatist ideology.
No state despite the best instruments of law and order or the military can be secure if it has lost the confidence of a section of its people. Therefore the first priority of a reviewed internal security strategy has to be reconnecting with the people and not just the number of helicopters and Unarmed Aerial Vehicles required for counter Naxal operations. While civil society voices have been speaking about this primary necessity including luminaries of the National Advisory Council, a serious effort to reestablish connectivity except through deployment of security forces and prime pumping development by allotting four figure sums in Crores of rupees to security stressed areas has not been evident.
As the government reviews the internal security strategy, people centricity must form the underpinning principle be it of security or development. Such a movement will have to be led politically by leaders and parties at the grass roots in the states. Success in counter terrorism in Punjab for instance came about only when the State took the lead with the Centre providing a firm backing.
Today the perception is that North Block is leading the charge treading on what is essentially state charter. This was more than evident when the Chief Minister of Manipur refused to allow Mr. Muivah access to his home village though reportedly issued instructions from New Delhi. Another trend is direct monitoring of development projects in a district by the Centre through the District Administration which undermines authority of the State government and will have serious long term implications.
The Centre will have to invest more political capital in motivating state and local leadership to claim ownership of internal security management rather than taking on the mantle so that measures taken are people sensitive. Given the complexity of Centre State relations in India, winning over support of the State government may not be easy in all cases but there are adequate political and administrative instruments available including the coercive one of Article 355 in an extreme case.
Thus winning over people in an area affected by militancy is no doubt a long process with many ups and downs but this will have to be the centre of gravity of government action administered through political connectivity and grass roots governance, even as other components as security and development unfold.
June 20, 2010
http://www.boloji.com/analysis2/0606.html
Challenges Before India's Internal Security: Countering TerrorismKriti SinghResearch Officer, IPCS email: kriti@ipcs.org The dawn of the 21st century has witnessed the rise of a most serious crisis in the form of global terrorism. Irrespective of their position, power, influence and progress, all nations across the globe have experienced the disastrous impact of terrorism. India has been a particular victim of this form of warfare for at least the last four decades. In the backdrop of the growing and altering non-conventional and conventional threat perception and the metamorphosis of the world into a global village coupled with easier access to technology, today terrorism is one of the most challenging internal security threats that India is dealing with. | ||
| Related Article | ||
| ||
| | Armed Forces Special Powers Act:A study in National Security tyranny |
| | 1. INTRODUCTIONThe Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 1958 (AFSPA) is one of the more draconian legislations that the Indian Parliament has passed in its 45 years of Parliamentary history. Under this Act, all security forces are given unrestricted and unaccounted power to carry out their operations, once an area is declared disturbed. Even a non-commissioned officer is granted the right to shoot to kill based on mere suspicion that it is necessary to do so in order to "maintain the public order". The AFSPA gives the armed forces wide powers to shoot, arrest and search, all in the name of "aiding civil power." It was first applied to the North Eastern states of Assam and Manipur and was amended in 1972 to extend to all the seven states in the north- eastern region of India. They are Assam, Manipur, Tripura, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram and Nagaland, also known as the "seven sisters". The enforcement of the AFSPA has resulted in innumerable incidents of arbitrary detention, torture, rape, and looting by security personnel. This legislation is sought to be justified by the Government of India, on the plea that it is required to stop the North East states from seceeding from the Indian Union. There is a strong movement for self-determination which precedes the formation of the Indian Union. 2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDAs the great Himalayan range dividing South and Central Asia runs down the east, it takes a southward curve and splits into lower hill ranges. The hills are punctuated by valleys and the valleys are washed by the rivers that drain into to the Bay of Bengal. Waves of people settled in these blue hills and green valleys at various times in history. They brought with them cultures and traditions. The new interacted with the old and evolved into the unique cultural mosaic that characterizes the region. Through the centuries, these hills and valleys have bridged South, South East, and Central Asia. On today's geo-political map, a large part of the original region constitutes the seven states of the Republic of India, but its political, economic and socio-cultural systems have always been linked with South East Asia. The great Hindu and Muslim empires that reigned over the Indian sub-continent never extended east of the Bhramaputra river. India's British colonizers were the first to break this barrier. In the early 19th century, they moved in to check the Burmese expansion into today's Manipur and Assam. The British, with the help of the then Manipur King, Gambhir Singh, crushed the Burmese imperialist dream and the treaty of Yandabo was signed in 1828. Under this treaty, Assam became a part of British India and the British continued to influence the political affairs of the region. This undue interference eventually led to the bloody Anglo- Manipuri conflict of 1891. The British reaffirmed their position but were cognizant of the ferocious spirit of independence of these people and did not administer directly but only through the King. It was during the Second World War, when the Japanese tried to enter the Indian sub-continent through this narrow corridor, that the strategic significance of the region to the Indian armed forces was realised. With the bombing of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a disenchanted Japanese had to retreat from Imphal and Kohima fronts, however the importance of control over the region subsequently remained a priority for the Government of India. With the end of the war, the global political map was changed over night. As the British were preparing to leave Asia, the Political Department of the British Government planned to carve out a buffer state consisting of the Naga Hills, Mikir Hills, Sadiya Area, Balipara Tract, Manipur, Lushai Hills, Khasi and Hills in Assam, as well as the Chin Hills and the hills of northern Burma. The impending departure of the British created confusion and turmoil over how to fill the political vacuum they would leave behind. Ultimately, the various territories were parceled out to Nehru's India, Jinnah's Pakistan, Aung Sang's Burma and Mao's China according to strategic requirements. As expected, there were some rumblings between the new Asiatic powers on who should get how much - India and Burma over Kabow valley, India and East Pakistan over Chittagong Hill Tracts, and India and China over the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA), present day Arunachal Pradesh. Compromises were made, and issues were finally settled in distant capitals, to the satifaction of the new rulers. The people who had been dwelling in these hills and valleys for thousands of years were systematically excluded from the consultation process. The Indian share of the British colonial cake in this region constitutes the present "Seven Sisters" states of the North-East. Over the years, thanks to the British, the advent of western education and contact with new ideas brought about the realization that the old ways had to give way to the new. Indigenous movements evolved as the people aspired to a new social and political order. For example, in the ancient Kingdom of Manipur, under the charismatic leadership of Hijam Irabot, a strong popular democratic movement against feudalism and colonialism was raging. After the departure of the British, the Kingdom of Manipur was reconstituted as a constitutional monarchy on modern lines by passing the Manipur Constitution Act, 1947. Elections were held under the new constitution. A legislative assembly was formed. In 1949, Mr V P Menon, a senior representative of the Government of India, invited the King to a meeting on the pretext of discussing the deteriorating law and order situation in the state at Shillong. Upon his arrival, the King was allegedly forced to sign under duress the merger agreement. The agreement was never ratified in the Manipur Legislative Assembly. Rather, the Assembly was dissolved and Manipur was kept under the charge of a Chief Commissioner. There were protests, but the carrot-and-stick policy launched by the Indian Government successfully suppressed any opposition. The Naga MovementAt the beginning of the century, the inhabitants of the Naga Hills, which extend across the Indo-Burmese border, came together under the single banner of Naga National Council (NNC), aspiring for a common homeland and self-governance. As early as 1929, the NNC petitioned the Simon Commission, which was examining the feasibility of future of self-governance of India. The Naga leaders were adamantly against Indian rule over their people once the British pulled out of the region. Mahatma Gandhi publicly announced that the Nagas had every right to be independent. His assertion was based on his belief in non-violence, he did not believe in the use of force or an unwilling union. Under the Hydari Agreement signed between NNC and British administration, Nagaland was granted protected status for ten years, after which the Nagas would decide whether they should stay in the Union or not. However, shortly after the British withdrew, independent India proclaimed the Naga Territory as part and parcel of the new Republic. The NNC proclaimed Nagaland's independence. In retaliation, Indian authorities arrested the Naga leaders. An armed struggle ensued and there were large casualties on either side. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act is the product of this tension. In 1975, some Naga leaders held talks with the Government of India which resulted in what is known as the Shillong Accord. The Naga leaders who did not agree with the Shillong accord formed the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) and continue to fight for what they call," Naga sovereignty". Problems of IntegrationMuch of this historical bloodshed could have been avoided if the new India had lived up to the democratic principles enshrined in its Constitution and respected the rights of the nationalities it had taken within its borders. But in the over-zealous efforts to integrate these people into the "national mainstream", based on the dominant brahminical Aryan culture, much destruction has been done to the indigenous populations. Culturally, the highly caste ridden, feudal society is totally incompatible with the ethics of North-East cultures which are by and large egalitarian. To make matters even worse, the Indian leaders found it useful to club these ethnic groups with the adivasis (indigenous peoples) of the sub-continent, dubbing them "scheduled tribes". As a result, in the casteist Indian social milieu, indigenous peoples are stigmatized by higher castes. The languages of the North-East are of the Tibeto- Chinese family rather than the Indo-Aryan or Dravidian. Until the recent Eighth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, none of the Tibeto- Chinese languages were recognized as Indian languages. The predominantly mongoloid features of the people of the North-East is another barrier to cultural assimilation. Politically dependent, the North East is being economically undermined; the traditional trade routes with South East Asia and Bangladesh have been closed. It was kept out of the Government of India's massive infrastructural development in the first few five-year-plans. Gradually, the region has become the Indian capitalist's hinterland, where local industries have been reduced to nothing and the people are now entirely dependent on goods and businesses owned predominantly by those from the Indo- Gangetic plains. The economic strings of this region are controlled by these, in many cases, unscrupulous traders. All the states of the North-East are connected to India by the "chicken's neck", a narrow corridor between Bangladesh and Bhutan. At partition, the area was cut off from the nearest port of Chittagong, in what is now Bangladesh, reducing traffic to and from the region to a trickle. The states in the region are largely unconnected to India' vast rail system. India freely exploits the natural resources of the North-East. Assam produces one-fourth of all the petroleum for India, yet it is processed outside of Assam so the state does not receive the revenues. Manipur is 22% behind the national average for infrastructural development, and the entire North-Eastern region is 30% behind the rest of India. Observers have pointed out that "...it is clear that in the North East, insurgency and underdevelopment have been closely linked; in such a situation strong-arm tactics will only help to further alienate the people." The shifting demographic balance due to large-scale immigration from within and outside the country is another source of tension. The indigenous people fear that they will be outnumbered by outsiders in their own land. Laborers from Bihar and Bengal who live under rigidly feudal, casteist socio-economic conditions in their states are ready to do all kinds of menial jobs at much lower wages. As they pour in, more and more local laborers are being edged out of their jobs. Illegal immigration from Bangladesh and Nepal is also percieved as a threat. In Tripura, the indigenous population has been reduced to a mere 28% of the total population of the state because of large scale immigration from then East Pakistan and now Bangladesh. In Assam, a similar fear of " immigrant invasion" was at the root of a student movement in the early eighties. The student leaders formed a political party called the Assam Gana Parisad (AGP) and contested state elections and won. In 1984, the Assam Accord was signed with the Central Government. However, the provisions of the Accord were never implemented. The failure of the AGP to bring about change in the state of Assam fostered the growth of the armed and overtly seccessionist United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). MizoramIn the Lushai hills of Assam in the early sixties, a famine broke out. A relief team cried out for help from the Government of India. But there was little help. The relief team organized themselves into the Mizo National Front (MNF) and called for an armed struggle, " to liberate Mizoram from Indian colonialiasm." In February 1966, armed militant groups captured the town of Aizawl and took possession of all government offices. It took the Indian army one week to recapture the town. The army responded viciously with air raids. This is the only place in India where the Indian Security Forces actually aerially bombed its own civilian population. The armed forces compelled people to leave their homes and dumped them on the roadside to set up new villages, so that the armed forces would be able to better control them. This devastated the structure of Mizo society. In 1986, the Mizo Accord was signed between the MNF and the Government of India. This accord was identical to the Shilong Accord made with the Nagas earlier. The MNF agreed to work within the Indian Constitution and to renounce violence. The Government of India's primary interest in the North East was strategic, and so was its response to the problems. A series of repressive laws were passed by the Government of India in order to deal with this uprising. In 1953, the Assam Maintenance of Public Order (Autonomous District) Regulation Act was passed. It was applicable to the then Naga Hills and Tuensang districts. It empowered the Governor to impose collective fines, prohibit public meetings and and detain anybody without a warrant. On 22 May 1958, a mere 12 days after the Budget Session of Parliament was over, the Armed Forces (Assam-Manipur) Special Powers Ordinance was passed. A bill was introduced in the Monsoon session of Parliament that year. Amongst those who cautioned against giving such blanket powers to the Army included the then Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, (Upper House of the Indian Parliament), Mr P N Sapru. In a brief discussion that lasted for three hours in the Lok Sabha and for four hours in the Rajya Sabha, Parliament approved the Armed Forces (Assam- Manipur) Special Powers Act with retrospective from 22 May 1958. 3. THE ACT AND ITS PROVISIONSSection 1: This section states the name of the Act and the areas to which it extends (Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram). Section 2: This section sets out the definition of the Act, but leaves much un-defined. Under part (a) in the 1972 version, the armed forces were defined as "the military and Air Force of the Union so operating". In the 1958 version of the Act the definition was of the "military forces and the air forces operating as land forces". In the Lok Sabha Debates which led to the passing of the original Act, Mr Naushir Bharucha commented, "that probably means that the Government very mercifully has not permitted the air forces to shoot or strafe the area ... or to bomb." The Minister of Home Affairs did not confirm this interpretation, but certainly "acting as land forces" should rule out the power to resort to aerial bombardment. Nevertheless, in 1966, the Air Force in Mizoram did resort to aerial bombardment. Section 2(b) defines a "disturbed area" as any area declared as such under Clause 3 (see discussion below). Section 2(c) states that all other words not defined in the AFSPA have the meanings assigned to them in the Army Act of 1950. Section 3: This section defines "disturbed area" by stating how an area can be declared disturbed. It grants the power to declare an area disturbed to the Central Government and the Governor of the State, but does not describe the circumstances under which the authority would be justified in making such a declaration. Rather, the AFSPA only requires that such authority be "of the opinion that whole or parts of the area are in a dangerous or disturbed condition such that the use of the Armed Forces in aid of civil powers is necessary." The vagueness of this definition was challenged in Indrajit Barua v. State of Assam case. The court decided that the lack of precision to the definition of a disturbed area was not an issue because the government and people of India understand its meaning. However, since the declaration depends on the satisfaction of the Government official, the declaration that an area is disturbed is not subject to judicial review. So in practice, it is only the government's understanding which classifies an area as disturbed. There is no mechanism for the people to challenge this opinion. Strangely, there are acts which define the term more concretely. In the Disturbed Areas (Special Courts) Act, 1976, an area may be declared disturbed when "a State Government is satisfied that (i) there was, or (ii) there is, in any area within a State extensive disturbance of the public peace and tranquility, by reason of differences or disputes between members of different religions, racial, language, or regional groups or castes or communities, it may ... declare such area to be a disturbed area." The lack of precision in the definition of a disturbed area under the AFSPA demonstrates that the government is not interested in putting safeguards on its application of the AFSPA. The 1972 amendments to the AFSPA extended the power to declare an area disturbed to the Central Government. In the 1958 version of the AFSPA only the state governments had this power. In the 1972 Lok Sabha debates it was argued that extending this power to the Central Government would take away the State's authority. In the 1958 debates the authority and power of the states in applying the AFSPA was a key issue. The Home Minister had argued that the AFSPA broadened states' power because they could call in the military whenever they chose. The 1972 amendment shows that the Central Government is no longer concerned with the state's power. Rather, the Central Government now has the ability to overrule the opinion of a state governor and declare an area disturbed. This happened in Tripura, when the Central Government declared Tripura a disturbed area, over the opposition of the State Government. In the 1972 Lok Sabha debates, Mr S D Somasundaram pointed out that there was no need to extend this power to the Central Government, since the President had "the power to intervene in a disturbed State at any time" under the Constitution. This point went unheeded and the Central Government retains the power to apply the AFSPA to the areas it wishes in the Northeast. Section 4: This section sets out the powers granted to the military stationed in a disturbed area. These powers are granted to the commissioned officer, warrant officer, or non-commissioned officer, only a jawan (private) does not have these powers. The Section allows the armed forces personnel to use force for a variety of reasons. The army can shoot to kill, under the powers of section 4(a), for the commission or suspicion of the commission of the following offenses: acting in contravention of any law or order for the time being in force in the disturbed area prohibiting the assembly of five or more persons, carrying weapons, or carrying anything which is capable of being used as a fire-arm or ammunition. To justify the invocation of this provision, the officer need only be "of the opinion that it is necessary to do so for the maintenance of public order" and only give "such due warning as he may consider necessary". The army can destroy property under section 4(b) if it is an arms dump, a fortified position or shelter from where armed attacks are made or are suspected of being made, if the structure is used as a training camp, or as a hide-out by armed gangs or absconders. The army can arrest anyone without a warrant under section 4(c) who has committed, is suspected of having committed or of being about to commit, a cognisable offense and use any amount of force "necessary to effect the arrest". Under section 4(d), the army can enter and search without a warrant to make an arrest or to recover any property, arms, ammunition or explosives which are believed to be unlawfully kept on the premises. This section also allows the use of force necessary for the search. Section 5: This section states that after the military has arrested someone under the AFSPA, they must hand that person over to the nearest police station with the "least possible delay". There is no definition in the act of what constitutes the least possible delay. Some case-law has established that 4 to 5 days is too long. But since this provision has been interpreted as depending on the specifics circumstances of each case, there is no precise amount of time after which the section is violated. The holding of the arrested person, without review by a magistrate, constitutes arbitrary detention. Section 6: This section establishes that no legal proceeding can be brought against any member of the armed forces acting under the AFSPA, without the permission of the Central Government. This section leaves the victims of the armed forces abuses without a remedy. 4. LEGAL ANALYSISThe Armed Forces Special Powers Act contravenes both Indian and International law standards. This was exemplified when India presented its second periodic report to the United Nations Human Rights Committee in 1991. Members of the UNHRC asked numerous questions about the validity of the AFSPA, questioning how the AFSPA could be deemed constitutional under Indian law and how it could be justified in light of Article 4 of the ICCPR. The Attorney General of India relied on the sole argument that the AFSPA is a necessary measure to prevent the secession of the North Eastern states. He said that a response to this agitation for secession in the North East had to be done on a "war footing." He argued that the Indian Constitution, in Article 355, made it the duty of the Central Government to protect the states from internal disturbance, and that there is no duty under international law to allow secession. This reasoning exemplifies the vicious cycle which has been instituted in the North East due to the AFSPA. The use of the AFSPA pushes the demand for more autonomy, giving the peoples of the North East more reason to want to secede from a state which enacts such powers and the agitation which ensues continues to justify the use of the AFSPA from the point of view of the Indian Government. A) INDIAN LAWThere are several cases pending before the Indian Supreme Court which challenge the constitutionality of the AFSPA. Some of these cases have been pending for over nine years. Since the Delhi High Court found the AFSPA to be constitutional in the case of Indrajit Barua and the Gauhati High court found this decision to be binding in People's Union for Democratic Rights, the only judicial way to repeal the act is for the Supreme Court to declare the AFSPA unconstitutional. It is extremely surprising that the Delhi High Court found the AFSPA constitutional given the wording and application of the AFSPA. The AFSPA is unconstitutional and should be repealed by the judiciary or the legislature to end army rule in the North East.
B) INTERNATIONAL LAWUnder relevant international human rights and humanitarian law standards there is no justification for such an act as the AFSPA. The AFSPA, by its form and in its application, violates the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the "UDHR"), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the "ICCPR"), the Convention Against Torture, the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, the UN Body of Principles for Protection of All Persons Under any form of Detention, and the UN Principles on Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra- legal and summary executions. A UDHR argument would just be repetitive with ICCPR so SAHRDC has not done it but the UDHR articles which the AFSPA violates are the following: 1 - Free and Equal Dignity and rights, 2 - Non- discrimination, 3 - Life, liberty, security of person, 5 - no torture, 7 - equality before the law, 8 - effective remedy, 9 - no arbitrary arrest, 17 - property.
5. CONCLUSIONSThe Supreme Court of India reached a low for its lack of enforcement of fundamental rights in the Jabalpur case of 1975. The country was in a state of emergency and the high courts had concluded that although the executive could restrict certain rights, people could still file habeas corpus claims. The Supreme Court rejected this conclusion and said the high court judges had substituted their suspicion of the executive for "frank and unreserved acception of the proclamation of emergency." Noted Legal luminary, H M Seervai notes that this shows the lack of judicial detachment. Indeed, it exemplifies a deference to the executive which leaves the people with no enforcement of their constitutional rights. Jabalpur has since been deemed an incorrect decision, but it remains an apt example of the judiciary's submission to the executive. The Supreme Court has avoided a Constitutional review for over 9 years, the amount of time the principal case has been pending. The Court is not displaying any judicial activism on this Act. The Lok Sabha in the 1958 debate acknowledged that if the AFSPA were unconstitutional, it would be for the Supreme Court to determine. The deference of the Delhi High Court to the legislature in the Indrajit case also demonstrates a lack of judicial independence. The Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary was adopted by the seventh UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders and was also adopted by the UN General Assembly. Principle 2 of this document says, "The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressure, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason." The Indian judicial system is not subject to direct interference. It seems to function independently, but under the surface it is possible to discern indirect pressure. For example, the practice of appointing retired judges to commissions may well influence judges while they are on the bench. There may not be direct pressure to render decisions favorable to the executive, but certainly a judge who has "towed the government line" is more likely to be appointed by that same government to a position of prominence upon retirement. Moreover, there is an absence of creative legal thinking. When the Guwahati High Court was presented with international law argument in People's Union for Democratic Rights, the court ignored it. Justice Raghuvir said in a personal interview that the court could not use international law. If the government has signed an international convention like the ICCPR which requires the government to guarantee rights to its citizens, how can these be enforced if the judiciary does not turn to the text of the convention in its rendering of decisions? The courts are not turning to the spirit of the law which guarantees the fundamental right to life to all people and as a result violations of human rights go unchecked. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence and Impartiality of the Judiciary, Jurors and Assessors and the Independence of Lawyers, Mr Param Cumaraswamy, stated in the 51st Session of the Commission on Human Rights on 10 February 1995, at the United Nations in Geneva that," The power of judicial review is vital for the protection of the rule of law." He also quoted from Mr L M Singhvi's 1985 report that "the strength of legal institutions is a form of insurance for the rule of law and for the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms and for preventing the denial and miscarriage of justice." 6. RECOMMENDATIONSThe only way to guarantee that the human rights abuses perpetrated by the armed forces in the North East cease is to both repeal the AFSPA and remove the military from playing a civil role in the area. Indeed with 50% of the military forces in India acting in a domestic role, through internal security duties, there is a serious question as to whether the civil authority's role is being usurped. As long as the local police are not relied on they will not be able to assume their proper role in law enforcement. The continued presence of the military forces prevents the police force from carrying out its functions. This also perpetuates the justification for the AFSPA. Among the recommendations made by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, from 1994 was the statement that "Governments which have been maintaining states of emergency in force for many years should lift them, limit their effects or review the custodial measures that affect many persons, and in particular should apply the principle of proportionality rigorously." The National Human Rights Commission is now reviewing the AFSPA. Hopefully, the NHRC will find that the AFSPA is unconstitutional and will submit this finding to the Supreme Court to influence its review of the pending cases. However, the NHRC has a very limited role. In past cases, the Supreme Court has not welcomed such intervention by the NHRC. This was evident when the NHRC attempted to intervene in the hearing against the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA). If the AFSPA is not repealed, it must at a bare minimum comply with international law and Indian law standards. This means the powers to shoot to kill under section 4(a) must be unequivocally revoked. Arrests must be made with warrants and no force should be allowed in the search and seizure procedures. Section 5 should clearly state that persons arrested under the Act are to be handed over to the police within twenty-four hours. Section 6 should be completely repealed so that individuals who suffer abuses at the hands of the security forces may prosecute their abusers. Moreover, the definition of key phrases, especially "disturbed area" must be clarified. The declaration that an area is disturbed should not be left to the subjective opinion of the Central or State Government. It should have an objective standard which is judicially reviewable. Moreover, the declaration that an area is disturbed should be for a specified amount of time, no longer than six months. Such a declaration should not persist without legislative review. Armed forces should not be allowed to arrest or carry out any procedure on suspicion alone. All their actions should have an objective basis so that they are judicially reviewable. This will also assist those who file suit against the security forces. All personnel acting in a law enforcement capacity should be trained according to the UN Code of Conduct for law enforcement personnel. The instructions and training given to the armed forces should be available to the public. Complete transparency should be established so that a public accountability is rendered possible. Having the armed forces comply with the Indian CrPC would also be a bare minimum. The CrPC itself does not fully comply with international human rights standards, so making the AFSPA comply on its face with the CrPC provisions for the use of minimal force, arrest, search and seizure would only be a rudimentary step in reducing the abuses committed under the AFSPA. If the Indian Government truly believes that the only way to handle the governance of the North Eastern states is through force, then it must allow the ICRC to intervene. This can only have a calming influence. Acceptance of ICRC services would demonstrate that the fighting parties want to bring an end to the violence. The ICRC's involvement could help protect the residents of the North East who are currently trapped in the middle between insurgents and the military. Top / About SAHRDC / Action Alerts / Human Rights Features / Online Resource Centre / Publications / Home All contents copyright © SAHRDC, B-6/6, Safdarjung Enclave Extension, New Delhi - 110029, India |
Posts
No comments:
Post a Comment